The two categories of the preceding section concerned the efficacy of physical feelings, pure or hybrid, for the origination of conceptual feelings in a later phase of their own subject. The present section considers analogous feelings with diverse subjects ‘scattered’ throughout mem- bers of a nexus. It considers a single subject, subsequent to the nexus, prehending this multiplicity of scattered feelings as the data for a corresponding multiplicity of its own simple physical feelings, some pure and some hybrid. It then formulates the process by which in that subject an analogy between these various feelings—con- stituted by one eternal object, of whatever complexity, implicated in the various analogous data of these feelings —is, by a supervening process of integration, converted into one feeling having for its datum the specific contrast between the nexus as one entity and that eternal object. This contrast is what is familiarly known as the qualifi- cation of the nexus by that eternal object. An inter-
The Transmission of Feelings 383
mediate stage in this process of integration is the forma- tion in the final subject of one conceptual feeling with that eternal object as its datum. This conceptual feeling has an impartial relevance to the above-mentioned vari- ous simple physical feelings of the various members of the nexus. It is this impartiality of the conceptual feeling which leads to the integration in which the many mem- bers of the nexus are collected into the one nexus which they form, and in which that nexus is set in contrast to the one eternal object which has emerged from their analogies.
Thus pure, and hybrid, physical feelings, issuing into a single conceptual feeling, constitute the preliminary phase of this transmutation in the prehending subject. The integration of these feelings in that subject leads to the transmuted physical feeling of a nexus as qualified by that eternal object which is the datum of the single conceptual feeling. In this way the world is physically felt as a unity, and is felt as divisible into parts which are unities, namely, nexus. Each such unity has its own characteristics arising from the undiscriminated actual entities which are members of that nexus. In some cases objectification of the nexus has only indirect ref- erence to the characteristics of its individual atomic actu- alities. In such a case the objectification may introduce new elements into the world, fortunate or unfortunate. Usually the objectification gives direct information, so that the prehending subject shapes itself as the direct outcome of the order prevalent in the prehended nexus. Transmutation is the way in which the actual world is felt as a community, and is so felt in virtue of its preva- lent order. For it arises by reason of the analogies between the various members of the prehended nexus, and eliminates their differences. Apart from transmuta- tion our feeble intellectual operations would fail to pene- trate into the dominant characteristics of things. We can only understand by discarding. Transmutation de- pends upon a categoreal condition.
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Category VI. The Category of Transmutation. When (in accordance with Category IV, or with Categories IV and V) one, and the same, conceptual feeling is derived impartially by a prehending subject from its analogous simple physical feelings of various actual entities, then in a subsequent phase of integration—of these simple physi- cal feelings together with the derivate conceptual feeling —the prehending subject may transmute the datum of this conceptual feeling into a contrast with the nexus of those prehended actual entities, or of some part of that nexus; so that the nexus (or its part), thus qualified, is the objective datum of a feeling entertained by this prehending subject.
Such a transmutation of simple physical feelings of
many actualities into one physical feeling of a nexus as
one, is called a ‘transmuted feeling.’ The origination of
such a feeling depends upon intensities, valuations, and
eliminations conjointly favourable.
In order to understand this categoreal condition, it must be noted that the integration of simple physical feelings into a complex physical feeling only provides for the various actual entities of the nexus being felt as separate entities requiring each other. We have to account for the substitution of the one nexus in place of its component actual entities. This is Leibniz’s problem which arises in his Monodology. He solves the problem by an unanalysed doctrine of ‘confusion.’ Some category is required to provide a physical feeling of a nexus as one entity with its own categoreal type of existence. This one physical feeling in the final subject is derived by transmutation from the various analogous physical feel- ings entertained by the various members of the nexus, together with their various analogous conceptual feelings (with these various members as subjects) originated from these physical feelings, either directly according to Category IV, or indirectly according to Category V. The analogy of the physical feelings consists in the fact that their definite character exhibits the same ingredient
The Transmission of Feelings 385
eternal object. The analogy of the conceptual feelings consists in the fact that this one eternal object, or one reversion from this eternal object, is the datum for the various relevant conceptual feelings entertained respec- tively by members of the nexus. The final prehending subject prehends the members of the nexus, (i) by ‘pure’ physical feelings in which the members are severally objectified by these analogous physical feelings, and (i1) by hybrid physical feelings in which the members are severally objectified by these analogous conceptual feelings.
In the prehending subject, these analogous, pure physi- cal feelings originate a conceptual feeling, according to Category IV; and, according to Category V, there may be a reverted conceptual feeling. There will be only one direct conceptual feeling; for the simple physical feelings (in the final subject) are analogous in the sense of exem- plifying the same eternal object. (If there be no rever- sion, this analogy extends over the pure and the hybrid physical feelings. If there be important reversion, this analogy only extends over the hybrid feelings with the reverted conceptual feelings as data. This latter case is only important when the reverted feelings involve the predominantly intense valuation.) Thus these many physical feelings of diverse actualities originate in the final subject one conceptual feeling. This single con- ceptual feeling has therefore an impartial reference throughout the actualities of the nexus. Also reverted conceptual feelings in the nexus are, in this con- nection, negligible unless they preserved this impartial- ity of reference throughout the nexus. Excluding for the moment the consideration of reverted feelings in the actualities of the nexus, the hybrid physical feelings in the prehending subject also, by Category IV, generate one conceptual feeling with impartial reference; also it is the same conceptual feeling as that generated by the pure physical feelings (in the final subject). Thus (with no reversion) the influence of the hybrid physical feelings
386 Process and Reality
is to enhance the intensity of the conceptual feeling derived from the pure physical feelings. But there may be reversions to be considered, that is to say, reversions with impartial reference throughout the nexus. The reversion may originate in the separate actualities of the nexus, or in the final prehending subject, or there may be a double reversion involving both sources. Thus we must allow for the possibility of diverse reverted feelings, each with impartial reference. In so far as there is con- cordance and the reversions are dominant, there will issue one conceptual feeling of enhanced intensity. When there is discordance among these various conceptual feelings, there will be elimination, and in general no transmutation. But when, from some (or all) of these sources of impartial conceptual feelings, one dominant impartial conceptual feeling emerges with adequate intensity, transmutation will supervene.
This impartiality of reference has then been trans- muted into the physical feeling of that nexus, whole or partial, contrasted with some one eternal object. It will be noted that this one impartial conceptual feeling is an essential element of the process, whereby an impartial reference to the whole nexus is introduced. Otherwise there would be no element to transmute particular rele- vancies to the many members into general relevance to the whole.
The eternal object which characterizes the nexus in this physical feeling may be an eternal object characteriz- ing the analogous physical feelings, belonging to all, or some, of the members of the nexus. In this case, the nexus as a whole derives a character which in some way belongs to its various members.
Again in the transmuted feeling only part of the orig- inal nexus may be objectified, and the eternal object may have been derived from members of the other part of the original nexus. This is the case for perception in the mode of ‘presentational immediacy,’ to be further dis- cussed in a later chapter (cf. Part IV, Ch. V, and also
The Transmission of Feelings 387
Part II, Ch. II, Sect. I, and Part II, Ch. IV, Sect. VII, and Part II, Ch. VIII).
Also the eternal object may be the datum of a reverted conceptual feeling, only indirectly derived from the mem- bers of the original nexus. In this case, the transmuted feeling of the nexus introduces novelty; and in unfortu- nate cases this novelty may be termed ‘error.’ But all the same, the transmuted feeling, whatever be its history of transmutation, is a definite physical fact whereby the final subject prehends the nexus. For example, consid- ering the example of presentational immediacy, colour- blindness may be called ‘error’; but nevertheless, it is a physical fact. A transmuted feeling comes under the definition of a physical feeling.
Our usual way of consciously prehending the world is by these transmuted physical feelings. It is only when we are consciously aware of alien mentalities that we even approximate to the conscious prehension of a single actual entity. It will be found that transmuted feelings are very analogous to propositional feelings, and to con- scious perceptions and judgments in their sequence of integration. Vagueness has its origin in transmuted feel- ings. For a quality, characterizing the mutual prehen- sions of all the members of a nexus, is transmuted into a predicate of the nexus. The intensity arising from the force of repetition makes this transmuted perception to be the prominent type of those feelings which in further integrations acquire consciousness as an element in their subjective forms. It represents a simplification of physi- cal feeling, effected in the course of integration.
According to this category the conceptual feelings entertained in any nexus modify the future réle of that nexus as a physical objective datum. This category gov- erns the transition from conceptual feelings in one actual entity to physical feelings either in a supervening phase of itself or in a later actual entity. What is conceptual earlier is felt physically later in an extended réle. Thus, for instance, a new ‘form’ has its emergent ingression con-
388 Process and Reality
ceptually by reversion, and receives delayed exemplifi-
cation physically when the other categoreal conditions
permit.
This joint operation of Categories IV and VI produces what has been termed ‘adversion’ and ‘aversion.’ For the conceptual feelings in the actualities of the nexus, produced according to Category IV, have data identical with the pattern exemplified in the objective data of the many physical feelings. If in the conceptual feelings there is valuation upward, then the physical feelings are transmuted to the new concrescence with enhanced intensity in its subjective form. This is ‘adversion.’
But if in the conceptual feelings there is valuation
downward, then the physical feelings are (in the later
concrescence) either eliminated, or are transmitted to it
with attenuated intensity. This is ‘aversion. Thus
‘adversion’ and ‘aversion’ are types of ‘decision.’
Thus the conceptual feeling with its valuation has pri- marily the character of purpose, since it is the agent whereby the decision is made as to the causal efficacy of its subject in its objectifications beyond itself. But it only achieves this character of purpose by its integration with the physical feeling from which it originates. This integration is considered in Chapter V on ‘Comparative Feelings.’
It is evident that adversion and aversion, and also the
Category of Transmutation, only have importance in the
case of high-grade organisms. They constitute the first
step towards intellectual mentality, though in themselves
they do not amount to consciousness. But an actual
entity which includes these operations must have an
important intensity of conceptual feelings able to mask
and fuse the simple physical feelings.
Also the examination of the Category of Transmutation
shows that the approach to intellectuality consists in
the gain of a power of abstraction. The irrelevant mul-
tiplicity of detail is eliminated, and emphasis is laid on
the elements of systematic order in the actual world. In