1 The word used by Plotinus here is ^ayημ a, which signifies in the Physics of Aristotle, the boundary of motion.
the universe. Is then time in us also ? May we
not say that it is in every such soul, that it subsists
uniformly in every similar soul, and that all of
them are [in a certain respect] one ? Hence, time
will not be divulsed, since neither is eternity, which
according to another characteristic is in all uniform
natures.
On the
Immortality of the Soul#
I. Whether each [part] of us is immortal, or
the whole perishes, or one part of us is dissipated
and corrupted, but another part perpetually remains,
which part is the man himself, may be learnt by
considering conformably to nature as follows :
Man, indeed, is not something simple, but there is
in him a soul, and he has also a body, whether it is
annexed to us as an instrument, or after some other
manner. However this may be, it must be ad¬
mitted, that the nature and essence of each of these
must be thus divided. Since the body, therefore,
is itself a composite, reason shows that it cannot
remain [perpetually the same] ; and sense likewise
sees that it is dissolved and wastes away, and re-
ceives all-various destructions ; since each of the
things inherent in it tends to its own [i. e. to the
whole from which it was derived], and one thing
belonging to it corrupts another, and changes and
perishes into something else. This, too, is espe¬
cially the case when the soul, which causes the parts
to be in friendly union with each other, is not pre-
sent with the corporeal masses. If each body,
likewise, is left by itself, it will not be one, since it
is capable of being dissolved into form and matter,
from which it is also necessary that simple bodies
should have their composition. Moreover, as be¬
ing bodies they have magnitude, and consequently
may be cut and broken into the smallest parts, and
through this are the recipients of corruption.
Hence, if body is a part of us, we are not wholly
immortal. But if it is an instrument [of the soul]
it is necessary that being given for a certain time,
it should be naturally a thing of this kind. That,
however, which is the most principal thing, and
the man himself, will be that with reference to the
body which form is with reference to matter, since
this according to form is as body to matter ; or
according to that which uses, the body has the
relation to it of an instrument. But in each way
soul is the man himself.
II. What, therefore, is the nature of this thing
[soul] ? If indeed it is a body, it is in every respect
capable of being analyzed. For every body is a
composite. But if it is not a body, but of another
nature, that also must be considered either after
the same, or after another manner. In the first
place, however, it must be considered into what
body this body which they call soul ought to be
analyzed. For since life is necessarily present with
soul, it is also necessary that this body which is
supposed to be soul, if it consists of two or more
bodies, should have a connascent life in both, or
in each of them ; or that one of these should have
life, but the other not, or that neither should be
vital. If, therefore, life is present with one of
them only, this very thing will be soul. Hence,
what body will this be which has life from itself?
For fire, air, w^ater and earth, are of themselves
inanimate; and with whichever of these soul is
present, the life which it uses is adventitious. There
are not, however, any other bodies besides these.
And those to whom it appears that there are other
bodies the elements of these, do not assert that they
are souls, or that they have life. But if it should
be said, that though no one of these bodies pos-
sesses life, yet the congress of them produces life,
he who says this would speak absurdly And if
each of them has life, one will be sufficient. Or
rather, it is impossible that a coacervation of bo¬
dies should produce life, and things void of intel¬
lect generate intellect. Moreover, neither will
these, in whatever manner they may say they are
mixed, generate either intellect or soul.’ Hence,
it is necessary there should be that which arranges,
and which is the cause of the mixture ; so that this
will have the order of soul. For that which is
compounded will not be that which arranges and
produces the mixture. But neither will there be a
simple body in the series of things, without the
existence of soul in the universe ; if reason [or a
productive principle] acceding to matter, produces
body. For reason cannot proceed from any thing
else than from soul.
III. If some one, however, should say that an
assemblage of atoms or impartibles produce soul
by their union, such a one will be confuted by
8 The words η vow , η are omitted in the original ;
but from the version of Ficinus it appears that they ought to be inserted.
similitude of passion, and by apposition ; since one
thing will not thus be generated through the whole,
nor will that which is co-passive be produced from
bodies which are without passion and incapable of
being united. But soul is co-passive with itself.
And of impartibles neither body nor magnitude can
consist. Moreover, with respect to a simple body,
they will not say that it has life from itself so far as
it is material. For matter is void of quality. But
they will rather say that what is arranged in body
according to form possesses life. Hence, if they
say that this form is essence, soul will not be both,
but one of these ; and this will no longer be body.
For this will not also consist of matter ; since if it
did, we must again analyze it after the same man¬
ner. But if they assert that this form is a passion
of matter and not essence, they must inform us
what that is from which this passion and life are
derived into matter. For matter will not give form
to itself, nor insert soul in itself. Hence, it is
necessary that there should be something which is
the supplier of life, whether the supply is to matter,
or to a certain body, this supplier being external
to, and beyond every corporeal nature. Indeed,
neither will there be any body, if there is no psychi-
Plot . P
cal power. For body [perpetually] flows, and its
nature is in [continual] motion. The universe 1
also would rapidly perish if all things were bodies ;
though some one of them should be denominated
soul. For it would suffer the same things as other
bodies, since there would be one matter in all of
them. Or rather, nothing would be generated, but
all things would stop in matter, as there would not
be any thing to invest it with form. Perhaps, too,
neither would matter have any subsistence what¬
ever. This universe also will be dissolved, if it is
committed to the connexion of body, and the order
of soul is given to body, as far as to names, viz. to
air and a dissipable spirit, and which has not from
itself any oneness. For how is it possible, since
all bodies are divisible, that this universe if it is
committed to any one of them, should not be borne
along in a foolish and casual manner? For what
order is there, or reason or intellect, in a pneumatic
substance, which is in want of order from soul ?
But if soul, indeed, has a subsistence, all these will
be subservient to it in order to the composition of
the world, and the existence of every animal, a
1 το παν is omitted in tlie original.
different power contributing from a different thing
to [the perfection of] the whole. If soul, however,
is not present to the whole of things, these will
neither have a subsistence, nor any arrangement.
IV. Compelled by truth, the authors of the
above mentioned hypothesis also testify, that it is
necessary there should be a certain form of soul
prior to and more excellent than bodies. For they
introduce a spirit endued with intellect, and an in¬
tellectual fire, as if it was not possible there could
be a better condition among beings without fire and
spirit, and without a place in which it might be
established, though they ought to have investigated
where bodies are to be placed ; for it is necessary
that these should be established in the powers of
soul. But if they assert that life and soul are
nothing else than a spirit or wind, we must enquire
what this celebrated spirit introduced by them is,
and how it subsists. For they are compelled to
fly to this when they admit that there is another
efficacious nature besides bodies. If therefore not
every spirit is soul, because there are myriads of
inanimate spirits, but a spirit subsisting after a cer¬
tain manner is according to them soul, we ask them
whether they say that such a spirit and this habi¬
tude is something belonging to beings, or nothing.
But if indeed it is nothing, it will be a name alone.
And its subsistence after a certain manner will be
also merely a name, and thus it will be an accident
to beings. Hence, according to them nothing but
matter will have an existence, and soul, deity, and
every thing [except matter] will be merely names.
If, however, habitude is something pertaining to
beings, and different from a subject and from mat¬
ter, and subsists indeed in matter, but is itself im¬
material, because it is not again composed from
matter -if this be the case, it will be a certain
reason [or productive principle] and will not be
body, but of another nature. Farther still, from
the following considerations it will be no less mani¬
fest that it is impossible for soul to be any body
whatever. For it would either be hot or cold, or
hard, or soft, or moist, or firm, or black, or white,
and all such different qualities as are in different
bodies. Apd if indeed it is hot alone, it will alone
heat ; if cold alone, it will alone refrigerate. If
also it is alone light, it will by its presence cause
things to be light ; if heavy, it will alone render
them heavy ; if black, it will blacken ; and if white,
will cause them to be white. For it is not the pro¬
vince of fire to refrigerate, nor of cold to produce
heat. But soul produces different effects in diffe¬
rent animals, and contrary effects in the same ani¬
mal ; fixing some things, but diffusing others.
And some things indeed it causes to be dense, but
others rare, black, white, light and heavy ; though
from the nature of one body it ought to produce
one quality only, and not different qualities. But
now it produces many qualities.
V. With respect to motions also, why are
different motions produced by the soul, and not
one only, there being but one [natural] motion of
every body ? But if they assign deliberate choice
as the cause of some motions, and reasons [or pro¬
ductive principles] as the causes of others, these
indeed are rightly assigned. Deliberate choice,
however, does not pertain to body, nor reasons,
since they are different, but an elementary body is
one and simple. Nor can such a body be full of
productive power, except so far as this is imparted
to it by that which makes it to be hot or cold.
But how can it belong to body to increase at cer¬
tain times, and to a certain extent, since it is
naturally adapted to be increased, except so far as
the power of augmenting is assumed in the bulk of
matter, and is subservient to that which through it
produces the increase P For if soul being body in¬
creases, it is necessary that it should also be in¬
creased, viz. by the addition of a similar body, in
order that it may be of an equal bulk vuth that
which is increased by it. And that which is added
will either be soul, or an inanimate bod) . And if
indeed it is soul, whence and how is it introduced,
atid how is it added ? But if that which is added is
inanimate, how is this animated, how does it accord
with the preceding soul, and become one with it,
and how does it entertain the same opinions with
the former soul ? Will not this added soul, as being
foreign, be ignorant of what the other knows P And
in the same manner as with another mass belonging
to our frame, there will be an efflux from, and an
influx into it, and nothing will continue the same..
How, therefore, shall we remember ? And how
shall we recognize such things as are appropriate
to us, since we shall never employ the same soul ?
Moreover, if soul is body, since the nature of body
is divided into many parts, each of the parts will
not be the same with the whole. If, therefore.
soul was a magnitude of a certain quantity, if this
quantity should become less, it would no longer be
soul ; just as the being of every quantity is changed
by ablation, from what it was before. But if some
one of those things which have magnitude, being
diminished in bulk, should remain the same in
quality, so far indeed as it is body, and so far as it
is quantity, it is different from what it was ; but
through quality which is different from quantity it
is able to preserve itself the same. What, there¬
fore, will those say who contend that the soul is
body ? In the first place, indeed, with respect to
each part of the soul which is in the same body, is
each part soul in the same manner as the whole
soul ? And again, is this the case with the part of a
part ? For if this is admitted, magnitude will con¬
tribute nothing to the essence of the soul ; though
it is necessary that it should if soul is a certain
quantity. The whole soul, likewise, is every where
present with the body ; but it is impossible for the
same corporeal whole to be in many things at the
same time, or for a part of it to be the same as the
whole. And if they say that each of the parts is
not soul, then according to them, soul will consist
of things inanimate. Besides, if the magnitude of
each soul is definite, it will no longer be soul, if it
is either extended or diminished. When, there¬
fore, from one copulation and one seed, twins are
begotten, or as in other animals many offspring are
produced, most of the seed being distributed into
many places, where also each part of the seed is a
whole, how is it possible this should not teach
those who are willing to learn, that where the part
is the same w ith the whole, this in the very essence
of itself transcends the nature of quantity ; and
ought from necessity to be without quantity. For
thus alone it can remain the same, quantity being
withdrawn, since it has no need of eittier quantity
or bulk, its essence being something different from
either. Hence soul and reasons [or productive
principles] are void of quantity.
VI. But that if soul is body, it will not be pos¬
sible to perceive either sensibly or intellectually, or
to know scientifically, and that there will neither
be virtue, nor any thing beautiful [in human con¬
duct,] will be manifest from the following consi¬
derations. Whatever is able to have a sensible
perception of any thing, ought itself to be one, and
to apprehend every thing by one and the same