It is necessary, however, to doubt what this
number is, whether it is monadic, and how it mea¬
sures ? For though some one should discover how
it measures, yet he would not find time measuring,
but a certain quantity of time. This, however, is
not the same with time [simply considered.] For
it is one thing to speak of time, and another, of so
much time. For prior to the so much, it is neces¬
sary to say what that is which is so much. Is time,
therefore, the number which measures motion ex-
ternally ? Such as the decad in horses* and not that
which is assumed together with horses. What this
number, therefore, is, has not been shown, which
prior to measuring, is what it is, in the same man¬
ner as the decad. Shall we say it is that number
which measures by running according to the prior
and posterior of motion ? 1 But it is not yet mani¬
fest what this number is which measures according
to prior and posterior. That, however, which
measures according to prior and posterior, whether
by a point, or by any thing else, entirely measures
according to time. This number,2 therefore, which
measures motion by prior and posterior, will be
successive to, and in contact with time, in order
that it may measure it. For prior and posterior,
must either be assumed locally, as the beginning
* Time is defined by Aristotle, to be the number of motion according to prior and posterior , which accords with Plato?s definition of it in the Timas us, viz. that it is an eternal image flowing according to number . For this shows that time sub¬ sists according to number which has the relation of an image, and exists according to the order of motion, i. e. according to prior and posterior. In short, time is properly the measure of motion according to the flux of being, which is the peculiarity of generation , or becoming to he .
% For xporos here, it is necessary to read αριθμοα.
[and end] of a stadium, or temporally. For in
short, with respect to prior and posterior, the former
indeed is time ending in the now ; but the latter is
time beginning from the now . Time, therefore, is
different from the number which measures motion
according to prior and posterior, not only motion
of any kind, but also that which is orderly. In the
next place, why when number is adjoined, whether
according to the measured, or the measuring, (for
the same number may be both that which measures,
and is measured) — why therefore when number is
added, w ill there be time ; but motion existing, and
prior and posterior entirely subsisting about it,
there will not be time ? Just as if some one should
say that magnitude is not as great as it is, unless
some one apprehends what the quantity of it is.
Since time, however, is, and is said to be infinite,
how will there be number about it, unless a part of
it being selected is measured, in which case it will
happen that it exists prior to its being measured.
But why will not time be prior to the existence of
soul that measures it? Unless it should be said
thaf the generation of it is effected by soul ; since
it is by no means necessary that time should exist
because it is measured by soul. For it would exist
as much as it is in quantity, though no one should
measure it. And if some one should say that it is
soul which uses magnitude for the purpose of mea-
suring time, what will this have to do with the con¬ ception of time ?
X. But to say that time is an appendix of
motion, is not to teach what time is, nor ought this
to be said before it is shown what the appendix is.
For perhaps it may be time. With respect to this
appendix, however, it must be considered, whether
it has a posterior, or simultaneous, or prior sub¬
sistence ; if there is an appendix of this kind. For
in whatever manner it may be spoken of, it is spoken
of in time. Hence, if this is time, it will follow
that time is the appendix of motion in time.
Since, however, we do not investigate what time is
not, but what it is, and much has been said on this
subject by many prior to us, according to each
position, he who discusses these would rather com¬
pose a history [than discover the nature of time ]
To which may be added, that we have occasionally
said something concerning these different positions.
Some things also may be opposed from what has
been already said, to him who asserts that time is
the measure of the universe, and likewise such
other things as have just now been asserted respect¬
ing the measure of motion. For separate from
inequality, all the other particulars may be ad¬
duced, which are adapted to their positions. It
follows, therefore, that we should now show what
it is necessary to think time is.
XI. Again, therefore, it is requisite that we
should betake ourselves to that condition of being
which we have said is in eternity ; a condition
which is immutable, and at once total, a life now
infinite and perfectly inflexible, and abiding in one,
and directed to the one . But time was not yet, or
at least was not in those natures ; but was about
to be generated * by the reason and nature of that
which is posterior. Inteiligibles, therefore, quietly
energizing in themselves, he who desires to know
how time first fell, will not perhaps call upon the
Muses who did not then exist, to tell him. Per¬
haps, however, he will, since the Muses also then
8 Time* as well as the world, is said to have been generated, not because it once was not* for It always existed, but because it depends for its subsistence on causes naturally prior to itself.
had a being.1 Perhaps, too, he will find time itself
generated, so far as it is generated and unfolded
into light. But he will speak about it as follows :
Before this priority originated, and was indigent
of the posterior, the former was quiescent together
with the latter in being, time not yet existing ; but
itself also quietly abiding [i. e. subsisting causally]
in real being. A certain nature, however, much
conversant with action, wishing to govern, and pos¬
sess authority from itself, and chusing to explore
more of the present, was itself indeed moved, and
together with it likewise time, always tending to
hereafter and the posterior, and not to the same,
but to another, and again another existence. But
we from this motion producing a certain length of
progression, conceive time to be the image of eter¬
nity. For since there was a certain unquiet power
* The Muses, considered according to their subsistence in Apollo, belong to the intellectual order, and are therefore superior to time. But if time is supposed to have had a beginning, then the Muses, according to their mundane sub¬ sistence, had no existence prior to the generation of time. To say, therefore, that the Muses did not once exist, is equivalent to the assertion that the intellectual is prior to the mundane order of them, according to nature, order, dignity, and causality.
of the soul, wishing always to transfer what it there
saw to something else, it was not willing that an
at- once-collected all should be present with it. But
as reason [i. e. a productive principle] evolving
itself from a quiet seed, produces as it fancies an
abundant progression, abolishing the abundant by
division, and instead of the one subsisting in
itself, consuming the one which is not in itself, and
thus proceeds into a more imbecile length ; in a
similar manner, this nature of soul, producing the
sensible through the imitation of the intelligible
world, and being moved not with the motion which
is there, but with a motion resembling it, and wish¬
ing to be its image, in the first place indeed, renders
itself temporal, producing this instead of eternity.
In the next place, it causes that which is generated
to be subservient to time, making the whole of it
to be in time, and comprehending all the progres¬
sions of it in time. For the world is moved in the
nature of soul ; since there is not any other place
of this universe than soul, and in the time of soul
it is moved. For soul exhibiting its energy succes¬
sively, generates together with its energy that which
is successive, and proceeds in conjunction with
• another reasoning process after that energy, which
was not before ; since, neither was the discursive
energy of reason effective, nor the present life of
soul similar to that which preceded it. Hence, at
the same time, there is another life, and this other
life will have another time. Distance of life, there¬
fore, [or the interval between one life and another,]
will be attended with time. The perpetual exten¬
sion of life also to the anterior part, will have per¬
petual time : and the past life will be accompanied
with past time. If, therefore, some one should say
that time is the energy 1 of soul, proceeding in a
transitive motion from one life to another, will he
not appear to say something to the purpose? a For
if eternity is life consisting in permanency, and in
8 The word cvepyeia is omitted in the original.
% Time, however, according to Proclus, is a medium be¬ tween that which is alone the cause of motion, as soul, and that which is alone immoveable, as intellect. Hence time is truly, so iar as it is considered in itself, immoveable, but so far as it is in its participants, it is moveable, and subsists toge¬ ther with them, unfolding itself into them. He adds, hence it is a certain proceeding intellect , established indeed in eternity, but proceeding and abundantly flowing into the things which are guarded by it. This definition of time by Proclus, appears to me to be uncommonly beautiful and accurate, bee the whole of the passage from which it is taken, in the Additional Notes to my translation of the Timteus of Plato.
Plot.
an invariable sameness of subsistence, and which is
now infinite, but it is necessary that time should be
the image of eternity, just as this universe is the
image of the intelligible world ; — if this be the case,
instead of the life which is there, it is necessary
there should be another life of the discursive power
of the mundane soul, homonymous as it w^ere to
the life of eternity ; and instead of intellectual
motion, that there should be the motion of a certain
part of the soul. It is also necessary, that instead
of an invariable sameness and permanency of sub¬
sistence, there should be that wdiich does not abide
in the same, but alw?ays has another and another
energy. Likewise, that instead of an essence which
is without interval and one, there should be an
image of the one , and which possesses unity in con¬
tinuity of succession. That instead of that which
is now infinite, and a whole, there should be that
which proceeds ad infinitum, according to what is
perpetually successive. And that instead of an
at-once-collected whole, there should be that which
is a whole according to parts, and is always about
to be a whole. For thus it will imitate that which
is now wholly what it is, and which is at-once-
collected, and infinite, if it wishes its being to con-
sist in perpetual acquisition ; since it will thus also
imitate the being of eternity. It is necessary,
however, not to assume time externally to soul* as
neither is eternity in the intelligible world external
to being. Nor again, must it be considered as any
thing consecutive, or posterior to soul, as neither is
eternity to being. But it must be beheld within,
and subsisting together with soul, in the same man¬
ner as eternity with being.
XII. Here, however, it is necessary to under¬
stand, that this is the nature of time, viz. that it is
the length of such a life as we have before men¬
tioned, proceeding in equable and similar muta¬
tions, which themselves proceed in a silent course;
this length also possessing a continuity of energy.
If, therefore, we again in words make this power to
revert, and the life of it to cease which it now pos¬
sesses, and wThich is unceasing, and will never end,
because it is the energy of a certain ever-existing
soul, not directed to itself, nor in itself, but em¬
ployed in producing and generating if, therefore,
we suppose this power no longer energizing, but
ceasing from this energy, and also this part of the
soul converted to real being and eternity, and
abiding in quiet, what will there any further be
besides eternity? What will any longer be another
and another, where all things abide in one ? And
what will be prior or posterior, or more extended ?
Where, likewise, will the soul any further betake
itself to any other thing than that in which it is ?
Or rather, neither will it betake itself to this. For
in this case, it must have first departed from it, in
order that it may accede to it ; since neither is it
the sphere itself [of the universe] which had not an
existence prior to time. For this sphere exists,
and is moved in time. And though time should
stop, this sphere still continuing to energize, we
should nevertheless measure the duration of its
permanency, as long as the permanency of eternity
is external to it. If, therefore, this sphere becom¬
ing quiescent and united, time is taken away, it is
evident that the commencement of its motion,
round the earth, and this its life, generate time.
Hence, also, it is said [in the Timas us of Plato,]
that time was generated together with the universe,
because soul produced it in conjunction with the
universe. For in an energy of this kind, this world
was generated. And this energy indeed is time,
but the universe is in time. If, however, some one
should say, that the circulations of the stars are
also denominated by Plato times, he should recol¬
lect that he says these were generated for the pur¬
pose of rendering time manifest and distinct, and
that the measure of it might be conspicuous to us.
For since it was not possible for time itself to be
bounded by soul, nor for each part of it to be
measured by us, since it is invisible and incompre¬
hensible, and especially since this is impossible to
those who do not know how to numerate,— hence
the Demiurgus made day and night, through which
mankind were enabled to» apprehend two things by
their difference ; from which, as Plato says, they
arrived at the conception of number. Afterwards
receiving the interval produced by the motion of
the sun from the east to the east again, they appre¬
hended what was the quantity of time, the form of
the motion being equable ; adhering to which, we
use a thing of this kind as a measure of time. For
time itself is not a measure. For how could it
measure ; and what would it say if it measured ?
Will it say this thing is as much in quantity as I
am? Who therefore is it that says I? Is it that
according to which the measure subsists r Has it
not therefore an existence in order that it may
measure, but is not a measure ? Hence the mea¬
sured motion of the universe will be according to
time And time will not be the measure of mo-
tipn, according to that which it is, but according to
accident, so that being something else prior to this,
it renders the quantity of the motion manifest.
One motion also being assumed in so much time,
and being frequently enumerated, leads to a con-
cep tion of the quantity of time that is past. So
that if some one should say that motion and circu¬
lation, after a certain manner, measure time as much
as possible, as manifesting in their quantity the
quantity of time, which cannot in any other way be
assumed or understood, he indeed will not adduce
an absurd manifestation of time. Hence , that
which is measured by circulation , viz. which
is manifested , and not generated by it , will be time .
And thus the measure of motion is that which is
measured by a definite motion, and is measured by
it, as being different from it. For if that which
measures was one thing, and that which is measured
another, but is measured accidentally ; in this case,
it would he just as if some one should say that
what is measured by a cubit is magnitude, but
should not say what that is which defines the mag-
nitude. It would also be just as if some one not
being able to render motion itself manifest on
account of its indefinite nature, should say that
motion is that which is measured by place. For
assuming the place which motion passes through,
he will say that the quantity of the motion is equal
to the quantity of the place.
XIII. Circulation, therefore, renders time in
which it is performed manifest. It is necessary^
however, that time should no longer alone be that
in which something is performed, but that prior to
this it should be what it is, namely, that in which
other things are moved and at rest, in an equable
and orderly manner ; and that from a certain thing
of an orderly nature, it should become apparent,
and shine forth to our conceptions, yet not be gene¬
rated by this thing, whether it is at rest, or in mo¬
tion. It becomes, however, more apparent when
this thing is in motion. For motion contributes
more to the knowledge, and transition to the nature
of time than rest. And the quantity of the motion
of a thing is more known than the quantity of its
rest. Hence [some philosophers] have been in¬
duced to say that time is the measure of motion,.
instead of saying that it is measured by motion.
In the next place, it is requisite to add what that is
which is measured by motion, and not to adduce
that which accidentally takes place about it, and
this alternately. Perhaps, however, they do not
intend to say that this takes place alternately, and
we do not understand their meaning ; but they
clearly asserting that time is a measure according
to that which is measured, we do not apprehend
their conceptions on this subject. The cause
however, why we do not, is because they have not
clearly shown in their writings what time is, whether
it is a measure, or that which is measured, as if
they were writing to those who were acquainted
with their opinions, and to their auditors. Plato,
indeed, does not say that the essence of time is
either a measure, or that which is measured by
something, but asserts in order to render it mani¬
fest, that the circulation [of the universe] is allotted
something which is the smallest [i. e. the centre,]
for the purpose of unfolding the smallest part of
time ; so that from hence both the quality and
quantity of time may be known. Wishing, how¬
ever, to manifest the essence of time, he says that
it was generated together with the universe, and
that it is a moveable image of its paradigm eter¬
nity ; because neither does time remain, life not
remaining, in conjunction with which it runs and is
convolved. But he says, it was generated together
with the universe, because such a life as this pro»
duced the universe, and one life fabricated both the
world and time. If, therefore, this life could be
converted into one, time which exists in this life
would immediately cease, and also the universe, in
consequence of no longer possessing this life.
If, however, some one assuming the prior and
posterior of the life which is here, should assert
this to be time, because this is something, but that
the more true motion which has prior and posterior
is not any thing, his assertion would be most ab¬
surd. For he would ascribe to inanimate motion
the prior and posterior, and also time together with
it, but he would not grant this to the motion
through the imitation of which the inferior motion
exists ; though from this superior motion prior and
posterior primarily subsist, since it is a self¬
operative motion. As, likewise, it generates its
several energies, thus too it produces that which is
successive, and together with the generation a trans-
Ition of energies. Why, therefore, do we refer
this motion of the universe to the comprehension of
the more true motion, and assert that it is in time,
but do not refer to this the motion of soul which
subsists in itself, and proceeds in a perpetual
course? Shall we say it is because that which is
prior to it is eternity, which neither runs in con¬
junction, nor is co-extended with this motion ? This
first motion, therefore, is referred to time which
also it generates, and which together with its own
energy it possesses. How, therefore, is time every
where ? Because this life and motion are not absent
from any part of the world, as neither does the life
which is in us desert any part of us. If, however,
some one should say that time consists in a non¬
hypostasis, or non-hyparxis, for we are deceived
about its essence, in the same manner as when we
say of God that he was or will be ; for thus he
will be and was in the same manner as that in
which it is said he will be , [i. e. in the same manner
as time ;] to assertions of this kind there belongs
another mode of discussion. With respect to all
that has been said, however, it is necessary to. ob¬
serve, that when any one assumes the quantity of
space passed over by a man that is moved, he also
assumes the quantity of the motion, and when he
assumes the quantity of the motion, such for in-
stance as is produced in walking, he directs his
attention to the boundary s of motion existing in
the man prior to this motion, in order that he may
judge whether he has walked to the full extent of
this boundary. And the body, indeed, which has
been moved in so much time, he refers to so much
motion ; for this is the cause of its being moved ;
and to the time of this motion. But he refers this
motion of the body to the motion of the soul which
produced an equality of interval. To what, there¬
fore, will he refer the motion of the soul ? For that
whatever it may be to which he may wush to refer
it, will be now without interval. Hence, this sub¬
sists primarily, and is that in which the rest are
contained ; but it is itself no longer contained in
any thing else. For there is not any thing by
which it can be contained. This, therefore, is
primarily ; and the like takes place in the soul of