logous to the one , and to hyparxis, but power as analogous to matter. And if, indeed, they say this, they speak rightly. But if they ascribe a certain formless and indefinite nature to an intelligible essence, they appear to me to wander from the conceptions of Plato on this subject. For the infinite is not the matter of bound, but the power of it, nor is bound the form of the infinite, but the hyparxis of it.” See tny transla¬ tion of this work of Proclus, vol. i. p. 173.
more true infinite. Is, therefore, the infinite the
same thing as to be infinite ? Perhaps where there
are that which has a productive and forming power,
and matter, each of these is different ; but where
there is matter alone, they must either be said to
be the same, or in short, and which also is better,
to be infinite is not here. For it would be reason
in order that it might be infinite [i. e. would have a
productive and forming power,] which is not in the
infinite. Hence matter must be said to be of itself
infinite, through having an arrangement opposite to
reason. For as reason not being any thing else is
reason, thus also it must be said, that matter being
opposed to reason according to infinity, is infinite
in such a way as not to be any thing else*
XVI. Is, therefore, matter the same with dif¬
ference, or is it not the same ? Perhaps it is not
the same with difference simply considered,1 but
with a part of difference which is opposed to beings
properly so called, and which are productive prin-
1 it appears from the version of Ficinus, that the words
η ον tclvtqv €Τ€ροτηπ απ\ω$> are wanting in this place in the
original.
ciples. Hence, also, non-being is thus a certain
being, and the same with privation, if privation is
an opposition to the things which subsist in reason.
Will, therefore, privation be corrupted by the ac¬
cession of that of which it is the privation ? By no
means* For the receptacle of habit, is not habit,
but privation. The receptacle, likewise, of bound,
is not that which is terminated, nor bound, but the
infinite, and this so far as it is infinite. How is it
possible, therefore, that bound approaching should
not destroy the nature of the infinite, especially
since this infinite has not an accidental subsistence ?
Or may we not say that if this infinite was infinite
in quantity, it would perish? Now, however, this
is not the case, but on the contrary its being is pre¬
served by bound. For bound brings that which
the infinite is naturally adapted to be, into energy
and perfection ; just as that which is not yet sown
[is brought to perfection] when it is sown, and as
the female [when impregnated] by the male. For
then the female nature is not destroyed, but pos¬
sesses the female characteristic in a greater degree ;
since then it becomes more eminently that which it
is. Is, therefore, matter evil when it partakes of
good ? Or shall we say it is evil on this account
because it was in want of good ? For it did not pos¬
sess it. For that which is in want of any thing,
and obtains what it wants, will perhaps become a
medium between good and evil, if it is equally dis*
posed towards both. But that which possesses
nothing, as being in poverty, or rather being poverty
itself, is necessarily evil. For this is not the want
of wealth or of strength, but it is the want of wis¬
dom, and the want of virtue, of beauty, strength,
morphe, form, and quality. How, therefore, is it
possible it should not be deformed ? How is it pos¬
sible it should not be perfectly base ? How is it
possible it should not be perfectly evil ? The mat¬
ter, however, which is in intelligibles is [real] being.
For that which is prior to it is beyond being. But
here [in the sensible region,] that which is prior to,
matter is being. Hence the matter which is here
is not being, since it is different from it when com¬
pared with the beauty of being.
Against the Gnostics/
I. Since it has appeared to us that the nature of the good is simple and the first ; for every thing
1 “ At the time in which Plotinus lived/’ (says Porphyry in his life of our philosopher,) " there were many Christians and others, who departing from the ancient philosophy, be¬ came heretics, [with respect to it;] viz. the followers of Adel- phius and Acylinus, who being in possession of many of the writings of Alexander, Philocomus, Demostratus, and Lydus, and exhibiting the revelations of Zoroaster, Zostrianus, Nico- theus, Allogenes, Meses, and certain others, deceived many, and were themselves deceived. For they asserted, that Plato had not penetrated the depth of an intelligible essence. Hence Plotinus in his conferences adduced many arguments against them, and also wrote a book which we have inscribed ‘Against the Gnostics/ leaving the rest to our judgment.”
After this testimony of Porphyry, it is singular, as Fabricius observes, that Plotinus should not even once use the word Gnostics, in any part of his treatise against them. But as he was a man sparing of words beyond all other writers, he was perhaps satisfied with the inscription which he knew would be given to the book by Porphyry, and being wholly attentive to the conceptions of his own wonderful mind, did not busy him» self with a repetition of names. Wherever this word, therefore, occurs in the following translation, it is inserted by me for the sake of perspicuity.
which is not the first is not simple ; and since it
has nothing in itself, but is one alone, and the
nature of what is called the oney is the same with
the good; for it is not first something else, and
afterwards one, — nor is the good something else,
and afterwards the good; — this being the case,
when we say the one , and when w^e say the good , it
is necessary to think that we speak of one and the
same nature ; not predicating any thing of it, but
manifesting it to ourselves as much as possible. It
is also called the first , because it is most simple ;
and sufficient to itself, because it does not consist
of many things. For if it did, it would be sus¬
pended from the things of which it consists. It
likewise is not in any thing else, because every
thing which is in another, is also derived from
another. If, therefore, it is neither from, nor in
another, and has not any composition in its nature,
it is necessary that there should not be any thing
superior to it. Hence, it is not requisite to pro¬
ceed to other principles, but having admitted this,
and next to this intellect which is primarily inteF
lect, we ought afterwards to place soul, as the next
in rank. For this is the order according to nature,
neither to admit more, nor fewer than these in the
Plot. E
intelligible. For those who admit fewer than these,
must either say that soul and intellect are the same,
or that intellect and that which is first are the
same. It has, however, been frequently demon¬
strated by us, that these are different from each
other.
It remains, therefore, that we should consider
at present, if there are more than these three,
what the natures are which exist besides these.
For since the principle of all things subsists in the
way we have shown, it is not possible for any one
to find a more simple and elevated principle. For
they [the Gnostics] will not say 1 that there is one
principle in capacity, but another in energy ; since
it is ridiculous in things which are in energy, and
immaterial, to make many natures by dividing into
capacity and energy. But neither in the natures
posterior to these, is it to be supposed that there is
a certain intellect established in quiet, but that
another is as it were moved. For what is the quiet
of intellect, what the motion and language of it ?
And what will be the leisure of one intellect, and
* Instead of ου yap bet, here, it is necessary to read ου yap δη9
the work of the other ? Tor intellect always pos¬
sesses an invariable sameness of subsistence, being
constituted in a stable energy. But motion direct¬
ed to, and subsisting about it, is nowT the employ¬
ment of soul Reason also proceeding from intel¬
lect into soul, causes soul to be intellectual, and
does not produce a certain other nature between
intellect and soul. Moreover, neither is it neces¬
sary to make many intellects on this account, that
one of them perceives intellectually, but another
sees that it sees intellectually. For if in these, to
perceive intellectually is one thing, but another to
perceive that it sees intellectually, yet there must
be one intuitive perception in these which is not in¬
sensible of its own energies. For it would be ridi¬
culous to form any other conception than this of
true intellect. But the intellect will be entirely the
same, which perceives intellectually, and which sees
that it sees intellectually. For if this were not the
case, the one would be alone intelligent but the
other would perceive that it was intelligent, and
the former would be different from the latter. If,
however, they say that these two [only] differ from
each other in conceptions, in the first place indeed,
they will be deprived of many hypostases ; and in
the next place it is necessary to consider, whether
any conception of ours can admit the subsistence
of an intellect which is alone intelligent, and which
does not perceive that it sees intellectually. For
when a thing of this kind happens to us who are
always attentive to impulses and cogitations, if we
are moderately worthy, it becomes the cause to us
of folly.
When, therefore, that which is truly intellect intellectually perceives itself in its intellections, and the intelligible of it is not externally posited, but intellect itself is also the intelligible, it necessarily follows that in intellectual perception it possesses itself, and sees itself. But seeing itself, it perceives itself not to be void of intelligence, but intelligent. So that in primarily energizing intellectually, it will also have a perception that it sees intellectually, both being as one ; nor can there be any concep¬ tion of duplicity there. If, likewise, always per¬ ceiving intellectually it is that which it is, what place can there be for the conception w hich sepa¬ rates intellectual perception from the perceiving that it sees intellectually P If, however, some one
should introduce a third conception to the second,
which asserts that it perceives that it sees intellec¬
tually, and should say that it understands, (i. e.
sees intellectually) that what understands under¬
stands, the absurdity is still more apparent. And
why ma}r not assertions of this kind be made to in¬
finity ? The reason, likewise, proceeding from in¬
tellect which may be adduced, and from which
afterwards another reason is generated in the soul,
so as to become a medium between intellect and
soul, deprives the soul of intellectual perception,* if
it does not derive this reason from intellect, but
from some other intermediate nature* Hence it
would possess an image of reason, but not reason
itself. And in short, it would not have a know¬
ledge of intellect, nor would it be intelligent.
II. Hence it must not be admitted that there
are more principles than these [in the intelligible
world,] nor must these superfluous conceptions be
adopted, which have no place there ; but it must
be said that there is one intellect always subsisting
with invariable sameness, and in every respect with¬
out fluctuation, which imitates as much as possible
its father ; and with respect to our soul, that one
part of it always abides on high,1 that another part
of it is conversant with sensibles, and that another
has a subsistence in the middle of these. For as
there is one nature in many powers, at one time
the whole soul tends upward in conjunction with
the most excellent part, of itself, and of the uni¬
verse, * but at another time, the worse part being
drawn down, draws together with itself the middle
part. For it is not lawful that the whole of it
should be drawn downward. This passion also
happens to the soul, because it did not abide in
that which is most beautiful, where the soul which
does not rank as a part [continually] abiding, and
of which we are not a part, imparts to the whole