* The visive energies of intellect are thus denominated, be¬ cause such an energy is an immediate darting forth as it were to the object of its intuition.
nothing in short has ever been generated about it ;
for otherwise it would not be perpetual being, or
would not always be a certain total being. Is it
therefore now perpetual ? It is not, unless a nature
of such a kind is inherent in it, as to procure credi¬
bility concerning it, that it thus subsists, and no
longer in any other way. So that if again you
survey it by the projecting energies of intellect, you
will find that it is such a thing as this. What
then, if some one should never depart from the
contemplation of it, but should incessantly perse¬
vere in admiring its nature, and should be able to
do this through the possession of an unwearied
nature, such a one perhaps running to eternity,
would there stop, and never decline from it, in
order that he might become similar to it, and eter¬
nal, surveying eternity and the eternal by that
which is eternal in himself. If, therefore, that
which thus subsists is eternal, and always being,
which does not decline in any respect to another
nature, but the life which it possesses is now all,
neither having received, nor receiving, nor being
about to receive any thing in future ; — that which
thus subsists, will indeed be perpetual. And per-
petuity is such a collocation as this of a subject,
subsisting from it, and being inherent in it. But
eternity is the subject in conjunction with a collo¬
cation of this kind presenting itself to the view.
Hence eternity is venerable, and as our intellectual
conception of it says, is the same with deity. But
it says that it is the same with that God [whom we
call by the appellation of being and life.] And
eternity may be properly denominated a God un¬
folding himself into light, and shining forth, such as
he essentially is, viz. as immutable and the same,
and thus firmly established in life. It ought not,
however, to be considered as wonderful, if we say
that it consists of many things. For every thing in
the intelligible world is many, on account of the
infinite power which it possesses ; since the infinite
receives its appellation from a never-failing essence.
And this properly, because nothing pertaining to it
is consumed. Hence, if some one should thus
denominate eternity, calling it life which is now
infinite, because it is all, and nothing of which is
consumed, because nothing pertaining to it is either
past or future, since otherwise it would not be all
things at once ; — if some one should thus denomi-
nate it, he will be near to the true definition 1 of it.
For what is afterwards added, viz. that it is all
things at once, and that nothing of it is consumed,
will be an exposition of the assertion, that it is now
infinite life.
VI. Because, however, such a nature as this,
thus all-beautiful and perpetual, subsists about the
one , proceeding from and with it, and in no respect
departing from it, but always abides about and in
the one , and lives according to it, hence I think it
is beautifully and with a profundity of decision,
said by Plato, that “ eternity abides in one,” 1 that
he might not only lead it to the one which is in
itself, but that he might also in a similar manner
lead the life of being about the one . This, there¬
fore, is that which we investigate, and that which
thus abides is eternity. For this very thing, and
1 This definition of eternity is justly admired by Proclus in his 3d book On the Theology of Plato, of which see my trans¬ lation. Boetius, likewise, as I have elsewhere observed, has adopted this definition in lib. 5. De Consol. Philosoph.
* Plato, however, does not by the one in this place, mean the ineffable principle of things, but the one of being, or the summit of the intelligible order, as is shown by Proclus in the above mentioned work.
which thus abides, which is the energy of a life
abiding from itself, subsisting with and in the one ,
and which neither in existing nor living is false and
fictitious, will certainly be eternity. For to be
truly, is never not to be, nor to be otherwise. But
the former of these is to be invariably the same ;
and the latter is to be without diversity. Hence it
has not in any respect, another and another. You
must not, therefore, conceive it to have interval, nor
evolve, nor extend it. Neither, therefore, must
you admit that there is any thing of prior and pos¬
terior in it. Hence, if there is neither prior nor
posterior about it, but the is, is the truest of all
the things about it, and is itself, and this in such a
way as to be essence and life ; — if this be the case,
again that which we call eternity will present itself
to our view. But when we say that it is always,
and that it is not at one time being, and at another
time non-being, it is requisite to think that we thus
speak for the sake of perspicuity ; since the term
always, is perhaps not properly employed, but is
assumed for the purpose of manifesting its incor¬
ruptible 1 nature. And farther still, it signifies that
1 After του άφθαρτου in the Greek, the words πλανώ αν την φυχψ', ets εκβασιν τον πλειονοε follow, which are to me uiiiiif
it never fails. Perhaps, however, it would be
better to call it only being. But though being is a
name sufficient to essence, yet since some are of
opinion that generation also is, essence, it is requi¬
site for the sake of discipline to add the term al¬
ways. For one thing is not being, but another
perpetual being ; as neither is a philosopher one
thing, but a true philosopher another. Because,
however, some persons are only philosophers in
appearance, the addition of a true philosopher be¬
came necessary. Thus, likewise, the always was
added to being, and being to the always . So that
it was called axon ; on which account the always
was assumed, in order that the conjunction of being
with the always , might indicate that which is truly
being. The always , likewise, must be contracted
into a power devoid of interval, and which besides
what it now possesses, is not in want of any thing.
But it possesses every thing. Hence it is every
thing and being, and is not indigent of any thing.
telligible. Something, I conceive, is omitted ; but ί am not able to conjecture what the omission is. The version of these words by Ficinus is certainly nonsense ; for it is, " animum potest reddere vagabundum per quendam in plura exitum et proven! um.”
Nor is a nature of this kind, full indeed in one re¬
spect, but deficient in another. For that which
exists in time, though it may seem to be as perfect
as is sufficient to body, yet it is perfect through
soul, and is in want of something future, because it
is deficient in time of which it is indigent ; so that it
exists together with time, if it is present with it,
and being imperfect, runs in conjunction with it.
On this account, therefore, it is equivocally said to
be a perfect being. That, however, which is a
thing; of such a kind, as neither to be in want of
futurity, nor to be measured by some other time,
nor to be in futurity infinite, and this infinitely,
but now possesses that which it ought to be ; — -this
is that after which our intellectual conception
aspires ; the being of which is not derived from a
certain quantity of extension, but is prior to all
quantity. For it is fit, since it is not of a definite
quantity, that it should not at all come into contact
with quantity, lest the life of it being divided,
should lose its pure impartibiiity ; but that it
should be both in life and essence impartible.
When, however, it is said in the Timasus that the
demiurgus was good, this must be referred to the
conception of the universe, signifying that what is
beyond the universe, does not originate from a cer¬
tain time ; so that neither is the world allotted a
certain temporal beginning, since the cause of its
existence is the source of priority. At the same
time, however, Plato thus speaking for the sake of
perspicuity, blames afterwards this expression was
goody as not altogether rightly employed in things
which are allotted what is called and is intellec¬
tually conceived to be, an eternal subsistence^
VII. Do we, therefore, bear witness to the
things of which we now speak, as to things foreign
from our nature ? But how is this possible ? For
how can intellectual perception be effected, except
by contact ? And how can we come into contact
with things that are foreign to us ? It is necessary,
therefore, that we also should participate of eter¬
nity. Since, however, we exist in time, how is this
possible ? But we shall know what it is to be in
time, and what it is to be in eternity, when we
have discovered what time is. We must, therefore,
descend from eternity to time, and the investigation
of time. For there, indeed, the progression was to
that which is above, but we must now speak de¬
scending, yet not profoundly, but our descent must
Plot . N
be such as that of time· If, indeed, nothing had
been said concerning time by ancient and blessed
men, it would be necessary that connecting from
the beginning what follows with eternity, we should
endeavour to speak what appears to us to be the
truth on this subject, and to adapt our opinion to
the conception of it which we possess. Now,
however, it is necessary first to assume those asser¬
tions which especially deserve attention, and to
consider if what we say is concordant with some
one of them. But perhaps the assertions concern-
ing time, ought in the first place to receive a three¬
fold division. For time may be said to be either
motion, or that which is moved, or something per¬
taining to motion. For to say that it is either
permanency, or that which is stable, or something
pertaining to permanency, will be perfectly remote
from the conception of time, since it is in no re¬
spect the same, [and therefore, can never accord
with that which is stable.] Of those, however,
who sav that time is motion, some indeed assert
that it is every motion ; but others, that it is the
motion of the universe. But those who say it is
that which is moved, assert it to be the sphere of
the universe. And of those who say it is some-
thing pertaining to motion, or the interval of mo¬
tion ; some assert that it is the measure of motion,
but others that it is an attendant on it, and either
on every motion, or on that which is arranged/
VIII. It is not, indeed, possible, that time should
be motion, neither if all motions are assumed, and
one as it were is produced from all of them, nor if
that motion is assumed which is orderly. For each
of these motions is in time. If, however, some
one should say that motion is not in time, much
less will motion be time ; since that in which mo¬
tion is, is one thing, and motion itself another a
1 Archytas the Pythagorean defined time to be the universal interval of the nature of the universe, in consequence of sur» veying the continuity in the productive principles of that na¬ ture, and their departure into division. Others still more ancient defined time to be, as the name manifests, a certain dance of intellect ; but others defined it to be the periods of soul ; others, the natural receptacle of these periods ; and others, orderly circulations ; all which (says Iamblichus, from whom this information is derived) the Pythagoric sect com¬ prehends. Both Archytas also and Aristotle appear to have admitted time to be a continued and indivisible fux of nows . See a treasure of the conceptions of the ancients on this sub¬ ject, in the Additional Notes to my translation of Aristotle’s Physics.
For a\y ov here, it is necessary to read άλλον.
thing. Since, however, there are besides these
other assertions, it may be sufficient to observe,
that motion may indeed cease and be interrupted,
but time cannot. But if some one should say that
the motion of the universe is not interrupted, yet
this motion, if it is admitted that the circulation
[of the world] is in a certain time, will itself be
carried round to the same point from whence it
began ; and not to that point in which the half of
it only is accomplished. And this motion, indeed,
will be the half, but the other will be double, each
being the motion of the universe, both that which
proceeds from the same to the same, and that
which arrives only at the half. The assertion, also,
that the motion of the outermost sphere is most
vehement and rapid, bears witness to what we say *
so that the motion of it is one thing, and time
another. For that motion is the most rapid of all,
which in the least time passes through the greatest
interval. But other motions are slower, which are
performed in a longer time, and pass through a
part only of the same space. If, therefore, time
is not the motion of the outermost sphere, much
less will it be that sphere itself, which in conse*
quence of being moved is conceived to be time.
Is, therefore, time something belonging to motion ?
If indeed it is interval, in the first place, there is
not the same interval of every motion, nor of uni¬
form motion. For the motion which is in place is
swifter and slower, and both the intervals may be
measured by another third interval, which may
with greater rectitude be denominated time. But
of which of these motions will time be the interval ?
Or rather, will it be the interval of any one of them,
since they are infinite ? And if time is the interval
of orderly motion, it is not the interval of every
motion, nor of every motion of this kind. For
these are many. So that there will also be at once
many times. But if time is the interval of the uni¬
verse, if indeed it is the interval in motion itself,
what else will it be than motion, viz. so much ; and
this quantity of motion will either be measured by
place, because the place which it passes through is
so much in quantity, and the interval will be this.
This, however, is not time, but place. Or motion
by its continuity, and from not immediately ceasing,
but being always assumed, possesses interval. But
this will be the multitude of motion. And if some
one looking to motion should assert that it is much,
just as if it should be said that heat is much, neither
will time here also present itself to our view, nor
become obvious ; but motion again and again will
occur, like water repeatedly flowing, and also the
interval which is beheld in it. The again and again
also will be number, as the duad or the triad ; but
the interval will belong to bulk. Thus, therefore,
the multitude of motion will he as the decad, or as
the interval which is beheld as it were in the bulk
of motion, which is not attended with a conception
of time. But this quantity of motion will be gene¬
rated in time ; for otherwise, time will not be every
where, but will be in motion as in a subject. It
will, likewise, again happen that time will be said
to be motion For the interval is not external to
motion, but is motion not at once collected toge¬
ther. But if it is not at once collected, if an at-
once-collected subsistence is in time, in what re¬
spect does that which is not at-once-collected differ
from that which is P Shall we say that they differ in
time ; so that the separating motion, and the inter¬
val of it, are not time itself, but subsist in time ? If,
however, some one should say, that the interval of
motion is time, by the interval not meaning the
peculiarity of motion, but that with which motion
has an extension* as if running together with it, yet
what this is, k not unfolded. For it is evident
that time is that in which the motion was generated*
This, therefore, is that which was investigated from
the first, viz. what that existing thing is which is
time ; since this is just as if some one being asked
what time is, should say that the interval of motion
is in time. What, therefore, is this interval, which
he calls time, who supposes it to be external to the
proper interval of motion ? For again, he who places
temporal interval in motion itself, will be dubious
where he should place the interval of rest. For as
much as a certain thing is moved, so much also
will something else have been quiescent. And you
may say that the time of each is the same, though
its relation to the one, is different from its relation
to the other. What therefore is this interval, and
what nature does it possess ? For it is not possible
that it should be local, since this has an external
subsistence.
IX. In the next place, it must be considered
how time is the number or measure of motion ; for
it is better to assert this of it, on account of its
continuity. In the first place, therefore, here also
it may be doubted* whether it is similarly the num-
her or measure of every motion, in the same manner
as it was dubious respecting the interval of motion.
For how can any one numerate inordinate and ano-
malous motion, or what number or measure will
there be of it, or according to what will the measure
subsist ? But if he numerates and measures with
the same thing, both irregular and regular motion,
whether swift or slow, the number and the measure
will be a thing of such a kind, as if it were the
decad, measuring both horses and oxen, or as if
the same thing were the measure both of moist and
dry substances. If, therefore, time is a measure
of this kind, it has indeed been shown what the
things are of which time is the measure, viz. that it
is the measure of motions, but it has not yet been
shown what time is. If, however, in the same
manner as the decad when assumed without horses,
may be understood as number, and a measure is a
measure possessing a certain proper nature, though
it should not yet measure any thing, thus also it is
necessary time should subsist, being a measure; —
if therefore time is such a thing in itself as number,
in what will it differ from this number which sub¬
sists according to the decad, or from any other
monadic number ? But if it is a continued measure,
being a certain quantity, it will be such a measure
as a certain cubital magnitude. It will, therefore,
be magnitude, such as a line accompanied with
motion. But how, since it also runs, can it mea¬
sure that with which it runs in conjunction ? For
why should one measure rather than the other ?
And it is better and more probable to admit this
not in every motion, but in that with which it con¬
curs. This, however, ought to be continuous, so
far as the concurrent motion is successive. But
that which measures ought not to be considered as
subsisting externally, nor as separate, but as at
once measured motion. And what will that be
w hich measures ? Will the motion indeed be mea¬
sured, but the magnitude be that w?hich measures ?
And which of these will time be ? Will it be the
measured motion, or the magnitude which mea¬
sures ? For time will either be the motion which is
measured by magnitude, or magnitude which mea¬
sures, or that which uses magnitude, as a cubit for
the purpose of measuring the quantity of the mo¬
tion. In all these, however, it is more probable as
we have said to suppose that the motion is equable.
For without equability, and besides this, without
one motion of the universe, the doubt will be
greater than that which results from admitting that
time is in some way or other the measure of
motion. But if time is measured motion, and is
measured by quantity, then just as if it were neces¬
sary that motion should be measured, it would not
be requisite that it should be measured by itself,
but by something else, thus also it is necessary, if
motion has another measure besides itself, and on
this account we are in want of a continuous mea¬
sure, for the purpose of measuring it, that magni¬
tude itself should have a measure, in order that the
motion may be as much in quantity as its measure.
And thus time will be the number of the magnitude
attending the motion, and not the magnitude which
runs in conjunction with the motion.