XII, But Plato having formed this conception
of matter, and not admitting that participation in
it, is as if form was generated in a subject, and im¬
parted to it morphe, so as to become one compo¬
site, the things which it participates being co-trans-
muted, and as it were co-mingled, and co-passive,
—Plato, therefore, not being willing to adopt such
a mode of participation as this, but desiring to show
how matter remaining impassive possesses forms,
investigated a paradigm of impassive participation,
without which it is not easy to show what those
things especially are, which when present preserve
the subject one and the same. He likewise excites
many doubts, while hastening to obtain the object
of his enquiry, and besides this, washing to repre¬
sent to us the vacuity of subsistence in sensibles,
and that the region of the resemblance of reality is
very ample. Supposing, therefore, that matter by
figures produces passions in animated bodies, while
at the same time it has itself none of these passions,
he indicates by this the stability of matter ; ena¬
bling us to collect by a syllogistic process that
matter neither suffers, nor is changed in quality by
these figures. For in these bodies indeed [which
are the objects of sense,] and which receive one
figure after another, perhaps some one may say a
change in quality is effected, asserting that the mu¬
tation of figure is an homonymous alliation.1
Since matter, however, has neither any figure, nor
any magnitude, how can it be said that the presence
of figure, in whatever way this may take place, is
alliation, though it should homonymously be said
to be so ? If, therefore, some one adopting this
conception of Plato as legitimate, should assert that
the subject nature [i. e, matter] does not possess
any thing in such a way as it is thought to possess
it, he will not speak absurdly. In what manner,
however, does matter possess forms, if you are not
willing to admit that it possesses them as figures?
But the hypothesis of Plato indicates as much as
possible the impassivity of matter, and the apparent
presence of images in it, which are not [in reality]
present.
Perhaps, however, we ought first to speak fur¬
ther about the impassivity of matter. Plato,
therefore, teaches us that we ought to be led by
usual appellations to the consideration of its passi¬
vity, as when he says it becomes dry, or ignited, or
moist, and receives the forms of air and water.
* i. c, Λ change in quality.
For the assertion that it receives these forms, miti¬
gates the force of the other assertion, that matter is
ignited and becomes moist. He likewise manifests
when he says that matter receives forms, that it is
not itself invested with morphe, but that the mor-
phse are in the same state as when they entered
into matter ; and that the term ignited is not pro-
perly applied to matter, but rather fire in genera¬
tion, or becoming to be. For it is not the same
thing for fire to be in generation, and for a thing to
be ignited. For to be ignited is indeed effected in
another thing, in which there is also passivity. But
how can that which is a part of fire, be itself ignited ?
For this would be just the same as if some one
should say, that the statue proceeded through the
brass, or fire through matter, and besides this ignited
it. Farther still, if that which accedes is reason or
a productive principle, how will it ignite P Shall
we say on account of figure ? But that which
ignited already consists both of matter and figure.
How, therefore, can it consist of both, unless it
becomes one from both ? Or shall we say that
though it becomes one, yet not from two things
having passions in each other, but acting upon
other things ? Does this, therefore, arise from the
agency of both, or from one of them causing the
other not to Ay away ? When, however, a certain
body is divided, how is it possible that matter also
should not be divided ? And matter when it is di¬
vided being passive, how is it possible it should not
suffer by this very passion? Or what hinders us
from asserting for the same reason that matter is
corrupted ? Since when body is corrupted, it must
be shown why matter likewise is not corrupted. In
answer to this, however, it may be said, that what
suffers and is divided is a magnitude of a definite
quantity, but in that which is not magnitude, the
passions of magnitude are not ingenerated. And,
in short, the passions of body are not inherent in
that which is not body ; so that those who make
matter to be passive, must also admit it to be
body.
XIII. It is likewise requisite that they should
attend to the manner in which they say matter flies
from form. For how can it fly from stones and
rocks by which it is comprehended ? For they will
not say that it sometimes flies from form, and some¬
times does not. For if it flies by its own will, why
does it not always fly from it ? But if it abides frojn
necessity, there is not any time in which it is not
invested with a certain form. The cause, however,
must be investigated why each matter has not al¬
ways the same form, and this must be in a still
greater degree investigated in the forms which
enter into matter. How, therefore, is matter said
to fly from form ? Is it by its own nature, and al¬
ways ? But what else will this be, than that never
departing from itself, it so possesses form as if it
never possessed it, or if this is not admitted, they
will not be able to assign any probable reason in
defence of what they assert. Plato also calls matter
the receptacle and nurse of all generation. And
the receptacle and nurse indeed, are different from
generation ; but that wdiich is changed in quality is
in generation. Since, likewise, the receptacle and
nurse are prior to generation, they will also be prior
to alliation. Add too, that they will preserve mat¬
ter in an impassive state ; as also will the assertion
that each thing has an apparent subsistence in that
in which it is ingenerated, and that it departs from
thence as from a receptacle and seat. The impas¬
sivity of matter, likewise, is preserved by the asser¬
tion that it is the place of forms ; for this does not
ascribe any passiort to it, but investigates another
mode of subsistence. What, therefore, is this
mode ? Since, indeed, a nature of this kind ought
not to be any one of, but to fly from every essence
of beings, and to be entirely different from them ;
for they are reasons or productive principles, and
have a real existence ; — this being the case, it is
necessary that matter in consequence of this differ¬
ence should preserve the safety which it is allotted,
and should not only be unreceptive of beings, but
also if there is a certain imitation of them, that it
should even be destitute of familiarity with this re¬
semblance. For thus it will be entirely different
from beings, since otherwise, being conversant with
a certain form, and becoming something else in
conjunction with it, it would cease to be different
from beings, and to be the receptacle of all things ;
for it would not be the recipient of any thing. It
is necessary, however, that matter should remain
the same, while forms enter into it, and that it
should be impassive during their egress from it, in
order that they may always enter into and depart
from it. But that which enters, enters as an image,
and not being itself real, enters into that which is
void of truth and reality. Does it, therefore, truly
enter ? But how is it possible it should be truly re-
ceived by that to which it is not in any respect
lawful to participate of truth, in consequence of its
being false ? Hence, it falsely proceeds into that
which is false, and becomes similar to an object in
a mirror, as long as the object is beheld within it.
For with respect to matter, if you take away [real]
beings, none of those things which are now seen in
the sensible region, would for the smallest space of
time be apparent. The mirror, therefore, of which
we have just spoken, is perceived by us ; for it is
itself a certain form. Matter, however, not
being itself any form, is not itself seen ; for other¬
wise, it would be requisite that it should be seen
by itself prior to the forms that it apparently con¬
tains. But it suffers something of the same kind
as the air when illuminated, which is then also in¬
visible, because it could not be seen without being
illuminated. Hence the objects which are seen in
mirrors, are believed not to have an existence, or
to have it in a less degree, because that which con¬
tains them is visible, and itself remains while the
objects depart. But matter is not itself perceived,
neither when it has, nor when it is without forms.
If, however, it was possible for the objects from
which mirrors are filled to remain without being
seen, yet no one would doubt the reality of the
objects which are seen in them. Hence, if there is
something in mirrors, sensibles also will be in mat¬
ter. But if there is nothing [in reality] in mirrors,
but objects have only an apparent subsistence in
them, in matter also it must be said, forms have a
resemblance of subsistence. The cause of this
appearance, likewise, must be ascribed to the hypo¬
stasis of beings, of which beings themselves always
truly participate, but non-beings not truly ; since it
is not proper that they should subsist in such a
manner as they would, if they had an existence,
and being had not.
XIV. What then* matter not existing, would
nothing have a subsistence ? Nothing except be-
ings ; 1 just as neither would an image have any
existence, unless there was a mirror, or something
of this kind. For that which is naturally adapted
to subsist in another thing, cannot exist when that
thing is not. For this is the nature of an image to
be in something different from itself. For if any
1 Th£ words ovtev π\ην τα οντα are omitted in the original ; hut from the version of Ficinus evidently ought to be inserted.
Plot. L
thing departs from the producing causes of its exist¬
ence, it may indeed subsist without being in another
thing. But since [true] beings remain, if there is a
representation of them in something else, it is
necessary there should be another thing imparting
a seat to that which does not truly accede.1 And
this by its presence and audacity, and as it may be
said, mendicity and poverty, is as it were compelled
to receive. It is however deceived, by not receiv¬
ing [truly,] in order that its poverty may also
remain, and that it may always be a mendicant.
For according to the fable, after it once had a sub¬
sistence, it began to beg ; the fable indicating by
this the nature of it, which consists in being desti¬
tute of good. It does not, however, beg to receive
those things which the giver has to bestowq but is
satisfied with whatever it may receive ; so that this
also indicates that what is apparent in it is different
[from reality.] Its name, likewise, [which is Penia
or Poverty] signifies that it is not filled. And the
assertion that it w^as connected with Plenty,4 does
1 Instead of τταρε'χει τψ ουκ eXOovrt in this place, it is neces¬ sary to read, παρεγων τ<ρ όντως ovic εΧθοντι.
z For πορρω here, it is necessary to read πορρ; See the speech of Diotima in the Banquet of Plato.
not signify that this connection was with [real] be¬
ing, nor with satiety, but with a certain artificial
thing, i. e. with the wisdom of a phantasm. For
since it was not possible for that to be entirely with·*
out the participation of being, which is in any re¬
spect external to it ; for it is the nature of being to
produce beings ; but that which is entirely non-
being is unmingled will being this being the case,
an admirable thing is effected, which participates,
and yet in a certain respect does not participate of
being, and which also in a certain respect possesses
something from proximity to being ; though by its
own nature it is incapable of being as it were con»
glutinated with it. Hence it becomes defluous, as
gliding away from a foreign nature which it has re¬
ceived, like echo from smooth and equable places,
because it does not abide there, though it appears
to be there, and to proceed from thence. If, how¬
ever, matter so participated and received, as some
one may think it does, that which proceeds into
would be absorbed by it. But now it appears, that
it is not absorbed, since matter remains the same,
having received nothing, but impeding progression
like some repercussive seat. It is also the recep¬
tacle of forms acceding to, and mingled in it ; just
as those who are desirous of enkindling a light from
the sun, place some smooth substance opposite to
it, which they also fill with water, in order that the
flame being impeded by that which is inward, and
of a contrary nature, may not pass through, but
may stop externally. Matter, therefore, thus be¬
comes the cause of generation, and the. forms which
consist in it, are constituted after this manner.
XV. In things, therefore, which collect fire from
the sun about themselves, as they receive flame from
a sensible fire, they become themselves objects of
sense. Hence also they are apparent, because the
objects are external, successive and proximate,
touch each other, and have two extremities. But
the productive principle in matter, has the external
after a different manner. For difference of nature
is sufficient, not being indigent of a twofold boun¬
dary ; but being much more alienated than every
boundary by a diversity T of essence which is desti¬
tute of all alliance, it possesses a power repugnant
to mixture. And this is the cause of its remaining
in itself, because neither that which enters into it
enjoys it, nor does it enjoy that which enters ; just