IX. What then are the things in this one in¬ tellect, which we divide in our conceptions of it ?
For it is necessary to exhibit them quiescent, and
to survey them proceeding from thence, as if from
science subsisting in unity. This world, therefore,
being an animal comprehending in itself all animals,
and possessing its existence, and the quality of its
existence from something different from itself, that
also from which it is derived being referred to in¬
tellect — this being the case, it is necessary that the
archetypal universe should be in intellect ; and
that this intellect should be the intelligible world,
which Plato [in the Timasus] says exists in that
which is animal itself. For as where there is rea-
son [or a productive principle] which is a certain
animal, and where also there is at the same time
matter which receives the spermatic reason, it is
necessary that an animal should be generated ; after
the same manner, an intellectual nature being pre¬
sent, which is all-powerful, and has nothing to im¬
pede its energy, (nothing existing between this, and
that which is able to receive it) it is necessary that
the recipient should be adorned, and that intellect
should adorn. And that, indeed, which is adorned,
possesses distributed forms, here man, and there
the sun. But in the adorning cause all things are
in one.
X. Such things, ‘therefore, as are forms in the
sensible world, are derived from the intelligible
world ; but such things aS are not forms do not
originate from thence. Hence, nothing preter¬
natural is there ; as neither is there in the arts any
thing which is a deviation from art, or lameness in
the seeds of animals. For lameness of the feet
which takes place in the generation of an animal,
arises from the productive seminal principle not
vanquishing [the seminal matter]. But the injury
which the form sustains is a casual circumstance.
According qualities, therefore, and quantities, num¬
bers and magnitudes, habitudes, actions and pas¬
sions, which are according to nature, and motions
and permanencies both universal and particular,
are among the number of things which are in the
intelligible world. Instead of time, however, eter¬
nity is there. But place is there intellectually,
being the [impartible] subsistence of one thing in
another. Hence, since all things there exist simul¬
taneously, whichever of them you assume is essence,
is intellectual, and participates of life. Sameness,
also, and difference, motion and permanency, that
which is moved, and that which is stable, essence
and quality, are there, and all things there are
essence. For each thing is being in energy, and
not in capacity ; so that quality is not separated
from each essence. Are, therefore, those things
alone these which the sensible world contains, or
are there likewise many other things ? Prior to the
discussion of this, however, the things pertaining to
art must be considered. For there is no paradigm
of evil there. For evil here happens from indi¬
gence, privation, and defect. And evil is the pas¬
sion of matter frustrated of form, and of that which
is assimilated to matter.
XI. With respect, therefore, to things per¬
taining to the arts, and the arts themselves, the arts
that are imitative, such as painting, statuary, danc¬
ing and pantomime, since they derive their subsis¬
tence from sensibles, and employ and imitate a
sensible paradigm, and also transfer [to their ori¬
ginals] the forms, motions and symmetries which
they perceive, cannot properly be referred to intel-
ligibles, except so far as the forms in the human
soul may be called intelligible. If any one, how¬
ever, considers the habit in all animals arising from
the symmetry of their formation, this will be a part
of the power which in the intelligible world surveys
and contemplates the symmetry of all things that
are there. Moreover, with respect to all music
which is conversant with harmony and rythm, so
far as its conceptions are employed about rythm
and harmony, it will subsist after the same manner
as the music which is conversant with intelligible
rythm. With respect to such arts as are produc¬
tive of sensible things conformably to art, as the
builder's and the carpenters art,— these, so far as
they employ symmetry, will derive their principles
from intelligibles, and from the wisdom which is
there. But as they mingle these with a sensible
nature, the whole of them wull not be in intelligi¬
bles, except so far as they subsist in man, [i. e. in
the human soul]. Neither will the agriculture be
there which is conversant with a sensible plant ;
nor the medicine which surveys the health of the
body, or which contributes to strength and a good
jcorporeal habit. For there is another power, and
another health there, through which all animals
are sufficiently corroborated. With respect to
rhetoric also, and the military art, economics, and
the art pertaining to regal government, if some of
these partake in actions of the beautiful, and make
it the object of their contemplation, —in this case,
they have a scientific allotment from the science
which is there. But geometry, which is conversant
with intelligibles, must be arranged in the intelli¬
gible world ; as likewise must the highest wisdom
wdfich is conversant with real being. And thus
much concerning the arts, and things pertaining to
the arts.
XII, If, however, the idea of man is there, the
ideas of the rational and the artificial are also there,
and likewise the arts which are the progeny of in¬
tellect. It is also requisite to assert, that the
forms of universals are there, i. e. not of Socrates,
but of man ; though it must be considered with
respect to man, whether the form of a particular
man is there, not because he is the same with ano¬
ther man, but because one man has a flat, and
another an aquiline nose. These nasal differences,
howrever, must be placed in the form of man, [as
certain differences of forms] just as there are diffe¬
rences of animals. But that one man has an aqui¬
line nose of this, and another of that kind, originates
from matter. With respect to the differences of
coLours, also, some of them exist in their produc¬
tive principles, but others are produced by matter
and difference of place.
XIII. It remains to consider whether what
the sensible world alone contains is in the intelligi¬
ble world, or whether as man himself is different
from the sensible man, so with respect to soul,
soul itself is different from the soul which is here,
and intellect itself from the human intellect In
the first place, therefore, it must be said, that it is
not proper to think that all things which are here,
are images of archetypes ; or that the human soul
is the image of soul itself, but that here also one
soul differs from another in dignity. Perhaps.,
however, soul, so far as it is here, is not soul itself.
But since each [rational] soul has a real subsistence,
as likewise have justice and temperance, there is
also in our souls true science, and not images only,
nor merely the similitudes of intelligibles, as in the
sensible region. For true science, justice, and
temperance themselves exist here, though after
another manner than in the intelligible world. For
they are not defined in a certain place. So that
where the soul emerges from the body, there also
these subsist. For the sensible world, indeed, is
in one place only ; but the intelligible world is
every where. Such things, therefore, as a soul of
this kind possesses here, these things also are there.
Plot . U
So that if the things which are in the sensible
world, are assumed to be those which are in the
number of visible objects, not only the natures
which are in the regions of sense are there, but
also more than these. But if among the natures
which are said to be in the world, soul, and what
soul contains are comprehended, then all such
things are here as subsist there.
XIV. Is this nature, therefore, which compre*
hends all things in the intelligible, to be considered
as the first principle of things? But how is this
possible, since that which is truly the principle is
one , and entirely simple, but multitude subsists in
beings? After what manner, however, this all-
comprehending nature subsists besides the one ,
how multitude exists, and how all these subsist,
and why and whence intellect is all these, must be
shown by beginning the discussion from another
principle. With respect, however, to things gene¬
rated from putrefaction, and to things artificial,1
* Instead of χαλεπών here, it is evidently necessary from what afterwards follows to read τεχνικών or τεχνών. Ficinus, from not seeing the necessity of this emendation, has made nonsense of the passage. For he translates ircpc be των ck ση-
whether there are forms of these, and also of mud
and clay in the intelligible world, it must be said,
that such things as intellect derives from the first
principle, are all of them most excellent. But the
above-mentioned particulars are not among the
number of these, nor does intellect consist of the
forms of such particulars. Soul, however, which
is derived from intellect, receives from matter other
things [besides what she receives from intellect],
and such particulars as the above are in the num¬
ber of these. The discussion of these, however,
will be rendered clearer by recurring to the doubt,
how multitude proceeds from the one . In the
mean time it is evident that such composite natures
as are casual are not derived from intellect, but
from a concurrence of sensibles in themselves, and
do not subsist in forms. Those things, also, which
are produced from putrefaction, are the progeny of
a soul which is perhaps incapable of effecting any
thing else ; for if this were not the case, it would
produce something conformable to nature. It
produces, therefore, where it is able. But with
ψεωί και των χαλεπών» u Ubi vero quaeritur nunquid ibi sit species eorum etiam quae ex putrefactione Hunt, dijficHiumque ,
et admodum molest orum
respect to the arts* such of them as are referred to
things natural to man, are comprehended in [the
soul of] man. The art also, which is universal, is
prior to other arts, and soul itself is prior to uni¬
versal art, or rather this must be asserted of the
life which is in intellect, before it became soul,
and which is necessary to the generation of soul.
And this life it is requisite to denominate soul
itself.
ON THE ESSENCE OF SOUL.
I. In investigating the essence of soul, if we
show that it is neither body, nor the harmony in
incorporeal natures ; and likewise if we omit what
is said of its being the entelecheia ,* or perfection of
the body, as not true, as the words [taken literally]
imply, and as not manifesting what the soul is |
and if also we should say that it is of an intelligible
nature, and a divine allotment, perhaps we shall
assert something perspicuous concerning its essence.
At the same time, however, it will be better to pro»
ceed still further than this. For this purpose,
1 The cause, according to Aristotle, by which the animal is vitally moved, is the rational soul, but the cause by which the animal thus moved is defined or bounded , is entelecheia , or form, which imparts to it perfection. See my Introduction to, and translation of, Aristotle’s treatise On the Soul.
therefore* we shall make a division into a sensible
and intelligible nature, and place soul in the intelli¬
gible. Hence, let it be at present admitted that it
ranks among intelligibles ; and let us in another
way investigate that which is proximate to, or the
peculiarity of, its nature. We say, therefore, that
some things are primarily partible, and in their own
nature dissipable ; but these are such as have no
part the same, either as another part, or as the
whole ; and in which it is necessary that the part
should be less than all and the whole. These,
however, are sensible magnitudes and masses, each
of which has an appropriate place, nor is it possible
among these, that the same thing should be in
many places at once. But there is another essence
opposed to this, which in no respect admits of a
separation into parts, since it is without parts, and
therefore impartible. It likewise admits of no in»
terval, not even in conception, nor is indigent of
place, nor is generated in a certain being, either
according to parts, or according to wholes, because
it is as it were at one and the same time carried in
all beings as in a vehicle ; not in order that it may
be established in them, but because other things
are neither able nor willing to exist without it. It
likewise possesses an essence which subsists accord¬
ing to sameness, and is the foundation 1 of all fol¬
lowing natures, being as it were a centre in a circle,
the lines drawn from which and terminating in the
circumference, nevertheless permit it to abide in
itself For they possess from the centre their
generation and being, participate of the point, and
have for their principle that which is impartible.
They also proceed, suspending themselves from the
centre. This, therefore, [of which the centre in a
circle is an image] being primarily impartible in
intelligibles, and the leader among beings, and again
that which is in sensibles being in every respect
partible, -—this being the case, prior to that which
is sensible, but which nevertheless is something
near to and in it, there is another certain nature,
which is partible indeed, yet not primarily so like
bodies, but becomes partible in bodies. Hence,
when bodies are divided, the form which is in them
is also divided, though it still remains a whole in
each of the divided parts ; the same thing in this
case becoming many, each of which is perfectly
distant from the other, in consequence of the form