the cause, for instance the clay, has undergone destruction as it were (so that the effect may be looked upon as some- thing altogether different from the cause); we rebut this objection by remarking that causal substances also such as milk, for instance, are perceived to exist even after they have entered into the condition of effects such as curds and the like (so that we have no right to say that the cause undergoes destruction). And even in those cases where the continued existence of the cause is not perceived, as, for instance, in the case of seeds of the fig-tree from which there spring sprouts and trees, the term ' birth ' (when applied to the sprout) only means that the causal substance, viz. the seed, becomes visible by becoming a sprout through the continual accretion of similar particles of matter; and the term 'death' only means that, through the secession of those particles, the cause again passes beyond the sphere of visibility. Nor can it be said that from such separation by birth and death as described just now it follows that the non-existing becomes existing, and the existing non- existing ; for if that were so, it would also follow that the unborn child in the mother's womb and the new-born babe stretched out on the bed are altogether different beings.
It would further follow that a man is not the same person in childhood, manhood, and old age, and that terms such as father and the like are illegitimately used. — The preceding arguments may also be used to refute the (Bauddha doctrine) of all existence being momentary only l.
The doctrine that the effect is non-existent previously to its actual origination, moreover, leads to the conclusion that the activity of the causal agent has no object ; for what does not exist cannot possibly be an object ; not any more than the ether can be cleft by swords 'and other weapons for striking or cutting. The object can certainly not be the inherent cause ; for that would lead to the erroneous con- clusion that from the activity of the causal agent, which has for its object the inherent cause, there results something else
1 Which doctrine will be fully discussed in the second pada of this adhyaya.
Ii Adhyaya, I Pada, I 8. 34 1
(viz. the effect). And if (in order to preclude this erroneous conclusion) the opponent should say that the effect is (not something different from the cause, but) a certain relative power (atuaya) of the inherent cause ; he thereby would simply concede our doctrine, according to which the effect exists in the cause already.
We maintain, therefore, as our final conclusion, that milk and other substances are called effects when they are in the state of curds and so on, and that it is impossible, even within hundreds of years, ever to bring about an effect which is different from its cause. The fundamental cause of all appears in the form of this and that effect, up to the last effect of all, just as an actor appears in various robes and costumes, and thereby becomes the basis for all the current notions and terms concerning the phenomenal world.
The conclusion here established, on the ground of rea- soning, viz. that the effect exists already before its origina- tion, and is non-different from its cause, results also from a different scriptural passage. As under the preceding Sutra a Vedic passage was instanced which speaks of the non-existing, the different passage referred to in the present Sutra is the one (Kk. Up. VI, 3, 1) which refers to that which is. That passage begins, ' Being only was this in the beginning, one without a second,' refers, thereupon, to the doctrine of the Non-existent being the cause of the world (' Others say, Non-being was this in the beginning'), raises an objection against that doctrine (' How could that which is be born of that which is not?'), and, finally, re- affirms the view first set forth, ' Only Being was this in the beginning.' The circumstance that in this passage the effect, which is denoted by the word ' this,' is by Scripture, with reference to the time previous to its origination, co- ordinated with the cause denoted by the term ' Being,' proves that the effect exists in — and is non-different from — the cause. If it were before its origination non-existing and after it inhered in its cause by samavaya, it would be something different from the cause, and that would virtually imply an abandonment of the promise made in the passage, ' That instruction by which we hear what is not heard,' &c.
342 VEDANTA-stiTRAS.
(VI, i, 3). The latter assertion is ratified, on the other hand, through the comprehension that the effect exists in — and is not different from — the cause.
19. And like a piece of cloth.
As of a folded piece of cloth we do not know clearly whether it is a piece of cloth or some other thing, while on its being unfolded it becomes manifest that the folded thing was a piece of cloth ; and as, so long as it is folded, we per- haps know that it is a piece of cloth but not of what definite length and width it is, while on its being unfolded we know these particulars, and at the same time that the cloth is not different from the folded object ; in the same way an effect, such as a piece of cloth, is non-manifest as long as it exists in its causes, i. e. the threads, &c. merely, while it becomes manifest and is clearly apprehended in consequence of the operations of shuttle, loom, weaver, and so on. — Applying this instance of the piece of cloth, first folded and then unfolded, to the general case of cause and effect, we con- clude that the latter is non-different from the former.
20. And as in the case of the different vital aifs.
It is a matter of observation that when the operations of the different kinds of vital air — such as pra/za the ascending vital air, apana the descending vital air, &c. — are suspended, in consequence of the breath being held so that they exist in their causes merely, the only effect which continues to be ac- complished is life, while all other effects, such as the bending and stretching of the limbs and so on, are stopped. When, thereupon, the vital airs again begin to act, those other effects also are brought about, in addition to mere life. — Nor must the vital airs, on account of their being divided into classes, be considered as something else than vital air ; for wind (air) constitutes their common character. Thus (i. e. in the manner illustrated by the instance of the vital airs) the non- difference of the effect from the cause is to be conceived. — As, therefore, the whole world is an effect of Brahman and
Ii Adhyaya, I Pada, 21. 343
non-different from it, the promise held out in the scriptural passage that ' What is not heard is heard, what is not per- ceived is perceived, what is not known is known ' (Kk. Up. VI, i, 3) is fulfilled1.
2i. On account of the other (i.e. the individual
soul) being designated (as non-different from Brah-
man) there would attach (to Brahman) various
faults, as, for instance, not doing what is bene-
ficial.
Another objection is raised against the doctrine of an intelligent cause of the world. — If that doctrine is accepted, certain faults, as, for instance, doing what is not beneficial, will attach (to the intelligent cause, i. e. Brahman), ' on ac- count of the other being designated.' For Scripture declares the other, i. e. the embodied soul, to be one with Brahman, as is shown by the passage, ' That is the Self; that art thou, O vSVetaketu!' (Kk. Up. VI, 8, 7.)— Or else (if we interpret ' the other ' of the Sutra in a different way) Scripture declares the other, i. e. Brahman, to be the Self of the embodied soul. For the passage, ' Having created that he entered into it,' declares the creator, i. e. the unmodified Brahman, to constitute the Self of the embodied soul, in consequence of his entering into his products. The following passage also, ' Entering (into them) with this living Self I will evolve names and forms' (Kk. Up. VI, 3, 2), in which the highest divinity designates the living (soul) by the word ' Self,' shows that the embodied Self is not different from Brahman. Therefore the creative power of Brahman belongs to the embodied Self also, and the latter, being thus an inde- pendent agent, might be expected to produce only what is beneficial to itself, and not things of a contrary nature, such as birth, death, old age, disease, and whatever may be the other meshes of the net of suffering. For we know that no free person will build a prison for himself, and take up his abode in it. Nor would a being, itself absolutely stainless,
1 Because it has been shown that cause and effect are identical; hence if the cause is known, the effect is known also.
344 vedanta-s6tras.
look on this altogether unclean body as forming part of its Self. It would, moreover, free itself, according to its liking, of the consequences of those of its former actions which result in pain, and would enjoy the consequences of those actions only which are rewarded by pleasure. Fur- ther, it would remember that it had created this manifold world ; for every person who has produced some clearly appearing effect remembers that he has been the cause of it. And as the magician easily retracts, whenever he likes, the magical illusion which he had emitted, so the embodied soul also would be able to reabsorb this world into itself. The fact is, however, that the embodied soul cannot reabsorb its own body even. As we therefore see that i what would be beneficial is not done/ the hypothesis of the world having proceeded from an intelligent cause is unacceptable.
22. But the separate (Brahman, i.e. the Brahman
separate from the individual souls) (is the creator) ;
(the existence of which separate Brahman we learn)
from the declaration of difference.
The word ' but ' discards the purvapaksha. — We rather declare that that omniscient, omnipotent Brahman, whose essence is eternal pure cognition and freedom, and which is additional to, i. e. different from the embodied Self, is the creative principle of the world. The faults specified above, such as doing what is not beneficial, and the like, do not attach to that Brahman ; for as eternal freedom is its charac- teristic nature, there is nothing either beneficial to be done by it or non-beneficial to be avoided by it. Nor is there any impediment to its knowledge and power; for it is omniscient and omnipotent. The embodied Self, on the other hand, is of a different nature, and to it the mentioned faults adhere. But then we do not declare it to be the creator of the world, on account of 'the declaration of difference., For scriptural passages (such as, ' Verily, the Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be perceived, to be marked,' Brz. Up. II, 4, 5 ; ' The Self we must search out, we must try to understand,' Kh, Up. VIII, 7, i ; ' Then he becomes