Sacred Books of the East, Vol. 38 — The Vedanta-Sutras, Part II (Sankara/Thibaut, page scans)

determine the particular effect only if it neither is other (than cause and effect) nor non-existent ; for if it were either, it would not be different from anything else which is either non-existent or other than cause and effect, (and how then should it alone be able to produce the particular effect?) Hence it follows that that power is identical with the Self of the cause, and that the effect is identical with the Self of that power. — Moreover, as the ideas of cause and effect on the one hand and of substance and qualities on the other hand are not separate ones, as, for instance, the ideas of a horse and a buffalo, it follows that the identity of the cause and the effect as well as of the substance and its qualities has to be admitted. (Let it then be assumed, the opponent rejoins, that the cause and the effect, although really different, are not apprehended as such, because they are connected by the so-called samavaya connexion 1.) — If, we reply, you assume the samavaya connexion between cause and effect, you have either to admit that the samavaya itself is joined by a certain connexion to the two terms which are connected by samavaya, and then that connexion will again require a new connexion (joining it to the two terms which it binds together), and you will thus be compelled to postulate an infinite series of connexions ; or else you will have to main- tain that the samavaya is not joined by any connexion to the terms which it binds together, and from that will result the dissolution of the bond which connects the two terms of the samavaya relation 2. — Well then, the opponent rejoins, let us assume that the samavaya connexion as itself being a connexion may be connected with the terms which it joins without the help of any further connexion. — Then, we reply, conjunction (sa//zyoga) also must be connected with the two terms which it joins without the help of the samavaya

1 Samavaya, commonly translated by inherence or intimate rela- tion, is, according to the Nyaya, the relation connecting a whole and its parts, substances, and qualities, &c.

2 Samavayasya svatantryapakshazrc dushayati anabhyupagamya- mane^eti. Samavayasya samavayibhi^ sambandho neshyate kim tu svatantryam evety atravayavavayavinor dravyaguwadina/ft ka. viprakarsha^ syat sa/flnidhayakabhavad ity artha^. An. Gi.

336 VEDANTA-stlTRAS.

connexion ; for conjunction also is a kind of connexion 1. — Moreover, as substances, qualities, and so on are apprehended as standing in the relation of identity, the assumption of the samavaya relation has really no purport.

In what manner again do you — who maintain that the cause and the effect are joined by the samavaya relation — assume a substance consisting of parts which is an effect to abide in its causes, i. e. in the material parts of which it consists ? Does it abide in all the parts taken together or in each particular part? — If you say that it abides in all parts together, it follows that the whole as such cannot be perceived, as it is impossible that all the parts should be in contact with the organs of perception. (And let it not be objected that the whole may be apprehended through some of the parts only), for manyness which abides in all its substrates together (i.e. in all the many things), is not apprehended so long as only some of those substrates are apprehended. — Let it then be assumed that the whole abides in all the parts by the mediation of intervening aggregates of parts 2. — In that case, we reply, we should have to assume other parts in addition to the primary originative parts of the whole, in order that by means of those other parts the whole could abide in the primary parts in the manner indicated by you. For we see (that one thing which abides in another abides there by means of parts different from those of that other thing), that the sword, for instance, pervades the sheath by means of parts different from the parts of the sheath. But an assumption of that kind would lead us into a regressus in infinitum, because in order to explain how the whole abides in certain

1 A conclusion which is in conflict with the Nyaya tenet that sazrayoga, conjunction, as, for instance, of the jar and the ground on which it stands, is a quality (gu/za) inherent in the two conjoined substances by means of the samavaya relation.

2 So that the whole can be apprehended by us as such if we apprehend a certain part only; analogously to our apprehending the whole thread on which a garland of flowers is strung as soon as we apprehend some few of the flowers.

Ii Adhyaya, I Pada, 1 8. 337

given parts we should always have to assume further parts1. — Well, then, let us maintain the second alternative, viz. that the whole abides in each particular part. — That also cannot be admitted ; for if the whole is present in one part it cannot be present in other parts also ; not any more than Devadatta can be present in .Srughna and in Pafoliputra on one and the same day. If the whole were present in more than one part, several wholes would result, comparable to Devadatta and Ya^adatta, who, as being two different persons, may live one of them at 6rughna and the other at Pa/aliputra. — If the opponent should rejoin that the whole may be fully present in each part, just as the generic character of the cow is fully present in each individual cow ; we point out that the generic attributes of the cow are visibly perceived in each individual cow, but that the whole is not thus perceived in each particular part. If the whole were fully present in each part, the consequence would be that the whole would produce its effects indifferently with any of its parts ; a cow, for instance, would give milk from her horns or her tail. But such things are not seen to take place.

We proceed to consider some further arguments opposed to the doctrine that the effect does not exist in the cause. — That doctrine involves the conclusion that the actual origi- nation of an effect is without an agent and thus devoid of substantial being. For origination is an action, and as such requires an agent 2, just as the action of walking does. To speak of an action without an agent would be a contradic-

1 Kalpantaram utthapayati atheti, tatha ka, yathavayavai/^ sutraw kusumani vyapnuvat katipayakusumagraha^e^pi grzhyate tatha katipayavayavagraha7ze*pi bhavaty avayavino graha/zarn ity artha^. Tatra kim arambhakavayavair eva teshv avayavi vartteta ki/# va tadatiriktavayavair iti vikalpyadyam pratyaha tadapiti. Yatra yad varttate tat tadatiriktavayavair eva tatra vartamana^ drzsh/am iti dr/sh/antagarbha/# hetum a^ash/e kayeti. Dvitiyam dushayati anavastheti. Kalpitanantavayavavyavahitataya prakrz'tavayavino duraviprakarshat tantunish/^atvam pa/asya na syad iti bhava^. An. Gi.

2 I.e. a something in which the action inheres; not a causal agent.

338 vedanta-s6tr as.

tion. But if you deny the pre- existence of the effect in the cause, it would have to be assumed that whenever the origi- nation of a jar, for instance, is spoken of the agent is not the jar (which before its origination did not exist) but something else, and again that when the origination of the two halves of the jar is spoken of the agent is not the two halves but something else. From this it would follow that the sentence, ' the jar is originated,' means as much as ' the potter and the other (operative) causes are originated1/ But as a matter of fact the former sentence is never understood to mean the latter ; and it is, moreover, known that at the time when the jar originates, the potter, &c. are already in exist- ence.— Let us then say, the opponent resumes, that origi- nation is the connexion of the effect with the existence of its cause and its obtaining existence as a Self. — How, we ask in reply, can something which has not yet obtained existence enter into connexion with something else ? A connexion is possible of two existing things only, not of one existing and one non-existing thing or of two non-existing things. To something non-existing which on that account is indefinable, it is moreover not possible to assign a limit as the opponent does when maintaining that the effect is non-existing before its origination ; for experience teaches us that existing things only such as fields and houses have limits, but not non-existing things. If somebody should use, for instance, a phrase such as the following one, ' The son of a barren woman was king previously to the coronation of Puraavarman,' the declaration of a limit in time implied in that phrase does not in reality determine that the son of the barren woman, i.e. a mere non-entity, either was or is or will be king. If the son of a barren woman could become an existing thing subsequently to the activity of some causal

1 Every action, *Sarikara says, requires an agent, i. e. a substrate in which the action takes place. If we deny that the jar exists in the clay even before it is actually originated, we lose the substrate for the action of origination, i.e. entering into existence (for the non-existing jar cannot be the substratum of any action), and have to assume, for that action, other substrates, such as the operative causes of the jar.

Ii Adhyaya, I Pada, 1 8. 339

agent, in that case it would be possible also that the non- existing effect should be something existing, subsequently to the activity of some causal agent. But we know that the one thing can take place no more than the other thing; the non-existing effect and the son of the barren woman are both equally non-entities and can never be. — But, the asatkaryavadin here objects, from your doctrine there follows the result that the activity of causal agents is alto- gether purposeless. For if the effect were lying already fully accomplished in the cause and were non-different from it, nobody would endeavour to bring it about, no more than anybody endeavours to bring about the cause which is already fully accomplished previously to all endeavour. But as a matter of fact causal agents do endeavour to bring about effects, and it is in order not to have to condemn their efforts as altogether useless that we assume the non- existence of the effect previously to its origination. — Your objection is refuted, we reply, by the consideration that the endeavour of the causal agent may be looked upon as having a purpose in so far as it arranges the causal substance in the form of the effect. That, however, even the form of the effect (is not something previously non-existing, but) belongs to the Self of the cause already because what is devoid of Selfhood cannot be begun at all, we have already shown above. — Nor does a substance become another substance merely by appearing under a different aspect. Devadatta may at one time be seen with his arms and legs closely drawn up to his body, and another time with his arms and legs stretched out, and yet he remains the same substantial being, for he is recognised as such. Thus the persons also by whom we are surrounded, such as fathers, mothers, brothers, &c, remain the same, although we see them in continually changing states and attitudes; for they are always recognised as fathers, mothers, brothers, and so on. If our opponent objects to this last illustrative example on the ground that fathers, mothers, and so on remain the same substantial beings, because the different states in which they appear are not separated from each other by birth or death, while the effect, for instance a jar, appears only after

340 vedanta-s6tras.