1 The phantasy or imagination is the highest of the gnostic irrational powers of the soul. But this in its summit is united to opinion , or that gnostic rational power which knows that a thing is, but docs not know xvhy it is ; and in its other extre-
is derived from the first, and is no longer opinion
{truly so called,] but is conversant with that which
is beneath, being as it were obscure opinion, and an
unadvised and rash imagination, such as the energy
which is said to be inherent in nature, according to
which it produces every thing without phantasy.
But a sensible perturbation from these is produced
about the body ; viz. a trembling and concussion,
paleness, and an inability of speaking. For these
effects are not in the psychical part ; since if they
were, we should not say that they are corporeal.
For if they pertained to the soul, that power of it
whose province it is to transmit these, w^ould no
longer perform its office, in consequence of being
detained by passions, and departing from itself.
This passive part, therefore, of the soul, is not in¬
deed body, but a certain form. Nevertheless, it is
in matter, as are also the epithymetic, the nutritive,
augmentative, and generative powers, the three
latter of which are the root and principle of the
epithymetic and passive form. It is requisite, how-
mity it is conjoined with sense. So far, therefore, as it is united to opinion, it may be said to be the same with it. See my Introduction to, and translation of Aristotle’s treatise On the Soul.
ever, that no perturbation, or in short passion
v' ·'· t .< '«· ’ V *■
should be present with any form ; but it is neces-
sary that form should remain permanent, and that
the matter of it should be conversant with passion,
when passion is produced through the presence of
the exciting power of form. For the vegetable
power does not itself vegetate when it causes other
things to vegetate; nor is increased when it in¬
creases other things ; nor in short when it moves,
is moved according to the motion with which it
moves, but is either not moved at all, or has ano¬
ther mode of motion or energy. Hence it is neces¬
sary that the nature itself of form should be energy ;
and should produce by being present, just as if
harmony should of itself move the chords [of a
musical instrument] The passive part of the
soul, therefore, will be indeed the cause of passion,
whether the motion is produced by it from the sen¬
sitive phantasy, or also without the phantasy.
This, likewise, must be considered, whether opinion
originating supernally, that which is passive in the
soul subsists alone in the form of the harmony ;
but the motive causes are analogous to the musi¬
cian ; and the things which are struck through pas¬
sion have the relation of chords. For in a musical
instrument also, harmony does not suffer, but the
chord. And the chord is not moved, though the
musician wishes that it should be, unless harmony
commands it to be moved.
V. Why, then, is it requisite to endeavour to
render the soul impassive by means of philosophy,
if from the first it is without passivity ? Shall we
say, it is because a phantasm as it were proceeding
into it from what is called the passive part, the con¬
sequent passion produces a perturbation [in this
part] and the image of expected evil is conjoined
with the perturbation ? Reason, therefore, thinks
it fit that a passion of this kind should be extir¬
pated, and that it should not be suffered to be in¬
generated, because where it is, the soul is not yet in
a good condition. But where it is not ingenerated,
there the soul is impassive, the vision which is the
cause of the passion about the soul, having no
longer an inherent subsistence. Just as if some
one wishing to expel the visions of sleep, should
recal the dreaming soul to wakefulness ; or as if
he should say that external spectacles produce the
passions, and should, assert that these passions be-
long to the soul. But what will the purification of
the soul be, if it is in no respect defiled ? Or in
what will the separation of it from the body con¬
sist ? May we not say that the purification of it will
be, to leave it by itself alone, and not suffer it to
associate with other things [that are hostile to its
nature,] nor permit it to look to any thing external ;
nor again, to have foreign opinions, whatever the
mode is, as we have said, of opinions or passions ;
nor to behold images, nor fabricate passions from
them? If, however, it is converted to supernal
from inferior objects, is not this a purification and
separation of the soul, which in this case is no longer
in body, so as to be something belonging to it, but
resembles alight not merged in turbid mire, though
at the same time that which is merged in it is im¬
passive ? But the purification, indeed, of the pas¬
sive part of the soul, is an excitation from the vision
of absurd images. And the separation of it will
consist in not verging downward, and in the imagi¬
nation not being conversant with inferior natures.
It will also consist in taking away those things by
the ablation of which this part likewise will be
separated, when it is not permitted to lie in a spirit
turbid from gluttony, lest it should be suffocated in
flesh, but when that in which it dwells is attenuated,
so that it may be quietly carried in it.
VI. That the intelligible essence, indeed, the
whole of which is arranged according to form, is
necessarily impassive, has been already shown.
Since, however, matter also is something incorpo¬
real, though after another manner [than the intelli¬
gible,] concerning this likewise it must be consi¬
dered after what manner it subsists ; whether it is
passive, as it is said to be, and in all things mutable,
or whether it is necessary to opine that this also is
impassive, and if it is so, the mode of its impassi¬
vity must be unfolded. In the first place, there¬
fore, this must be assumed by those who speak
concerning the nature of it, and who endeavour to
show what it is, that the nature, essence, and exist¬
ence of being, is not such as the multitude conceive
it to be. For being which may be so denominated
in reality, is truly being ; but this is that which is
entirely being ; and this again is that which in no
respect is deficient in existence. But since it is
perfectly being, it is not in want of any thing in
order that it may be preserved and be, but to other
things which appear to be, it is the cause of their
apparent existence. If, therefore, these things are
rightly asserted, it is necessary that it should sub¬
sist in life, and in a perfect life ; for if it were defi¬
cient in this, it wrould not be essence in a more
eminent degree. This, however, is intellect and
perfect wisdom. Hence it is bounded and definite,
and nothing is there in capacity which does not
also possess a mighty power ; since otherwise it
would be deficient. Hence, too, it is eternal, in¬
variably the same, and unreceptive of any thing.
For if it should receive any thing, it would receive
something besides itself ; and this would be non-
being. It is necessary, however, that it should be
perfectly being. Hence it is requisite it should
accede to existence, possessing all things in itself,
and being at once all things, and one all, if by these
peculiarities we define being. But it is necessary
that we should thus define it, or intellect and life
would not proceed from being, but these would be
adventitious to it, though they will not emanate
from non-being, and being will be deprived of life
and intellect. That which is truly non-being,
therefore, will have these in such a way as it is
requisite for them to subsist in less excellent na-
tures, and in things posterior to being. For that
which is prior to being, imparts these indeed to it,
but is not itself indigent of these. Hence, if being
is a thing of this kind, it is necessary that it should
neither be a certain body, nor that which is the
subject of bodies, but that existence to these should
consist in non-being.
It may, however, be said, how is it possible the
nature of bodies and matter should not have a [real]
being, in which these mountains and rocks exist,
the whole solid earth, and all resisting substances ?
Indeed, things which are struck, confess that their
essence subsists by compulsion. If, therefore, some
one should say, how is it possible that things which
neither press, nor are impelled, nor resist, and
which in short are not visible, viz. soul and inteb
lect should be beings, and truly beings, — we reply,
that among bodies, earth is most stable, but that
which is more moveable, is also less ponderous,
and of this that which is on high is most moveable.
And hence, fire flies [as it were] from the nature
of body. I am of opinion, however, that things
which are more sufficient to themselves, disturb
others in a less degree, and occasion them less pain.
But things which are more ponderous and terrene,
because thev are in a defective and fallen condition,
and are unable to elevate themselves, strike against
others, falling on them through imbecility, and
oppressing them by their descending and sluggish
weight. For dead bodies cause greater molesta¬
tion 1 when they fall, and strike and injure more
vehemently. But animated bodies, as they parti¬
cipate of [real] being, are the more innoxious the
more they participate of it. Hence motion, which
is a certain life as it were in bodies, and an imita¬
tion of life, is in a greater degree present with those
things that have less of body, as if a defect of being
rendered that with which it is present, more corpo¬
real. From what are called passions, likewise, it
may be seen, that what is in a greater body is more
passive, earth than other things, and other things
according to the same ratio. For other things
when divided, return again into one, when nothing
prevents them. But when a terrene body is di¬
vided, the parts always continue separate from each
other, as being naturally averse to reunion, and by
a small impulse are disposed to remain as they are
impelled, and be corrupted. Hence, that which
* For auheffTtpa it is necessary to read
becomes body in a most eminent degree, as having
especially arrived at nonentity, is incapable of re¬
calling itself into one. Ponderous, therefore, and
vehement concussions, by which some things act
upon others, are attended with ruin. But one
debile thing falling on another, possesses with re¬
spect to it the same efficacy and power, as 1 non¬
entity falling on nonentity. And this we think a
sufficient refutation of their opinion who place be¬
ings among bodies, and who are induced to do so
by the testimony of impulsions and concussions ;
and from the phantasms produced through sense
derive their belief of the truth. Such as these are
affected in a manner similar to those who are
dreaming, and who imagine that what they perceive
is true, though it is nothing more than a dream.
For sense is alone the employment of the dormant
soul ; since as much of the soul as is merged in
body, so much of it sleeps. But true vigilance is
a true elevation from, and not in conjunction with
body. For indeed a resurrection with body, is a
transmigration from sleep to sleep, [and from dream
to dream] like a man passing [in the dark] from
* ωά is omitted in the original.
bed to bed. But that elevation is entirely true,
which wholly rises [from the shadowy essence] of
bodies. For these possessing a nature contrary to
soul, have also that which is contrary to essence.
And this also is testified by their generation, their
flowing and corruption ; all which are foreign to
the nature of real being.
VII. Let us, however, again return in the first
place, to the subject matter, and afterwards to the
things which are said to be in matter, from which
it will be known that matter itself has no [real]
existence, and that it is impassive. It is there¬
fore incorporeal, since body is posterior to it, and
is a composite, and matter in conjunction with
another thing [i.e. with form,] produces body. For
thus it is allotted the same appellation according to
the incorporeal, because both being and matter are
different from bodies. Since, however, matter is
neither soul nor intellect, nor life, nor form, nor
reason, nor bound ; for it is infinite ; nor power ;
for what can it effect ; but falls off from all these,
neither can it rightly receive the appellation of be¬
ing. But it may deservedly be called non-being.
Yet it is not non-being in the same manner as mo-
tion is, or permanency ; but it is truly non-being*
the image and phantasm of bulk, and the desire of
subsistence. And it stands, indeed, but not in that
which is permanent, is of itself invisible, and flies
from him who wishes to behold it. When, like¬
wise, some one does not see it, then it is present ;
but is not perceived by him who strives intently to
behold it. Add too, that contraries are always
apparent in it ; the small and the great, the less
and the more, the deficient and the exceeding, be¬
ing an image neither able to remain, nor yet to fly
aw ay. For it has not even power to effect this, as
receiving no strength from intellect, but subsisting
in the defect of all being. Hence it deceives us in
w hatever it announces of itself ; so that if it should
appear to be great, it is small ; if more, it is less ;
and the being which we meet with in the imagina¬
tion of it, is non-being, and as it were a flying
mockery. Hence, also, the things which appear to
be ingenerated in it, are mockeries, and images in
an image, just as in a mirror, where a thing which
is situated in one place appears to be in another.
It likewise seems to be full and to be all things,
and yet has nothing. But the things which enter