The general doctrine of the previous section requires an examination of principles regulating the transmission of feelings into data for novel feelings in a new concres- cence. Since no feeling can be abstracted from its sub- ject, this transmission is merely another way of consider- ing the objectification of actual entities. A feeling will be called ‘physical’ when its datum involves objectifica- tions of other actual entities. In the previous chapter the special case of ‘simple physical feelings’ was dis- cussed. A feeling belonging to this special case has as its datum only one actual entity, and this actual entity is objectified by one of its feelings. All the more com- plex kinds of physical feelings arise in subsequent phases of concrescence, in virtue of integrations of simple, physi- cal feelings with each other and with conceptual feelings. But before proceeding to these more complex physical feelings, a subdivision of simple physical feelings must be considered. Such feelings are subdivided into ‘pure physical feelings’ and ‘hybrid physical feelings.’ In a ‘pure physical feeling’ the actual entity which is the datum is objectified by one of its own physical feelings. Thus having regard to the ‘re-enaction’ which is charac- teristic of the subjective form of a simple physical feel- ing, we have—in the case of the simpler actual entities— an example of the transference of energy in the physical
376 Process and Reality
world. When the datum is an actual entity of a highly
complex grade, the physical feeling by which it is objecti-
fied as a datum may be of a highly complex character,
and the simple notion of a transference of some form of
energy to the new subject may entirely fail to exhaust
the important aspects of the pure physical feeling in
question.
In a ‘hybrid physical feeling’ the actual entity forming
the datum is objectified by one of its own conceptual
feelings. Thus having regard to the element of autonomy
which is characteristic of the subjective form of a con-
ceptual feeling, we have—in the case of the more complex
actual entities—an example of the origination and direc-
tion of energy in the physical world. In general, this
simplified aspect of a hybrid physical feeling does not
exhaust its rdle in the concrescence of its subject.
The disastrous separation of body and mind, character- istic of philosophical systems which are in any important respect derived from Cartesianism, is avoided in the philosophy of organism by the doctrines of hybrid physi- cal feelings and of the transmuted feelings. In these ways conceptual feelings pass into the category of physi- cal feelings. Also conversely, physical feelings give rise to conceptual feelings, and conceptual feelings give rise to other conceptual feelings—according to the doctrines of the categories of Conceptual Valuation (Category IV), and of Conceptual Reversion (Category V), to be discussed in the subsequent sections of this chapter.
One important characteristic of a hybrid feeling is the intensity of the conceptual feeling which originates from it, according to the category of subjective valuation. In the next section, this categoreal condition of ‘conceptual valuation’ is considered in relation to all physical feelings, ‘pure’ and ‘hybrid’ alike. The present section will only anticipate that discussion so far as hybrid feelings are concerned. Thus the part of the general category now relevant can be formulated:
The Transmission of Feelings 377
A hybrid physical feeling originates for its subject a
conceptual feeling with the same datum as that of the
conceptual feeling of the antecedent subject. But the
two conceptual feelings in the two subjects respectively
may have different subjective forms.
There is an autonomy in the formation of the subjec- tive forms of conceptual feelings, conditioned only by the unity of the subject as expressed in categoreal conditions I, VII, and VIII. These conditions for unity correlate the sympathetic subjective form of the hybrid feeling with the autonomous subjective form of the derivative conceptual feeling with the same subject.
There are evidently two sub-species of hybrid feelings:
(i) those which feel the conceptual feelings of temporal
actual entities, and (11) those which feel the conceptual
feelings of God.
The objectification of God in a temporal subject is effected by the hybrid feelings with God’s conceptual feelings as data. Those of God’s feelings which are posi- tively prehended are those with some compatibility of contrast, or of identity, with physical feelings transmit- ted from the temporal world. But when we take God into account, then we can assert without any qualifica- tion Hume’s principle, that all conceptual feelings are derived from physical feelings. The limitation of Hume’s principle introduced by the considerationof the Category of Conceptual Reversion (cf.Sect. III of this chapter) is to be construed as referring merely to the transmission from the temporal world, leaving God out of account. Apart from the intervention of God, there could be noth- ing new in the world, and no order in the world. The course of creation would be a dead level of ineffectiveness, with all balance and intensity progressively excluded by the cross currents of incompatibility. The novel hybrid feelings derived from God, with the derivative sympa- thetic conceptual valuations, are the foundations of progress.
378 Process and Reality
Conceptual feelings are primarily derivate from physi- cal feelings, and secondarily from each other. In this statement, the consideration of God’s intervention is excluded. When this intervention is taken into account, all conceptual feelings must be derived from physical feelings. Unfettered conceptual valuation, ‘infinite’ in Spinoza’s sense of that term, is only possible once in the universe; since that creative act is objectively immortal as an inescapable condition characterizing creative action.
But, unless otherwise stated, only the temporal enti- ties of the actual world will be considered. We have to discuss the categoreal conditions for such derivation of conceptual feelings from the physical feelings relating to the temporal world. By the categoreal condition of subjective unity—Category I—the initial phase of physi- cal feelings has the propositional unity of feelings com- patible for integration into one feeling of the actual world. But the completed determination of the subjec- tive form of this final ‘satisfaction’ awaits the origination of conceptual feelings whose subjective forms introduce the factor of ‘valuation,’ that is, ‘valuation up’ or ‘valuation down.’
Thus a supplementary phase succeeds to the initial purely physical phase. This supplementary phase starts with two subordinate phases of conceptual origination, and then passes into phases of integration, and of rein- tegration, in which propositional feelings, and intellectual feelings, may emerge. In the present chapter we are con- cerned with the first two phases of merely conceptual origination. These are not phases of conceptual analysis, but of conceptual valuation. The subsequent analytic phases involve propositional feelings, and in certain cir- cumstances issue in consciousness. But in this chapter, we are merely concerned with blind conceptual valuation, and with the effect of such valuation upon physical feel-
The Transmission of Feelings 379
ings which lie in the future beyond the actual entities in which such valuations occur.
The initial problem is to discover the principles accord-
ing to which some eternal objects are prehended posi-
tively and others are prehended negatively. Some are
felt and others are eliminated.
In the solution of this problem five additional cate- goreal conditions must be added to the three such condi- tions which have already been explained. The con- ditions have regard to the origination, and coordination, of conceptual feelings. They govern the general process of ‘conceptual imagination,’ so far as concerns its origi- nation from physical experience.
Category IV. The Category of Conceptual Valuation.
From each physical feeling there is the derivation of a
purely conceptual feeling whose datum is the eternal
object exemplified in the definiteness of the actual entity,
or the nexus, physically felt.
This category maintains the old principle that men-
tality originates from sensitive experience. It lays down
the principle that all sensitive experience originates
mental operations. It does not, however, mean that there
is no origination of other mental operations derivative
from these primary mental operations. Nor does it mean
that these mental operations involve consciousness,
which is the product of intricate integration.
The mental pole originates as the conceptual counter-
part of operations in the physical pole. The two poles
are inseparable in their origination. The mental pole
starts with the conceptual registration of the physical
pole. This conceptual registration constitutes the sole
datum of experience according to the sensationalist
school. Writers of this school entirely neglect physical
feelings, originating in the physical pole. Hume’s ‘im-
pressions of sensation’ and Kant’s sensational data are
considered in terms only applicable to conceptual regis-
tration. Hence Kant’s notion of the chaos of such ulti-
380 Process and Reality
mate data. Also Hume—at least, in his Treatise—can only find differences of ‘force and vivacity.’
The subjective form of a conceptual feeling is valua- tion. These valuations are subject to the Category of Subjective Unity. Thus the conceptual registration 1s conceptual valuation; and conceptual valuation intro- duces creative purpose. The mental pole introduces the subject as a determinant of its own concrescence. The mental pole is the subject determining its own ideal of itself by reference to eternal principles of valuation autonomously modified in their application to its own physical objective datum. Every actual entity is ‘in time’ so far as its physical pole is concerned, and is ‘out of time’ so far as its mental pole is concerned. It is the union of two worlds, namely, the temporal world, and the world of autonomous valuation. The integration of each simple physical feeling with its conceptual counterpart produces in a subsequent phase a physical feeling whose subjective form of re-enaction has gained or lost subjec- tive intensity according to the valuation up, or the valu- ation down, in the conceptual feeling. So far there is merely subjective readjustment of the subjective forms. This is the phase of physical purpose. The effect of the conceptual feeling is thus, so far, merely to provide that the modified subjective form is not merely derived from the re-enaction of the objectified actual entity. Also, in the complex subsequent integrations, we find that the conceptual counterpart has a réle in detachment from the physical feeling out of which it originates.
Category V. The Category of Conceptual Reversion.
There is secondary origination of conceptual feelings
with data which are partially identical with, and partially
diverse from, the eternal objects forming the data in
the primary phase of the mental pole; the determina-
tion of identity and diversity depending on the subjec-
tive aim at attaining depth of intensity by reason of
contrast.
Thus the first phase of the mental pole is conceptual
The Transmission of Feelings 381
reproduction, and the second phase is a phase of concep- tual reversion. In this second phase the proximate novelties are conceptually felt. This is the process by which the subsequent enrichment of subjective forms, both in qualitative pattern, and in intensity through contrast, is made possible by the positive conceptual pre- hension of relevant alternatives." There is a conceptual contrast of physical incompatibles. This is the category which, as thus stated, seems to limit the strict applica- tion of Plato’s principle of reminiscence, and of Hume’s principle of recollection. Probably it does not contradict anything that Plato meant by his principle. But it does limit the rigid application of Hume’s principle. Indeed Hume himself admitted exceptions. It is the category by which novelty enters the world; so that even amid stabil- ity there is never undifferentiated endurance. But, as the category states, reversion is always limited by the necessary inclusion of elements identical with elements in feelings of the antecedent phase. By the category of subjective unity, and by the seventh category of subjec- tive harmony, to be explained later, all origination of feelings is governed by the subjective imposition of apti- tude for final synthesis. Also by the category of objective identity this aptitude always has its ground in the two- way functionings of self-identical elements. Then in syn- thesis there must always be a ground of identity and an aim at contrast. The aim at contrast arises from the depth of intensity promoted by contrast. The joint necessity of this ground of identity, and this aim at contrast, is partially expressed in this category of con- ceptual reversion. This ‘aim at contrast’ is the expres- sion of the ultimate creative purpose that each unifica- tion shall achieve some maximum depth of intensity of feeling, subject to the conditions of its concrescence. This ultimate purpose is formulated in Category VIII. The question, how, and in what sense, one unrealized
* For another discussion of this topic, cf. my Religion in the Making, Ch. III, Sect. VII.
382 Process and Reality
eternal object can be more, or less, proximate to an
eternal object in realized ingression—that is to say, in
comparison with any other unfelt eternal object—is left
unanswered by this category of reversion. In conformity
with the ontological principle, this question can be
answered only by reference to some actual entity. Every
eternal object has entered into the conceptual feelings
of God. Thus, a more fundamental account must ascribe
the reverted conceptual feeling in a temporal subject to
its conceptual feeling derived, according to Category
IV, from the hybrid physical feeling of the relevancies
conceptually ordered in God’s experience. In this way,
by the recognition of God’s characterization of the crea-
tive act, a more complete rational explanation is
attained. The category of reversion is then abolished;
and Hume’s principle of the derivation of conceptual
experience from physical experience remains without any
exception.