There are four lines more in this section in the original ; hut the meaning of them is so very obscure, that I have not attempted to translate them.
XV. What these assertions, however, effect iri
the souls of those that hear them, persuading them
to despise the world , and the things that are in it,
ought not by any means to be concealed from us.
For there are two sects of philosophers with re¬
spect to the attainment of the end of life, one of
which places the pleasure of the body as the end ;
but the other chooses the beautiful and virtue, the
desire of which is derived and suspended from
God. The manner, however, in which this is ac¬
complished, must be elsewhere discussed. And
Epicurus, indeed, taking away providence, exhorts
us to pursue pleasure and delight, as the only things
which then remain. But the doctrine of the Gnos¬
tics, as still more juvenile than this, blames the
domination of providence, and providence itself,
despises all human laws, and virtue which has ex¬
isted in every age, and considers temperance as
ridiculous, in order that nothing beautiful and good
may be seen to subsist among men. Together with
temperance also it subverts justice which is con-
nascent with it in manners, and which derives its
perfection from reason and exercise ; and in short,
it subverts every thing by which a man may become
a worthy character. Hence, nothing else is left
for them to pursue but pleasure, and their own
concerns and utility, and not that which is com¬
mon to other men ; unless some one among them
happens to be superior to these assertions. For
none of the abovementioned particulars are consi¬
dered as beautiful by them, but something else
whatever it may be which they pursue ; though
they ought to endeavour to correct those with whom
they are well acquainted, applying themselves from
a divine nature to human concerns. For it is the
province of this nature which despises the pleasure
of the body, to know what is beautiful and good.
But those who are destitute of virtue, are not at all
excited to supernal natures. This is testified by
their never saying any thing about virtue, and by
their entirely omitting the discussion of things per¬
taining to it. Nor do they say what virtue is , or
how many virtues there are , or direct their atten¬
tion to the numerous and beautiful assertions which
may be surveyed in the writings of the ancients , or
to the means of acquiring and possessing virtue ,
and of cultivating and purify ing the soul For it
is to no purpose to say , look to God , unless you also
teach how we are to look to him. For what hinders ,
some one may say , but that a man may look to God
who does not abstain from any one pleasure , and
who suffers his anger to be without any restraint ;
such a one recollecting indeed the name of God , but
being held in bondage by all the passions , and not
at all endeavouring to expel them ? Virtue , there¬
fore, indeed proceeding to the end [i. e. to its per¬
fection ,] and being ingenerated in the soul in con¬
junction with wisdom , will present God to the view ,
But to speak of God without true virtue , is to utter
nothing but a name .
XVI. Again , to despise the zvorld, and the
Gods , and other beautiful natures that are con¬
tained in it, is not to become a good man. For
every bad man will in the first place despise the
Gods ; and no one is completely bad till he does
despise them . Hence, if he is not bad in every
thing else, from this very thing he will become so.
For the honour which the Gnostics say is paid by
them to the intelligible Gods, is utterly incongruous .
For he who loves any thing, is delighted with every
thing which is allied to the object of his love. For
you also love the children of the father whom you
love. But every soul is the daughter of the father
of the universe. And the souls in the mundane
spheres, are intellectual, and good, and are united
to intelligible essences much more than ours . For
how could this world be separated from the intelli¬
gible world ; or the Gods in it, from the intelligi¬
ble Gods ? But these things have been discussed
by us before. Now, however, we must say, that
those who despise things allied to the intelligible
Gods, have no knowledge of those Gods, except
what is merely verbal. For how can it be pious to
assert as they do, that providence does not extend
to terrene affairs, and to every thing whatever it
may be ? How also is this consonant to their own
doctrine ? For they say that divinity providentially
attends to them alone. Whether, therefore, did he
pay attention to them while they were with super¬
nal natures, or does he also attend to them during
their existence here P For if the former, how came
they to descend ? But if the latter, how is it that
they are still upon the earth ? How, likewise, does
it happen that divinity is not present in the earth ?
For whence does he know that they are here, and
that being here and revolting from him, they have
become evil ? But if he has a knowledge of souls
that have not become evil, he will also know those
that have, in order that he may be able to distin-
guish the former from the latter. He will, there¬
fore, be present to all things, and will be in this
world, whatever the mode may be of his subsistence
in it. So that the world will participate of him.
But if he is absent from the world, he will also be
absent from you ; and you will not have any thing
to say either about him, or the natures posterior to
him. But whether a certain providence proceeds
from divinity to you, or whatever you may think fit
to assert respecting it, the world certainly derives
its subsistence from thence, and is not, nor ever
will be, deserted by him. For the providence of
divinity is in a much greater degree extended to
wholes than to parts ; and the former of these par¬
ticipate of him more abundantly than the latter.
And much more does he providentially attend to
the soul of the world. This is evident from the
existence of the world, and from the wisdom of the
mode in which it exists. For xvho among those
that are stupidly proud , is so orderly and wise as
the universe? Indeed, to compare the one with
the other is ridiculous, and is attended with great
absurdity. Hence, when the comparison is made
for any other purpose than that of argument, it is
attended with impiety. Nor is it the province of
a wise man to investigate things of this kind [as if
he was dubious about them,] but of one who is men¬
tally blind , who is entirely destitute both of sense
and intellect , and who being very remote from a
knowledge of the intelligible world , does not look to
the sensible universe. For what musician is there,
who on perceiving the harmony in the intelligible
world, is not moved when he hears the harmony
arising from sensible sounds? Or who that is
skilled in geometry and numbers, when he beholds
through his eyes that which is commensurate, ana¬
logous and orderly, is not delighted with the view ?
For those who view through the eyes the produc¬
tions of art, in pictures, do not behold them in the
same way as they do the originals of which they
are the resemblances. But the geometrician and
arithmetician, knowing in the sensible object the
imitation of that w hich subsists in intellection, they
are as it were agitated, and brought to the recollec¬
tion of reality. And from this passion also, love
is excited. He however, who sees beauty resplen¬
dent in the face, tends thither. But his mind must
be dull and sluggish in the extreme, and incapable
of being incited to any thing else, who on seeing all
the beautiful objects in the sensible world, all this
Plot . H
symmetry and great arrangement of things, and the
form apparent in the stars though so remote, is not
from this view mentally agitated, and does not
venerate them as admirable productions of still
more admirable causes. For he who is not thus
affected, will neither direct his attention to the one,
nor have a knowledge of the other.
XVII. If also, they are induced to hate the
nature of body, because they have heard that Plato
greatly blames it as being an impediment to the
soul, and says, that the whole of a corporeal nature
is inferior to the soul, yet separating this by the
discursive energy of reason, it is requisite to survey
what remains, viz. the intelligible sphere, compre¬
hending in itself the form of the world, souls in an
orderly series without bodies, imparting magnitude
according to the intelligible, and producing it into
interval ; so that the magnitude of that which is
generated, may as much as possible be adequate to
the im parti bility of the paradigm. For that which
is there great in power, is here great in bulk. And
whether they wish to understand this sphere as cir¬
cularly moved by a divine power, which contains
the beginning, middle, and end of the whole sphere,
or whether they consider it as stable* and not yet
governing any thing else* they will thus be led to
form a proper conception of the soul which go»
verns this universe. They ought likewise to con¬
nect body with this soul in such a manner that soul
may not be at all passive, but may impart some¬
thing to the body, which it is able to receive, be¬
cause it is not lawful there should be envy in the
Gods. They should likewise ascribe such a power
to the soul of the world, as is able to render the
nature of body which is not of itself beautiful, a
participant of beauty as far as it is capable of being
adorned ; which beauty also excites divine souls.
Unless, indeed, the Gnostics should say that their
souls are not excited by beauty, and that they do
not in a different manner survey deformed and
beautiful bodies. If, however, this be the case,
neither are they differently affected by base and
beautiful studies, nor by beautiful disciplines and
the contraries to these. Hence neither do they
perceive the transcendency of the contemplative
energy, nor of God himself. For on account of
first natures the above-mentioned particulars sub¬
sist. If, therefore, the latter are not beautiful,
neither are the former. Hence, the latter are beau-
tiful after the former. When, however, they say
that they despise the beauty which is here, they
would do well to despise the beauty in boys and
women, so as not to be vanquished by lust. But
it is requisite to know that they ought not to boast,
if they despise what is base, but if they despise
what they before had acknowledged to be beautiful,
and by which they were in a certain respect affect¬
ed. In the next place it must be observed, that
there is not the same beauty in a part and the
whole, in all individuals and the universe. And in
the third place, that there is so great a beauty even
in sensibles, and partial natures such as dasmons,
as to cause us to admire the maker of these, and to
believe that they are derived from him. Hence,
when we are not detained by these lower beauties,
but proceed from these without reviling them to
supernal natures, we then proclaim that the beauty
of the latter is immense. And if, indeed, we are
inwardly as well as outwardly beautiful, we must
say that the one accords with the other. But if we
are internally bad, we ought then to acknowledge
that we suffer a diminution in things of a more ex-
cellent nature. Nothing, however, that is truly
beautiful externally, is internally deformed. For
every thing which is externally beautiful, is so in
consequence of the domination of inward beauty.
But those who are said to be beautiful, and are at
the same time internally deformed, have a false
external beauty. And if some one should say that
he has seen those who are outwardly truly beauti¬
ful, but are inwardly base, I am of opinion that he
has not seen such persons, but has mistaken others
for them ; or if he has seen them, their inward de¬
formity has been adventitious to them, they being
naturally beautiful. For there are many impedi¬
ments here which prevent our arriving at the. end.
But what is there to prevent the universe which is
externally beautiful from being so internally ?
Moreover, those to whom nature has not given per¬
fection from the beginning, are perhaps incapable
of arriving at the end ; so that it is possible for
them to become depraved. The universe, how¬
ever, was never once a child so as to be imperfect ;
nor does it acquire any thing new 1 by proceeding,
and which is added to its body. For whence could
it acquire this ? Since it already possessed all things.
Nor can any addition to the soul of it be devised*