If, however, there is another [sensible] world better than this, what is it ? But if it is neces-
x It appears from the version of Ficinus, that aei is, here wanting in the original. And indeed, the sense requires it should be inserted.
sary that this world should exist, and there is no
other, it is this world which preserves the imitation
of the intelligible universe. For the whole earth
indeed, is full of various animals, and of immortal
beings; and all things are replete with these, as
far as to the heavens. And with respect to the
stars, both those which are in the inferior spheres,
and those which are in the highest orb, what reason
can be assigned why they are not Gods, since they
are moved in order, and revolve with such beauti-
ful bodies P Why should they not possess virtue, or
what can hinder them from obtaining it? For those
things have no place there, which are the causes of
evils here ; nor is that evil of body there, which
here is disturbed and disturbs. What, likewise,
prevents celestial natures from possessing intellec¬
tual energy, since they are always at leisure, and
from receiving in their intellect divinity, and the
other intelligible Gods ? But to assert that our wis¬
dom is more excellent than theirs, wall be said by
no one who is not insane ; since if souls have de¬
scended hither, through being compelled by the
soul of the world, how since they suffer compulsion
are they better than that soul ? For in souls, that
which has dominion is more excellent. And if
souls descended hither voluntarily, why do you
blame this sensible region, into which you willingly
came ? Especially since you may be liberated from
it, if it is not agreeable to you to stay. If, how¬
ever, this universe is a place of such a kind, that it
is possible to obtain wisdom in it, and while dwell¬
ing here to live according to a similitude of intelli-
gibles, does not this testify that sensible are sus¬
pended from intelligible forms ?
IX. If, however, some one should blame wealth
and poverty, and the inequality in the dispensation
of every thing of this kind, in the first place, such a
one is ignorant that the worthy man does not seek
for equality in such like particulars ; nor is of opi¬
nion that those who possess many things, have more
[of good ;] nor that rulers are better than private
individuals, but suffers others to make such things
as these the objects of their pursuit. He also
knows that the present life is twofold, the one being
that of worthy men, but the other that of the mul¬
titude. And that the life of worthy men tends to
the summit, and that w hich is on high ; but that
the life which is merely human is again tw’ofold,
the one kind being mindful of virtue, and partici-
paling of a certain good, but the other pertaining
to the vile rabble and to artificers, who administer
to the necessities of more worthy men. But if one
man slays another, or is vanquished by pleasure,
through imbecility of mind, what is there wonder¬
ful in this, since the guilt is not in intellect, but in
souls that are of a puerile nature? And if this
should happen to be an exercise of the victors and
the vanquished, how is it possible that this also
should not subsist rightly ? But if you should be
injured, what dreadful thing is there in this to an
immortal nature ? And if you kill another [instead
of being killed yourself,] you have what you wish.
If, however, you still blame the administration of
things, there is no necessity for you to continue
any longer in life. But it is acknowledged that
there are judicial decisions here, and punishments.
How, therefore, is it right to blame a city for distri¬
buting to every one according to his desert, since
virtue is honoured in it, and vice has its appropriate
disgrace ? There are, likewise, in the world, not
only statues of the Gods, but the Gods themselves,
beholding from on high, who easily, as it is said,
escape the accusations of men, since they conduct
all things in order from the beginning to the end,
and distribute an appropriate allotment to every
one, conformable to the mutations of lives, and to
actions in a pre-existent state ; of which he who is
ignorant, is of all men the most rash and rustic in
divine concerns. It is requisite, however, that you
should endeavour to become a most excellent cha¬
racter, and not think that you alone are able to
become so ; for thus you will not yet be. most ex¬
cellent. But you ought to be persuaded that there
are other transcendently good men, and also good
daemons ; and much more Gods, who dwell in this
world, and look to that which is intelligible ; and
especially that there is that most blessed soul the
leader and ruler of this universe. From hence
also , it is proper that you should celebrate the in¬
telligible Gods ; and besides all these , the great
king which is there , and should demonstrate that
the magnitude of his nature especially consists in
the multitude of Gods . For it is the province if
those who know the power of God , not to contract
this power into one , but to shoxv that the amplitude
of divinity is as great as he himsef has demon¬
strated it to be ; since remaining that which he is ,
he has produced many Gods , all of whom are sus¬
pended from , and subsist through and by him .
This world , likewise , w through him ,
/ooA\9 ifo to divinity , #<9 ztos too each of the Gods ,
prophetically announce to men what they there
behold , and by oracles unfold their will .
If, however, the Gods that proceed from, are
not the same with the first God, this very thing
also is according to nature. But if you wish to
despise superior beings, and arrogantly extol your¬
self as not inferior to them, in the first place [it
should be remembered,] that by how much more
excellent any one is, by so much the more is he
benevolently disposed towards all other beings, and
towards mankind. And in the next place, it is
proper to have a moderate conception of our own
dignity, and unaccompanied with any rusticity ;
exalting ourselves only so far as our nature is able
to ascend ; conceiving that there is also a place
with divinity for others, as well as for ourselves,
and not, as if flying in a dream, arrange ourselves
alone immediately after the highest God ; and thus
deprive ourselves of that power by which it is pos¬
sible for the soul of man to become a God. But
this is possible so far as intellect is the leader of the
soul. To attempt, however, to pass beyond intel»
lect, is to fall from intellect. But stupid men are
persuaded when they suddenly hear such sounds as
these : “ You are better , not only than all other
men , to than the Gods ? For there is much
arrogance among men [of the present time.] And
he who prior to this was humble and modest , and
a man of no consequence , becomes exalted beyond
measure when he is told, u You are the son of God ,
but other men whom you formerly admired , are
not the sons of God ; as neither are those beings
which men honor conformably to the rites of their
ancestors . It may be shown , however , without
any labour , that you are more excellent than the
heavens themselves? 1 Others, also, vociferate the
same things. Just as if some one in the company
of many persons who knew not how to numerate,
1 Of this most stupid and arrogant opinion was the slashing Dr. Bentley, as Pope calls him, as is evident from the follow¬ ing extract :
Nor do we count it any absurdity, that such a vast and immense universe should be made for the sole use of such mean and unworthy creatures as the children of men. For if we consider the dignity of an intelligent being, and put that in the scales against brute inanimate matter, we may affirm, without over-valuing human nature, that the soul of one virtuous and religious man, is of greater worth and excellency than the sun and his planets, and all the stars in the world.” See Bentley's Sth Sermon at Boyles Lectures,
should hear it said that he was a thousand cubits
in height. If, therefore, he should think himself
so tall as this, but should hear that other men were
five cubits in height, he would only have a con¬
fused imagination that a thousand was a great
number.
Farther still, they acknowledge that the provi¬
dence of God is attentive to human concerns.
Why, therefore, does he neglect the whole world,
of which we are a part ? If it is because he is not
at leisure to look to it, neither therefore is it lawful
for him to survey that which is inferior and us.
if
Why also, while he surveys us, does he not behold
that which is external ; and thus look to the world
in wyhich we are contained ? But if he does not
look to that wdrich is external, in order that he roav
not see the world, neither will he behold us. Di¬
vinity, however, knows the order of the wrorld, and
the manner in which men who are contained in it
subsist. Those, also, who are dear to divinity,
bear mildly whatever happens to them from the
world, if any thing necessarily befals them from the
motion of all things. For it is not proper to look
to what is pleasing to an individual, but we should
direct our attention to the universe, and honour
every one according to his desert ; hastening to that goal to which all things that are able hasten*
and by the attainment of which they become
blessed ; some things as far as they have ability
obtaining an allotment adapted to their nature.
Nor should any man ascribe this ability to himself
alone. For it does not follow that a man possesses
what he pretends to possess ; since many assert
they possess that of which they know they are des*
titute, and also fancy they have a thing when they
have it not, and that they alone are the possessors
of that which they alone do not possess.
X. He, therefore, who investigates many other
particulars, or rather every particular respecting
their opinions, will be able to show copiously what
the nature of them is. We, indeed, are ashamed
of certain of our friends,1 who before they were in¬
timate with us were conversant with these opinions,
and who still, I know not how, persevere in them,
and endeavour to render them credible. We, how¬
ever, speak to those with whom we are acquainted,
1 Plotinus, I suppose, alludes here to Origen the Christian father, among others, who had formerly been one of his dis¬ ciples.
and not to the many who are auditors of these
men. For we shall effect nothing by endeavouring
to persuade them not to be disturbed by the argu¬
ments of the Gnostics, which are not accompanied
with demonstrations ; (for how is it possible they
should ?) but are the assertions of arrogant men.
For there is another mode of properly confuting
those who dare to reprehend the doctrines of an¬
cient and divine men, and a mode which adheres to
the truth. We shall, therefore, dismiss the enquiry
how they are to be persuaded. For those who
accurately understand what has now been said, will
know what the nature is of every other particular.
We shall dismiss, however, the consideration of
that assertion which surpasses every thing in absur¬
dity, if it is requisite to call it an absurdity, viz.
that soul and a certain wisdom verged downward,
whether soul w^as the first that began to verge, or
wisdom was the cause of this tendency to an infe¬
rior condition, or both had the same intention#
They add, that other souls and the members of
wisdom descended at the same time, and entered
bodies, such for instance as those of men. They
say, however, that the soul for the sake of which
other souls descended, did not descend, as if it did
not verge downward, but that it only illuminated
the darkness ; and that afterwards an image was
from thence produced in matter. Again, also,
after this fashioning an image of an image, they
assert that it pervades through matter or mate¬
riality, or whatever else they may please to call it y
for they call this by one name, and that by another,
devising many appellations for the purpose of ren¬
dering what they say obscure. And thus they
generate what is denominated by them the dumiur-
gus. Making the world, likewise, to revolt from
the mother, they say that it proceeds from the
demiurgus as far as to the last of images/
XL In the first place, therefore, if this sou!
did not descend, but illuminated the darkness, how
can it be rightly said to have verged downward ?
For it is not proper to say that it now verged, be¬
cause something flowed from it such as light ; un¬
less one thing belonging to it was situated in the