the degrees of force and liveliness with which they strike upon the mind, and make their way into our thought or consciousness. Those perceptions which enter with most force and violence, we may name impressions; and, under this name, I comprehend all our sensations, passions, and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul. By ideas, I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning; such as, for instance, are all the percep- tions excited by the present discourse, excepting only those which arise from the sight and touch, and excepting the immediate pleasure or uneasiness it may occasion.” ”
The exceptions made in the above quotation are, of course, due to the fact that the ‘perceptions’ arising in these excepted ways are ‘impressions’ and not ‘ideas.’ Hume immediately draws attention to the fact that he deserts Locke’s wide use of the term ‘idea,’ and restores it to its more usual and narrow meaning. He divides both ideas and impressions into ‘simple’ and ‘complex.’ He then adds: “. . . we shall here content ourselves with establishing one general proposition, That all our sumple ideas in their first appearance, are derived from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent.” *
When Hume passes on to complex impressions and ideas, his admirable clearness partially deserts him. He fails to distinguish sufficiently between (i) the ‘manner’ (or ‘order’) in which many simples constitute some one complex perception, i.e. impression or idea; and (ii) the efficacious fact by reason of which this complex percep- tion arises; and (iii) the mere multiplicity of simples which constitute the complex perception in this definite manner. In this respect Hume’s followers only differ from Hume by discarding some of that clarity which never wholly deserts him. Each one of these three notions is an essential element in his argument. He writes:
2 Cf. Treatise, Part I, Sect. I. * Treatise, Part I, Sect. I.
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“| | we may conclude with certainty, that the idea of extension is nothing but a copy of these colored points, and of the manner of their appearance.” ‘ Also he writes: “Were ideas entirely loose and unconnected, change alone would join them; and it is impossible the same simple ideas would fall regularly into complex ones (as they com- monly do), without some bond of union among them, some associating quality, by which one idea naturally introduces another. This uniting principle among ideas is not to be considered as an inseparable connection; for that has been already ° excluded from the imagination; nor yet are we to conclude, that without it the mind can- not join two ideas; for nothing is more free than that faculty; but we are only to regard it as a gentle force, which commonly prevails, and is the cause why, among other things, languages so nearly correspond to each other; Nature, in a manner, pointing out to every one those simple ideas, which are most proper to be united into a complex one.” ° As a final quotation, to illustrate Hume’s employment of the third notion, we have: “The idea of a substance as well as that of a mode, is nothing but a collection of simple ideas, that are united by the imagination, and have a particular name assigned them.
. . But the difference betwixt these ideas consists in this, that the particular qualities, which form the sub- stance, are commonly referred to an unknown something [italics Hume’s], in which they are supposed to inhere; or granting this fiction should not take place, are at least supposed to be closely and inseparably connected by the relations of contiguity and causation. The effect of this is, that whatever new simple quality we discover to have the same connection with the rest, we immediately com- prehend it among them, even though it did not enter into the first conception of the substance. . . . The principle of union being regarded as the chief part of the complex
“Cf. Treatise, Part II, Sect. IIT.
° Cf. Hume’s previous section. ° Cf. Treatise, Part I, Sect. IV.
Locke and Hume 201
idea, gives entrance to whatever quality afterwards
occurs, and is equally comprehended by it, as are the
others, which first presented themselves. . . .”*
In this last quotation, the phrase ‘principle of union’ is ambiguous as between ‘manner’ and ‘efficacious’ reason. In either sense, it is inconsistent with the phrase ‘nothing but a collection,’ which at the beginning of the quotation settles so simply the notion of ‘substance.’
Returning to the first of this sequence of three quota- tions, we note that any particular ‘manner’ of composi- tion must itself be a simple idea, or impression. For otherwise we require yet another ‘manner’ of composition for the original manner, and so on indefinitely. Thus there is either a vicious infinity or a final simple idea. But Hume admits that there are novel compound ideas which are not copies of compound impressions. Thus he should also admit that there is a novel simple idea conveying the novel ‘manner,’ which is not a copy of an impression. He has also himself drawn attention to another exception in respect to missing shades of colour in a graduated colour scheme. This exception cannot be restricted to colour, and must be extended to sound, and smell, and to all graduations of sensations. Thus Hume’s proposition, that simple ideas are all copies of simple impressions, is subject to such considerable qualifications that it cannot be taken for an ultimate philosophical principle, at least not when enunciated in Hume’s unguarded fashion. Hume him- self, in the passage (Part I, Sect. IV) quoted above for its relevance to his doctrine of the association of ideas, says, “. . . for nothing is more free than that faculty (i.e. the imagination).” But he limits its freedom to the production of novel complex ideas, disregarding the exceptional case of missing shades. This question of imaginative freedom is obviously treated very super- ficially by Hume. Imagination is never very free: it does not seem to be limited to complex ideas, as asserted by
7 Cf. Treatise, Part I, Sect. VI. Italics not in edition quoted, except where noted.
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him; but such freedom as it has in fact seems to establish the principle of the possibility of diverse actual entities with diverse grades of imaginative freedom, some more, some less, than the instances in question.
In this discussion of Hume’s doctrine of imaginative freedom, two other points have been left aside. One such point is the difference between various grades of generic abstraction, for example, scarlet, red, colour, sense-datum, manner of connectedness of diverse sense-data. The other point is the contrast between ‘simplicity’ and ‘com- plexity.’ We may doubt whether ‘simplicity’ is ever more than a relative term, having regard to some definite procedure of analysis. I hold this to be the case; and by reason of this opinion find yet another reason for dis- carding Hume’s doctrine which would debar imagination from the free conceptual production of any type of eternal objects, such as Hume calls ‘simple.’ But there is no such fact as absolute freedom; every actual entity possesses only such freedom, as is inherent in the primary phase ‘given’ by its standpoint of relativity to its actual uni- verse. Freedom, givenness, potentiality, are notions which presuppose each other and limit each other.
Hume, at the end of this passage on the connectedness
of ideas, places the sentence “. . . Nature, in a manner,
pointing out to every one those simple ideas, which are
most proper to be united into a complex one.” Hume’s
philosophy is occupied with the double search, first,
for manners of unity, whereby many simples become
one eomplex impression; and secondly, for a standard
of propriety by which to criticize the production of
ideas.
Hume can find only one standard of propriety, and that is, repetition. Repetition is capable of more or less: the more often impressions are repeated, the more proper it is that ideas should copy them. Fortunately, and with- out any reason so far as Hume can discover, complex
Locke and Hume 203
impressions, often repeated, are also often copied by their corresponding complex ideas.
Also the frequency of ideas following upon the fre- quency of their correlate impressions is also attended by an expectation of the repetition of the impression. Hume also believes, without any reason he can assign, that this expectation is pragmatically justified. It is this prag- matic justification, without metaphysical reason, which constitutes the propriety attaching to ‘repetition.’ This is the analysis of the course of thought involved in Hume’s doctrine of the association of ideas in its rela- tion to causation, and in Hume’s final appeal to practice.
It is a great mistake to attribute to Hume any dis- belief in the importance of the notion of ‘cause and effect.’ Throughout the Treatise he steadily affirms its funda- mental importance; and finally, when he cannot fit it into his metaphysics, he appeals beyond his metaphysics to an ultimate justification outside any rational systematiza- tion. This ultimate justification is ‘practice.’
Hume writes: “As our senses show us in one instance two bodies, or motions, or qualities, in certain relations of succession and contiguity, so our memory presents us only with a multitude of instances wherein we always find like bodies, motions, or qualities, in like relations. From the mere repetition of any past impression, even to infinity, there never will arise any new original idea, such as that of a necessary connection; and the number of impressions has in this case no more effect than if we confined ourselves to one only. But though this reason- ing seems just and obvious, yet, as it would be folly to despair too soon, we shall continue the thread of our dis- course; and having found, that after the discovery of the constant conjunction of any objects, we always draw an inference from one object to another, we shall now examine the nature of that inference, and of the transi- tion from the impression to the idea. Perhaps it will appear in the end, that the necessary connection depends on the inference, instead of the inference’s depending on
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the necessary connection. . . . The only connection or relation of objects which can lead us beyond the imme- diate impressions of our memory and senses, is that of cause and effect; and that because it is the only one, on which we can found a just inference from one object to another. The idea of cause and effect is derived from experience [italics Hume’s], which informs us, that such particular objects, in all past instances, have been con- stantly conjoined with each other; and as an object similar to one of these is supposed to be immediately present in its impression, we thence presume on the existence of one similar to its usual attendant. Accord- ing to this account of things, which is, I think, in every point unquestionable, probability is founded on the pre- sumption of a resemblance betwixt those objects of which we have had experience, and those of which we have had none; and, therefore, it is impossible that this presump- tion can arise from probability.” *
Hume’s difficulty with ‘cause and effect’ is that it lies ‘beyond the immediate impressions of our memory and senses.’ In other words, this manner of connection is not given in any impression. Thus the whole basis of the idea, its propriety, is to be traced to the repetition of impressions. At this point of his argument, Hume seems to have overlooked the difficulty that ‘repetition’ stands with regard to ‘impressions’ in exactly the same position as does ‘cause and effect.’ Hume has confused a ‘repeti- tion of impressions’ with an ‘impression of repetitions of impressions.’ In Hume’s own words on another topic (Part II, Sect. V): “For whence should it be derived? Does it arise from an impression of sensation or of reflec- tion? Point it out distinctly to us, that we may know its nature and qualities. But if you cannot point out any such impression [Hume’s italics], you may be certain you are mistaken, when you imagine you have any such idea,”
Hume’s answer to this criticism would, of course, be
® Cf. Treatise, Part III, Sect. VI. Italics not in Treatise.
Locke and Hume 205
that he admits ‘memory.’ But the question is what is consistent with Hume’s own doctrine. This is Hume’s doctrine of memory (cf. Part III, Sect. V): “Since there- fore the memory is known, neither by the order of its complex ideas, nor by the nature of its simple ones; it follows, that the difference betwixt it and the imagination lies in its superior force and vivacity.” But (in Part I, Sect. I) he writes: “By ideas I mean the faint images of these (1.e. impressions) in thinking and reasoning,” and tater on he expands ‘faint’ into “degree of force and vivacity.” ° Thus, purely differing in ‘force and vivacity,’ we have the order: impressions, memories, ideas.