The argumentation of the Sahkhyas that the pradhana may be called all-knowing on account of knowledge con- stituting an attribute of the gu/za Goodness is inadmissible. For as in the pradhana-condition the three gu^as are in a state of equipoise, knowledge which is a quality of Goodness only is not possible1. Nor can we admit the explanation that the pradhana is all-knowing because endowed with the capacity for all knowledge. For if, in the condition of equipoise of the guTzas, we term the pradhana all-knowing with reference to the power of knowledge residing in Goodness, we must likewise term it little-knowing, with reference to the power impeding knowledge which resides in Passion and Dark-
1 Knowledge can arise only where Goodness is predominant, not where the three qualities mutually counterbalance one an- other.
I Adhyaya, I Pada, 5. 49
ness. Moreover a modification of Goodness which is not connected with a witnessing (observing) principle (sakshin) is not called knowledge, and the non-intelligent pradh&na lis destitute of such a principle. It is therefore impossible to ascribe to the pradh&na all-knowingness. The case of the Yogins finally does not apply to the point under consideration ; for as they possess intelligence, they may, owing to an excess of Goodness in their nature, rise to omniscience1.— Well then (say those Sankhyas who believe in the existence of a Lord) let us assume that the pradh&na possesses the quality of knowledge owing to the witnessing principle (the Lord), just as the quality of burning is im- parted to an iron ball by fire.— No, we reply; for if this were so, it would be more reasonable to assume that that which is the cause of the pradhana having the quality of thought i.e. the all-knowing primary Brahman itself is the cause of the world.
The objection that to Brahman also all-knowingness in its primary sense cannot be ascribed because, if the activity of cognition were permanent, Brahman could not be con- sidered as independent with regard to it, we refute as follows. In what way, we ask the Sankhya, is Brah- man's all-knowingness interfered with by a permanent cognitional activity? To maintain that he, who possesses eternal knowledge capable to throw light on all objects, is not all-knowing, is contradictory. If his knowledge were considered non-permanent, he would know sometimes, and sometimes he would not know; from which it would follow indeed that he is not all-knowing. This fault is however avoided if we admit Brahman's knowledge to be permanent. — But, it may be objected, on this latter alternative the knower cannot be designated as independent with reference to the act of knowing.— Why not ? we reply ; the sun also, although his heat and light are permanent, is nevertheless designated as independent
1 The excess of Sattva in theYogin would not enable him to rise to omniscience if he did not possess an intelligent principle in- dependent of Sattva.
50 VEDANTA-SIJTRAS.
when we say, ' he burns, he gives light1/ — But, it will again be objected, we say that the sun burns or gives light when he stands in relation to some object to be heated or illuminated ; Brahman, on the other hand, stands, before the creation of the world, in no relation to any object of knowledge. The cases are therefore not parallel. — This objection too, we reply, is not valid ; for as a matter of fact we speak of the Sun as an agent, saying 'the sun shines/ even without reference to any object illuminated by him, and hence Brahman also may be spoken of as an agent, in such passages as ' it thought,' &c, even without reference to any object of knowledge. If, however, an object is supposed to be required (' knowing ' being a transitive verb while e shining' is intransitive), the texts ascribing thought to Brahman will fit all the better.— What then is that object to which the knowledge of the Lord can refer previously to the origin of the world ? — Name and form, we reply, which can be defined neither as being identical with Brahman nor as different from it, unevolved but about to. be evolved. For if, as the adherents of the Yoga-^astra assume, the Yogins have a perceptive knowledge of the past and the future through the favour of the Lord ; in what terms shall we have to speak of the eternal cognition of the ever pure Lord himself, whose objects are the creation, subsistence, and dissolution of the world ! The objection that Brahman, previously to the origin of the world, is not able to think because it is not connected with a body, &c. does not apply ; for Brahman, whose nature is eternal cognition— as the sun's nature is eternal luminous-
1 Ananda Giri comments as follows: paroktanupapattim ni- rasitum iprtkkAati idam iti. Prakn'tyarthabhavat pratyayarthabhavad va brahma«o sarva^^ateti pra^nam eva praka/ayati katham iti. Pra- thama/rc pratyaha yasyeti. Ukta#z vyatirekadv&ra vivrinoti anityatve hiti. Dvitfya#z jarikate ^Mneti. Svato nityasyapi ^Tzanasya tatta- darthava^^innasya karyatvat tatra svatantryam pratyayartho brah- ma»a^ sidhyatity dha. — The knowledge of Brahman is eternal, and in so far Brahman is not independent with regard to it, but it is in- dependent with regard to each particular act of knowledge ; the verbal affix in '^anati ' indicating the particularity of the act.
I Adhyaya, I Pad a, 5. 51
ness — can impossibly stand in need of any instruments of knowledge. The transmigrating soul (sa^sarin) indeed, which is under the sway of Nescience, &c., may require a body in order that knowledge may arise in it ; but not so the Lord, who is free from all impediments of knowledge. The two following Mantras also declare that the Lord does not require a body, and that his knowledge is without any obstructions. * There is no effect and no instrument known of him, no one is seen like unto him or better ; his high power is revealed as manifold, as inherent, acting as knowledge and force.' ' Grasping without hands, hasting without feet, he sees without eyes, he hears without ears. He knows what can be known, but no one knows him ; they call him the first, the great person ' (Sv. Up. VI, 8 ; III, 19).
But, to raise a new objection, there exists no trans- migrating soul different from the Lord and obstructed by impediments of knowledge ; for .Sruti expressly declares that ' there is no other seer but he ; there is no other knower but he' (Br/. Up. Ill, 7, 23). How then can it be said that the origination of knowledge in the transmigrating soul depends on a body, while it does not do so in the case of the Lord ? — True, we reply. There is in reality no transmigrating soul different from the Lord. Still the connexion (of the Lord) with limiting adjuncts, consisting of bodies and so on, is assumed, just as we assume the ether to enter into connexion with divers limiting adjuncts such as jars, pots, caves, and the like. And just as in con- sequence of connexion of the latter kind such conceptions and terms as e the hollow (space) of a jar,' &c. are generally current, although the space inside a jar is not really different from universal space, and just as in consequence thereof there generally prevails the false notion that there are different spaces such as the space of a jar and so on ; so there prevails likewise the false notion that the Lord and the transmigrating soul are different ; a notion due to the non-discrimination of the (unreal) connexion of the soul with the limiting conditions, consisting of the body and so on. That the Self, although in reality the only existence, imparts the quality of Selfhood to bodies and the like
5 2 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
which are Not-Self is a matter of observation, and is due to mere wrong conception, which depends in its turn on antecedent wrong conception. And the consequence of the soul thus involving itself in the transmigratory state is that its thought depends on a body and the like.
The averment that the pradhana, because consisting of several elements, can, like clay and similar substances, occupy the place of a cause while the uncompounded Brahman cannot do so, is refuted by the fact of the pra- dhana not basing on Scripture, That, moreover, it is possible to establish by argumentation the causality of Brahman, but not of the pradhana and similar principles, the Sutrakara will set forth in the second Adhyaya (II, i, 4, &c).
Here the Sankhya comes forward with a new objection. The difficulty started by you, he says, viz. that the non- intelligent pradhana cannot be the cause of the world, because thought is ascribed to the latter in the sacred texts, can be got over in another way also, viz. on the ground that non-intelligent things are sometimes figura- tively spoken of as intelligent beings. We observe, for instance, that people say of a river-bank about to fall, ' the bank is inclined to fall (pipatishati),' and thus speak of a non-intelligent bank as if it possessed intelligence. So the pradhana also, although non-intelligent, may, when about to create, be figuratively spoken of as thinking. Just as in ordinary life some intelligent person after having bathed, and dined, and formed the purpose of driving in the after- noon to his village, necessarily acts according to his purpose, so the pradhana also acts by the necessity of its own nature, when transforming itself into the so-called great principle and the subsequent forms of evolution ; it may therefore figuratively be spoken of as intelligent. — But what reason have you for setting aside the primary meaning of the word ' thought ' and for taking it in a figurative sense ? —The observation, the Sankhya replies, that fire and water also are figuratively spoken of as intelligent beings in the two following scriptural passages, ' That fire thought ; that water thought ' (Kh. Up. VI, 2, 3 ; 4). We therefrom con- clude that thought is to be taken in a figurative sense there
i adhyAya, i pada, 6. 53
also where Being (Sat) is the agent, because it is mentioned in a chapter where (thought) is generally taken in a figura- tive sense \
To this argumentation of the Sclnkhya the next Sutra replies :
6. If it is said that (the word 'seeing') has a
figurative meaning, we deny that, on account of the
word Self (being applied to the cause of the world).
Your assertion that the term ' Being ' denotes the non- intelligent pradhana, and that thought is ascribed to it in a figurative sense only, as it is to fire and water, is untenable. Why so ? On account of the term ' Self.' For the passage Kh. Up. VI, a, which begins ' Being only, my dear, this was in the beginning,' after having related the creation of fire, water, and earth (' it thought/ &c. ; ' it sent forth fire,' &c.), goes on — denoting the thinking principle of which the whole chapter treats, and likewise fire, water, and earth, by the term ' divinities ' — as follows, ' That divinity thought : Let me now enter those three divinities with this living Self (^iva dtman) and evolve names and forms.' If we assumed that in this passage the non-intelligent pradhana is figuratively spoken of as thinking, we should also have to assume that the same pradhana — as once constituting the subject-matter of the chapter — is referred to by the term ' that divinity/ But in that case the divinity would not speak of the ^iva as ' Self.' For by the term ' Civa ' we must understand, according to the received meaning and the etymology of the word, the intelligent (principle) which rules over the body and sustains the vital airs. How could such a principle be the Self of the non-intelligent pradhana ? By * Self ' we understand (a being's) own nature, and it is clear that the intelligent Giva cannot constitute the nature of the non-intelligent pradhana. If, on the other hand, we refer the whole chapter to the intelligent Brahman, to
1 In the second Khanda. of the sixth Prapa/^aka of the Kh. Up. ' aikshata ' is twice used in a figurative sense (with regard to fire and water); it is therefore to be understood figuratively in the third passage also where it occurs.
54 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.