* i, e. Is a light emanating from intellect.
% There is evidently a defect here in the original ; for there is nothing more than φησι γαρ π ρωτά. But the words of Plato ill his second Epistle are περί τον πάντων βασιλέα παντ εστι, και εκείνου ενεκα παντα , και εκείνο αίτιον απαντών των καλών, δεύτερον δε περί τα δεύτερα , και τρίτον περί τα τρίτα .
3 παρα here is erroneously printed for πατέρα .
Plato, intellect is the demiurgus. But he says that
this cause produced soul in that Crater [mentioned
by him in the Timasus]. The cause, however, be¬
ing intellect, he says that the father1 is the good ,
and that which is beyond intellect, and beyond
essence. In many places, also* he calls being and
intellect idea ; so that from Plato we may know
that intellect and idea are from the good , but soul
from intellect. These assertions, however, are not
new, nor of the present time, but were delivered
by the ancients, though not explicitly, and what
has now been said by us is an interpretation of
them. That these opinions also are ancient, is
testified and confirmed by the writings of Plato.
Parmenides, therefore, prior to Plato, adopted this
opinion, so far as he collects into one and the same
thing being and intellect. Being, likewise, he does
not place among sensibles. For he says, that to
perceive intellectually , and to be , are the same
thing . He also says, that this is immoveable ,
though he adds, that it perceives intellectually ,
removing from it all corporeal motion in order that
it may abide invariably the same. And he assimi»
1 There is the same error in the original here as above.
lates it to the bulk of a sphere* because it contains
all things involved in itself* and because its intel¬
lection is not external to but in its own essence.
When, likewise, in his writings he calls it one, he
alludes to the cause of it, as if this one [of intellect]
was found to be many. The Parmenides, how¬
ever, in Plato, speaking more accurately, divides
from each other this and the first one, which is
more principally one. He also calls the second
one many, and the third, one and many. And
after this manner, he likewise accords with the doc¬
trine of the three [above mentioned] natures.
IX. But Anaxagoras, when he says that there
is a pure and unmingled intellect, admits also that
the first [principle of things] is simple, and that
the one is separate. On account of antiquity, how¬
ever, he omits the accurate discussion of these
things. Heraclitus, also, knew an eternal and in¬
telligible one. For he says, that bodies are always
rising into existence , or becoming to be , and flow -
ing. With Empedocles, strife $ indeed divides,
but friendship is the one ; and this according to
* In the original, eitcos instead of vcikos .
him is incorporeal. But the elements are arranged
by him analogous to matter. Aristotle, however.,
afterwards asserts that the first principle is separate
and intelligible. But when he says that it intellec¬
tually perceives itself, again he makes it not to be
the first.1 When also he introduces many other
intelligibles, and as many as there are spheres in
the heavens, in order that each of these may move
each of the spheres, he speaks of intelligibles in a
way different from Plato, and not being able to
assign probable reasons, adduces necessity. It
may also be opportunely observed, that it is more
reasonable to refer all the spheres to one co-ordi¬
nation, and to assert that they look to one thing,
and the first cause of all Moreover, it may like¬
wise be asked, whether according to him the many
intelligibles are from one first cause, or whether
there are many principles in intelligibles ? And if
indeed they are from one first, they will be ana-
1 Aristotle in his writings ascended no higher than the in¬ telligible* and this with him is the first principle. And per¬ haps this was because he knew that the nature which is beyond the intelligible is perfectly ineffable and unknown, and there» fore accurately speaking, is even beyond principle. See my translation of his Metaphysics.
iogously arranged, like the spheres in the sensible
universe, one comprehending another, but one ex¬
ternal to them ruling over all of them. So that
the first will there comprehend the rest, and there
will be an intelligible world. As here, likewise,
the spheres are not empty, but the first is full of
stars, and all the rest have stars ; so there also the
moving causes will contain many things in them¬
selves, and what is there contained will have a more
true subsistence. But if each is a principle, the
principles will subsist fortuitously. And it may
be asked, why they subsist and accord in accom¬
plishing one work, viz. the concord of all heaven.
How, likewise, are the sensible natures in the
heavens equal to the intelligible and motive causes.
And how are they thus many being incorporeal,
since matter does not separate them from each
other. Hence, those ancients who especially em¬
braced the doctrines of Pythagoras and his fol¬
lowers, and of Pherecydes, were investigators of
this intelligible essence, Some of them, however,
committed discussions of these things to writing,
but others delivered them not in writing, but un¬
folded them in unwritten discourses, or wholly dis¬
missed the consideration of them.
X. It has been shown, however, as far as it is
possible to demonstrate about things of this kind,
that it is requisite to think that beyond being there
is the oney such as reason wishes to unfold ; that
next to this, being and intellect subsist ; and that,
in the third place, follows the nature of soul. But,
as in the nature of things there are these three
hypostases, so likewise it is proper to think, that
the above mentioned three subsist with us. I do
not mean to assert that they are to be found in
sensibles ; for they have a separate subsistence ;
but that they are external to sensibles, and external
after the same manner in man also, as the three
which we have been considering are external to all
heaven. This, however, is such a man as Plato
calls the inward man. Our soul, therefore, is like¬
wise something divine, and of a nature different
from sensibles, such as is the whole nature of souL
But the soul is perfect which possesses intellect
With respect to intellect, however, one kind is a
reasoning intellect, but another imparts the power
of reasoning. He, therefore, will not err who
places in the intelligible order of things this reason¬
ing intellect of the soul, which is not in want of
any corporeal organ to the subsistence of its dis-
cursive energy, but which possesses the energy of
itself in purity, in order that it may reason purely,
in as great perfection as possible» For we must
not inquire after a place where we may establish it,
but it must be arranged external to all place. For
thus that which is from itself, the external, and the
immaterial subsist, when they are alone, and have
nothing from a corporeal nature. On this account,
also, Plato in the Timaeus says, u that the Demi-
urgus surrounded the body of the universe with
soul,” indicating that part of the mundane soul
which abides in the intelligible. Concerning our
soul, likewise, concealing his meaning, he says, in
the Phaedrus, that it sometimes hides its head in
the heavens, and sometimes elevates it beyond
them.1 The exhortation, too, in the Phaedo, to
separate the soul from the body, does not relate to
a local separation, which is effected by nature, but
insinuates that the soul should not verge to imagi¬
nations, and to an alienation from itself, by a ten¬
dency to body. He also indicates that we should
elevate the remaining [i. e. the irrational] form of
1 I have followed the version of Ficinus in this place, as the original is obviously defective : for there is nothing more than, επ' i be ημών ere κρυπτών, €7r ακρα ειρηκε τρ κεφάλρ.
the soul, and lead it on high together with the
superior part of it; and that the part which is
established in the sensible region, and is alone the
fabricator and plastic maker of body, should like»
wise be engaged in an employment of this kind.
XL Since, therefore, the soul reasons about
things just and beautiful, and inquires by a reason-
ing process whether this thing is just, and that is
beautiful, it is necessary there should be something
stably just, from which the reasoning of the soul
originates ; or how could it reason ? And if the
soul at one time reasons about these things, but at
another time not, it is necessary there should be an
intellect in us^ which does not reason about, but
always possesses the just. It is likewise necessary
that we should contain the principle and cause of
intellect, and God ; the latter of these not being
divisible, but abiding, yet not in place, [but in him¬
self,] and again being surveyed in each of the mul¬
titude of things that are able to receive him. They
receive him, however, as something different from
themselves ; just as the centre of a circle is in
itself, but each of the lines in the circle has its sum¬
mit terminating in the centre, and the several lines
tend with their peculiarity to this. For by a thing
of this kind which is in us/ we also touch, associate
with, and are suspended from deity. But we are
established in it more or less according as we con-
verge to it in a greater or less degree.
XII. How, therefore, does it happen, since we
possess things of such great dignity, that we do not
apprehend them, but for the most part are sluggish
with respect to such like energies ? And there are
some who do not energize about them at alb In¬
tellect, indeed, and that which, prior to intellect, is
always in itself, are always employed in their own
energies. Soul, likewise, is thus that which is al¬
ways moved. For not every thing which is in the
soul is now sensible ; but it arrives to us wdien it
proceeds as far as to sense. When, however, each
thing in us energizing, does not impart itself to the
sensitive power, it does not yet proceed through
the whole souh Hence we have not yet any know¬
ledge of the energy, because we exist in conjunc¬
tion with the sensitive power, and are not a part
of the soul, but the whole soul. And farther still,
1 This is called by Proclus, the one , flower, and summit of the soul, and is that in which our truest being consists**
each of the psychical animals in us, always ener-
gizes essentially according to its peculiarity ; but
we then only recognize the energy, when there is a
participation and apprehension of it. It is neces¬
sary, therefore, in order that there may be an
apprehension of things which are thus present, that
the animadversive power should be converted to
the interior of the soul, and there fix its attention.
Just as if some one waiting to hear a voice which
is pleasing to him, should separate himself from
other voices, and excite his hearing to the percep¬
tion of the more excellent sound, when it approaches.
Thus, also, here it is necessary to dismiss sensible
auditions, except so far as is necessary, and to
preserve the animadversive power of the soul pure,
pud prepared to hear supernal sounds,
On
Intellect, Ideas,'
[REAL! BEING.
I. Since all men from their birth employ sense
prior to intellect and are necessarily first conver¬
sant with sensibles, some proceeding no farther
pass through life, considering these as the first and
last of things, and apprehending that whatever is
painful among these is evil, and whatever is plea¬
sant is good ; thus thinking it sufficient to pursue
the one and avoid the other* Those too among
E For a more ample discussion of Ideas than is contained in this treatise of Plotinus, see the Introduction and Notes to my translation of the Parmenides of Plato, and the notes to my translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics, in which the reader will find the treasures of antiquity on this subject unfolded.
them, who pretend to a greater share of reason
than others, esteem this to be wisdom, being
affected in a manner similar to more heavy birds,
who collecting many things from the earth, and
being oppressed with the weight, are unable to fly
on high, though they have received wings for this
purpose from nature. But others are in a small
degree elevated from things subordinate, the more
excellent part of the soul recalling them from plea¬
sure to a more worthy pursuit. As they are, how¬
ever, unable to look on high, and as not possessing
any thing else which can afford them rest, they
betake themselves together with the name of virtue
to actions and the election of things inferior, from
which they at first endeavoured to raise themselves,
though in vain. In the third class is the race of
divine men , who through a more excellent power,
and with piercing eyes, acutely perceive supernal
light, to the vision of which they raise themselves
above the clouds and darkness as it were of this
lower world, and there abiding despise every thing
in these regions of sense ; being no otherwise de¬
lighted with the place which is truly and properly
their own, than he who after many wanderings is
at length restored to his lawful country.
II. What then is this place? And how may
some one arrive at it? He, indeed, will arrive
thither, who is by nature amatory, and who is truly
a philosopher in disposition from the beginning.
For as being amatory, he will be parturient about
the beautiful, yet will not be satisfied with the
beauty which is in body, but will fly from thence
to the beauty of soul, to virtues and sciences,
studies and laws, and will again from these ascend
to the cause of the beauty contained in soul. If,
also, there is a beauty prior to this, he will ascend
to it, till he at length arrives at that which is first,
and which is beautiful from itself. Having like»
wise arrived hither, he will be liberated from his
parturiency, but not before. But how will he
ascend, whence does he derive the power of
ascending, and what is the reasoning which will
conduct this love [to the desired end ?] Is it the
following ? This beauty which is in bodies, is ad¬
ventitious to bodies. For the morphce , or forms
themselves of bodies, are in them as in matter.
The subject, therefore, is changed, and from being
beautiful becomes deformed. Hence reason says
that body is beautiful by participation. What is
it then which causes body to be beautiful ? This,
indeed, is effected in one way by the presence of
beauty, but in another by soul, which fashions body,
and inserts in it a viorphe , or form of such a kind.
What then? Is soul of itself beautiful or not?
Certainly not ; since if it were, one soul would not
be wise and beautiful, but another unwise and base*
Hence, the beauty which is in soul is derived from
wisdom. Who is it, therefore, that imparts wis¬
dom to the soul ? Is it not necessarily intellect ?
But it is an intellect, which is not at one time in¬
tellect, and at another deprived of it : for it is true
intellect, and which is therefore beautiful from it¬
self. Is it then necessary to stop here as at that
which is first, or is it requisite to pass beyond
intellect ? Intellect, indeed, as with reference to us
precedes the first principle of things, announcing as
it were in the vestibules of the good ’ that all things
subsist in itself ; as being a multitudinous impres¬
sion of the good w7hich entirely abides in unity.
III. This nature, however, of intellect must be
considered, which reason announces to be truly
being, and true essence, previously confirming, by
proceeding in another way, [what we have before
asserted] that it is necessary there should be a cer-
tain nature of this kind. Perhaps* therefore, it is
ridiculous to investigate whether intellect ranks in
the order of beings ; though perhaps some persons
may be dubious concerning this. And they may
be in a still greater degree dubious whether there
is such an intellect as we have maintained there is,
and which is separate 1 [from soul]. Likewise,
whether this intellect is [real] beings, and whether
it contains the nature of forms, about which we
now propose to speak. We see, therefore, that all
the things which are said to exist are composites,
and that no one of them is simple, whether they
are fashioned by art, or constituted by nature. For
artificial substances consist of brass, or wood, or
stone, and do not yet obtain perfection from these,
till they are elaborated by the several arts, one of
which produces a statue, another a bed, and ano¬
ther a house, and each effects this by the insertion
of the form which it contains. Moreover, with
respect to the things which are constituted by na¬
ture, such of them as are composed of many parti¬
culars, and which are said to be co-mingled, may