But we do not usually think of the things as symboliz- ing the words correlated to them. This failure to invert our ideas arises from the most useful aspect of symbolism. In general the symbols are more handy elements in our experience than are the meanings. We can say the word ‘forest? whenever we like; but only under certain condi- tions can we directly experience an existent forest. To procure such an experience usually involves a problem of transportation only possible on our holidays. Also it is not so easy even to remember forest scenes with any vividness; and we usually find that the immediate experi- ence of the word ‘forest’ helps to elicit such recollections. In such ways language is handy as an instrument of communication along the successive occasions of the his- toric route forming the life of one individual. By an
278 Process*and* Readtity
extension of these same principles of behaviour, it com- municates from the occasions of one individual to the succeeding occasions of another individual. The same means which are handy for procuring the immediate pre- sentation of a word to oneself are equally effective for presenting it to another person. Thus we may have a two-way system of symbolic reference involving two per- sons, A and B. The forest, recollected by A, symbolizes the word ‘forest’ for A; then A, for his own sake and for B’s sake, pronounces the word ‘forest’; then by the effi- cacy of the environment and of B’s bodily parts, and by the supplemental enhancement due to B’s experiential process, the word ‘forest’ is perceived by B in the mode of immediacy; and, finally by symbolic reference, B recollects vaguely various forest scenes. In this use of language for communication between two persons, there is in principle nothing which differs from its use by one person for communication along the route of his own actual occasions.
This discussion shows that one essential purpose of symbols arises from their handiness. For this reason the Egyptian papyrus made ink-written language a more useful symbolism than the Babylonian language im- pressed on brick. It is easier to smell incense than to produce certain religious emotions; so, if the two can be correlated, incense is a suitable symbol for such emo- tions. Indeed, for many purposes, certain aesthetic ex- periences which are easy to produce make better symbols than do words, written or spoken. Quarrels over sym- bolism constitute one of the many causes of religious dis- cord. One difficulty in symbolism is that the unhandy meanings are often vague. For instance, this is the case with the percepta in the mode of efficacy which are sym- bolized by percepta in the mode of immediacy: also, as another instance, the incense is definite, but the religious emotions are apt to be indefinite. The result is that the meanings are often shifting and indeterminate. This happens even in the case of words: other people misun-
SYMBOLIC REFERENCE 27s
derstand their import. Also, in the case of incense the
exact religious emotions finally reached are very uncer-
tain: perhaps we would prefer that some of them were
never elicited.
Symbolism is essential for the higher grades of life; and the errors of symbolism can never be wholly avoided.
CHAPTER, Tx THE PROPOSITIONS
A LIVING occasion is characterized by a flash of novelty among the appetitions of its mental pole. Such ‘appe- titions,’ i.e. ‘conceptual prehensions,’ can be ‘pure’ or ‘impure.’ An ‘impure’ prehension arises from the inte- gration of a ‘pure’ conceptual prehension with a physical prehension originating in the physical pole. The datum of a pure conceptual prehension is an eternal object; the datum of an impure prehension is a proposition, other- wise termed a ‘theory.’
The integration of a conceptual and physical prehen- sion need not issue in an impure prehension: the eternal object as a mere potentiality, undetermined as to its physical realization, may lose its indetermination, i.e. its universality, by integration with itself as an element in the realized definiteness of the physical datum of the physical prehension. In this case we obtain what in Part III is termed a ‘physical purpose.’ In a physical purpose the subjective form has acquired a special appe- tition—adversion or aversion—in respect to that eternal object as a realized element of definiteness in that phys- ical datum. This acquisition is derived from the concep- tual prehension. The ‘abruptness’ of mental operations is here illustrated. The physical datum in itself illus- trates an indefinite number of eternal objects. The ‘physical purpose’ has focussed appetition upon an abruptly selected eternal object.
But with the growth of intensity in the mental pole,
evidenced by the flash of novelty in appetition, the appe-
tition takes the form of a ‘propositional prehension.’
tah PROPOS PELONS 281
These prehensions will be studied more particularly in Part III. They are the prehensions of ‘theories.’ It is evident, however, that the primary function of theories is as a lure for feeling, thereby providing immediacy of enjoyment and purpose. Unfortunately theories, under their name of ‘propositions,’ have been handed over to logicians, who have countenanced the doctrine that their one function is to be judged as to their truth or falsehood. Indeed Bradley does not mention ‘propositions’ in his Logic. He writes only of ‘judgments.’ Other authors define propositions as a component in judgment. The doctrine here laid down is that, in the realization of prop- ositions, ‘judgment’ is very rare component, and so is ‘consciousness.’ The existence of imaginative literature should have warned logicians that their narrow doctrine is absurd. It is difficult to believe that all logicians as they read Hamlet’s speech, “To be, or not to be: .. .” commence by judging whether the initial proposition be true or false, and keep up the task of judgment through- out the whole thirty-five lines. Surely, at some point in the reading, judgment is eclipsed by aesthetic delight. The speech, for the theatre audience, is purely theoreti- cal, a mere lure for feeling.
Again, consider strong religious emotion—consider a
Christian meditating on the sayings in the Gospels. He
is not judging ‘true or false’; he is eliciting their value
as elements in feeling. In fact, he may ground his judg-
ment of truth upon his realization of value. But such
a procedure is impossible, if the primary function of
propositions is to be elements in judgments.
The ‘lure for feeling’ ‘is the final cause guiding the concrescence of feelings. By this concrescence the multi- fold datum of the primary phase is gathered into the unity of the final satisfaction of feeling. The ‘objective lure’ is that discrimination among eternal objects intro- duced into the universe by the real internal constitutions of the actual occasions forming the datum of the con- crescence under review. This discrimination also in-
282 Process and Reality
volves eternal objects excluded from value in the tem.
poral occasions of that datum, in addition to involving
the eternal objects included for such occasions.
For example, consider the Battle of Waterloo. This battle resulted in the defeat of Napoleon, and in a con- stitution of our actual world grounded upon that defeat. But the abstract notions, expressing the possibilities of another course of history which would have followed upon his victory, are relevant to the facts which actually happened. We may not think it of practical importance that imaginative historians should dwell upon such hypo- thetical alternatives. But we confess their relevance in thinking about them at all, even to the extent of dis- missing them. But some imaginative writers do not dismiss such ideas. Thus, in our actual world of today, there is a penumbra of eternal objects, constituted by relevance to the Battle of Waterloo. Some people do admit elements from this penumbral complex into effec- tive feeling, and others wholly exclude them. Some are conscious of this internal decision of admission or rejec- tion; for others the ideas float into their minds as day- dreams without consciousness of deliberate decision; for others, their emotional tone, of gratification or regret, of friendliness or hatred, is obscurely influenced by this penumbra of alternatives, without any conscious analysis of its content. The elements of this penumbra are prop- ositional prehensions, and not pure conceptual prehen- sions; for their implication of the particular nexus which in the Battle of Waterloo is an essential factor.
Thus an element in this penumbral complex is what is termed a ‘proposition.’ A proposition is new kind of entity. It is a hybrid between pure potentialities and actualities. A ‘singular’ proposition is the potentiality of an actual world including a definite set of actual enti- ties in a nexus of reactions involving the hypothetical ingression of a definite set of eternal objects.
A ‘general’ proposition only differs from a ‘singular’ proposition by the generalization of ‘one definite set of
Crep Opostrlons 283
actual entities’ into ‘any set belonging to a certain sort of sets.’ If the sort of sets includes all sets with poten- tiality for that nexus of reactions, the proposition is called ‘universal.’
For the sake of simplicity, we will confine attention
to singular propositions; although a slight elaboration
of explanation will easily extend the discussion to include
general and universal propositions.
The definite set of actual entities involved are called the ‘logical subjects of the proposition’; and the definite set of eternal objects involved are called the ‘predicates of the proposition.’ The predicates define a potentiality of relatedness for the subjects. The predicates form one complex eternal object: this is ‘the complex predi- cate. The ‘singular’ proposition is the potentiality of this complex predicate finding realization in the nexus of reactions between the logical subjects, with assigned stations in the pattern for the various logical subjects.
In a proposition the various logical subjects involved are impartially concerned. The proposition is no more about one logical subject than another logical subject. But according to the ontological principle, every proposi- tion must be somewhere. The ‘locus’ of a proposition consists of those actual occasions whose actual worlds include the logical subjects of the proposition. When an actual entity belongs to the locus of a proposition, then conversely the proposition is an element in the lure for feeling of that actual entity. If by the decision of the concrescence, the proposition has been admitted into feeling, then the proposition constitutes what the feeling has felt. The proposition constitutes a lure for a member of its locus by reason of the germaneness of the complex predicate to the logical subjects, having regard to forms of definiteness in the actual world of that member, and to its antecedent phases of feeling.
The interest in logic, dominating overintellectualized
philosophers, has obscured the main function of propo-
sitions in the nature of things. They are not primarily
284 Process and Reality
for belief, but for feeling at the physical level of uncon- sciousness. They constitute a source for the origination of feeling which is not tied down to mere datum. A proposition is ‘realized’ by a member of its locus, when it is admitted into feeling.
There are two types of relationship between a proposi-
tion and the actual world of a member of its locus. The
proposition may be conformal or non-conformal to the
actual world, true or false.
When a conformal proposition is admitted into feeling, the reaction to the datum has simply resulted in the con- formation of feeling to fact, with some emotional acces- sion or diminution, by which the feelings inherent in alien fact are synthesized in a new individual valuation. The prehension of the proposition has abruptly empha- sized one form of definiteness illustrated in fact.
When a non-conformal proposition is admitted into
feeling, the reaction to the datum has resulted in the
synthesis of fact with the alternative potentiality of the
complex predicate. A novelty has emerged into creation.
The novelty may promote or destroy order; it may be
good or bad. But it is new, a new type of individual,
and not merely a new intensity of individual feeling.
That member of the locus has introduced a new form
into the actual world; or at least, an old form in a new
function.
The conception of propositions as merely material for
judgments is fatal to any understanding of their réle in
the universe. In that purely logical aspect, a non-con-
formal proposition is merely wrong, and therefore worse
than useless. But in their primary role, they pave the
way along which the world advances into novelty. Error
is the price which we pay for progress.
The term ‘proposition’ suits these hybrid entities pro-
vided that we substitute the broad notion of ‘feeling’
for the narrower notions of ‘judgment’ and ‘belief. A
proposition is an element in the objective lure proposed
for feeling, and when admitted into feeling it constitutes
Ree Ipropos Etions 285
what is felt. The ‘imaginative’ feeling (cf. Part III) of a proposition is one of the ways of feeling it; and intel- lectual belief is another way feeling the proposition, a way which presupposes imaginative feeling. Judgment is the decision admitting a proposition into intellectual belief.