into and depart from matter, are imitations and
images of [real] beings, flowing about a formless
resemblance ; and on account of its formless nature
are seen within it. They also appear, indeed, to
effect something in it, but effect nothing ; for they
are vain and debile, and have no resisting power.
And since matter, likewise, is void of resistance,
they pervade without dividing it, like images in
water, or as if some one should send as it were
forms into what is called a vacuum. For again, if
the things which are beheld in matter were such as
those from which they proceeded into it, perhaps a
certain pow er of these might be ascribed to material
forms, and matter might be supposed to suffer by
them. But now^, since the things which are repre¬
sented are of one kind, and those that are beheld
in matter of another, from these also we may learn
that the passion of matter is false ; that which is
seen in it being false, and in no respect possessing
any similitude to its maker. Hence, being imbecile
and false, and falling into a false receptacle, as in
a dream, or in water, or a mirror, it necessarily
permits matter to be impassive, though in the
things which have been just mentioned,1 there is a
* viz. In water, a mirror, and a' dream.
similitude between the representations in them, and the originals of which they are the resemblances.
VIII. In short, that which suffers ought to be
a thing of this kind, so that it may be as it were in
the contrary powers and qualities of the things
which accede and produce passion. For to the in¬
herent heat the change in quality is from that which
refrigerates ; and to the inherent humidity the
change is from that which causes dryness. And
we say that the subject is changed in quality, when
from being cold it becomes hot, or moist from be¬
ing dry. But what is called the corruption of fire,
testifies the truth of this, the mutation being made
into another element. For wre say that the fire and
not the matter is corrupted ; so that passions are
about that, about which corruption also subsists.
For the reception of passion is the path to corrup¬
tion ; and to be corrupted pertains to that to which
likewise it belongs to suffer. It is not however
possible, that matter should be corrupted. For
into what, and how can it be corrupted ? But is
not matter [it may be said] co-passive, since quali¬
ties in their mixture with each other suffer, and
matter receives in itself myriads of heats and colds,
Plot. K
and in short infinite qualities, and is distinguished
by these, and has them as it were connaseent and
mingled with each other ? For each of these is not
separate from the rest, and matter is left in the
middle of them. Unless perhaps some one should
place it external to them. But every thing which
is in a subject, is in such a manner present with
the subject, as to impart something to it from itself.
IX. It must therefore be assumed, that one
thing is present with another, and that one thing is
in another, not according to one mode only. But
sometimes together with being present, it causes
that with which it is present to be better or worse,
accompanied with permutation ; as is seen to be
the case in the bodies of animals ; and at another
time, it makes it to be as it were better or worse,
without that being passive with which it is present,
as is said to be the case in the soul. Sometimes,
also, this takes place in such a way as when a figure
is imprinted in wax, where there is neither any pas¬
sion, so as to cause the wax to be something else
when the figure is present with it, nor any defect in
the wax, when the figure is destroyed. Light, also,
does not produce a change in quality of the figure
about that which is illuminated. Nor does a stone,
when it becomes cold, possess any thing besides
frigidity, from that through which it is cold, while
it remains a stone. And what does a line [viz. the
extension of length] suffer from colour ? Nor, in
my opinion, does a superficies suffer any thing
from it, but perhaps the subject body. Though
what can this suffer from colour ? For it is Hot pro¬
per to say that a thing suffers when something is
[merely] present with it ; nor when it is invested
with form. If, however, some one should say that
mirrors, and in short diaphanous substances, suffer
nothing from the images that are seen within them,
he will not adduce an unappropriate paradigm.
For the forms which are in matter are images, and
matter is still more impassive than mirrors. Hence
heat and cold are ingenerated in it, but do not heat
[or refrigerate] it. For to be heated and refrige¬
rated, pertains to quality leading the subject from
one quality to another.
It is requisite, however, to consider, whether fri¬
gidity is not the absence and privation [of heat] :
but qualities entering together into matter, many of
them act on each other, or rather are contrarily
affected. For what can fragrance effect in sweet-
ness ; or colour in figure ? Or what can that which
belongs to one genus effect in another ? Whence
especially credibility may be obtained, that a thing
may be in that which is different from it, without
injuring by its presence that with which it is pre¬
sent. As, therefore, that which is injured is not
injured by any thing of a casual nature, so neither
does that which is changed and which suffers, suffer
by any thing indiscriminately. But contraries only
suffer from contraries, other things being unchanged
by others ; so that those things in which there is
no contrariety, do not suffer by any thing of a con-
trary nature. Hence, it is necessary if any thing
suffers, that it should not be matter, but something
which is a composite of matter and form, or in
short, that it should be at one and the same time
many things. But that which is alone, and sepa¬
rate from other things, and which is entirely simple,
will be impassive to all things, and will be inclosed
in the middle of all things, acting on each other ;
just as when in the same house certain persons
strike each other, neither does the house suffer any
thing from the blows, nor the air which is in it.
But the forms which are in matter, perform such
things as they are naturally adapted to perform.
Matter itself, however, is much more impassive
than such qualities in it, which by not being con¬
traries are impassive with reference to each other.
X. In the next place, if matter suffers, it is
necessary that it should possess something from the
passion, and that this should either be the passion
itself, or that it should be disposed differently from
what it was before the passion was produced in it.
Hence, another quality acceding after the former,
the recipient will no longer be matter, but matter
with a certain quality. If, however, quality 1 itself
should fail, leaving something of itself of an effec¬
tive nature, the subject will in a still greater degree
become something else ; and proceeding after this
manner, the subject will be something besides
[mere] matter, and will be manifold and multiform.
Hence, it will no longer be the universal recipient,
since it will be an impediment to the multitude of
things which accede to it, and matter will no longer
remain, and therefore will not be incorruptible.
So that if it is necessary that matter should be as it
s Quality is that which imparts what is apparent in matter, and which is the object of sense.
was from the first, it ought thus to be always the
same, since to assert that it has been changed is
not to preserve it the same. Farther still, if in
short every thing which is changed in quality ought,
remaining in the same form, to be changed accord¬
ing to accidents, and not essentially ; — if, therefore,
it is requisite that what is changed in quality should
remain, and that part of it which suffers is not that
which remains, one of two things is necessary, either
that matter when changed in quality should depart
from itself, or that not departing from itself it
should not be changed in quality. If, however,
some one should say, that it is changed in quality,
yet not so far as it is matter ; in the first place, in¬
deed, he cannot assign what that is according to
which it is so changed ; and in the next place, he
must confess that thus also matter itself is not
changed in quality. For as in other things which
are forms, it is not possible that they can be essen¬
tially changed in quality, since their essence con¬
sists in this, [i. e. in being forms,] thus also, since
the being of matter is to exist as matter, it cannot
be changed in quality so far as it is matter, but it
must necessarily remain what it is. And as there
form itself is unchanged in quality, so likewise
here it is necessary that matter itself should he immutable.
XI. Whence, also, I think that the divine
Plato, [in the Timseus] having formed the same
conception rightly says, that the tilings which enter
into and depart from matter, are imitations of be¬
ings ; the words entering into and departing , not
being used by him in vain. For he wished to direct
our attention to the mode in which matter partici¬
pates of forms. It also appears that the doubt
how this participation is effected, is not what many
prior to us conceived it to be, viz. how forms pro¬
ceed into matter, but rather how they subsist in it.
For it seems to be truly wonderful, how these forms
being present with matter, it nevertheless remains
impassive ; especially since the forms which enter
into it suffer from each other. According to Plato,
however, the entering forms expel those which en¬
tered prior to them, and passion is in the composite
from matter and form ; yet not in every composite,
but in that which is in want of the acceding or depart¬
ing form ; and which indeed in its composition is
defective by the absence of a certain form, but is
perfect by the presence of it. But matter does not
possess any thing more whatever as an accession
to its composition, by the entrance of any thing
into it. For it does not then become that which it
is through the form that enters, nor is it less by the
departure of this form. For it remains that which
it was at first. To the natures, indeed, which re¬
quire ornament and order, it is useful to be adorn¬
ed ; and to these ornament may accede without
transmutation, as is the case with things which we
surround with decoration. If, however, any thing
is so adorned as to have the ornament connascent,
it will be requisite that what was before void of
beauty, should be changed in quality, become dif¬
ferent from what it was, and from being deformed
be beautiful. If, therefore, matter being deformed
is rendered beautiful, it is no longer that base thing
which it was before ; so that in being thus adorned,
it loses its subsistence as matter, and especially if
its deformity is not accidental. But if it is so de¬
formed as to be deformity itself, it will not partici¬
pate of ornament. And if it is so evil, as to be evil
itself, it will not participate of good. Hence it does
not participate in such a way as some fancy it does,
viz. by being passive, but after another manner,
which is that of appearing to participate, Perhaps,
too, according to this mode the doubt may be
solved, how, since matter is evil, it can aspire after
good, because it does not through the participation
cease to be what it was. For if what is called the
participation of matter subsists after this manner
so that it remains as we say the same, unchanged
in quality, and is always that which it is, it will no
longer be wonderful, how being evil it participates
of good. For it does not depart from itself. But
because it is indeed necessary it should participate,
it participates after a certain manner as long as it
exists. In consequence, however, of remaining that
which it is, and the mode of participation preserv¬
ing it [in its own proper nature] it is not injured in
its essence by that which thus imparts something
to it. And it appears not to be less evil on this
account, viz. because it always remains that which
it is. For if it truly participated of, and was truly
changed in quality by the good , it would not be
naturally evil. So that if some one should say that
matter is evil, he will assert what is true, if he says
it is impassive to the good , which is the same thing
as to say, that it is entirely impassive.