* After ttiis in the original, the words tva σφοδρά Χοώορη- στρ-αι ο τούτο γραφ as follow, i. e. “ in order that he who writes this may be more vehemently reprehended." But as I do not see what connection they have with the words immediately preceding them, 1 have not inserted' them in the translation.
region beneath, but another proceeded locally to
this region, and becoming near to it, illuminated it.
But if this soul illuminated, abiding in itself, and
not at all operating for this purpose, why did this
soul alone illuminate, and not those natures also
which are more powerful than it in the order of
beings ? If, however, they say that this soul, in con¬
sequence of forming a rational conception of the
wrorld, illuminated it from the discursive energy of
reason, why did it not at one and the same time
illuminate and make the world, but instead of this
waited for the generation of images ? In the next
place, this rational conception of the world, which
is called by them a foreign land, and which was
produced as they say by greater causes, did not
occasion the makers of it to verge downward. Be¬
sides, how did it happen that matter being illumi¬
nated, made psychical images, but not the nature
of bodies ? For the image of soul, would not be at
all in want of darkness or matter ; but that which
was generated wrould when generated follow its
maker, and be suspended from him. Again, whe¬
ther is this illumination from a reasoning process,
essence, or as they say, a conception ? For if it is
essence, what is the difference between it, and that
Plot . G
from which it proceeds ? But if it is another species
of soul, and this rational, perhaps it is vegetable
and generative. If, however, this he the case, how
will it any longer be true that it made the world in
order that it might be honoured for so doing ; and
how did it make it through arrogance and audacity,
and in short, through imagination ? And still more
absurd is it, that it should have made the world
through a reasoning process. Why, also, was it
requisite, that the fabricator of the world should
have made it from matter and an image ? But if
this illumination is a conception, in the first place
it must be shown whence the name derives its ori¬
gin ; and in the next place how it produces, unless
it imparts to the conception a fabricative power.
But how can there be production with a fiction ?
They will say, that this thing is first, and another
is posterior to it. This, however, is asserted with¬
out any authority. Why, also, wras fire the first
thing produced, [and afterwards other things ?]
XI L After what manner, likewise, did this
image wdien just produced attempt to fabricate ?
Was it through a recollection of what it previously
knew ? But in short it had not then an existence,
neither itself, nor the mother which they assign to
it, in order that it might know this. In the next
place, is it not wonderful, since they came into this
world, not as images of souls, but as true souls,
that scarcely one or two of them being raised from
the world, and recovering their recollection, have
been able to remember something of what they for¬
merly saw ; and yet this image, as soon as it was
generated, formed a conception, though as they
say, obscurely, of supernal natures ? Or that this
should have been the case with the mother of it,
who is a material image ; and that it should not
only have formed a conception of these natures,
and of both this and the intelligible world, but
should also have learned what the things are from
which the sensible universe was generated* Whence
did it conceive that fire should first be produced,
and think that this was necessary? For why did it
not conceive this of something else ? But if it was
able to produce fire from the conception of it, why
did it not produce the world from a conception of
the world ? For it is in a similar manner requisite,
that the production of the world should be simulta¬
neous with the conception of it. For both fire and
the world were comprehended in the conception of
them ; since this image fabricated entirely in a
more physical way, and not like the arts. For the
arts are posterior both to nature and the world.
And even now, in the individuals which are gene¬
rated by natures, fire is not first produced, after¬
wards each particular, and in the next place the
mixture of these, but the enclosure and circum¬
scription of the v/hole animal, impressed in the
menstrual effluxions. Why, therefore, might not
matter be there circumscribed in the impression of
the world, in which impression, earth and fire and
the rest of things were comprehended ? But per¬
haps they would thus have made the world, in con^
sequence of employing a more true soul. The
artificer of the world, however, knew not how to
make it in this manner, though he foresaw the de¬
finite magnitude of the heavens, the obliquity of
the zodiac, the motion of the bodies under it, and
[the central position of] the earth ; and all this in
such a way as to possess the causes through which
they thus subsist ; though such foreknowledge could
not belong to an image, but entirely proceeded
from a power derived from the best of things, and
which they also though unwillingly acknowledge.
For the illumination diffused through the darkness,
compels them to assent to the true causes of the
world. For why was it requisite to illuminate, if
it was not entirely necessary ? For this necessity
was either according to nature, or preternatural.
And if, indeed, it was according to nature, this illu¬
mination always existed ; but if it w'as preter¬
natural* then among supernal beings that which is
irregular had a subsistence, and evils existed prior
to this world. Hence, this world is not the cause
of evil, but supernal beings are the causes of evils
to the world. And evil to the soul is not from the
universe, but the evils that are here are derived
from soul. And thus by a reasoning process we
are led to refer the world to the first of things.
But if matter also is the cause of evil, whence does
it appear that it is so ? For soul verging downward,
saw', as they say, the darkness, and illuminated it.
Whence, therefore, did the darkness originate ?
For if they say that soul verging downward pro¬
duced it, then it will follow that the darkness did
not exist prior to this downward tendency of the
soul. Nor will the darkness itself be the cause of
this tendency, but the nature of soul. This, how¬
ever, is the same thing as to attribute the cause to
precedaneous necessities. So that the cause is from the first of beings.
XIII. He therefore who blames the nature of
the world, does not know what he does, nor whi¬
ther this audacity of his tends. This, however,
arises from the Gnostics not knowing the succes¬
sive order of things, viz. of first, second, and third
natures, this order always extending itself as far
as to the last of things, and from not considering
that subordinate beings ought not to revile such
as are first, but should mildly yield to the nature
of all things ; and that they should betake them¬
selves to the first of beings, abandoning the tragic
fears, which they fancy are produced from the
spheres of the world, all which are the causes of
bland effects. For what do they contain of a terri¬
ble nature, with which those that are unskilled in
arguments, and such as are strangers to erudite
and elegant knowledge, are terrified ? For though
the bodies of these spheres are of a fiery 1 charac-
1 The fire of which the heavenly bodies consists is unburn- ing and innoxious, perpetually shining, as Proclus says in the Timaeus, with viviftc heat, illuminative power, purity, and transparent light.
teristic, yet it is not proper to be afraid of them,
since they subsist with commensuration both to the
universe and to the earth* But they ought to look
to 1 the souls of these spheres, by whom they ima¬
gine themselves to be considered as beings of a
very honourable nature, though their bodies trans¬
cendency surpass ours both in magnitude and
beauty, and contribute to and co-operate with na¬
tural effects. For otherwise subordinate beings
would not be generated, as long as the first of
things subsist. These spheres also give completion
to the universe, of which they are likewise mighty
parts. If men, however, possess something ho¬
nourable beyond other animals, much more do the
starry spheres, which do not exist in the universe
for tyrannical purposes, but impart to it ornament
and order. But with respect to those things which
are said to be effected by them, these are to be
considered as signs of future events ; and that
things which are generated are produced accompa¬
nied with different fortunes. For it is not possible
that the same things should happen to each indivi-
* For ci be ras ψνχαε here, it is necessary to read eis be ras ψνχας.
dual, since they are much distant from eaeh other,
in the times of their generation, the places in which
they reside, and in the dispositions of the soul.
Nor again, is it fit to require that all things should
be [perfectly] good, nor, because this is impossible,
rashly to blame [the order of the universe.1] Nor
is it proper to think that these inferior differ in no
respect from superior natures, or to conceive that
to be evil which is more defective with respect to
the possession of wisdom, and is less good, and
thus always considering a thing to be evil in pro¬
portion as it is more inconsiderable. Just as if
some one should say that nature is evil, because it
is not sense. And that what is sensitive is evil,
because it is not reason. For those who thus think
must be compelled to assert that evil also subsists
in the intelligible world. For there, likewise, soul
is inferior to intellect, and intellect to something
else [or the good.']
XIV. After another manner, also, they espe-
1 The words την ταζιν τον ? rarros are omitted in the origi¬ nal j but both the sense, and the version of Ficinus, require they should be inserted.
ciallv make supernal natures not to be incorrupti¬
ble. For when they write incantations, and utter
them as to the stars, not only to [the bodies 1 and]
souls of these, but also to things superior to soul,
what do they effect ? They answer, charms, allure¬
ments, and persuasions, so that the stars hear the
words addressed to them, and are drawn down ;
if any one of us knows how in a more artificial
manner to utter these incantations, sounds, aspira¬
tions of the voice, and hissings, and such other par¬
ticulars as in their writings are said to possess a
magical power. If, however, they are not willing
to assert this, but that sounds possess certain in¬
corporeal powers, it will follow that while they wish
to render their assertions more venerable, they
ignorantly subvert their renown. They likewise
pretend that they can expel disease. And if, in¬
deed, they say that they effect this by temperance
and an orderly mode of life, they speak rightly, and
conformably to philosophers. But now when they
assert that diseases are dasmons, and that they are
* Instead of ου μονον irpos την ψυχήν in the original, from the version of Ficinus, it is necessary to read, ου μονον rrpos τα σώματα αλλα και την ψνχην .
able to expel these by words, and proclaim that
they possess this ability, they may appear to the
multitude to be more venerable, who admire the
powers of magicians ; but they will not persuade
intelligent men that diseases have not their causes
either from labours, or satiety, or indigence, or pu¬
trefaction, and in short from mutations which either
have an external or internal origin. This, how¬
ever, is manifest from the cure of diseases. For
disease is deduced downward, so as to pass away
externally, either through a flux of the belly, or the
operation of medicine. Disease, also, is cured by
letting of blood, and fasting. Perhaps, however,
[they will say] that the daemon is then hungry, and
the medicine causes him to waste away ; but that
sometimes health is suddenly obtained, through the
daemon departing, or remaining within the body.
But if this is effected while the daemon still remains
within, why, while he is within, is the person no
longer diseased ? And if he departs, what is the
cause of his departure? For what did he suffer?
Is it because he was nourished by the disease ?
The disease, therefore, was something different
from the daemon. In the next place, if the daemon
enters without any cause, why is not the body al-
ways diseased ? But if he enters when the cause of
the disease is present, why is the daemon necessary
in order to the body becoming diseased ? For the
cause is sufficient to produce the fever. At the
same time, however, it is ridiculous, that as soon
as the cause of the disease exists, the daemon should
immediately be present, as if subsisting in conjunc¬
tion with the cause. The manner, however, in
which these things are asserted by the Gnostics,
and on what account is evident ; since for the sake
of this, no less than of other things, we have men¬
tioned these dasmons. Other particulars, however,
we shall leave to the consideration of the reader.
And this must every where he considered , that he
who pursues our form of philosophy > will , besides
all other goods , genuinely exhibit simple and vene¬
rable manners , in conjunction with the possession
of wisdom , and will not endeavour to become inso¬
lent and proud ; but will possess confidence accom¬
panied with reason , much security and caution ,
and great circumspection .*