injunctions and prohibitions. With regard to the other passage quoted (' as action is the purport of the Veda, what- ever does not refer to action is purportless ') we remark that if that passage were taken in an absolutely strict sense (when it would mean that only those words which denote action have a meaning), it would follow that all information about existent things is meaningless1. If, on the other hand, the Veda — in addition to the injunctions of activity and cessation of activity — does give information about existent things as being subservient to some action to be accom- plished, why then should it not give information also about the existent eternally unchangeable Self? For an existent thing, about which information is given, does not become an act (through being stated to be subservient to an act). — But, it will be said, although existent things are not acts, yet, as they are instrumental to action, the information given about such things is merely subservient to action. — This, we reply, does not matter; for although the information may be subservient to action, the things themselves about which information is given are already intimated thereby as things which have the power of bringing about certain actions. Their final end (prayo^ana) indeed may be sub- serviency to some action, but thereby they do not cease to be, in the information given about them, intimated in themselves. — Well, and if they are thus intimated, what is gained thereby for your purpose2? We reply that the information about the Self, which is an existing thing not comprehended from other sources, is of the same nature (as the information about other existent things); for by the comprehension of the Self a stop is put to all false knowledge, which is the cause of transmigration, and thus a
1 That, for instance, in the passage ' he is to sacrifice with Soma/ the word ' soma/ which does not denote an action, is devoid of sense.
2 I.e. for the purpose of showing that the passages conveying in- formation about Brahman as such are justified. You have (the objector maintains) proved hitherto only that passages containing information about existent things are admissible, if those things have a purpose; but how does all this apply to the information about Brahman of which no purpose has been established ?
I Abhyaya, I Pad a, 4. 39
purpose is established which renders the passages relative to Brahman equal to those passages which give information about things instrumental to actions. Moreover, there are found (even in that part of the Veda which treats of actions) such passages as ' a Brahma^a is not to be killed/ which teach abstinence from certain actions. Now abstinence from action is neither action nor instrumental to action. If, therefore, the tenet that all those passages which do not express action are devoid of purport were insisted on, it would follow that all such passages as the one quoted, which teach abstinence from action, are devoid of purport — a con- sequence which is of course unacceptable. Nor, again, can the connexion in which the word ' not' stands with the action expressed by the verb ' is to be killed ' — which action is naturally established 1 — be used as a reason for assuming that ' not ' denotes an action non-established elsewhere 2, different from the state of mere passivity implied in the abstinence from the act of killing. For the peculiar function of the particle ' not ' is to intimate the idea of the non- existence of that with which it is connected, and the concep- tion of the non-existence (of something to be done) is the cause of the state of passivity. (Nor can it be objected that, as soon as that momentary idea has passed away, the state of passivity will again make room for activity ; for) that idea itself passes away (only after having completely destroyed the natural impulse prompting to the murder of a Brahma^a, &c), just as a fire is extinguished only after having completely consumed its fuel. Hence we are of opinion that the aim of prohibitory passages, such as ' a Brahma^a is not to be killed,' is a merely passive state, consisting in the abstinence from some possible action; excepting some special cases, such as the so-called Pra^apati- vow, &c.3 Hence the charge of want of purpose is to be
1 It is 'naturally established ' because it has natural motives— not dependent on the injunctions of the Veda, viz. passion and the like.
2 Elsewhere, i. e. outside the Veda.
3 The above discussion of the prohibitory passages of the Veda
40 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
considered as referring (not to the Vedanta-passages, but only) to such statements about existent things as are of the nature of legends and the like, and do not serve any purpose of man.
The allegation that a mere statement about an actually existent thing not connected with an injunction of some- thing to be done, is purposeless (as, for instance, the state- ment that the earth contains seven dvipas) has already been refuted on the ground that a purpose is seen to exist in some such statements, as, for instance, 'this is not a snake, but a rope.' — But how about the objection raised above that the information about Brahman cannot be held to have a purpose in the same way as the statement about a rope has one, because a man even after having heard about Brahman continues to belong to this transmigratory
is of a very scholastic nature, and various clauses in it are differently interpreted by the different commentators. *Sankara endeavours to fortify his doctrine, that not all parts of the Veda refer to action by an appeal to prohibitory passages which do not enjoin action but abstinence from action. The legitimacy of this appeal might be contested on the ground that a prohibitory passage also, (as, for instance, ' a Brahmawa is not to be killed/) can be explained as enjoining a positive action, viz. some action opposed in nature to the one forbidden, so that the quoted passage might be interpreted to mean ' a determination, &c. of not killing a Brahmarca is to be formed;' just as we understand something positive by the expression * a non-Brahma«a/ viz. some man who is a kshattriya or something else. To this the answer is that, wherever we can, we must at- tribute to the word ' not ' its primary sense which is the absolute negation of the word to which it is joined ; so that passages where it is joined to words denoting action must be considered to have for their purport the entire absence of action. Special cases only are excepted, as the one alluded to in the text where certain pro- hibited actions are enumerated under the heading of vows ; for as a vow is considered as something positive, the non-doing of some particular action must there be understood as intimating the per- formance of some action of an opposite nature. The question as to the various meanings of the particle 'not' is discussed in all treatises on the Purvd Mimosa ; see, for instance, Arthasamgraha, translation, p. 39 fF.
I Adhyaya, I Pad a, 4. 4 1
world ?- — We reply as follows : It is impossible to show that a man who has once understood Brahman to be the Self, belongs to the transmigratory world in the same sense as he did before, because that would be contrary to the fact of his being Brahman. For we indeed observe that a person who imagines the body, and so on, to consti- tute the Self, is subject to fear and pain, but we have no right to assume that the same person after having, by means of the Veda, comprehended Brahman to be the Self, and thus having got over his former imaginings, will still in the same manner be subject to pain and fear whose cause is wrong knowledge. In the same way we see that a rich householder, puffed up by the conceit of his wealth, is grieved when his possessions are taken from him ; but we do not see that the loss of his wealth equally grieves him after he has once retired from the world and put off the conceit of his riches. And, again, we see that a person possessing a pair of beautiful earrings derives pleasure from the proud conceit of ownership ; but after he has lost the earrings and the conceit established thereon, the pleasure derived from them vanishes. Thus Sruti also declares, c When he is free from the body, then neither pleasure nor pain touches him ' (Kk. Up. VIII, 12, 1). If it should be objected that the condition of being free from the body follows on death only, we demur, since the cause of man being joined to the body is wrong knowledge. For it is not possible to establish the state of embodiedness upon anything else but wrong knowledge. And that the state of disembodiedness is eternal on account of its not having actions for its cause, we have already explained. The ob- jection again, that embodiedness is caused by the merit and demerit effected by the Self (and therefore real), we refute by remarking that as the (reality of the) conjunction of the Self with the body is itself not established, the circumstance of merit and demerit being due to the action of the Self is likewise not established ; for (if we should try to get over this difficulty by representing the Self's embodiedness as caused by merit and demerit) we should commit the logical fault of making embodiedness dependent on merit and de-
42 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
merit, and again merit and demerit on embodiedness. And the assumption of an endless retrogressive chain (of em- bodied states and merit and demerit) would be no better than a chain of blind men (who are unable to lead one another). Moreover, the Self can impossibly become an agent, as it cannot enter into intimate relation to actions. If it should be said that the Self may be considered as an agent in the same way as kings and other great people are (who without acting themselves make others act) by their mere presence, we deny the appositeness of this instance ; for kings may become agents through their relation to servants whom they procure by giving them wages, &c, while it is impossible to imagine anything, analogous to money, which could be the cause of a connexion between the Self as lord and the body, and so on (as servants). Wrong imagination, on the other hand, (of the individual Self, considering itself to be joined to the body,) is a manifest reason of the connexion of the two (which is not based on any assumption). This ex- plains also in how far the Self can be considered as the agent in sacrifices and similar acts1. Here it is objected that the Self's imagination as to the body, and so on, belonging to itself is not false, but is to be understood in a derived (figurative) sense. This objection we invalidate by the remark that the distinction of derived and primary senses of words is known to be applicable only where an actual difference of things is known to exist. We are, for instance, acquainted with a certain species of animals having a mane, and so on, which is the exclusive primary object of the idea and word ' lion,' and we are likewise acquainted with per- sons possessing in an eminent degree certain leonine quali- ties, such as fierceness, courage, &c. ; here, a well settled difference of objects existing, the idea and the name ' lion ' are applied to those persons in a derived or figurative sense. In those cases, however, where the difference of the objects is not well established, the transfer of the conception and
1 The Self is the agent in a sacrifice, &c. only in so far as it imagines itself to be joined to a body ; which imagination is finally removed by the cognition of Brahman.