1 For ερωτητι here, it is necessary to read ετεροτητι.
as opinions and imaginations in the soul are not
mingled with each other, but each again departs,
as being alone that which it is, neither attracting,
nor leaving any thing, because it was not mingled,
and having the external, not because it is super¬
jacent, and is visibly different from that in which
it is, but because reason distinguishes the one from
the other. Here, therefore, imagination is as it
were an image, (the soul not being an image natu¬
rally,) though it appears to be the leader of many
things, and to lead them where it pleases. The
soul, nevertheless, uses the imagination as matter,
or as that which is analogous to matter. The ima¬
gination, however, does not conceal the soul, since
the soul by its energies frequently expels the phan¬
tasy ; nor would it ever be able to conceal it,
though it should be wholly diffused through it,
though this by the imagination appears to be some¬
times effected. For the soul contains in herself
energies and reasons contrary to those of the phan¬
tasy by which the acceding [phantasms] are re¬
pelled. Matter, however, is much more imbecile
than the soul, and contains nothing of beings whe¬
ther true or false, w;hich is properly its own.
Neither has it any thing through which it may be-
come apparent, being a solitude of all things. It
is, however, the cause to other things of their appa¬
rent subsistence ; but is not able to say even this
of itself, I am here, [though I am by no means
visible.] And if at any time a certain profound
reason discovers where it is concealed among be¬
ings, it exclaims that it is something deserted by all
beings, and by things which appear to be posterior
to beings, that it it is likewise attracted to all things,
and as it seems follows, and again does not follow
them.
XVI. Moreover, a certain reason acceding
and extending matter as far as it proceeds into it,
causes it to be great, investing it from itself with
greatness, w hich is not in matter. But matter does
not through this become quantity ; for if it did,
that which is great in it would be magnitude. If,
therefore, some one takes away this form, the sub¬
ject no longer is, nor w ill appear to be great. But
if that which is generated was great, man and horse,
and together with horse the magnitude of horse
which accedes, would depart on the departure of
horse. If, however, it should be said, that horse is
generated in a certain great bulk and of a certain
extent, and that the magnitude remains, we reply
that it is not the magnitude of the horse, but the
magnitude of the bulk which there remains.
Nevertheless, if this bulk is fire or earth, on the
departure of fire or earth, the magnitude of fire or
of earth will also depart. Matter, therefore, will
neither enjoy figure, nor magnitude ; for otherwise
it would not be something else from fire, but re¬
maining fire, it would not become fire. Hence,
matter having now become as we see, as great in
extent as the universe, if the heavens should cease
$o exist, and all they contain, together with these,
all magnitude would likewise depart from matter,
and at the same time all other qualities, and matter
would be left that which it was before, preserving
no one of the things which had a prior subsistence
about it. In the natures, however, which suffer by
the presence of certain things, something is still
left in the recipients, when those things depart ;
but this is no longer the case with natures that do
not suffer. Thus the air which is surrounded with
light, retains nothing of the light when it departs.
But if some one should wonder how it is possible,
that a thing should become great which does not
possess magnitude ; it may also be doubted how
that can become hot which has not heat. For it is
not the same thing in matter, to he matter and to
be magnitude ; since magnitude is immaterial, in
the same manner as figure is immaterial. And if
we preserve matter, we must assert that it is all
things by participation. But magnitude is one of
all things. In bodies, therefore, which are compo¬
sites, there is magnitude together with other things,
yet it is not indefinite ; since in the definition of
body magnitude also is included. But in matter,
even indefinite magnitude is not included ; for it is
not body.
XVII. Neither, again, will matter be magni¬
tude itself. For magnitude is form, but not the
recipient of form ; and magnitude subsists by itself.
If matter, likewise, cannot adapt to itself the imita¬
tions of beings,1 on this account also it is not mag¬
nitude. Since, however, that which is placed in
intellect or in soul, wishes to be great, it imparts to
those things which by proceeding as it were, en¬
deavour to imitate it, by the desire of, or motion
towards it, the ability of impressing the same pas-
* For αντων here, it is necessary to read οντων»
sion in another thing. That which is great, there¬
fore, running in the progression of the phantasy so
as to cause the smallness of matter to run in con¬
junction with it, occasions matter also to appear
great, though it is not filled by the co-extension.
For this greatness of matter is falsely great, since
by not having the power to be great, and being ex¬
tended towards magnitude, it becomes amplified by
the extension. For since all beings produce in
other things, or in another thing the representation
of themselves as in mirrors, each of the agents is in
a similar manner 1 great ; and the universe also is
great in this way. The magnitude, therefore, of
each productive principle, as of that of a horse or
any thing else concurs with the particular thing to
which the productive principle pertains. And every
appearance, indeed, of things as in a mirror is great
in consequence of being illuminated by greatness
itself. Each portion of them, likewise, becomes
something great, and all things at once present
themselves to the view from every form of which
magnitude is one. From each form, also, there is,
as it were, an extension to every thing and to all
* Instead of ws avro here, it is accessary to read ωσαυτωζ.
things, and this is to be compelled in form. Power,
too, produces as much in bulk as bulk is capable
of receiving ; so that what is [in reality] nothing,
appears to be all things. Hence colour which
proceeds from what is not colour, and the quality
in sensibles which is derived from what is not
quality, have an equivocal appellation from their
producing causes. Magnitude, also, proceeds from
that which is not magnitude, or from that which is
homonymously magnitude ; these 1 being surveyed
as having a subsistence between matter itself, and
form itself. And they become apparent, indeed,
because they are derived from form themselves.
They have, however, a false subsistence, because
that in w?hich they are apparent is not [truly.] But
each of them becomes extended into magnitude,
being attracted by the power of the things which
are seen in matter, and which make for themselves
a place. There is, however, an attraction to all
things, yet not by violence, because the universe is
matter. But each thing attracts according to the
power which it possesses ; and derives from the
representation of magnitude itself, the ability of
1 viz. Colour, quality, and magnitude.
making matter so great as it appears to be. Hence
the magnitude which is here is the phantasm of it
which is apparent. Matter, however, being com»
pelled to concur with this attraction, at once im¬
parts itself wholly and every where ; for it is the
matter of the universe, and not some particular
matter. But that which is not of itself some par»
ticular thing, may on account of something else be¬
come contrary to what it was, and having become
contrary, no longer is [what it was] ; since if it
were, it w ould cease to be changed.
XVIII. If some one, therefore, possessing an
intellectual conception of magnitude, should have
this conception attended with a power not only of
subsisting in itself, but also of proceeding as it were
externally, and the powder should receive a nature
not existing in the intellectual perceiver, nor having
a certain form, nor a certain vestige of magnitude
or of any other form, what would he produce
through this power ? Not a horse, or an ox. For
other powers would produce these. Or shall we
say, that since this power proceeds from a great
father, nothing else [besides matter] is able to re¬
ceive this magnitude, and that its possession of it
will only be imaginary, and not real. Hence, to
that which does not so obtain magnitude, as to be
in its own nature the great itself, it remains for it to
be apparently only as much as possible great. But
this is not to be deficient, and not to proceed to
many things in many places ; but to possess in
itself kindred parts, and not to leave any thing des¬
titute of itself. For it is not possible that in a
small bulk, there should still be an equal image of
magnitude, since it is an image of greatness ; but
so far as it aspires through its hope, it accedes as
far as it is possible for it to accede, and running in
conjunction with that which is not able to leave it,
it causes that to be great w hich is not great, yet not
so as to appear to he the magnitude which is seen
in bulk. At the same time, however, matter pre¬
serves its own nature, using this magnitude as a
vestment, through which it ran together with it,
when magnitude running became its leader. But
if at any time it should divest itself of magnitude,
it would again remain the same as it w as before in
itself ; or would be as great as form when present
caused it to be. And soul, indeed, possessing the
forms of beings, since she is also herself a form,
contains all things at once. Since, likewise, each
form is at once wholly contained in her, hence per¬ ceiving the forms of sensibles as it were converted
and acceding to her, she cannot endure to receive
them with multitude, but sees them divested of
bulk. For she cannot become any thing else than
what she is.
Matter, however, having nothing repercussive ;
for it has no energy ; but being a shadow, stays to
suffer whatever the producing cause may effect in
it. That also which proceeds from the reason that
is in soul, has now a vestige of the thing which is
about to be effected ; just as in the iconic nature of
the phantasy, reason which is moved, or the motion
from reason, is a division into parts ; since if it was
one and the same, it would not be moved, but be
permanent. Matter, however, is not able to intro¬
duce at once all things into itself, for if it were
able, it would be some one of all things. But since
it is necessary that it should receive all things, yet
not impartibly, it is requisite that existing as the
place of all things, it should proceed to all things,
meet with them, and be sufficient for every interval,
because it is not itself comprehended by interval,
but is exposed to the reception of it. How does it
happen, therefore, that one thing entering into
matter, does not impede other things ? It is because
all things cannot enter together at the same time ;
for if they could, there would not be any thing
which is first. But if there is, it is the form of the
universe ; so that all things are indeed simulta¬
neous, but each has a partial existence. For the
matter of the animal nature is distributed in con¬
junction with the division of the animal into parts.
For if this were not the case, nothing would have
been produced besides reason.
XIX. The things, therefore, which enter into
matter as a mother, neither injure it, nor benefit it.
For the impulses of these do not pertain to matter,
but to each other, because the powers of these also
pertain to contraries, but not to subjects, unless the
subjects are considered in conjunction with the im¬
pulses. For heat destroys cold, and the black the
white; or if they are mingled together, another
quality is produced from the mixture. Hence,
things which are mingled suffer ; but with them, to
suffer, is not to be that which they were before.
In animated natures, also, the passions indeed, are
about the bodies, the change in quality taking place
according to the inherent qualities and powers.
But when their state of existence is dissolved, or
congregated, or transposed preternatu rally, then,
the passions indeed are in the bodies, but know¬
ledge is in the souls that perceive the more vehe¬
ment passions. If, however, they do not perceive
them, they have no knowledge of them, but matter
still remains. For matter suffers nothing, when
cold departs, and heat accedes ; since neither of
these is either friendly or foreign to it. Hence, the
appellations of a receptacle and nurse are more
appropriate to it [than any other names.] But *vhy
is it called a mother ? For it does not generate.
Those, however, appear to have denominated it a
mother, who think that a mother has the relation
of matter towards her offspring, as alone receiving,
but imparting nothing to the things begotten ; since
whatever of body there is in the offspring, is de¬
rived from the nutriment. But if the mother im¬
parts any thing to her progeny, it is not so far as
she has the relation of matter, but because she is
also form. For form alone is prolific, but the
other nature is barren. Whence , also , I think the
ancient wise men obscurely signifying this in their
mysteries , represent the ancient Hermes always
possessing the organ of generation erects thus
manifesting that it is intelligible reason which
generates in the sensible universe . But they in -
dicated the unproliflc nature of matter which al¬
ways remains the same , by the barren substances
which were placed about it . For they introduce
the mother of all things, which they thus proclaim,
receiving the principle according to the subject,
and they give her this appellation in order to render
their meaning manifest, wishing to indicate to
those who are desirous of more accurately compre¬
hending the nature of matter, and who do not in-
vestigate it superficially, that it is not entirely
similar to a mother. By this, indeed, they demon¬
strate remotely, but at the same time as much as
they are able, that matter is unprolific, and not
perfectly feminine ; but that it is of a female nature
so far as it receives, but not so far as pertains to a
generative power. For that which has proceeded
into matter, is neither feminine, nor able to gene¬
rate, but is separated from all generative power,
which is alone inherent in that which continues to
be of a masculine nature.