But the classical theory also assumed the converse of this statement. It assumed that any actual occasion only lies in one duration; so that if N lies in the duration including M’s immediate present, then M lies in the dura- tion including N’s immediate present. The philosophy of organism, in agreement with recent physics, rejects this conversion; though it holds that such rejection is based on scientific examination of our cosmic epoch, and not on any more general metaphysical principle. Accord- ing to the philosophy of organism, in the present cosmic epoch only one duration includes all M’s immediate present; this one duration will be called M’s ‘presented duration.’ But M itself lies in many durations; each duration including / also includes some portions of M’s presented duration. In the case of human perception practically all the important portions are thus included; also in human experience the relationship to such dura-
° Cf. my Principles of Natural Knowledge, Ch. XI, and my Concept of Nature, Ch. V.
192 Process and Reality
tions is what we express by the notion of ‘move- ment.’
To sum up this discussion. In respect to any one actual
occasion WM there are three distinct nextis of occasions to
be considered:
(i) The nexus of M’s contemporaries, defined by the
characteristic that M and any one of its contemporaries
happen in causal independence of each other.
(ii) Durations including M, any such duration is de-
fined by the characteristic that any two of its members
are contemporaries. (It follows that any member of such
a duration is contemporary with M, and thence that such
durations are all included in the locus (i). The charac-
teristic property of a duration is termed ‘unison of
becoming.’)
(i) M’s presented locus, which is the contemporary nexus perceived in the mode of presentational immediacy, with its regions defined by sensa. It is assumed, on the basis of direct intuition, that M’s presented locus is closely related to some one duration including M. It is also assumed, as the outcome of modern physical theory, that there is more than one duration including M. The single duration which is so related to M’s presented locus is termed ‘M’s presented duration.’ But this connection is criticized in the following sections of this chapter. In Part IV, the connection of these ‘presented’ loci to regions defined by straight lines is considered in more detail; the notion of ‘strain loci’ is there introduced.
SECTION Ix
Physical science has recently arrived at the stage in which the practical identification, made in the preceding section, between the ‘presented locus’ of an actual entity, and a locus in ‘unison of becoming’ with the actual entity must be qualified.
The two notions, ‘presented locus’ and ‘unison of be- coming,’ are distinct. The identification merely rests on the obvious experience of daily life. In any recasting of
Organisms and Environment 198
thought it is obligatory to include the identification as a practical approximation to the truth, sufficient for daily life. Subject to this limitation, there is no reason for rejecting any distinction between them which the evi- dence suggests.
In the first place, the presented locus is defined by
some systematic relation to the human body—so far as
we rely, as we must, upon human experience. A certain
state of geometrical strain in the body, and a certain
qualitative physiological excitement in the cells of the
body, govern the whole process of presentational imme-
diacy. In sense-perception the whole function of ante-
cedent occurrences outside the body is merely to excite
these strains and physiological excitements within the
body. But any other means of production would do just
as well, so long as the relevant states of the body are
in fact produced. The perceptions are functions of the
bodily states. The geometrical details of the projected
sense-perception depend on the geometrical strains in the
body, the qualitative sensa depend on the physiological
excitements of the requisite cells in the body.
Thus the presented locus must be a locus with a sys- tematic geometrical relation to the body. According to all the evidence, it is completely independent of the con- temporary actualities which in fact make up the nexus of actualities in the locus. For example, we see a picture on the wall with direct vision. But if we turn our back to the wall, and gaze into a good mirror, we see the same sight as an image behind the mirror. Thus, given the proper physiological state of the body, the locus presented in sense-perception is independent of the details of the actual happenings which it includes. This is not to say, that sense-perception is irrelevant to the real world. It demonstrates to us the real extensive continuum in terms of which these contemporary happenings have their own experiences qualified. Its additional information in terms of the qualitative sensa has relevance in proportion to the relevance of the immediate bodily state to the imme-
194 Process and Reality
diate happenings throughout the locus. Both are derived
from a past which is practically common to them all.
Thus there is always some relevance; the correct inter-
pretation of this relevance is the art of utilizing the per-
ceptive mode of presentational immediacy as a means for
understanding the world as a medium.
But the question which is of interest for this discussion is how this systematic relevance, of body to presented locus, is definable. This is not a mere logical question. The problem is to point out that element in the nature of things constituting such a geometrical relevance of the body to the presented locus. If there be such an element, we can understand that a certain state of the body may lift it into an important factor of our experience.
The only possible elements capable of this extended
systematic relevance beyond the body are straight lines
and planes. Planes are definable in terms of straight
lines, so that we can concentrate attention upon straight
lines.
It is a dogma of science that straight lines are not defin- able in terms of mere notions of extension. Thus, in the expositions of recent physical theory, straight lines are defined in terms of the actual physical happenings. The disadvantage of this doctrine is that there is no method of characterizing the possibilities of physical events antecedently to their actual occurrence. It is easy to verify that in fact there is a tacit relevance to an underlying system, by reference to which the physical loci—including those ealled ‘straight lines—are defined. The question is how to define this underlying system in terms of ‘pure’ straight lines, determinable without ref- erence to the casual details of the happenings.
It will be shown later (ef. Part IV, Chs. III and IV)
that this dogma of the indefinability of straight lines is
mistaken. Thus the systematic relation of the body to
the presented locus occasions no theoretical difficulty.
All measurement is effected by observations of sensa
Organisms and Environment 195
with geometrical relations within this presented locus. Also all scientific observation of the unchanged character of things ultimately depend upon the maintenance of directly observed geometrical analogies within such loci.
However far the testing of instruments is carried,
finally all scientific interpretation is based upon the
assumption of directly observed unchangeability of some
instrument for seconds, for hours, for months, for years.
When we test this assumption we can only use another
instrument; and these cannot be an infinite regress of
instruments.
Thus ultimately all science depends upon direct obser-
vation of homology of status within a system. Also the
observed system is the complex of geometrical relations
within some presented locus.
In the second place, a locus of entities in ‘unison of
becoming’ obviously depends on the particular actual
entities. The question, as to how the extensive con-
tinuum is in fact atomized by the atomic actualities, is
relevant to the determination of the locus. The factor
of temporal endurance selected for any one actuality
will depend upon its initial ‘subjective aim.’ The cate-
goreal conditions which govern the ‘subjective aim’ are
discussed later in Part III. They consist generally in
satisfying some condition of a maximum, to be obtained
by the transmission of inherited types of order. This is
the foundation of the ‘stationary’ conditions in terms of
which the ultimate formulations of physical science can
be mathematically expressed.
Thus the loci of ‘unison of becoming’ are only deter-
minable in terms of the actual happenings of the world.
But the conditions which they satisfy are expressed in
terms of measurements derived from the qualification of
actualities by the systematic character of the extensive
continuum.
The term ‘duration’ will be used for a locus of ‘unison of becoming,’ and the terms ‘presented locus’ and ‘strain
196 Process and Reality
locus’ for the systematic locus involved in presentational immediacy.”
The strain loci provide the systematic geometry with its homology of relations throughout all its regions; the durations share in the deficiency of homology character- istic of the physical field which arises from the peculiari- ties of the actual events.
We can now sum up this discussion of organisms, order, societies, nexus.
The aim of the philosophy of organism is to express a coherent cosmology based upon the notions of ‘system,’ ‘process,’ ‘creative advance into novelty,’ ‘res vera’ (in Descartes’ sense), ‘stubborn fact,’ ‘individual unity of experience,’ ‘feeling,’ ‘time as perpetual perishing,’ ‘en- durance as re-creation,’ ‘purpose,’ ‘universals as forms of definiteness,’ ‘particulars—ie. rés verae—as ultimate agents of stubborn fact.’
Every one of these notions is explicitly formulated
either by Descartes or by Locke. Also no one can be
dropped without doing violence to common sense. But
neither Descartes nor Locke weaves these notions into
one coherent system of cosmology. In so far as either
philosopher is systematic, he relies on alternative notions
which in the end lead to Hume’s extreme of
sensationalism.
In the philosophy of organism it is held that the notion of ‘organism’ has two meanings, interconnected but intel- lectually separable, namely, the microscopic meaning and the macroscopic meaning. The microscopic meaning is concerned with the formal constitution of an actual occa- sion, considered as a process of realizing an individual unity of experience. The macroscopic meaning is con- cerned with the givenness of the actual world, considered as the stubborn fact which at once limits and provides
*In The Concept of Nature these two loci were not discriminated, namely, durations and strain loci.
Organisms and Environment 197
opportunity for the actual occasion. The canalization of the creative urge, exemplified in its massive reproduction of social nexiis, is for common sense the final illustration of the power of stubborn fact. Also in our experience, we essentially arise out of our bodies which are the stubborn facts of the immediate relevant past. We are also car- ried on by our immediate past of personal experience; we finish a sentence because we have begun it. The sentence may embody a new thought, never phrased before, or an old one rephrased with verbal novelty. There need be no well-worn association between the sounds of the earlier and the later words. But it remains remorselessly true, that we finish a sentence because we have begun it. We are governed by stubborn fact.
It is in respect to this ‘stubborn fact’ that the theories of modern philosophy are weakest. Philosophers have worried themselves about remote consequences, and the inductive formulations of science. They should confine attention to the rush of immediate transition. Their explanations would then be seen in their native absurdity.
Locke and Hume
A more detailed discussion of Descartes, Locke, and
Hume—in this and in the succeeding chapter—may make
plain how deeply the philosophy of organism is founded
on seventeenth-century thought and how at certain
critical points it diverges from that thought.
We shall understand better the discussion, if we start with some analysis of the presuppositions upon which Hume’s philosophy rests. These presuppositions were not original to Hume, nor have they ceased with him. They were largely accepted by Kant and are widely prev- alent in modern philosophy. The philosophy of organ- ism can be best understood by conceiving it as accepting large portions of the expositions of Hume and Kant, with the exception of these presuppositions, and of infer- ences directly derived from them. Hume is a writer of unrivalled clearness; and, as far as possible, it will be well to allow him to express his ideas in his own words. He writes: “We may observe, that it is universally allowed by philosophers, and is besides pretty obvious of itself, that nothing is ever really present with the mind but its perceptions or impressions and ideas, and that external objects become known to us only by those per- ceptions they occasion. To hate, to love, to think, to feel, to see; all this is nothing but to perceive.” * Again: “All the perceptions of the human mind resolve them- selves into two distinct kinds, which I shall call impres- sions and ideas. The difference betwixt these consists in
* Treatise, Part II, Sect. VI.