The former mode produces percepta which are vague, not to be controlled, heavy with emotion: it produces the sense of derivation from an immediate past, and of pas- sage to an immediate future; a sense of emotional feel- ing, belonging to oneself in the past, passing into oneself in the present, and passing from oneself in the present towards oneself in the future; a sense of influx of influ- ence from other vaguer presences in the past, localized and yet evading local definition, such influence modify- ing, enhancing, inhibiting, diverting, the stream of feel- ing which we are receiving, unifying, enjoying, and trans- mitting. This is our general sense of existence, as one item among others, in an efficacious actual world.
By diversion of attention we can inhibit its entry into
consciousness; but, whether mentally analysed or no, it
remains the given uncontrolled basis upon which our
character weaves itself. Our bodies are largely con-
trivances whereby some central actual occasion may
inherit these basic experiences of its antecedent parts.
Thus organic bodies have their parts coordinated by a
peculiar vividness in their mutual inheritance. In a
sense, the difference between a living organism and the
inorganic environment is only a question of degree; but
it is a difference of degree which makes all the difference
—in effect, it is a difference of quality.
The percepta in the mode of presentational immediacy
have the converse characteristics. In comparison, they
are distinct, definite, controllable, apt for immediate
enjoyment, and with the minimum of reference to past,
or to future. We are subject to our percepta in the mode
of efficacy, we adjust our percepta in the mode of imme-
diacy. But, in fact, our process of self-construction for
the achievement of unified experience produce a new
272 Process and Reality
product, in which percepta in one mode, and percepta in
the other mode, are synthesized into one subjective feel-
ing. For example, we are perceiving before our eyes a
grey stone.
We shall find that generally—though not always—the adjectival words express information derived from the mode of immediacy, while the substantives convey our dim percepts in the mode of efficacy. For example, ‘grey’ refers to the grey shape immediately before our eyes: this percept is definite, limited, controllable, pleasant or unpleasant, and with no reference to past or to future. It is this sort of percept which has led to Descartes’ definition of substances as ‘requiring nothing but them- selves in order to exist,’ and to his notion of ‘extension’ as the principle attribute of a genus of substances. It has also led to Hume’s notion of ‘impressions of sensa- tions’ arising from unknown sources, and in complete independence so far as any discernable nexus is con- cerned. But the other element in the compound percept has a widely different character. The word ‘stone’ is selected, no doubt, because its dictionary meaning will afford some help in understanding the particular percepta meant. But the word is meant to refer to particular feel- ings of efficacy in the immediate past, combined with anticipations for the immediate future; this feeling is vaguely localized, and conjectually identified with the very definite localization of the ‘grey’ perceptum.
Thus, so far as concerns conscious judgment, the sym- bolic reference is the acceptance of the evidence of per- cepta, in the mode of immediacy, as evidence for the localization and discrimination of vague percepta in the mode of efficacy. So far as bodily feelings are concerned, there is some direct check on this procedure; but, beyond the body, the appeal is to the pragmatic consequences, involving some future state of bodily feelings which can be checked up.
But throughout this discussion of perception there has been excessive emphasis on the mental phase in the
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experiential process. This is inevitable because we can only discuss experiences which have entered into con- scious analysis. But perception is a feeling which has its seat in the two earlier phases of the experiental process, namely, the ‘responsive’ phase, and the ‘supplemental’ phase. Perception, in these phases, is the appropriation of the datum by the subject, so as to transform the datum into a unity of subjective feeling. The mode of efficacity belongs to the responsive phase, in which the objectifi- cations are felt according to their relevance in the datum: the mode of immediacy belongs to the supplemental phase in which the faint indirect relevance, in the datum, of relationships to regions of the presented locus are lifted into distinct, prominent, relevance. The question as to which regions have their relatedness to other constitu- ents of the datum—such as ‘grey,’ for instance—thus accentuated, depends upon the coordination of the bodily organs through which the routes of inheritance pass. In a fortunately construed animal body, this selec- tion is determined chiefly by the inheritance received by the superficial organs,—the skin, the eyes, etc—from the external environment, and preserves the relevance of the vector character of that external inheritance. When this is the case, the perceptive mode of immediacy has definite relevance to the future efficacy of the ex- ternal environment, and then indirectly illustrates the inheritance which the presented locus receives from the immediate past.
But this illustration does not gain its first importance from any rational analysis. The two modes are unified by a blind symbolic reference by which supplemental feelings derived from the intensive, but vague, mode of efficacity are precipitated upon the distinct regions illus- trated in the mode of immediacy. The integration of the two modes in supplemental feeling makes what would have been vague to be distinct, and what would have been shallow to be intense. This is the perception of the grey stone, in the mixed mode of symbolic reference.
274 Process and Reality
Such perception can be erroneous, in the sense that
the feeling associates regions in the presented locus with
inheritances from the past, which in fact have not been
thus transmitted into the present regions. In the mixed
mode, the perceptive determination is purely due to the
bodily organs, and thus there is a gap in the perceptive
logic—so to speak. This gap is not due to any concep-
tual freedom on the part of the ultimate subject. It is
not a mistake due to consciousness. It is due to the
fact that the body, as an instrument for synthesizing
and enhancing feelings, is faulty, in the sense that it
produces feelings which have but slight reference to the
real state of the presented duration.
Symbolic reference between the two perceptive modes affords the main example of the principles which govern all symbolism. The requisites for symbolism are that there be two species of percepta; and that a perceptum of one species has some ‘ground’ in common with a per- ceptum of another species, so that a correlation between the pair of percepta is established. The feelings, and emotions, and general characteristics associated with the members of one species are in some ways markedly diverse from those associated with the other species. Then there is ‘symbolic reference’ between the two species when the perception of a member of one species evokes its correlate in the other species, and precipitates upon this correlate the fusion of feelings, emotions, and deri- vate actions, which belong to either of the pair of corre- lates, and which are also enhanced by this correlation. The species from which the symbolic reference starts is called the ‘species of symbols,’ and the species which it ends is called the ‘species of meanings.’ In this way there can be symbolic reference between two species in the same perceptive mode: but the chief example of sym- bolism, upon which is based a great portion of the lives
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of all high-grade animals, is that between the two perceptive modes.
Symbolism can be justified, or unjustified. The test of justification must always be pragmatic. In so far sym- bolism has led to a route of inheritance, along the percipi- ent occasions forming the percipient ‘person,’ which con- stitutes a fortunate evolution, the symbolism is justified; and, in so far as the symbolism has led to an unfortunate evolution, it is unjustified. In a slightly narrower sense the symbolism can be right or wrong; and rightness or wrongness is also tested pragmatically. Along the ‘his- toric route’ there is the inheritance of feelings derived from symbolic reference: now, if feelings respecting some definite element in experience be due to two sources, one source being this inheritance, and the other source being direct perception in one of the pure modes, then, if the feelings from the two sources enhance each other by syn- thesis, the symbolic reference is right; but, if they are at variance so as to depress each other, the symbolic reference is wrong. The rightness, or wrongness, of sym- bolism is an instance of the symbolism being fortunate or unfortunate; but mere ‘rectitude,’ in the sense defined above, does not cover all that can be included in the more general concept of ‘fortune.’ So much of human experi- ence is bound up with symbolic reference, that it is hardly an exaggeration to say that the very meaning of truth is pragmatic. But though this statement is hardly an exag- geration, still it 7s an exaggeration, for the pragmatic test can never work, unless on some occasion—in the future, or in the present—there is a definite determination of what is true on that occasion. Otherwise the poor prag- matist remains an intellectual Hamlet, perpetually ad- journing decision of judgment to some later date. Ac- cording to the doctrines here stated, the day of judgment arrives when the ‘meaning’ is sufficiently distinct and relevant, as a perceptum in its proper pure mode, to afford comparison with the precipitate of feeling derived
276 Process and Reality
from symbolic reference. There is no inherent distinc-
tion between the sort of percept which are symbols, and
the sort of percepta which are meanings. When two
species are correlated by a ‘ground’ of relatedness, it de-
pends upon the experiential process, constituting the
precipient subject, as to which species is the group of
symbols, and which is the group of meanings. Also it
equally depends upon the percipient as to whether there
is any symbolic reference at all.
Language is the example of symbolism which most
naturally presents itself for consideration of the uses of
symbolism. Its somewhat artificial character makes the
various constitutive elements in symbolism to be the
more evident. For the sake of simplicity, only spoken
language will be considered here.
A single word is not one definite sound. Every instance of its utterance differs in some respect from every other instance: the pitch of the voice, the intonation, the accent, the quality of sound, the rhythmic relations of the component sounds, the intensity of sound, all vary. Thus a word is a species of sounds, with specific identity and individual differences. When we recognize the spe- cies, we have heard the word. But what we have heard is merely the sound—euphonious or harsh, concordant with or discordant with other accompanying sounds. The word is heard in the pure perceptive mode of immediacy, and primarily elicits merely the contrasts and identities with other percepta in that mode. So far there is no symbolic interplay.
If the meaning of the word be an event, then either that event is directly known, as a remembered perceptum in an earlier occasion of the percipient’s life, or that event is only vaguely known by its dated spatio-temporal nexus with events which are directly known. Anyhow there is a chain of symbolic references (inherited along the historic route of the percipient’s life, and reinforced by the production of novel and symbolic references at various occasions along that route) whereby in the datum
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for the percipient occasion there is a faintly relevant nexus between the word in that occasion of utterance and the event. The sound of the word in presentational im- mediacy, by symbolic references elicits this nexus into important relevance, and thence precipitates feelings, and thoughts, upon the enhanced objectification of the event. Such enhanced relevance of the event may be unfortu- nate, or even unjustified; but it is the function of words to produce it. The discussion of mentality is reserved for Part III: it is a mistake to think of words as primarily the vehicle of thoughts.
Language also illustrates the doctrine that, in regard to a couple of properly correlated species of things, it depends upon the constitution of the percipient subject to assign which species is acting as ‘symbol’ and which as ‘meaning.’ The word ‘forest’ may suggest of memories of forests; but equally the sight of a forest, or memories of forests, may suggest the word ‘forest.’ Sometimes we are bothered because the immediate experience has not elicited the word we want. In such a case the word with the right sort of correlation with the experience has failed to become importantly relevant in the constitution of our experience.