1 This is one of the peculiar dogmas of Plotinus, which is however opposed, and 1 think very justly by Prod us, in the last Proposition of his Elements of Theology. “ For if,’’ (as he there says) “ something pertaining to the soul remains on high in the intelligible world, it will always perceive intellec¬ tually, without transition, or transitively. But if without transition, it will be intellect, and not a part of the soul. And if with transition, then from that which always, and from that which sometimes energizes intellectually, one essence will be formed. This, however, is impossible.
α From the version of Ficinus, it appears that instead of του ovtos in this place, we should read του παντός.
body of the universe, as much as it is able to re¬
ceive from it. At the same time also, this soul
remains free from all solicitude, not governing the
world by the discursive energy of reason, nor cor¬
recting any thing [in itself ;] but by the vision of
that which is prior to itself, adorning the universe
with an admirable power. For the more it looks
to itself, the more beautiful and powerful it be¬
comes, and possessing these excellencies from the
intelligible world, it imparts them to that which is
posterior to itself, and as it is always illuminated,
it always illuminates.
III. Being therefore always illuminated, and
continually possessing light, it imparts it to the
natures that are in a consequent order. And these
are always contained and irrigated by this light, and
enjoy life through it, as far as they are able. Just
as if a fire being placed in a certain middle, what¬
ever is capable of receiving heat, should be heated
by it as much as possible ; though the fire is limited
by measure. But when the powers not being
measured, are never-failing, how is it possible that
they should have an existence, and yet nothing
should participate of them ? It is, however, neces-
sary that every thing should impart itself to some¬
thing else ; or the good will not be good, nor intel¬
lect be intellect, nor soul be soul ; unless after that
which lives primarily, there is also that which has a
secondary life, as long as that exists which is pri¬
marily vital. Hence it is necessary that all things
should be perpetually consequent to each other,
and should be generated by other things, because
they depend on others for their subsistence. Things
therefore that are said to be generated, were not
generated at a certain time, but were and will be
rising into existence ; nor will they be corrupted,
those things excepted which they contain, into
which they may be resolved. But that which has
nothing into which it can be resolved, will not be
corrupted. If, however, some one should say that
things which are in generation may be resolved into
matter, we reply, and why may not matter also be
dissolved ? But if it is said that matter may be disr
solved, we ask what necessity there was that it
should be generated ? If they say it was necessary,
and therefore it was generated, we reply, and it is
also now necessary. But if it should be left alone,
divine natures would not be every where, but would
be circumscribed in a certain place, as if surrounded
with a wall. If, however, this is impossible, mat¬ ter is perpetually 1 2 illuminated [by divinity.]
IV. But if they say that soul suffering as it
were a defluxion of its wings, made the world, we
reply, that this does not befal the soul of the uni¬
verse. If also they say this soul is deceived and
in error, they should assign the cause of its decep¬
tion and error. When likewise was it deceived ?
For if from eternity, it will for the same a reason
remain in error. But if it began at a certain
time to be deceived, why was it not deceived
prior to that time ? We, however, do not say that
the tendency of the soul downward produced the
world, but rather the non-tendency of it. But if
it tends downward, it is evident that this must arise
from its forgetfulness of what the intelligible world
contains. And if it is forgetful of these, how did
it fabricate the world ? For whence can it make,
except from the things which it saw there ? But if
it fabricates recollecting the things that are there, it
1 It appears that aei is wanting here in the original.
2 Instead of κατα τον αυτών λογον , it is necessary to read κατα τον αυτόν λογον.
has not in short, any tendency downward. For it
does not possess nor see them obscurely, if it is
without this tendency. And why, if it has any re¬
collection of them, should it not wish to return
thither ? For what can it suppose will happen to
itself from fabricating the world ? For it is ridi¬
culous to assert that it made the world, in order
that it might be honoured, and is an opinion derived
from the makers of statues. If, likewise, soul fa¬
bricated by a reasoning process, and did not natu¬
rally possess a producing power, how did it make
this world ? When also will it destroy the world ?
For if it repented having made it, why does it
defer its destruction ? But if it does not yet repent,
neither will it ever, as being now accustomed to it,
and becoming through time more friendly towards
it. If, also, it defers the destruction of the world
on account of partial souls, waiting for their union
with it, these souls ought not to have descended
again into generation, having experienced in a
former descent, the evils which are here ; so that
prior to the present time they would have ceased
to descend. Nor must we grant them that this
world was produced in an evil condition, because
there are many molestations in it. For this arises
from forming too exalted an opinion of this sensible
world, and conceiving it to be the same with that
which is intelligible, and not the image of it. For
what more beautiful image of it could have been
generated ? What other fire could be a better image
of the fire which is there, than the tire which is
here ? Or what other earth than this, of the earth
which is there ? What sphere, also, could be more
accurate and venerable, or more orderly in its mo¬
tion [than that of this sensible universe,] after the
comprehension which is there of the intelligible
world in itself? And what other sun after the intel¬
ligible sun, can be prior to this which is the object
of sight ?
V. It is however truly absurd, that they having
a body like other men, together with desires, pains,
and anger, should not despise the power of these,
but assert that they are able to come into contact
with the intelligible, and yet that there is not in the
sun a more impassive power, though it exists in a *
superior order, and has not as our bodies have, a
predominant tendency to a change of quality, and
that it has not likewise a wisdom more excellent
than we have whose origin is recent^ and who are
prevented by so many impediments from arriving at
truth. Nor again , is it fit to assert that the soul
of the vilest men is immortal and divine , hut that
all heaven and the stars that are there , do not
participate of immortality , though they consist of
things far more beautiful and pure [ than any
thing terrestrial ,] and though it is evident that
whatever is there is orderly and elegant ; espe¬
cially since they blame the disorder which is about
the earth, as if an immortal soul would chitse this
inferior abode, and willingly though more excellent
be subservient to a mortal soul. The introduction
also of this other soul by them is absurd, which
according to them derives its composition from the
elements. For how can a composition from the
elements possess any life? For the mixture of
these produces either the hot or the cold, or that
which is mingled from both, or the dry, or the
moist, or a compound from these. How, likewise,
is soul the connecting bond of the four elements,
since it consists from and is posterior to them ? But
when they also add animadversion and will, and
ten thousand other things to this soul, it may be
asked why they ascribe these to it. Farther still ,
they do not honour this sensible fabrication of
things , nor this visible earth , but they say that
there is a nezv 1 earth produced for them , into
which they are to ascend from hence ; and that
this new earth is the productive principle of the
world ; though why is it necessary that they should
dwell in the paradigm of a world which they hate ?
Whence likewise does this paradigm subsist P For
this, according to them, derived its subsistence from
the maker of the world, verging to terrestrial na¬
tures. If, therefore, by the maker of the universe
great attention is paid to the production of another
world, after the intelligible world which he pos¬
sesses, why is this attention requisite ? And if he
\yas thus attentive prior to the world, was it in
order that souls might be saved? How is it, there¬
fore, that they are not saved ? So that the world
was made in vain. But if he was thus attentive
posterior to the world, receiving his knowledge by
a spoliation of form from matter, in this case, the
skill which souls derive from experience, is suffi¬
cient to their salvation. But if they think that the
form of the world should be assumed in souls, from
whence is this novel doctrine derived ?
1 It appears from the version of Ficinus, that for νυν here, we should read veav.
VI. And why is it requisite to speak of the
other hypostases which they introduce, such as
transmigrations, repercussions, and repentances ? 1
For if they say that these are the passions of soul
when it repents, and repercussions, when it con*
templates as it were the images of beings, and not
beings themselves, — these are vain assertions, ad¬
duced for the purpose of establishing a peculiar
sect. For as they do hot adhere to the ancient
wisdom of the Greeks, they fabricate such fictions
as these. For the Greeks knew and asserted with¬
out any arrogance and pride, that there are methods
of ascent from the cavern [of sense] and gradual
progressions to a more and more true survey [of an
intelligible essence. ] And, in short, some things are
assumed by the Gnostics from Plato, but others
1 Forms or ideas, according to the ancient wisdom of the Greeks, leap into matter, which is adapted by the exemplar of the universe to receive the images of them, and like a mirror gives back the influx of the ideas which it receives. Souls, therefore, falling from the intelligible world become deceived, by mistaking the resemblances of forms for forms themselves, till by repentance they return to their true country, from which they have been as it were banished, through their abode on the earth. The Gnostics perverting this doctrine, gave the names of essences to such like passions of the soul.
are innovations of their own, in order that they
may establish a peculiar philosophy, and are devia¬
tions from the truth. For the punishments and
rivers in Hades, and transmigrations into other
bodies, are derived from Plato. The admission,
likewise, of multitude in intelligibles, viz. of being
and intellect ; and another demiurgus, and soul, is
assumed from what is said in the Timaeus. For
Plato there says, “ Intellect, therefore, perceiving
ideas in that which is animal itself, understood by
the discursive energy of reason, that the universe
should contain as many as are there.” But they not
understanding Plato, introduce an intellect at rest,
containing all things in itself ; a second intellect
besides this, contemplating what the first contains ;
and a third intellect energizing dianoetically. Fre¬
quently, likewise, the fabricating soul is assumed
by them for the reasoning intellect. And they
fancy that this soul is the Demiurgus, according to
Plato ; not knowing who the Demiurgus is. And,
in short, they falsely ascribe to Plato the mode of
fabrication which they introduce, and many other
things, and pervert the opinions of the man ; as if
they alone understood an intelligible nature, but he,
and other blessed men were ignorant of it. Deno-
minating, likewise, the intelligible multitude, they
fancy that they have accurately discovered its na¬
ture ; though at the same time, by the multitude
which they introduce, they draw down the intelli¬
gible nature into a similitude with that which is
sensible and subordinate. For it is necessary to
consider intelligible multitude as subsisting accord¬
ing to the least possible number, and ascribing all
things to that which is posterior to the first, not to
investigate any other intelligibles ; that being all
things, and the first intellect and essence, and such
other beautiful essences as exist after the first na¬
ture. But we should admit that the form of soul
ranks in the third place.
Moreover, we should investigate the diffe¬
rences of souls, in passions, or in nature, so as
not in any respect to reprehend divine men, but
should benevolently receive their assertions, as be¬
ing sanctioned by antiquity, adopting what has
been well said by them, respecting the immortality
of the soul, the intelligible world, and the first God ;
as also, that it is necessary the soul should fly from
an association with the body, and that a separa¬
tion from the body is a flight from generation to
real essence. For if they were clearly to assert
these things, which are admitted by Plato, they
would do well. No one , however , will envy their
wishing to dissent from these dogmas ; nor their
endeavours to establish their own opinions among
their auditors , by d faming and insolently attack¬
ing the doctrines of the Greeks., But they ought
to demonstrate that their own peculiar opinions,
which are different from those of the Greeks, are
right ; and should benevolently and philosophically
adduce the opinions of the ancients. Justly, also,
looking to truth when they oppose the ancients,
they ought not to aim at renown by censuring those
who from a remote period have been celebrated by
no contemptible men, nor assert that they are bet¬
ter than them. For what the ancients have said
concerning intelligibles, is much better, and more
replete with learning than what they say ; and is
easily known to be so by those who are not deceived
by the fraud which at present invades mankind .
Indeed, the additions which the Gnostics have
made to what they received from the ancients, will
be found to be by no means appropriate ; and
hence in their oppositions to them, they introduce
manifold generations and corruptions. They like-
Plot. F
wise find fault with this universe, reprobate the
communion of the soul with body, and blame the
governor of the world. They also confound the
demiurgus with soul, and ascribe the same passions
to the soul of the world as to partial souls.
That this world, therefore, never began, nor
will ever cease to be, but will continue in exist¬
ence, as long as intelligibles have a subsistence, has
been elsewhere shown by us. And that the com¬
munion of our soul with the body, is not better for
the soul, has been asserted prior to them. But
that the soul of the universe should receive any
thing from ours, is just as if some one adducing
the tribe of potters or braziers, in a well-governed
city, should blame the whole city [on their account.]
It is necessary, however, to be persuaded that the
soul of the universe governs in a way very different
from ours ; and not bound to body as our souls are.
For besides ten thousand other differences which
we have elsewhere enumerated, this also ought to
be considered, that we are bound by the body, the
bond being now in reality produced. For the na¬
ture of body being bound in the whole soul, binds
together with itself whatever it may comprehend ;
but the soul of the universe is not bound by the
things which it binds. For it has dominion over
them. Hence it is not passively affected by them.
We, however, are not the lords of these. But so
much of the soul of the world as is raised to the
divine nature which is above it, so much of it re¬
mains entire and simple, and without impediment ;
and so much of it as imparts life to the body whth
which it is connected, receives nothing from it.
For, in short, that which is in something different
from itself, necessarily receives the passive proper»
ties of that in which it is. But this no longer im¬
parts any thing of itself to that which possesses its
own proper life. Just as if one thing should be
centrically inserted in another, and which is co¬
passive with that in which it is inserted ; but the
latter being decayed, should permit the former to
have its own life ; since, neither when the fire
which is in you is extinct, is the wholeness of fire
extinguished. Nor if the whole of fire should
perish, this would not affect the soul of the universe,
but the composition of the mundane body. And if
in each of the remaining elements there should be
a certain world, this would not affect the soul of
the universe, since the composition of the world is
different from that of each of the animals which it
contains* For the soul of the world stands as it
were over its body* and orders it to abide ; but
here the elements secretly as it were withdrawing
themselves, are bound in their proper order by a
secondary bond. In the former case, however, they
have no place into which they can fly. Hence, it
is neither necessary to contain them internally, nor
by external compression to impel them inwardly ;
but each remains where nature from the first in¬
tended it should remain. And if any one of them
is naturally moved, those things to which motion is
not natural are affected by it. The bodies, how-
ever? which are naturally moved, are moved in a
beautiful manner, as being parts of the w hole ; but
certain things are corrupted, in consequence of not
being able to sustain the order of the whole. Just
as if in a great dance, which is conducted in a be¬
coming manner, a tortoise being caught in the
middle of the progression, should he trod upon,
not being able to escape the order of the dance ;
though if the tortoise had arranged itself with the
dance, it would not have suffered from those that
composed it.
To enquire, however, why the world was
made, is the same thing as to ask why soul is ; and
why the demiurgus made it ? For this indeed, in
the first place, is the enquiry of those who suppose
there is a beginning of perpetuity. In the next
place, they fancy that the demiurgus became the
cause of the fabrication of the world, through being
changed from one thing to another. Hence, they
are to be taught, if they are equitably disposed,
what the nature of these things is, that they may
cease to revile what is honourable, which they will
easily do, if they become properly cautious respect¬
ing such like particulars. For no one can rightly
blame the administration of the universe, since in
the first place it demonstrates the magnitude of an
intelligible nature. For if it proceeds into life in
such a way, as not to have an indistinct and con¬
fused life, such as the smallest natures in it possess,
which are perpetually generated night and day
through the abundant life it contains ; but is con¬
tinued, clear and abundant, and is every where a
liie exhibiting an inestimable wisdom., how is it
possible not to assert that it is a perspicuous and
beautiful statue of the intelligible Gods ? But if
though it imitates the intelligible paradigm it is not
the same with it, this is conformable to nature ;
since if it were the same with, it would no longer
imitate it. The assertion, however, is false, that it
imitates this paradigm in a dissimilar manner. For
nothing is omitted, which a beautiful and natural
image can possibly possess ; since it was indeed
necessary that this imitation should exist, but yet
that it should not be an imitation resulting- from the
discursive energy of reason, and an artificial care.
For it was not possible that the intelligible should
be the last of things ; since it was necessary that
the energy of it should be twofold, one indeed abid¬
ing in itself, but the other proceeding into something
else. Hence it was necessary that there should be
something posterior to it. For that alone which is
the most powerless of all things, has nothing of it¬
self which proceeds downwards. But an admirable
power flourishes in intelligibles, so that this power
perpetually 1 fabricates.