state of truth and reality the whole apparent world does not exist. The Bhagavadgita also (' The Lord is not the cause of actions, or of the capacity of performing actions, or of the connexion of action and fruit; all that proceeds according to its own nature. The Lord receives no one's sin or merit. Knowledge is enveloped by Ignorance ; hence all creatures are deluded;' Bha. Gi. V, 14; 15) declares that in reality the relation of Ruler and ruled does not exist. That, on the other hand, all those distinctions are valid, as far as the phenomenal world is concerned, Scripture as well as the Bhagavadgita states; compare Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22, ( He is the Lord of all, the king of all things, the protector of all things ; he is a bank and boundary, so that these worlds may not be confounded;' and Bha. Gi. XVIII, 61, ( The Lord, O Ar^una, is seated in the region of the heart of all beings, turning round all beings, (as though) mounted on a machine, by his delusion/ The Sutrakara also asserts the non-difference of cause and effect only with regard to the state of Reality ; while he had, in the pre- ceding Sutra, where he looked to the phenomenal world, compared Brahman to the ocean, &c, that comparison resting on the assumption of the world of effects not yet having been refuted (i. e. seen to be unreal). — The view of Brahman as undergoing modifications will, moreover, be of use in the devout meditations on the qualified (sagu;za) Brahman.
15, And because only on the existence (of the cause) (the effect) is observed.
For the following reason also the effect is non-different from the cause, because only when the cause exists the effect is observed to exist, not when it does not exist. For instance, only when the clay exists the jar is observed to exist, and the cloth only when the threads exist. That it is not a gene- ral rule that when one thing exists another is also observed to exist, appears, for instance, from the fact, that a horse which is other (different) from a cow is not observed to exist only when a cow exists. Nor is the jar observed to exist only when the potter exists ; for in that case non-difference
Ii Adhyaya, I Pada, I 5. 33 I
does not exist, although the relation between the two is that of an operative cause and its effect1. — But — it maybe objected — even in the case of things other (i. e. non-identical) we find that the observation of one thing regularly depends on the existence of another ; smoke, for instance, is observed only when fire exists. — We reply that this is untrue, because sometimes smoke is observed even after the fire has been ex- tinguished ; as, for instance, in the case of smoke being kept by herdsmen in jars.— Well, then — the objector will say — let us add to smoke a certain qualification enabling us to say that smoke of such and such a kind 2 does not exist unless fire exists. — Even thus, we reply, your objection is not valid, because we declare that the reason for assuming the non-dif- ference of cause and effect is the fact of the internal organ (buddhi) being affected (impressed) by cause and effect jointly 3. And that does not take place in the case of fire and smoke. — Or else we have to read (in the Sutra) 'bhavat,' and to translate, ' and on account of the existence or obser- vation.' The non-difference of cause and effect results not only from Scripture but also from the existence of percep- tion. For the non-difference of the two is perceived, for instance, in an aggregate of threads, where we do not per- ceive a thing called ' cloth/ in addition to the threads, but merely threads running lengthways and crossways. So again, in the threads we perceive finer threads (the aggre-
1 So that from the instance of the potter and the jar we cannot conclude that the relation of clay and the jar is only that of nimitta and naimittika, not that of non-difference.
2 For instance, smoke extending in a long line whose base is connected with some object on the surface of the earth.
3 I.e. (as An. Gi. explains) because we assume the relation of cause and effect not merely on the ground of the actual existence of one thing depending on that upon another, but on the additional ground of the mental existence, the consciousness of the one not being possible without the consciousness of the other. — Tad- bhavanuvidhayibhavatvam tadbhananuvidhayibhanatvaw £a kar- yasya karawananyatve hetur dhumavijeshasya /fcagnibhavanuvi- dhayibhavatve*pi na tadbhananuvidhayibhanatvam agnibhanasya dhumabhanadhinatvat.
332 vedAnta-s6tr as.
gate of which is identical with the grosser threads), in them again finer threads, and so on. On the ground of this our perception we conclude that the finest parts which we can perceive are ultimately identical with their causes, viz. red, white, and black (the colours of fire, water, and earth, according to Kk. Up. VI, 4) ; those, again, with air, the latter with ether, and ether with Brahman, which is one and without a second. That all means of proof lead back to Brahman (as the ultimate cause of the world ; not to pra- dhana, &c), we have already explained.
16. And on account of that which is posterior (i. e. the effect) being that which is.
For the following reason also the effect is to be con- sidered as non-different (from the cause). That which is posterior in time, i. e. the effect, is declared by Scripture to have, previous to its actual beginning, its Being in the cause, by the Self of the cause merely. For in passages like, * In the beginning, my dear, this was that only which is' [Kk, Up. VI, 2, 1); and, ' Verily, in the beginning this was Self, one only5 (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 1, 1), the effect which is denoted by the word ' this ' appears in grammatical co-ordi- nation with (the word denoting) the cause (from which it appears that both inhere in the same substratum). A thing, on the other hand, which does not exist in another thing by the Self of the latter is not produced from that other thing ; for instance, oil is not produced from sand. Hence as there is non-difference before the production (of the effect), we understand that the effect even after having been produced continues to be non-different from the cause. As the cause, i. e. Brahman, is in all time neither more nor less than that which is, so the effect also, viz. the world, is in all time only that which is. But that which is is one only; therefore the effect is non-different from the cause.
17. If it be said that on account of being denoted
as that which is not (the effect does) not (exist before
it is actually produced) ; (we reply) not so, (because
Ii Adhyaya, I Pada, I 7. 333
the term ' that which is not ' denotes) another
quality (merely) ; (as appears) from the comple-
mentary sentence.
But, an objection will be raised, in some places Scripture speaks of the effect before its production as that which is not ; so, for instance, ' In the beginning this was that only which is not' (Kh. Up. Ill, 19, 1); and ' Non-existent 1 indeed this was in the beginning' (Taitt. Up. II, 7). Hence Being (sattvam) cannot be ascribed to the effect before its production.
This we deny. For by the Non-existence of the effect previous to its production is not meant absolute Non- existence, but only a different quality or state, viz. the state of name and form being unevolved, which state is different from the state of name and form being evolved. With reference to the latter state the effect is called, previous to its production, non-existent although then also it existed identical with its cause. We conclude this from the complementary passage, according to the rule that the sense of a passage whose earlier part is of doubtful meaning is determined by its complementary part. With reference to the passage, ' In the beginning this was non-existent only,' we remark that what is there denoted by the word ' Non-existing ' is — in the complementary passage, ' That became existent' — referred to by the word 'that/ and qualified as ' Existent.'
The word 'was' would, moreover, not apply to the (absolutely) Non-existing, which cannot be conceived as connected with prior or posterior time. — Hence with refer- ence to the other passage also, ' Non-existing indeed/ &c, the complementary part, 'That made itself its Self/ shows, by the qualification which it contains, that absolute Non-existence is not meant. — It follows from all this that the designation of ' Non-existence ' applied to the effect before its production has reference to a different state of being merely. And as those things which are distinguished
1 For simplicity's sake, asat will be translated henceforth by non- existing.
334 VEDANTA-stjTRAS.
by name and form are in ordinary language called ' existent,' the term 'non-existent' is figuratively applied to them to denote the state in which they were previously to their differentiation.
1 8. From reasoning and from another Vedic passage.
That the effect exists before its origination and is non- different from the cause, follows from reasoning as well as from a further scriptural passage.
We at first set forth the argumentation. — Ordinary expe- rience teaches us that those who wish to produce certain effects, such as curds, or earthen jars, or golden ornaments, employ for their purpose certain determined causal sub- stances such as milk, clay, and gold; those who wish to produce sour milk do not employ clay, nor do those who intend to make jars employ milk and so on. But, according to that doctrine which teaches that the effect is non-existent (before its actual production), all this should be possible. For if before their actual origination all effects are equally non-existent in any causal substance, why then should curds be produced from milk only and not from clay also, and jars from clay only and not from milk as well? — Let us then main- tain, the asatkaryavadin rejoins, that there is indeed an equal non-existence of any effect in any cause, but that at the same time each causal substance has a certain capacity reaching beyond itself (atLraya) for some particular effect only and not for other effects ; that, for instance, milk only, and not clay, has a certain capacity for curds ; and clay only, and not milk, an analogous capacity for jars. — What, we ask in return, do you understand by that ' atu-aya ? ' If you understand by it the antecedent condition of the effect (before its actual origi- nation), you abandon your doctrine that the effect does not exist in the cause, and prove our doctrine according to which it does so exist. If, on the other hand, you understand by the atuaya a certain power of the cause assumed to the end of accounting for the fact that only one determined effect springs from the cause, you must admit that the power can