a nature subordinate to themselves]. They must*
% likewise, be suspended from their boundaries, and
conspire with each other in their tendencies to su¬
pernal natures, by the projecting energies of intel¬
lect ; like a light which is now on the earth, and is
distributed in different habitations, yet is not
divided into parts separated from the w hole, but is
nevertheless one. Hence, the soul of the universe
is always transcendent, because it does not belong
to it to descend, and be converted to these inferior
realms. But our souls are subordinate, because a
certain part of their essence is limited to this ter¬
rene abode, and to a conversion to body which
requires solicitude and care. The soul of the w orld,
therefore, in its most inferior part, resembles a
great vegetable soul, which without labour and
silently governs the plant of which it is the soul,
[i. e. in the same manner as worms are generated
in wounds], But the government of the inferior
part of our soul, resembles the worms that are
generated in the putrified part of a plant. For
thus the animated body of the universe subsists.
Another soul, however, which is similar in species
to the superior part of the soul of the w orld, resem¬
bles in its government the husbandman whose
attention is directed to the worms that are generated
from putrefaction in a plant, and who is solicitously
employed in the cultivation of the plant. Or as if
some one should say that a man who is well, and
is with other men that are in health, is with those
persons with whom he co-operates either in acting
or contemplating ; but that a diseased man, and
who is employed in procuring remedies for the
body, is with the body, and becomes corporeal
through his attention to it.
V. How, therefore, any longer will this be your
soul, that the soul of some other person, and that
again of another ? Shall we say that it is the soul
of this person according to its inferior part, but not
of this according to its supreme part, but of some
other person ? Thus, however, Socrates will indeed
exist, w hen the soul of Socrates is in body ; but he
will perish when he is especially in the most ex¬
cellent condition [i. e. when he is in the intelligible
world]. But no being perishes, since the intellects
which are in the intelligible do not perish, because
they are not corporeally distributed into one thing,
but each remains possessing in difference a same¬
ness of subsistence, in which its very being consists.
After this manner, therefore, souls also being sue-
cessively suspended according to each intellect,
being likewise reasons of intellects, though more
evolved than an intellectual essence, and becoming
as it were much from that which is few , and being
in contact with it, they are now willing to be
divided by each of those more impartible essences,
yet are not able to proceed to the very extremity
of division. For they preserve their sameness and
difference, and each remains one, and at the same
time all are one. We have, however, summarily
shown, that all souls are from one soul, and that
all of them are divisible and at the same time indi-
visible. The soul, also, which abides [on high], is
the one reason of intellect, and from this soul par¬
tial and immaterial reasons are derived, in the same
manner as there, [i. e. in the same manner as partial
intellects are derived from one intellect which ranks
as a whole].
VI. Why, however, did the soul of the world
being of a uniform nature make the world, but
not the soul of each individual, though it likewise
contains all things in itself? For we have before
shown that productive power may exist at one and
the same time in many things. Now, however,
the reason of this must be assigned. For perhaps
the manner may be known by us in which the same
thing in different subjects either does or suffers a
certain thing, or is with respect to it both an agent
and a patient. Or rather let us consider how and
why the soul of the universe made the world, but
other souls govern a certain part of the world.
Perhaps, however, it is not at all wonderful, that of
those who possess the same science, some should
rule over many, but others over few. But why, it
may be said, is this the case ? To this it may be
answered, that the difference of souls is greater, so
far as one of them does not depart from the soul
of the universe, but abiding there has a body sur¬
rounding it; but other souls, body now existing,
and their sister soul having dominion, are allotted
an appropriate destiny, this soul preparing for them
proper habitations. It may also be said, that the
soul of the universe beholds that intellect which
ranks as a whole, but that other souls rather behold
their own intellects which are of a partial nature.
Perhaps, however, these souls also are able to
make the universe ; but the soul of the world
having made it, this is no longer possible to other
souls, productive energy having commenced from
the first soul. But the same doubt will arise if
any other soul first began to fabricate. It is better,
however, to say that the soul of the wrorld rather
than other souls fabricated the universe, because it
in a greater degree adheres to intelligibles. For
the power of those souls is greater that more vigor¬
ously tend to the intelligible world. For, preserv¬
ing themselves in that secure region, they fabricate
with facility ; since it is the property of a greater
power, not to suffer in the things which it produces.
But power remains suspended from the supernal
region. Abiding, therefore, in itself, it produces
[other things] acceding. But other souls which
proceed from the one soul, depart from it into the
profundity [of a material nature]. Perhaps, also,
that which is most abundant in them, being drawn
downward, draws them likewise into an inferior
condition, their own decisions conspiring with the
downward impulse. What, however, is said in the
Timaeus of mixture in a second and third degree,
must be considered as signifying that some souls
are nearer to, but others more remote from the
soul of the world ; just as in our sbuls, all of them
are not similarly disposed with reference to super-
nal natures, but some are united to them, others
through [ardent] desire accede near, and others
accomplish this in a less degree, because they do
not energize with the same powers* For some,
indeed, energize with a first, others with a second,
and others with a third power, all souls neverthe¬
less possessing all powers.
VII. And thus much concerning these parti¬
culars. What is said in the Philebus, however,
may lead us to suspect that other souls are parts
of the soul of the universe. But the meaning of
what is there asserted, is not what some one may
fancy, but was useful to Plato in demonstrating
that the world is animated. This, therefore, he
renders credible by saying that it is absurd to assert
that the universe is inanimate, and that we who
have a part of the body of the universe, have a
soul. For how can a part have a soul, if the uni¬
verse is inanimate ? The opinion of Plato, however,
is especially manifest in the Timaeus ; where the
Demiurgus having generated the soul of the uni¬
verse, afterwards produces other souls, mingling
them in the same crater in which he had mingled
the soul of the world, and making them to be of a
similar species with it, but assigning them a differ·»
ence in a second and third degree. Nor is what
he asserts in the Phaedrus wonderful, that every
soul pays a guardian attention to that which is
inanimate. For what is it except soul which go¬
verns, fashions, arranges, and produces the nature
of body ? Nor must it be said, that one soul is
naturally adapted to do this, but another not. The
perfect soul, therefore, says he, revolves on high,
not verging downward, but fabricates, riding in the
world as it were as in a vehicle. Every other per¬
fect soul, also, governs the universe in a similar
manner. But when he speaks of the soul whose
wings suffer a defluxion, he evidently makes a dif¬
ference between such a soul as this, and that of the
universe. And when he adds, that souls follow
the circulation of the universe, derive their manners
from thence, and suffer from it, this does not at all
indicate that our souls are parts of the soul of the
world. For soul is sufficiently able to represent
many things in itself, from the nature of places,
and water, and air. And to this ability, the habi-
tations of different cities, and the temperature of
bodies, also contribute. And if we should grant
that since we are in the universe w’e have some-
thing from the soul of the world, and that we suffer
from the celestial circulation, yet we shall oppose
to these things another soul, [i. e. the rational soul]
and which by its resistance especially demonstrates
itself to be a different soul. To the assertion, also,
that we are generated within the world, we reply
that the foetus in the womb of the mother has a
soul different from that of the mother, and which
accedes to it externally.1
VIII. Such, therefore, is the solution of these
particulars ; the sympathy of souls being no impe¬
diment to our arguments. For since all of them
originate from the same source as the soul of the
universe, they are co-passive. For it has been
already asserted by us that there is one [first] soul,
and many souls. And we have likewise shown
what the difference is between part and wdiole;
and have in short spoken concerning the difference
of souls. Now, also, we shall summarily observe,
1 i. e. It has a rational soul different from that of the mother. It is better, however, to say with Proclus, that as nature does nothing in vain, the presence of the rational soul to the foetus in the womb would be useless, as it could not then energize ; but that it becomes united to the irrational soul in the very moment in which the infant leaves the womb.
that besides bodies souls differ, especially in their
manners, in the operations of the reasoning power,
and from a pre-existent life. For in the Republic
of Plato it is said, that the choice of souls is made
conformably to their antecedent lives. But if any
one in short assumes the nature of soul, he will
assert that there are differences in the souls in
which it is admitted there are second and third de¬
grees. It has, likewise, been said by us, that all
souls are all things ; and that each is characterized
by that which energizes in each. This, however,
is the same thing as to assert, that one soul indeed
is united in energy, another in knowledge, and
another in appetite. Different souls also behold
different objects, and are and become the very
objects which they behold. Plenitude, likewise,
and perfection pertain to souls, yet all of them
have not the same of either of these ; but the whole
co-ordination of them is various. For every reason
[or productive principle] is one, abundant, and
various, in the same manner as a psychical animal,
which has many forms. But if this be the case,
there is co-ordination, and beings are not, in short,
divulsed from each other. Nor i« there any where
that which is casual in beings ; not even among
Plot. Y
bodies/ Hence it follows, that the number of
things is definite. For again, it is necessary that
beings should stop [in their progression], that intel-
ligibles should continue the same, and that each
thing should be one in number ; for thus it will be
this particular thing . For every body being natu¬
rally in a continual flux, in consequence of having
an adventitious form, the perpetual existence of
bodies according to form takes place through an
imitation of [real] beings. The essence of the
latter, however, as not subsisting from composition,
consists in that which is one in number, which
exists from the beginning, and neither becomes that
which it was not, nor will be that which it is not ;
since if there were any thing in some future time
which could produce them, it would not produce
them from matter. But if this be the case, it is
necessary to add something which is of itself essen¬
tial J so that there will be a mutation about this
very thing, if it now produces more or less. Why,
likewise, should it produce now, and not always
after the same manner? That, likewise, which is
generated will not be perpetual, if it admits of the
more and the less. But soul is supposed to be a
thing of this kind. How*, therefore, is it infinite if
it is stopped [in its progression] ? May we not say,
that it is infinite in power, because power is infinite,
since God himself is not bounded. With respect
to souls, therefore, each is not that which it is, as
if it were so much in quantity, through a foreign
boundary; but it is as great as it wishes to be.
Nor will it ever proceed out of itself, but will per¬
vade every where, to bodies and through bodies, as
it is naturally adapted to do ; yet it is not divulsed
from itself, when it is in a finger and a foot. Thus
also in the universe, soul remains entire, into what¬
ever it may proceed, and in another and another
part of a plant. Hence, when any part of a plant
is cut off, it is both in the plant as it was at first,
and in the part which is separated from it. For
soul is every where in the body of the universe, as
in the one of it, this body being one. But when
an animal becomes putrid, if many animals are
generated from it, soul is then no longer the soul
of the whole animal in the body ; for it has not
then a proper receptacle of itself ; nor yet does it
perish. But the putrified matter being adapted to
the generation of animals, has partly the soul of
these, and partly the soul of those animals, soul
never being absent from any thing, though one
tiling is adapted to receive it, and another is not
The parts of matter, however, which thus become
animated, are not the cause of there being many
souls. For these [spontaneously-generated] animals
are suspended from one soul, so far as it remains
one ; in the same manner as in us, when certain
parts of the body are amputated, and others grow
instead of them, the soul indeed is absent from
[i. e. is not participated by] the, former, but is pre¬
sent with the latter, so long as it remains one. In
the universe, however, it always remains one. But
of the natures within the universe, some indeed
have soul, but others not, the same psychical
[powers] still remaining.
IX. The manner, however, in which the soul
is ingenerated in the body, must be considered.
For this is no less admirable, and no less deserves
to be investigated. The mode, therefore, in which
the soul enters into the bodv is twofold. For one
of these modes takes place, w hen the soul being in
one body changes it for another, and from an aerial
[or fiery], becomes situated in a terrestrial body ;
which some do not call a transmigration, because
that from which the insertion originates is imma-
iiifest. But the other mode is a transition from an
incorporeal essence to any body whatever ; which
also will be the first communion of the soul with
the body. It will be right, therefore, to consider
respecting this communion, what the passion arising
from this conjunction then is, when the soul being
entirely pure from body, becomes surrounded with
the nature of body. Let us, however, first consider
how this is effected in the soul of the universe ;
for perhaps it is proper, or rather is necessary, to
begin from hence. For it is requisite that we
should explain its ingress into and animation of the
body, for the sake of doctrine and perspicuity.
Though there never was a time, therefore, in which
this universe was not animated, and it is not possi¬
ble for body to subsist if soul is absent, nor was
matter ever unadorned, yet it is possible in con-
ception and in words to separate these from each
other. For by these we may analyze every com¬
position. The truth then is as follows : If body
had no existence, there would be no progressions
of soul ; since there is not any other place, where
it is naturally adapted to be. If, however, soul
intends to proceed, it will generate for itself a
place, so that it will generate body. The stability
of soul, however, being as it were corroborated in
permanency itself, .and soul also resembling the
effulgence of a great light, a darkness was in the
mean time generated in the very extremity of the
light, which soul perceiving, gave form to it, since
it was likewise the cause of its subsistence. For it
was not lawful for any thing proximate to soul, to
be destitute of form. Hence, by this obscure na¬
ture which w^as generated by soul, that which is
called obscure was received. [The universe] there¬
fore, being generated like a certain beautiful and
various edifice, is not separated from its maker
[soul], nor yet is mingled with it; but the whole of
it is every where considered by its artificer as de¬
serving a providential attention. It is advan¬
tageous, therefore, both to its existence and its
beauty, to participate as much as possible of its
maker ; and to the latter this participation is not
injurious. For it governs, abiding on high. And
the world is animated after such a manner, that it
rannot with so much propriety be said to have a
soul of its own, as to have a soul presiding over it ;
being subdued by, and not subduing it, and being
possessed, but not possessing. For it lies 1 in soul
which sustains it, and no part of it is destitute of
soul ; being moistened with life, like a net in water.
It is not, however, able to become that in which it
lies ; but the sea [of soul] being now extended, the
net is also co-extended with it, as far as it is able.
For each of the parts is incapable of existing in any
other situation than where each is placed. But
soul is naturally so great, because it is without
quantity. Hence every body is comprehended by
one and the same thing. And wherever body is
extended, there also soul is. Unless, however,
body existed, the attention of soul would not be at
all directed to magnitude. For it is of itself that
which it is· For the world is so greatly extended,
through soul being present with the whole of it.
And the extension of the world is bounded, so far