be analyzed into the form which is inherent in all
* For αχώριστοι here, it is necessary to read χωριστός.
substances that are minded together. Thus man
o o
may be analyzed into soul and body ; and body
into the four elements. But finding that each of
these is a composite, consisting of matter and that
which gives it form (for the matter of the elements
is of itself formless) you will again also investigate
respecting the soul, whether it now ranks among
simple natures, or whether one thing in it has the
relation of matter, but another, viz. the intellect
which it contains, the relation of form ; one indeed
being analogous to the morphe in brass, but the
other to the artist who produces that morphe . He,
likewise, who transfers these very same things to
the universe, will also here ascend to intellect, and
will admit that it is truly the maker and demiurgus
[of all things]. He will, likewise, say that the sub¬
ject matter receiving forms, becomes either fire or
water, or air, or earth ; but that these forms pro»
ceed from another cause, and that this is soul.
Again, also, he will assert, that soul imparts morphe
to the four elements of the wOrld ; but that intel¬
lect becomes the supplier of productive principles
to soul ; just as productive principles being inserted
from the arts in the souls of artists enable them to
energize [according to art]. With respect to in-
Plot. T
tellect, also, one which is as the form of the soul is
analogous to rnorphe , but another which imparts
this form, is analogous to the maker of the statue,
in whom all things are inherent which he imparts.
The things, however, which body receives, are now
nothing more than images and imitations.
IV. Why, therefore, is it necessary to ascend
to soul, and yet not admit that it is the first of
things ? Is it not because in the first place, indeed,
intellect is different from, and more excellent than
soul ? But that which is more excellent is prior by
nature. For soul when perfect, does not, as some
fancy it does, generate intellect. For whence will
that which is in capacity become in energy, unless
there is a cause which leads into energy ? Since if
it becomes in energy casually, it is possible that it
may not proceed into energy. Hence, it is neces¬
sary that first natures should be established in
energy, and that they should be unindigent and
perfect. But imperfect natures are posterior to
them. The progeny also of imperfect, are per¬
fected by first natures, who after the manner of
fathers give perfection to what posterior natures
generated imperfect from the beginning. That,
likewise, which is generated, has at first the relation
-of matter to the maker of it, but is afterwards ren¬
dered perfect by the participation of form. But if
it is necessary that soul should be connected with
passion, and if it is likewise necessary that there
should be something impassive, or all things would
perish in time ; it is necessary that there should be
something prior to souh And, if soul is in the
world, but it is necessary there should be something
beyond the world, on this account also it is neces-
sary that there should be something prior to souh
For if that which is in the world, is in body and
matter, nothing would remain the same [if that
which is mundane only existed]. So that man.
and all productive principles, would not be perpe¬
tual, nor always the same. Hence, that it is neces¬
sary intellect should be prior to soul, may be sur¬
veyed from these and many other arguments.
V. It is necessary, however, to consider intel¬
lect truly so called, neither as intellect in capacity,
nor as proceeding from the privation to the posses¬
sion of intellect. For if we do not, we must again
investigate another intellect prior to this. But we
must assume intellect in energy, and which is
always intellect If such an intellect, however,
has not an adventitious intellection, whatever it
intellectually perceives, it perceives from itself.
And whatever it possesses, it possesses from itself.
But if it perceives intellectually by and from itself,
it is itself that which it perceives. For if the
essence of it was one thing, but the objects of its
perception different from it, its very essence would
be destitute of intellection ; and again, it would be
intellect in capacity, but not in energy. Neither
of these, therefore, must be separated from the
other. With us, however, it is usual, from the
things with which we are conversant, to separate
in our conceptions intellect, and the objects of its
perception. What therefore is its energy, and what
does it intellectually perceive, in order that we may
admit it to be those things which it perceives ? Is
it not evident, that being intellect, it intellectually
perceives in reality, and gives subsistence to be¬
ings ? Hence it is itself beings. For it either
intellectually perceives them existing elsewhere, or
it perceives them in itself as being itself. It is
impossible, therefore, that it can perceive them
existing elsewhere. For in what other place can
they exist ? Hence it intellectually sees itself, and
perceives them in itself. For it does not perceive
these, as some fancy, in sensibles. For each of
the things which have a primary subsistence, is not
a sensible object. For the form which is in sen¬
sibles is in matter, and is truly an image. Every
form, also, which is in another thing, is derived
from another thing, proceeds to it, and is the image
of it. If, likewise, it is necessary that intellect
should be the maker of this universe, it will not
intellectually perceive things in that which does not
yet exist, in order that it may produce it. Hence,
it is necessary that these things should be prior to
the world, not as impressions from other things,
but as archetypes, and primary natures, and the
essence of intellect. If, however, some should say
that [seminal] productive principles are sufficient,
it is evident that these must be perpetual. But if
they are perpetual and impassive, it is necessary
that they should subsist in intellect, and in such an
intellect as is prior to habit, and nature and soul·
For these are in capacity. Intellect, therefore, is
truly beings, not intellectually perceiving such
things as are situated out of itself. For the objects
of its perception are not external to itself. But it is as it were the first legislator, or rather the law
itself of existence. Hence it is rightly said, that it
is the same thing to perceive intellectually and to
be, and that the science of things without matter,
is the same with the things themselves. I have
also investigated myself as one among the number
of beings. And the same thing is testified by re¬
miniscence. For no one of [real] beings subsists
out of intellect, nor is in place ; but they always
abide in themselves, neither receiving mutation nor
corruption. Hence, also, they are truly beings ;
since if they were generated and corrupted, they
would have an adventitious existence ; and they
would no longer be [real] beings, but that which is
adventitious to them wTould be being. Sensibles,
therefore, are indeed by participation that which
they are said to be, the subject nature [i. e. matter]
receiving form externally derived ; as for instance,
brass receiving form from the art of the statuary,
and wood from the tectonic art ; in consequence
of art proceeding into these materials through an
image. Art itself, however, abides in sameness,
external to matter, and possesses in itself the true
statue, and the true bed. Thus also in bodies, this
universe which participates of images, evinces that
real beings are different from bodies ; since the
former are immutable, but the latter mutable. The
former, likewise, are established in themselves, and
are not in want of place. For they are not mag»
nitudes, but have an hypostasis intellectual, and
sufficient to themselves. For the nature of bodies
is indebted to something else for its preservation.
But intellect, since it sustains through an admirable
nature things which are of themselves in a perish¬
able condition, does not seek where it may be itself
established.
VI. Let, therefore, intellect be [real] beings,
and possess all things in itself, not as in place but
as itself, and as being one with them. But all
things there subsist collectively at once, and yet
nevertheless they are separated from each other ;
since the soul also which has many sciences in itself
simultaneous, possesses them without any confu»
sion. Each also, when it is requisite, performs
what pertains to it, without the co-operation of the
rest. And each conception energizes with a purity
unmingled with the other inward conceptions. Thus,
therefore, and in a still greater degree, intellect
is at once all things ; and again, not at once, be^
cause each is a peculiar power. Every intellect,
however, comprehends all things,1 in the same
manner as genus comprehends species, and as whole
comprehends parts. The powers of seeds, likewise,
bring with them an image of what we have said.
For in the whole seed, all things are without separa¬
tion, and the reasons [or productive principles] are
as it were in one centre. That there is one pro¬
ductive principle likewise of the eye, and another
of the hand, is known from what is sensibly gene¬
rated from them. With respect, therefore, to the
powers in seeds, each of them is one wrhole pro¬
ductive principle, together with the parts compre¬
hended in it. And that which is corporeal indeed
in the seeds, possesses a certain quantity of matter
which is as it were moist ; but the productive prin¬
ciple itself is according to the whole of its form, and
the same thing is also reason, generating a certain
thing by the form of a soul, and which is the image
of another more excellent soul. Some, however, de¬
nominate this principle which is inserted in the
seeds, nature ; which being thence excited from
things prior to itself, in the same manner as light
from fire, changes and gives form to matter ; effect-
* τπιΐ'τα is omitted the original.
ing this, not by impulsion, nor by employing levers
[or any other mechanical power], but by imparting
seminal productive principles.
VII. The sciences, however, of sensibles, which
are in the rational soul, if it is proper to say that
there are sciences of these, since the appellation
adapted to them is that of opinion, in consequence
of being posterior to sensible things, are the images
of them. But the sciences of intelligibles, which
are truly sciences, and which descend from intellect
into the rational soul, understand indeed nothing
sensible ; but so far as they are sciences, are each
of the things which are the objects of their percep¬
tion ; and possess internally the intelligible and
intelligence. This, however, is because intellect is
inward, which is primary natures themselves, is
eternally present with itself, and exists, in energy.
It likewise does not extend itself to the objects of
its perception as if it did not possess them, or as if
it acquired them externally, or obtained them by a
discursive process, as if they were not already pre~
sent with it (for these are the passions of soul) ;
but it stands firmly in itself, being at once all things,
and does not energize intellectually in order that it
may give subsistence to every thing. For it does
not, when it intellectually perceives God, become
God, nor when it understands motion does it be¬
come motion. Hence, if the assertion that forms
are intellections signifies, that when intellect un¬
derstands this particular form it then becomes that
form, it is not true. For it is necessary that the
object of intellection should be prior to this intel¬
lectual perception. Or how would intelligence
arrive at the perception of it? For it cannot be
fortuitously, nor does intelligence extend itself to*
wards the intelligible in vain.
VIII. If, therefore, intelligence is truly one,
that form which is the object of its perception and
idea itself are one. What therefore is this ? In¬
tellect and an intellectual essence, each idea not
being different from intellect, but each is intel¬
lect. And, in short, intellect is all forms ; but
each form is each intellect; just as the science
which ranks as a whole is all the theorems [of the
several sciences]. Each theorem, however, is a
part of whole science, not as separated by place ;
but each possesses powder in the whole. This in¬
tellect, therefore, is in itself, and possesses itself in
quiet, being always exuberantly full. Hence, if
intellect were conceived to subsist prior to being,
it would be requisite to say that intellect, by ener¬
gizing and intellectually perceiving, generated and
perfected beings. But since it is necessary to con¬
ceive being to be prior to intellect, it is requisite
to admit that beings are established in that which
is intellective, but that energy and intelligence are
posterior to beings ; just as the energy of fire is
posterior to fire. Hence, since beings are esta¬
blished in intellect, they possess in themselves their
own energy. Being, likewise, is energy ; or rather,
both are one. Hence, too, both being and intel¬
lect are one nature ; and on this account also,
beings, the energy of being, and an intellect of this
kind, are one. Such intellections, also, are form,
and the morphe and energy of being. In conse¬
quence, however, of these being divided by us, we
conceive some of them to be prior to others. For
the intellect which makes this division, is different
from them. But impartible intellect and which
does not divide, is being and all things.