1 τι vtov is omitted in the original..
But even if some one should grant the Gnostics
that there can, yet nothing evil can be added
to it-
XVII I. Perhaps, however, they will say that
they by their arguments cause those who believe
in them, to fly far from, and hate the body, but
that our doctrines detain the soul in body. But
this is just as if two persons dwelling in the same
house, one of them should blame the furniture and
the builder of it, and yet nevertheless stay in it ;
but the other should not blame either of these, but
assert that the builder of it had constructed it in a
most artificial manner, and should wait for the
time as long as he dwells in it, in which he may be
liberated, and may no longer be in want of a house.
The former of these, however, is thought to be the
wiser of the two, and more prepared to depart,
because he knows that the house is composed of
inanimate stones and wood, and is very far from
being a true edifice, though he is ignorant of the
great difference between bearing [properly,] and
not bearing things of a necessary nature ; since he
would not be indignant if he was moderately
pleased with the beauty of the stones. It is
necessary, however, that those who have a body
should remain in the habitations which are fabri¬
cated by a sister beneficent soul, and who possesses
an abundant power of fabricating without labour.
Indeed the Gnostics think fit to call the vilest men
their brethren , but refuse thus to denominate the
sun , and the other stars ; and with an insane
mouth separate the soul of the world from an alli¬
ance with ours . While, therefore, we are bad, it
is not indeed lawful to conjoin us with supernal
natures ; but then only this can take place, when
we become worthy, since we are not bodies, but
souls resident in bodies, and capable of dwelling in
them in such a manner, as to approximate very
nearly to the mode in which the soul of the universe
inhabits the whole bodv of the world. This
however, consists in being free from impulsion, in
not yielding to externally-acceding pleasures, or
visible objects, and in not being disturbed at any
severe occurrence. The soul of the world, there¬
fore, is not impelled ; for there is not any tiling by
which it can be. And we dwelling in this region
of sense, may indeed by virtue repel the percus¬
sions of external objects, so as by magnitude and
strength of decision, to diminish some of the per»
cussions, and prevent others from taking place.
But when we proximately accede - to that which
cannot be impelled, then we shall imitate the soul
of the universe, and the soul of the stars, and be¬
coming near through similitude, we shall hasten to
be one and the same with them. Then also those
things which w?ere the objects of their vision from
the first, will be ours, in consequence of being well
prepared for this [felicitous event] both by nature
and study The Gnostics, however, will not, by
saying that they alone are able to survey [divine
natures] behold more of them on this account ; nor
because they assert that when they die they shall
entirely lay aside the body, though this is not per¬
mitted to the souls that always adorn the heavens.
For Ihey say this through ignorance of the meaning
of being out of the body, and of the manner in
which the whole soul of the universe pays attention
to that which is inanimate. It is possible there¬
fore, not to be a lover of body, to become pure, to
despise death, to have a knowledge of more excel¬
lent natures, and to make them the objects of pur-
suit ; and also not to envy those who are able to
pursue them, and always do so, as if they did not.
Nor should we be affected in the same manner as
those who fancy that the stars do not move, be¬
cause sense announces to them that they stand still.
For on this account also, the Gnostics fancy, that
the nature of the stars does not survey the intelli-
gibles that are as it were external to them, because
they themselves do not see the soul of them exter¬
nally subsisting.
On the Impassivity of
INCORPOREAL NATURES.
I. If we should say that the senses are not
passions, but energies and judgments about the
passions, the passions indeed subsisting about some»
thing else, as for instance about a body affected in
a certain manner, but judgment about the soul;
judgment not being passion, for if it were, another
judgment would again be necessary, and thus we
should be obliged to proceed in an infinite ascent ;
—if we should thus speak, it would nevertheless be
here dubious, whether judgment itself has nothing
in it of the subject of its decision, or whether if it
has an impression of it, it is not passively affected.
At the same time, however, let us speak about
these impressions as they are called, and show that
the mode of their subsistence is entirely different
from what it is apprehended to be, and is such as
that of intellections, which being energies are able
to know without passivity. And in short, neither
our reason, nor our will permits us to subject the
soul to such conversions and changes in quality,
as are the calefactions and refrigerations of bodies.
With respect to what is called the passive part of
the soul also, it is requisite to see and consider,
whether we must admit this likewise to be immuta¬
ble, or grant that passivity belongs to this alone.
This however, we shall discuss hereafter. But let
us now direct our attention to the doubts pertain¬
ing to the former particulars. For it is dubious
how that part of the soul, whatever it may be, is
immutable, which is prior to the passive part, and
to sense, since depravity is ingenerated in it, and
false opinions and ignorance ; and besides these,
familiarity and alleniation, when it is pleased and
pained, is angry and envious, is emulous and desir¬
ous ; and in short, which is never quiescent, but is
moved and changed by every incidental circum¬
stance. If, indeed, the soul is body and has mag¬
nitude, it is not easy, or rather is wholly impossible
to show that it is impassive and immutable in any
one of the particulars, which are said to take place
about it. But if it is an essence void of magnitude,
and it is necessary that the incorruptible should be
present with it, we should take care not to ascribe
to it passions of this kind, lest we should also igno¬
rantly grant that it is corruptible. Whether, like¬
wise, the essence of it is number or reason, as we
say it is, how can passion be ingenerated in number
or reason ? But we ought rather to think that irra¬
tional reasons, and impassive passions are produced
in it. And these being transferred to it from bo¬
dies, are each of them to be oppositely assumed,
and according to analogy, so that the soul [after a
manner] possessing these, does not [really] possess
them, and being passive to them does not suffer.
And it must be considered what the mode is of
such like affections.
II. In the first place however, it is requisite to
speak of virtue and vice, and to show what then
takes place when vice is said to be present with the
soul. For we say it is necessary to take away
something, as if a certain evil was in the soul, and
that virtue should be inserted in it, and it should
be adorned and made beautiful, instead of being,
as it was before, base and deformed. If therefore
we should say that virtue is harmony, but vice dis¬
sonance, shall we adduce an opinion conformable
to that of the ancients ? For this assertion will in
no small degree promote the object of our investi¬
gation. For if, indeed, virtue consists in the parts
of the soul being naturally concordant with each
other, but vice, in their not being concordant,
nothing adventitious or extraneous will take place ;
but each part will proceed such as it is, into an
appropriate order, and being such will not enter
into dissonance, like dancers who in dancing do not
accord with each other ; either one of them singing,
when the rest do not sing, or each singing by him¬
self. For it is not only necessary that they should
sing together, but that each should sing well with
an appropriate music, as far as pertains to his own
part of the performance ; so that then also in the
soul there is harmony, when each part performs
that which is adapted to it. It is requisite, howr~
ever, prior to the harmony, that there should be
another virtue of each of the parts, and another
vice of each prior to their dissonance with respect
to each other. What is it therefore, from which
being present, each part is evil ? Is it from vice
being present? And again* is each part good
through the presence of virtue ? Perhaps, therefore,
some one may say that ignorance in the reasoning
power is the vice of it, this ignorance consisting in
the negation of knowledge, and not in the presence
of a certain thing. But when false opinions are
inherent, which especially produce vice, how is it
possible in this case that something should not be
ingenerated, and that this part of the soul should
not thus be changed in quality ? Is not also the
irascible part affected in one way when it is timid,
and in another when it is brave ? And is not the
epithymetic 1 part likewise, affected differently
when it is intemperate, and when it is temperate ?
Or may we not say, that when each part possessing
virtue, energizes according to the essence by which
it is characterized, we then say it is obedient to
reason ? And the reasoning part, indeed, is obedient
to intellect, but the other parts to reason. Or shall
we say that to be obedient to reason is as it were
to see, that which is obedient not being figured,
1 i. e. The part characterized by desire ; the whole soul receiving a triple division, into reason, anger, and desire, which last is a tendency to the possession and enjoyment of external good.
but seeing, and being in energy when it sees ; just
as sight both when it is in capacity, and when in
energy, is the same in essence ; but energy is not a
change in quality, but at once applies itself to that
to which it is essentially adapted, and perceives
and knows without passivity. The reasoning power
also thus subsists with reference to intellect, and
thus sees. And the power of intellection is this,
not becoming internally, the impressions as it were
of a seal, but it possesses, and again does not pos¬
sess that which it sees. It possesses the spectacle
indeed, in consequence of knowing it ; but does
not possess it, because nothing is impressed in it
from the object of vision, like the figure in the wax.
It is, however, necessary to recollect, that memory
is not a certain repository of impressions , but a
power of the soul exciting itself in such a way as
to possess that which it had not .
What then, was it not one thing before it thus
recollected, and another afterwards when it now
recollects ? [It was] if you are willing to call it
another, and not to say that it is changed in qua-
%; unless some one should assert that a progres¬
sion from power to energy is a mutation in quality.
Nothing however is here added, but that is effected
which there was a natural aptitude to effect. For
in short, the energies of immaterial natures are not
themselves in energizing changed in quality, or they
would perish, but they much rather energize by
remaining permanent. But to energize with passi¬
vity is the province of things which are connected
in their energies with matter. If however that
which is immaterial is passively affected, it will not
be able any where to abide, as in the sight, vision
energizing, it is the eye which suffers [and not the
energy of seeing.] And opinions are as it were
visions. But how7 is the irascible part timid ?
And how also does it possess fortitude ? Shall we
sav it is timid indeed, either because it does not
look to reason, or because it looks to depraved rea¬
son ; or that it is so through a defect of instru¬
ments, such as the want or the weakness of corpo¬
real arms, in consequence of which it is either pre¬
vented from energizing, or is not moved so as to
be as it were incited ? But it possesses fortitude, if
the contrary takes place ; in neither of w hich cases,
there is not any change of quality, or passion.
Again, that part of the soul w hich desires, when it
energizes alone, produces what is called intem¬
perance. For [sometimes] it performs all things
alone, other things not being present, whose pro¬
vince it is in their turn to have dominion, and to
point out to this part [what it ought to do.] In
the mean time the power whose province it is to
see, performs something else, and not all things ;
but is elsewhere at leisure, in consequence of seeing
as much as possible other things. Perhaps, too,
what is called the vice of this part, consists very
much in a bad habit of the body ; but the virtue of
it is a contrary habit; so that no addition is in
either case made to the soul.
III. But how is it that familiarities and aliena¬
tions, pains, anger, and pleasures, desires and fears,
are not mutations and passions inherent and ex¬
citing? It is necessary, therefore, thus to distin¬
guish concerning these. For not to acknowledge
that changes in quality are ingenerated in us, and
also vehement sensations of these, is the province
of one who denies things that are evident. It is
requisite, therefore, admitting the subsistence of
these, that we should investigate what that is which
is changed. For by asserting that these things take
place about the soul, we are in danger of falling
into the same absurdity as if we should admit that
Plot . I
the soul is red, or becomes pale, not considering
that these passions are produced indeed on account
of the soul, but subsist about another composition
[than that of the soul.] And shame, indeed, in the
Soul, arises from an opinion of baseness ; the body,
(that we may not err in our conceptions) being as
it were contained in the soul, and not being the
same with that which is inanimate. The animated
body, therefore, when it is moved with facility, un¬
dergoes a change in the blood, from the shame
which subsists in the soul. And with respect to
what is called fear, the principle of it, indeed, is in
the soul; but the paleness produced by it, arises
from the blood retreating in vrardly. In pleasure,
also, the sensible diffusion of it subsists about the
body ; but that which takes place about the soul is
no longer passion. The like also must be asserted
with respect to pain. For the principle of desire
latently subsisting in the soul, that wdiich proceeds
from thence is recognized by sense. For w hen we
say that the soul is moved in desires, in reasonings,
and in opinions, we do not say that it produces
these in consequence of being agitated, but that
motions are generated from it ; since also, when
we assert that life is motion, we do not conceive
that it is a change of quality. But the natural
energy of each part of the soul, is life not departing
from itself. In short, it will be sufficient if we do
not admit that energies, lives, and appetites, are
mutations in quality ; that recollections are not
types impressed in the soul ; and that imaginations
are not configurations described as it were in wax.
For every where, in all passions and motions, the
soul must be acknowledged to subsist with invaria¬
ble sameness in its subject and essence ; and that
virtue and vice are not produced in it after the
same manner as black and white, or heat and cold
about the body. But it must be admitted that The
soul subsists with reference to both these, and in
short, about all contraries, according to the above
mentioned mode.
IV. Let us, however, direct our attention to
what is called the passive part of the soul ; though
we have already after a manner spoken concerning
this, when we discussed all the passions which are
produced about the irascible and epithymetic part,
and showed how each of them subsists. Never¬
theless, it is requisite to discuss it more amply ; in
the first place assuming what that which is passive
in the soul is said to be. It is said, therefore, to
be that about which the passions appear to subsist.
But these are things to which pleasure and pain are
consequent. Of the passions, however, some ori¬
ginate from opinions, as when some one being of
opinion that he shall die, is terrified, or fancying
that he shall obtain some good is delighted ; the
opinion indeed, being in one thing, but the exciting
passion in another. But other passions are such
as, existing involuntarily, produce opinion in that
which is naturally adapted to opine. And we
have already observed that opinion permits the
nature which opines to remain immoveable. Un¬
expected fear, however, when it accedes, will be
found to originate from opinion, affording as it were
a certain perception to the part of the soul which
is said to be afraid. For what does this being
afraid effect ? Perturbation it is said, and astonish¬
ment from the expectation of evil. It is evident,
however, that the phantasy is in the soul, both the
first 1 which we call opinion, and the second which