® Conformably to this, Aristotle also, in his Metaphysics says of intellect, “ that it energizes possessing,” ενεργεί be εγων»
% Instead of ο μεν ουν vovs , Kara to roetv v<piaras3 ro or, it is necessary to read as in the above translation, © μεν ovy vovs, Kara to yoetv vfioras ro oy.
through becoming the object of intellectual percep¬ tion to intellect, and through imparting to it, intel¬ lection and existence. There is, however, another cause of intellection, which is also the cause of existence to being. Of both therefore at once, there is another cause. For both these are con- subsistent, and never desert each other. But being two, this one thing [resulting from both] is at once intellect ; and is being, intellective, and intelligible. It is intellect, indeed, so far as it is intellective ; but being, so far as it is intelligible [or the object of perception to intellect.] For intellectual percep¬ tion could not subsist, difference and sameness not existing. Intellect, therefore, being, difference and sameness, are the first of things. But it is likewise necessary to assume together with these, motion and permanency. And motion, indeed, is neces¬ sary if being intellectually perceives ; but perma¬ nency in order that it may remain the same ; and difference, in order that it mav be intellective and intelligible. For if you take away difference from it, then becoming one it will be perfectly silent. It is necessary, however, that intellective natures should be different from each other ; and that they should also be the same with each other, since they
subsist in the same thing, and there is something
common in all of them. Diversity, likewise, is
otherness. But these becoming many produce
number and quantity. And the peculiarity of each
of these produces quality, from all which, as prin°
ciples, other things proceed.
V. This exuberant God, therefore, exists in the
soul which is here, being conjoined to him by things
of this kind, unless it wishes to depart from him.
Approaching therefore to, and as it were becoming
one with him, it enquires as follows : Who is he
that, being simple and prior to a multitude of this
kind, generated this God ? Who is the cause of his
existence, and of his being exuberant, and by whom
number was produced ? For number is not the first
of things ; since the one is prior to the duad. But
the duad is the second thing, and being generated
by the one , is defined by it. The duad, however,
is of itself indefinite. But when it is defined, it is
now number. And it is number as essence. Soul
also is number. For neither corporeal masses nor
magnitudes are the first of things. For these gross
substances which sense fancies to be beings, are
things of a posterior nature. Nor ls the moisture
which is in seeds honourable, but that contained in
them, which is not visible. But this is number and
reason [or a productive principle]. What are said
therefore to be number and the duad in the intelli¬
gible world, are reasons and intellect. But the
duad indeed is indefinite, when it is assumed as
analogous to a subject. Number, however, which
proceeds from it and the one , is each form of things ;
intellect being as it were formed by the species of
things which are generated in it. But it is formed
in one manner from the one 9 and in another from
itself, in the same manner as sight which is in
energy. For intelligence is sight perceiving, both
being one.
VI. How, therefore, does intelligence see ;
what does it see ; and, in short, how does it subsist ;
and how is it generated from the one , so that it may
see ? For now indeed the soul perceives the neces¬
sity of the existence of these things. It desires,
however, to understand this which is so much
spoken of by the wise men of antiquity, viz. how
from the one being such as we have said it is, each
thing has its subsistence, whether it be multitude,
or the duad, or number ; and why the one did not
abide in itself, but so great a multitude flowed from
it, as is seen to have an existence, and which we
think should be referred to the one. We must say,
therefore, as follows, invoking God himself \ not
with external speech , but with the soul itself, ex¬
tending ourselves in prayer to him , since we shall
then be able to pray to him properly , when we
approach by ourselves alone to the alone. It is
necessary, therefore, that the beholder of him, being
in himself as if in the interior part of a temple, and
quietly abiding in an eminence beyond all things,
should survey the statues as it were which are esta¬
blished outwardly, or rather that statue which first
shines forth to the view, and after the following
manner behold that which is naturally adapted to
be beheld# With respect to every thing that is
moved/ it is necessary there should be something
to which it is moved. For if there is nothing of
this kind, we should not admit that it is moved.
But if any thing is generated posterior to that to
which the moveable nature tends, it is necessary
that it should always be generated in consequence
* Instead of ffa vra τφ ι ανουμινω in this place, it is necessary to read em Tram τψ κίνονμςνω.
of that prior cause being converted to itself. Let,
however, the generation which is in time be now
removed from us who are discoursing about eternal
beings. And if in the course of the discussion we
attribute generation to things which exist eternally,
let it be considered as indicative of cause and order.
Hence, that which is from thence generated, must
be said to be generated, the cause not being moved.
For if something was generated in consequence of
that cause being moved, the thing generated after
the motion would be the third, and not the second
from the cause. It is necessary, therefore, the
cause being immoveable, that if any thing secondary
subsists after it, this second nature should be pro¬
duced, without the cause either verging to it, or
consulting,1 or in short being moved. How, there¬
fore, and what is it necessary to conceive about that
abiding cause ? We must conceive a surrounding
splendor, proceeding indeed from this cause, but
from it in a permanent state, like a light from the
sun shining, and as it were running round it, and
being generated from it, the cause itself always
abiding in the same immoveable condition. All
1 For povXrjdeyTos here, it is requisite to read β ουλευθεντος»
beings, likewise, as long as they remain, necessarily
produce from their own essence, about themselves,
and externally from the power which is present with
them, a nature whose hypostasis is suspended from
them, and which is as it were an image of the arche¬
type from which it proceeded. Thus fire emits
from itself indeed heat, and snow not only retains
cold within itself [but imparts it to other things].
This, however, such things as are fragrant espe¬
cially testify. For as long as they exist, something
proceeds from them, of which whatever is near
them partakes. All such things, likewise, as are
now perfect generate ; but that which is always
perfect, always generates, and that which it pro¬
duces is perpetual. It also generates something
less than itself. What, therefore, is it requisite to
say of that which is most perfect ? Shall we say
that nothing proceeds from it ; or rather that the
greatest things posterior to it are its progeny ? But
the greatest thing posterior to it, and the second, is
intellect. For intellect sees it, and is in w?ant of it
alone. But this most perfect nature is not in want
of intellect. It is also necessary that the thing
generated from that which is better than intellect,
should be intellect. And intellect is superior to all
things after the first, because other things are pos¬
terior to it. Thus, for instance, soul is the reason
of intellect, and a certain energy of it, just as intel¬
lect is of that first God [who is beyond intellect].
But the reason of soul is indeed obscure. For as
it is the image of intellect, on this account it is
necessary that it should look to intellect. After
the same manner also, it is necessary that intellect should look to the highest God, in order that it
may be intellect. It sees him, however, not sepa-
rated from him, but because it is after him, and
there is nothing between ; as neither is there any
thing between soul and intellect. But every thing
desires its generator. This also it loves, and espe»
dally when that which is generated and the gene¬
rator are alone. When, however, that which
— .*··'·· *
generates is the most excellent of things, the thing
begotten is necessarily present with it in such a manner, as to be separated by otherness 1 alone.
1 In the original ετεροτητι, which is derived from erepos another . And this word is properly used when we speak of two things only. Hence, ετεροτης must not be considered in this place as merely signifying difference ; for universally one thing is separated from another by difference, but as denoting the greatest proximity and alliance.
VII. But we say that intellect is the image of
this most excellent nature. For it is necessary to
speak more clearly. In the first place, indeed, it
is necessary that intellect should in a certain respect
be generated, and preserve [in itself] much of its
generator ; and also that it should have such a
similitude to it, as light has to the sun. Its gene»
rator, however, is not intellect. How therefore did
he generate intellect, [so far as it is intellect ?]
May we not say, because intellect, by conversion,
looks to him ? But the vision itself is intellect*
For that which apprehends another thing, is either
sense or intellect. And sense indeed may be com»
pared to a line, but the other gnostic powers of the
soul to a circle. A circle, however, of this kind is
as it were partible. But this is not the case with
intellect. Or may we not say that this also is one?
But the one here is the power of all things. Hence
intelligence surveys those things of which it is the
power, divided as it were from the power ; for
otherwise it would not be intellect. For intellect
now possesses from itself a co-sensation as it were
of the great extent of its power ; in which power,
its essence, consists. Intellect, therefore, through
itself defines its own being, by a power derived
from him [i. e. from the first God,] and perceives
that essence is as it were one of the parts of and
from him, and that it is corroborated by him, and
perfected by and from him into essence. It sees,
however, itself derived from thence, as something
which is as it were partible from that which is im¬
partible ; and not only itself, but life, and intellec¬
tion, and all things, because the first God is no¬
thing of all things. For on this account all things
are from him, because he is not detained by a cer¬
tain form. For he is one alone. And intellect,
indeed, in the order of beings is all things. But
he on this account is none of the things which are
in intellect ; and all things which have a subsist¬
ence among beings are derived from him. Hence
also these are essences* For they are now definite,
and each possesses as it were a form. Being,
however, ought not to be surveyed in that which is
as it were indefinite, but as fixed by bound and per¬
manency. But permanency in intelligibles is cir¬
cumscription and form, in which also they receive
their hypostasis. This intellect, therefore, which
deserves the appellation of the most pure intellect,
and which is of the genus of intelligibles, originates
from no other source than the first principle. And
being now generated, it generates together with it¬
self beings, all the beauty of ideas, and all the
intelligible Gods. Being, likewise, full of the things
which it generates, and as it were absorbing its
progeny, it again contains them in itself, and does
not suffer them to fall into matter, nor to be nou¬
rished by Rhea, as the mysteries and the fables
about the Gods obscurely indicate. For they say
that Saturn the most wise God was born prior to
Jupiter, and that he again contains the things
which he generates, in himself, so far as he is full,
and an intellect characterized by purity. But after
this they say that he generated Jupiter, who was
now a boy [i. e. pure and full]. For intellect, being
a perfect intellect, generates soul. For being per¬
fect it is requisite that it should generate, and since
it is so great a power that it should not be unpro-
lific. Neither here, however, is it possible that
the thing generated should be more excellent than
the generator ; but being inferior, it is necessary
that it should be an image of it. In a similar
manner it is requisite that it should be indefinite,
but bounded, and as it were invested with form by
its generator. But the progeny of intellect is a
certain reason, and an hypostasis which energizes
Plot . S
dianoetically. This, however, is that which is
moved about intellect, is the light of intellect,1 and
a vestigie suspended from it. Hence, according to
one part of itself it is conjoined with it, and on this
account it is replete with and enjoys it, participates
of, and intellectually perceives it ; but according
to another part, it comes into contact with things
posterior to itself, or rather, generates them, and
which are necessarily inferior to soul. About
these, however, we shall speak hereafter. And as
far as to these is the progression of divine natures.
VIII. On this account all things are distributed
by Plato in a triple order about the king of all.
For he says, ££ that all things are about the king
of all ; a second things about that which is second,
and such as are third about that which ranks as
the third/ He also says that this king is the father 3
of cause, denominating intellect cause. For with