ο ν Eternity and Time
I. With respect to eternity and time, we say
that each of these is different from the other, and
that one of them indeed is conversant with a per¬
petual nature, but the other about that which is
generated. We also think that we have a certain
clear perception of these in our souls spontaneously,
and, as it were, from the more collected projections
of intellectual conception ; always and every where
calling these by the same appellations. When,
however, we endeavour to accede to the inspection
of these, and to approach as it were nearer to them,
again we are involved in doubt, admitting some of
the decisions of the ancients about these, and re¬
jecting others, and perhaps receiving differently the
same decisions. Resting also in these, and think-
Plot. * M
mg it sufficient if when interrogated we are able to
relate the opinion of the ancients concerning time
and eternity, we are liberated from any farther
investigation about them. It is necessary, there¬
fore, to think that some of the ancient and blessed
philosophers have discovered the truth ; but it is fit
to consider who those are that have obtained it,
and after what manner we also may acquire the
same knowledge on these subjects. In the first
place, however, it is requisite to investigate what
those conceive eternity to be, who admit that it is
different from time. For that which is established
as the paradigm being known, that also which is the
image of it, and which they say is time, will per¬
haps become manifest* But if some one, prior to
the survey of eternity, should imagine what time is,
it will happen to him, proceeding from hence thither
by reminiscence, that he will behold the nature to
which time is assimilated, if the latter has a simili¬
tude to the former.
II. What, therefore, is it requisite we should
assert eternity to be ? Shall w?e say it is the intelli¬
gible essence itself, just as if some one should say
that time is the whole heaven and the world ? For
some are said to have had this opinion concerning
time. For since we imagine and conceive eternity
to be something most venerable, and an intelligible
nature is also most venerable, we are unable to say
which is the more venerable of the two ; and since
also, that which is beyond these is not to be predi¬
cated in the same way, some one may he induced
to consider eternity and an intelligible essence as
the same. For again, both the intelligible world
and eternity comprehend in themselves the same
things. When, however, we say that the one is in
the other, we place intelligibles in eternity ; and
when we predicate the eternal of intelligibles, as
when Plato in the Timaeus says, “ if the nature of
the paradigm is eternal,” we then assert that the
eternal is different from the intelligible. Never¬
theless, we say that it either exists about, or in, or
is present with an intelligible essence. That each
of them, however, is venerable, does not manifest a
sameness of nature ; for perhaps the venerableness
of the one is derived from the other. With respect
to comprehension also, that of the intelligible is as
of parts, but eternity comprehends the whole at
once not as a part, but because all such things as
are eternal subsist according to it. Shall we, there-
fore, say that eternity exists according to the per¬
manency which is in intelligibles ; just as here,
time is said to exist according to motion ? It may,
however, be very properly investigated, whether
eternity is the same with permanency, or whether it
is not simply the same, but is the same with the
permanency which is about essence. For if it is
the same with permanency [simply considered] in
the first place, we cannot say that permanency is
eternal, as neither do we say that eternity is eternal.
For the eternal is that which participates of eter¬
nity. And in the next place, how is motion eter¬
nal ? For thus it will be stable. Farther still, how
does the conception of permanency contain in itself
ihe ever ? I do not mean the ever which is in time,
but such as we intellectually perceive when we
speak of the eternal. But if it contains the ever in
the stability of essence, again, we shall separate
the other genera of being from eternity. Besides,
it is not only necessary to conceive eternity as sub¬
sisting in permanency, but also as subsisting in one.
And in the next place, we must admit that eternity
is without interval, in order that it may not be the
same with time. Permanency, however, so far as
it is permanency, neither contains in itself the con-
ception of unity, nor of that which is without inter-
val. But we predicate of eternity that it abides
in one. Hence, it will participate of permanency,
but will not be permanency itself.
III. What, therefore, will that be according to
which we say, the whole world which is there is
eternal and perpetual ? And what is perpetuity ?
Whether it is the same with eternity, or eternity
subsists according to perpetuity. Shall we say,
therefore, that it is necessary to conceive of eternity
as one certain thing, but a certain intelligence or
nature collected together from many things, whe¬
ther it be something consequent to the natures in
the intelligible world, or existing together with, or
perceived in them, but which is able to effect and is
many things. Indeed, he who surveys an abundant
power collected into one, according to this parti¬
cular thing which is as it were a subject, he deno¬
minates it essence ; afterwards, so far as he be¬
holds life in it, he denominates it motion ; and in
the next place, he calls it permanency, so far as it
entirely possesses an invariable sameness of sub¬
sistence. And he denominates it different and the
same, so far as all these are at once one. Thus,
therefore, composing these, so as to be at once one
life alone, contracting in them difference, and be¬
holding an unceasing sameness of ener gy, and which
never passes from one intelligence or life to ano¬
ther, but always possesses the invariable, and is
without interval ; — beholding all these, he will be¬
hold eternity. For he will perceive life abiding in
sameness, and always possessing every thing pre¬
sent, and not at one time this, and afterwards ano¬
ther thing, but containing all things at once, and
not now some things, and again others. For it is
an impartible end ; just as in a point where all
things subsist at once, and have not }ret proceeded
into a [linear] flux. It likewise abides in the same,
i. e. in itself, and does not suffer any change. But
it is always in the present, because nothing of it is
past, nor again will be in future, but this very thing
which it is, it always is. Hence, eternity is not a
subject, but that which as it were shines forth from
a subject, according to sameness itself, which it
announces not concerning the future, but that
which is now present, indicating that it subsists in
this manner, and in no other. For what can after¬
wards happen to this, which it now is not? Nor
again, will it be in futurity what it is not at present.
For there is not any thing from which it can arrive
at the present time. For it is not another thing,
hut this. Nor will it be this in future, which it
does not now possess from necessity ; nor does it
possess about itself that which was. For what is
there which was present with it and is past? Nor
does that which will be, belong to it. For what is
there which will happen to it? It remains, there¬
fore, that in to be , it is that which it is. Hence,
that which neither was, nor will be, but alone is,
stably possessing its being, in consequence of not
changing into will be, nor having been changed
from the past, is eternity. The life, therefore,
which is about being, and which in existence or
to be , is at once total and full, and every where
without interval, is the eternity which we investi-
gate.
IV. Nor must we think that this [eternity]
happens externally to that nature, [viz. to being
itself,] but that it is in it, and from it, and subsists
together with it. For it is seen to be profoundly
inherent in it. For perceiving all such other things
as we say are there, to be inherent, we assert that
all of them are from, and subsist together with
essence. For it is necessary that things which
have a primary subsistence, should exist together
with first essences, and should be contained in
them ; since the beautiful also is in and from them,
and truth also is inherent in them. And in a cer¬
tain degree, indeed, the whole itself is as it were in
a part, and the things which are there are as parts
in a whole, as if in reality this were an all not col¬
lected from parts, but itself generating parts, in
order that through this it may be truly all. The
truth also which is there, is not a concord with
something else that is intelligible, but of each thing
itself of which it is the truth. It is necessary,
therefore, that the whole of this which is true, if it
is truly all, should not only be every thing so far as
it is all things, but likewise that the all should sub¬
sist in such a way, as not to be in any thing defi¬
cient. But if this be the case, nothing will accede
to it. For if something will be added to it, it was
prior to the accession of this deficient. Hence,
prior to this it was not every thing. But what can
happen to it preternaturally ? For it suffers nothing.
If, therefore, nothing can accede to it, it neither is
about to be, nor will be, nor was. If, indeed, you
take away from generated natures, the it will be ,
since they subsist in perpetual acquisition, non-
existence is immediately present with them. But
to things which are not such as these, if you add
the it will he , a departure from the seat of exist¬
ence is the consequence of such an addition. For
it is evident that existence is not connascent with
them, if they are in any respect indebted to futurity
for their subsistence. For in generated natures,
indeed, essence is seen to be an extension from the
beginning of generation, to the extremity of the
time in which they no longer exist. This it is,
therefore, for them to be ; and if any one should
deprive them of this extension of being, their life
would be diminished. So that it is necessary that
the existence of the universe also, should be an ex¬
tension of this kind. Hence, it hastens to be in
futurity, and is not willing to stop, since it attracts
existence to itself, in performing another and ano¬
ther thing, and is moved in a circle through a cer¬
tain desire of essence. So that we have found
what existence is in such natures as these, and also
what the cause is of a motion which thus hastens
to be perpetually in the future periods of time. In
first and blessed natures, however, there is not any
desire of the future ; for they are now the whole,
and whatever of life they ought to possess, they
wholly possess, so that they do not seek after any
thing, because there is not any thing which can be
added to them in futurity. Hence, neither does
that happen to them in which there is the future.
The all-perfect and total essence therefore of being,
is not only total in its parts, but is not in any thing
deficient, and is that to which nothing pertaining to
non-being can happen ; for it is not only necessary
that all beings should be present with the all , and
the whole , but likewise that nothing should be
added to it of that which sometimes is not. Hence
this disposition and nature of the all -perfect essence
of being, will be eternity. For eternity is denomi¬
nated from that which always is.
V. He, however, will know that eternity T thus
subsists, who by the projecting * energies of intel¬
lect is able to speak concerning it : or rather, he
who sees it to be a thing of such a kind, that
s Instead of nvt here, it appears to me to be necessary to read τω αιωνι.