power. This will also be the case, if many things
enter through many organs of sense, or there are
many qualities about one thing, and likewise when
there is a variegated appearance such as that of
the face, through one thing. For one thing does
not perceive the nose, and another the eves, but
the same thing perceives at once all the parts of
the face. And though one thing proceeds through
the eyes, but another through the ears, yet it is
necessary there should be one thing at which both
these arrive. Or how could the soul sav that these
are different, unless the perceptions of sense at once
terminated in the same thing ? It is necessary,
therefore, that this should be as it were a centre,
that the senses should on all sides be extended to
this, like lines from the circumference of a circle,
and that a thing of this kind which apprehends the
perceptions of sense should be truly one. For if
it were any thing divisible, and the informations of
the senses arrived at this as at the two extremities
of a line, they must either again concur in one and
the same thing as a middle, or there would be ano¬
ther thing there and another, and each would have
a sensible perception of each ; just as if I should
perceive one thing, but you another, even though
the object of sense should be one thing, such as the
Face ; or they must be collected into one. And
this indeed appears to be the case. For visible
forms are collected in the pupils of the eyes ; or
how through these could the greatest things be seen ?
Hence5 in a still greater degree the forms which
arrive at the ruling part of the soul, become as it
were conceptions ; and therefore this part also
must be impartible. For if it had magnitude, it
would be co-divided with the object of sensible
perception. Hence, one part of it would perceive
a part of the sensible object, and nothing in us
would have the apprehension of the whole of a sen¬
sible thing. But the whole is one thing. For how
can it be divided ? For in the division, equal can¬
not be adapted to equal, because the ruling part is
not equal to every sensible thing. Into how many
parts, therefore, must the division of it be made ?
Must it be divided into as many parts, as the sen¬
sible perception which is introduced to it, is divided
into ? And will each of the parts of the soul, there¬
fore, perceive the parts of the sensible object ? Or
shall we say that the parts of the soul will not have
a sensation of the parts of the thing perceived ?
This however is impossible. But if any part what-
ever perceives the whole of the sensible object,
since magnitude is adapted to be divided infinitely,
it will happen that infinite sensible perceptions will
be produced about each part ; so that, for instance,
there will be infinite images of the same thing in
our ruling part. Moreover, if that which perceives
is body, it will not be able to perceive in any other
way, than as if certain images were impressed from
wax in a seal ; whether the sensible forms are im¬
pressed in blood, or in air. And if, indeed, they
are impressed as in moist bodies, which it is reason¬
able to suppose they will be, if as in water, they
\vill be confounded, and there will be no memory.
But if the impressions remain, either it will not be
possible for others to be impressed while they re¬
main, so that there will be no other sensible per¬
ceptions, or if others are produced, the former w ill
be destroyed, so that there will not be a remem¬
brance of any thing. But if it is possible to
remember, and to have a sensible perception of
other things after others, the former not impeding
the latter, it is impossible for the soul to be body,
VII. The same thing also may be seer» from pain and the sensation of pain ; when a man is said
to have a pain in his finger or about his finger. For
then it is manifest that the sensation of pain is pro¬
duced about the principal or ruling part ; a portion
of the spirit being pained, but the ruling part having
a perception of the pain, and the whole soul in con¬
sequence of this suffering the same thing. How,
therefore, does this happen ? They will say by suc¬
cession, the psychical spirit about the finger suffer¬
ing in the first place, but imparting the passion to
that which is next to it, and afterwards to some¬
thing else, until the passion arrives at the ruling
part. Hence, it is necessary if that which is pri¬
marily pained perceives, that there should be ano¬
ther sensation of that which is second, if sensation
is produced according to succession. And likewise,
that there should be another sensation of that
which is the third in order ; that there should be
many and infinite sensible perceptions of one and
the same pain ; and that afterwards all these should
be perceived by the ruling part, and besides these,
that it should have a perception of its own passion.
In reality, however, each of these does not perceive
the pain that is in the finger ; but one sensation
perceives that the part of the palm of the hand
which is next to the finger is pained, and another
more remote sensation perceives the pain which is
in a more remote part. There will also be many
pains, the ruling part not perceiving the passion
which is in the finger, but that which is present
with itself. And this it will alone know, but will
bid farewell to the others, not perceiving that the
finger is pained. If, therefore, it is not possible
that sensible perception of a thing of this kind
should subsist according to succession, and it does
not belong to body, since it is a bulk, that one part
of it suffering, another part should recognize the
suffering ; for in every magnitude this is one thing,
and that another ; — if this be the case, it is neces¬
sary that the power which perceives should be a
thing of such a kind, as to be every where itself the
same with itself. But this pertains to any thing
else rather than to body.
VIII. Moreover, that neither will it be possi¬
ble to perceive intellectually if the soul is body,
may be demonstrated as follows. For if to per¬
ceive sensibly is, for the soul using the body to
apprehend sensibles, intellectual perception will
not be an apprehension of the objects of such per¬
ception, through body. For unless this is admitted,
intellectual will be the same with sensible percept
tion. Hence, if to perceive intellectually is to
apprehend without body, by a much greater priority
it is necessary that the nature which thus perceives
should not be body. Farther still, if sense indeed
is the perception of sensibles, intellection is the
perception of intelligibles. If, however, they are
not willing to admit this, yet there will be in us
intellections of certain intelligibles, and apprehen¬
sions of things without magnitude. How, there¬
fore, will intellect if it is magnitude, understand
that which is not magnitude, and by that wdiich is
partible that which is impartible? Shall we say it
will understand it by a certain impartible part of
itself? But if this be the case, that which under¬
stands will not be body. For there is no need of
the whole in order to come into contact with the
object of its intellection ; since contact according
to one certain thing is sufficient. If, therefore,
they admit that the first intellections, which is true,
are entirely liberated from body, it is necessary
that the nature which intellectually perceives the
form separate from body of each thing, should
know either real being, or that which is becoming
to be. But if they say that intellections are of
forms inherent in matter, yet they are then only
apprehended when by intellect they are separated
from body. For the separation [i. e. abstraction]
of a circle and triangle, of a line and a point, is not
effected in conjunction with flesh, or in short, with
matter. Hence it is necessary that the soul also,
in a separation of this kind, should separate itself
from the body. And therefore it is necessary that
it should not be itself body. I think, likewise, that
the beautiful and the just are without magnitude,
and consequently the intellection of these is un¬
attended with magnitude. Hence, these approach¬
ing to us are apprehended by that which is imparti¬
ble in the soul, and in the soul they reside in the
impartible. How also, if the soul is body, can
temperance and justice be the virtues of it, which
are its saviours, so far as they are received by it ?
IX. There must, therefore, be another nature
which possesses existence from itself, and such is
every thing which is truly being, and which is
neither generated, nor destroyed. For without the
subsistence of this, all things would vanish into
non-entity, and this perishing, would not afterwards
be generated ; since this imparts safety to all other
things, and also to the universe which through soul
is preserved and adorned. For soul is the princi¬
ple of motion, with which it supplies other things,
itself moving itself, and imparting life to the ani¬
mated body. But it possesses life from itself,
which it will never lose, because it is derived from
itself. For all things do not use an adventitious
life, or there would be a progression of life to infi¬
nity. But it is necessary there should be a certain
nature primarily vital, w hich is also necessarily in¬
destructible and immortal, as being the principle of
life to other things. Here, likewise, it is requisite
that every thing divine and blessed should be esta¬
blished, living from itself, and existing primarily
being, and primarily vital, void of essential muta¬
tion, and being neither generated nor destroyed.
For whence could it be generated, or into what
could it perish ? If, likewise, it is necessary that
the appellation of being should truly belong to this
nature, it is requisite that it should not at one time
exist, and at another not ; just as a colour which is
of itself white, is not at one time wrhite, and at ano¬
ther not white. If, however, whiteness was [real]
being, together with being white, it would likewise
always be. But now it possesses whiteness alone.
That, however, to which being is present which is
from itself, and is primarily being, will always have
a subsistence. Hence, this which is primarily and
perpetually being, ought not to be destitute of life,
like a stone, or a piece of wood, but to be vital, and
enjoy a pure life, in that part of itself which is alone
permanent. But that part of it which is mingled
with a subordinate nature is an impediment to its
possession of the best of things, yet it does not
through this lose its nature, but resumes its ancient
condition, when it recurs to things which are [truly]
its owm.
X. That soul, however, is allied to a more di¬
vine and eternal nature, is evident from its not
being body as w^e have demonstrated, -and also be-
cause it has neither figure nor colour. Moreover,
this likewise may be shown from the following
considerations. It is acknowledged by all of us,
that every divine nature, and which is truly being,
enjoys an excellent and wise life. This, therefore,
being admitted, it is necessary to consider in the
next place, what the nature is of our soul. We
must assume the soul, however, not receiving in the
body irrational desires and angers, and other pas-
Plot . Q
sions, but as abolishing all these, and as much as
possible having no communication with the body.
For such a soul as this will perspicuously show
that evils are an addition to the soul, and are ex¬
ternally derived ; and that the most excellent things
are inherent in it when it is purified, viz. wisdom
and every other virtue, which are its proper posses¬
sions, If, therefore, the soul is such when it re¬
turns to itself, how is it possible it should not be¬
long to that nature which we say is possessed by
every thing eternal and divine ? For wisdom and
true virtue being divine, cannot be inherent in any
vile and mortal thing ; but that which is of this kind
is necessarily divine, as being full of divine goods,
through an alliance and similitude of essence to a
divine nature. Hence, whoever of us resembles a
soul of this description, will in soul itself differ but
little from superior beings ; in this alone being in¬
ferior to them, that he is in body. On which
account, also, if every man was such, or if the mul¬
titude employed souls of this kind, no one would
be so incredulous as not to believe that our soul is
entirely immortal. Now, however, men perceiving
that the soul of the greater part of the human race
is defiled with vice, they do not reason about it,
either as a divine or an immortal thing. But it is
necessary, in considering the nature of every things
to direct our attention to the purity of it ; since
whatever is added, is always an impediment to the
knowledge of that to which it is added. Consider
the soul, therefore, by taking away [that which is
extraneous] ; or rather, let him who takes this
away survey himself, and he will believe himself to
be immortal, when he beholds himself in the intel¬
ligible wrorld, and situated in a pure abode. For
he will perceive intellect seeing not any thing sen¬
sible, nor any of these mortal objects, but by an
eternal power contemplating that which is eternal ;
every thing in the intelligible world, and itself also
being then luminous, in consequence of being en¬
lightened by the truth proceeding from the good \
which illuminates all intelligibles with reality. By
such a soul as this, therefore, it may be properly
said,