name of the one to the other is not figurative, but simply founded on error. Such is, for instance, the case of a man who at the time of twilight does not discern that the object before him is a post, and applies to it the conception and designation of a man ; such is likewise the case of the con- ception and designation of silver being applied to a shell of mother-of-pearl somehow mistaken for silver. How then can it be maintained that the application of the word and the conception of the Ego to the body, &c, which application is due to the non-discrimination of the Self and the Not- Self, is figurative (rather than simply false) ? considering that even learned men who know the difference of the Self and the Not-Self confound the words and ideas just as common shepherds and goatherds do.

As therefore the application of the conception of the Ego to the body on the part of those who affirm the existence of a Self different from the body is simply false, not figurative, it follows that the embodiedness of the Self is (not real but) caused by wrong conception, and hence that the person who has reached true knowledge is free from his body even while still alive. The same is declared in the *Sruti passages concerning him who knows Brahman : s And as the slough of a snake lies on an ant-hill, dead and cast away, thus lies this body; but that disembodied immortal spirit is Brahman only, is only light ' (Bn. Up. IV, 4, 7) ; and ' With eyes he is without eyes as it were, with ears without ears as it were, with speech without speech as it were, with a mind without mind as it were, with vital airs without vital airs as it were.' Smrzti also, in the passage where the characteristic marks are enume- rated of one whose mind is steady (Bha. Gita II, 54), declares that he who knows is no longer connected with action of any kind. Therefore the man who has once com- prehended Brahman to be the Self, does not belong to this transmigratory world as he did before. He, on the other hand, who still belongs to this transmigratory world as before, has not comprehended Brahman to be the Self. Thus there remain no unsolved contradictions.

With reference again to the assertion that Brahman is not

44 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

fully determined in its own nature, but stands in a comple- mentary relation to injunctions, because the hearing about Brahman is to be followed by consideration and reflection, we remark that consideration and reflection are themselves merely subservient to the comprehension of Brahman. If Brahman, after having been comprehended, stood in a subordinate relation to some injunctions, it might be said to be merely supplementary. But this is not the case, since consideration and reflection no less than hearing are subservient to comprehension. It follows that the 5astra cannot be the means of knowing Brahman only in so far as it is connected with injunctions, and the doctrine that on account of the uniform meaning of the Vedanta- texts, an independent Brahman is to be admitted, is thereby fully established. Hence there is room for beginning the new *Sastra indicated in the first Sutra, 'Then therefore the enquiry into Brahman.' If, on the other hand, the Ved&nta- texts were connected with injunctions, a new 5astra would either not be begun at all, since the vSastra concerned with injunctions has already been introduced by means of the first Sutra of the Purva Mima^sa, ' Then therefore the enquiry into duty ;' or if it were begun it would be intro- duced as follows : ' Then therefore the enquiry into the remaining duties ;' just as a new portion of the Purva Mima/^sa Sutras is introduced with the words, 'Then therefore the enquiry into what subserves the purpose of the sacrifice, and what subserves the purpose of man ' (Pu. Mt. Su. IV, i, i). But as the comprehension of the unity of Brahman and the Self has not been propounded (in the previous S&stra), it is quite appropriate that a new vSastra, whose subject is Brahman, should be entered upon. Hence all injunctions and all other means of knowledge end with the cognition expressed in the words, ' I am Brah- man ;' for as soon as there supervenes the comprehension of the non-dual Self, which is not either something to be eschewed or something to be appropriated, all objects and knowing agents vanish, and hence there can no longer be means of proof. In accordance with this, they (i. e. men knowing Brahman) have made the following declaration : —

I Adhyaya, I Pad a, 4. 45

' When there has arisen (in a man's mind) the knowledge, " I am that which is, Brahman is my Self," and when, owing to the sublation of the conceptions of body, relatives, and the like, the (imagination of) the figurative and the false Self has come to an end1; how should then the effect2 (of that wrong imagination) exist any longer? As long as the knowledge of the Self, which Scripture tells us to search after, has not arisen, so long the Self is knowing subject ; but that same subject is that which is searched after, viz. (the highest Self) free from all evil and blemish. Just as the idea of the Self being the body is assumed as valid (in ordinary life), so all the ordinary sources of knowledge (perception and the like) are valid only until the one Self is ascertained.'

(Herewith the section comprising the four Sutras is finished3.)

So far it has been declared that the Vedanta-passages, whose purport is the comprehension of Brahman being the Self, and which have their object therein, refer exclusively to Brahman without any reference to actions. And it has further been shown that Brahman is the omniscient omni- potent cause of the origin, subsistence, and dissolution of the world. But now the Sankhyas and others being of opinion that an existent substance is to be known through other means of proof (not through the Veda) infer different causes, such as the pradhana and the like, and there- upon interpret the Ved&nta-passages as referring to the latter. All the Vedanta-passages, they maintain, which treat of the creation of the world distinctly point out that the cause (of the world) has to be concluded from the effect by inference ; and the cause which is to be inferred is the connexion of the pradhana with the souls (purusha). The followers of Kaz^ada again infer from the very same

1 The figurative Self, i.e. the imagination that wife, children, possessions, and the like are a man's Self; the false Self, i. e. the imagination that the Self acts, suffers, enjoys, &c.

2 I. e. the apparent world with all its distinctions.

3 The words in parentheses are not found in the best manuscripts.

46 VEDANTA-SlJTRAS.

passages that the Lord is the efficient cause of the world while the atoms are its material cause. And thus other argumentators also taking their stand on passages apparently favouring their views and on fallacious argu- ments raise various objections. For this reason the teacher (Vyasa) — thoroughly acquainted as he is with words, pas- sages, and means of proof — proceeds to state as p r i m a f a c i e views, and afterwards to refute, all those opinions founded on deceptive passages and fallacious arguments. Thereby he at the same time proves indirectly that what the Vedanta- texts aim at is the comprehension of Brahman.

The Sankhyas who opine that the non-intelligent pra- dhana consisting of three constituent elements (guna) is the cause of the world argue as follows. The Vedanta-passages which you have declared to intimate that the all-knowing all-powerful Brahman is the cause of the world can be consistently interpreted also on the doctrine of the pra- dhana being the general cause. Omnipotence (more liter- ally: the possession of all powers) can be ascribed to the pradhana in so far as it has all its effects for its objects. All- knowingness also can be ascribed to it, viz. in the following manner. What you think to be knowledge is in reality an attribute of the guna. of Goodness1, according to the Smrzti passage ' from Goodness springs knowledge ' (Bha. Gita XIV, 17). By means of this attribute of Goodness, viz. knowledge, certain men endowed with organs which are effects (of the pradhana) are known as all-knowing Yogins ; for omniscience is acknowledged to be connected with the very highest degree of ' Goodness.' Now to the soul (purusha) which is isolated,, destitute of effected organs, consisting of pure (undifferenced) intelligence it is quite impossible to ascribe either all-knowingness or limited knowledge ; the pradhana, on the other hand, because consisting of the three gu/zas, comprises also in its pra- dhana state the element of Goodness which is the cause of all-knowingness. The Vedanta-passages therefore in

1 The most exalted of the three constituent elements whose state of equipoise constitutes the pradhana.

I Adhyaya, I Pad a, 5. 47

a derived (figurative) sense ascribe all-knowingness to the pradhana, although it is in itself non-intelligent. Moreover you (the Vedantin) also who assume an all-knowing Brah- man can ascribe to it all-knowingness in so far only as that term means capacity for all knowledge. For Brahman cannot always be actually engaged in the cognition of everything ; for from this there would follow the absolute permanency of his cognition, and this would involve a want of independence on Brahman's part with regard to the activity of knowing. And if you should propose to con- sider Brahman's cognition as non-permanent it would follow that with the cessation of the cognition Brahman itself would cease. Therefore all-knowingness is possible only in the sense of capacity for all knowledge. Moreover you assume that previously to the origination of the world Brahman is without any instruments of action. But with- out the body, the senses, &c. which are the instruments of knowledge, cognition cannot take place in any being. And further it must be noted that the pradhana, as con- sisting of various elements, is capable of undergoing modi- fications, and may therefore act as a (material) cause like clay and other substances; while the uncompounded homogeneous Brahman is unable to do so.

To these conclusions he (Vyfisa) replies in the following Sutra.

5. On account of seeing (i. e. thinking being
attributed in the Upanishads to the cause of the
world ; the pradhana) is not (to be identified with
the cause indicated by the Upanishads ; for) it is
not founded on Scripture.

It is impossible to find room in the Vedanta-texts for the non-intelligent pradhana, the fiction of the Sankhyas ; because it is not founded on Scripture. How so? Because the quality of seeing, i. e. thinking, is in Scripture ascribed to the cause. For the passage, Kh. Up. VI, 2, (which begins : ' Being only, my dear, this was in the beginning, one only, without a second/ and goes on, ' It thought (saw),

48 vedanta-sCtras.

may I be many, may I grow forth. It sent forth fire,') declares that this world differentiated by name and form, which is there denoted by the word 'this/ was before its origination identical with the Self of that which is and that the principle denoted by the term 'the being' (or ' that which is ') sent forth fire and the other elements after having thought. The following passage also (' Verily in the beginning all this was Self, one only; there was nothing else blinking whatsoever. He thought, shall I send forth worlds? He sent forth these worlds,' Ait. Ar. II, 49 1, 2) de- clares the creation to have had thought for its antecedent. In another passage also (Pr. Up. VI, 3) it is said of the person of sixteen parts, ' He thought, &c. He sent forth Pra/za.' By ' seeing ' (i. e. the verb ' seeing ' exhibited in the Sutra) is not meant that particular verb only, but any verbs which have a cognate sense ; just as the verb ' to sacrifice ' is used to denote any kind of offering. Therefore other passages also whose purport it is to intimate that an all- knowing Lord is the cause of the world are to be quoted here, as, for instance, Mu. Up. I, 1, 9, 'From him who perceives all and who knows all, whose brooding consists of knowledge, from him is born that Brahman, name and form and food.'