Sacred Books of the East, Vol. 34 — The Vedanta-Sutras, Part I (Sankara/Thibaut, page scans)

not something to be attained by that person. And even if Brahman were altogether different from a person's Self still it would not be something to be obtained ; for as it is omnipresent it is part of its nature that it is ever present to every one, just as the (all-pervading) ether is. Nor, again, can it be maintained that Release is something to be cere- monially purified, and as such depends on an activity. For ceremonial purification (sawskara) results either from the accretion of some excellence or from the removal of some blemish. The former alternative does not apply to Release as it is of the nature of Brahman, to which no excellence can be added ; nor, again, does the latter alter- native apply, since Release is of the nature of Brahman, which is eternally pure. — But, it might be said, Release might be a quality of the Self which is merely hidden and becomes manifest on the Self being purified by some action ; just as the quality of clearness becomes manifest in a mirror when the mirror is cleaned by means of the action of rubbing. — This objection is invalid, we reply, because the Self cannot be the abode of any action. For an action cannot exist without modifying that in which it abides. But if the Self were modified by an action its non-eternality would result therefrom, and texts such as the following, 'unchangeable he is called/ would thus be stultified; an altogether unacceptable result. Hence it is impossible to assume that any action should abide in the Self. On the other hand, the Self cannot be purified by actions abiding in something else as it stands in no relation to that extraneous something. Nor will it avail to point out (as a quasi-analogous case) that the embodied Self (dehin, the individual soul) is purified by certain ritual actions which abide in the body, such as bathing, rinsing one's mouth, wearing the sacrificial thread, and the like. For what is purified by those actions is that Self merely which is joined to the body, i.e. the Self in so far as it is under the power of Nescience. For it is a matter of per-

obviating the imputation to moksha of non-eternality which results
from the two preceding hypotheses.
[34] D

34 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

ception that bathing and similar actions stand in the relation of inherence to the body, and it is therefore only proper to conclude that by such actions only that some- thing is purified which is joined to the body. If a person thinks ' I am free from disease,' he predicates health of that entity only which is connected with and mistakenly identifies itself with the harmonious condition of matter (i.e. the body) resulting from appropriate medical treatment applied to the body (i.e. the ' I ' constituting the subject of predication is only the individual embodied Self). Analo- gously that I which predicates of itself, that it is purified by bathing and the like, is only the individual soul joined to the body. For it is only this latter principle of egoity (aha^kartrz), the object of the notion of the ego and the agent in all cognition, which accomplishes all actions and enjoys their results. Thus the mantras also declare, ' One of them eats the sweet fruit, the other looks on without eating ' (Mu. Up. Ill, i, t) ; and ' When he is in union with the body, the senses, and the mind, then wise people call him the Enjoyer ' (Ka. Up. Ill, 1,4). Of Brahman, on the other hand, the two following passages declare that it is incapable of receiving any accretion and eternally pure, ' He is the one God, hidden in all beings, all-pervading, the Self within all beings, watching over all works, dwelling in all beings, the witness, the perceiver, the only one ; free from qualities' (Sv. Up. VI, 11); and 'He pervaded all, bright, incorporeal, scatheless, without muscles, pure, un- touched by evil ' (ts. Up. 8). But Release is nothing but being Brahman. Therefore Release is not something to be purified. And as nobody is able to show any other way in which Release could be connected with action, it is im- possible that it should stand in any, even the slightest, relation to any action, excepting knowledge.

But, it will be said here, knowledge itself is an activity of the mind. By no means, we reply ; since the two are of different nature. An action is that which is enjoined as being independent of the nature of existing things and de- pendent on the energy of some person's mind; compare, for instance, the following passages, ' To whichever divinity the

I Adhyaya, I Pad a, 4. 35

offering is made on that one let him meditate when about to say vasha^' (Ait. Brahm. Ill, 8, 1) ; and ' Let him meditate in his mind on the sandhya.' Meditation and reflection are indeed mental, but as they depend on the (meditating, &c.) person they may either be performed or not be per- formed or modified. Knowledge, on the other hand, is the result of the different means of (right) knowledge, and those have for their objects existing things ; knowledge can there- fore not be either made or not made or modified, but depends entirely on existing things, and not either on Vedic statements or on the mind of man. Although mental it thus widely differs from meditation and the like.

The meditation, for instance, on man and woman as fire, which is founded on Kh. Up. V, 7, 1 ; 8, 1, ' The fire is man, O Gautama ; the fire is woman, O Gautama,' is on account of its being the result of a Vedic statement, merely an action and dependent on man ; that conception of fire, on the other hand, which refers to the well-known (real) fire, is neither dependent on Vedic statements nor on man, but only on a real thing which is an object of perception ; it is therefore knowledge and not an action. The same remark applies to all things which are the objects of the different means of right knowledge. This being thus that knowledge also which has the existent Brahman for its object is not de- pendent on Vedic injunction. Hence, although imperative and similar forms referring to the knowledge of Brahman are found in the Vedic texts, yet they are ineffective because they refer to something which cannot be enjoined, just as the edge of a razor becomes blunt when it is applied to a stone. For they have for their object something which can neither be endeavoured after nor avoided. — But what then, it will be asked, is the purport of those sentences which, at any rate, have the appearance of injunctions ; such as, * The Self is to be seen, to be heard about?' — They have the purport, we reply, of diverting (men) from the objects of natural activity. For when a man acts intent on external things, and only anxious to attain the objects of his desire and to eschew the objects of his aversion, and does not thereby reach the highest aim of man although desirous of attaining it ; such

36 vedAnta-s6tras.

texts as the one quoted divert him from the objects of natural activity and turn the stream of his thoughts on the inward (the highest) Self. That for him who is engaged in the enquiry into the Self, the true nature of the Self is nothing either to be endeavoured after or to be avoided, we learn from texts such as the following: 'This every- thing, all is that Self ' (Br/. Up. II, 4, 6) ; ' But when the Self only is all this, how should he see another, how should he know another, how should he know the knower?' (Bn. Up. IV, 5, 15) ; ' This Self is Brahman ' (Brl Up. II* 5> J9)» That the knowledge of Brahman refers to something which is not a thing to be done, and therefore is not concerned either with the pursuit or the avoidance of any object, is the very thing we admit ; for just that constitutes our glory, that as soon as we comprehend Brahman, all our duties come to an end and all our work is over. Thus vSruti says, ' If a man understands the Self, saying, " I am he," what could he wish or desire that he should pine after the body?' (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 13.) And similarly Smrzti declares, ' Having understood this the understanding man has done with all work, O Bharata ' (Bha. Gita XV, 20). Therefore Brahman is not represented as the object of injunctions.

We now proceed to consider the doctrine of those who maintain that there is no part of the Veda which has the purport of making statements about mere existent things, and is not either an injunction or a prohibition, or supple* mentary to either. This opinion is erroneous, because the soul (purusha), which is the subject of the Upanishads, does not constitute a complement to anything else. Of that soul which is to be comprehended from the Upanishads only, which is non-transmigratory, Brahman, different in nature from the four classes of substances1, which forms a topic of its own and is not a complement to anything else ; of that

1 Viz. things to be originated (for instance, gha/azrc karoti), things to be obtained (gramas ga&£//ati), things to be modified (suvanzazra kundalam karoti), and things to be ceremonially purified (vrihin prokshati).

I Adhyaya, I Pada, 4. 37

soul it is impossible to say that it is not or is not apprehended ; for the passage, ' That Self is to be described by No, no ! ' (Br/. Up. Ill, 9, 26) designates it as the Self, and that the Self is cannot be denied. The possible objection that there is no reason to maintain that the soul is known from the Upanishads only, since it is the object of self-conscious- ness, is refuted by the fact that the soul of which the Upanishads treat is merely the witness of that (i. e. of the object of self-consciousness, viz. the ^ivatman). For neither from that part of the Veda which enjoins works nor from reasoning, anybody apprehends that soul which, different from the agent that is the object of self-consciousness, merely witnesses it ; which is permanent in all (transitory) beings; uniform; one; eternally unchanging; the Self of everything. Hence it can neither be denied nor be repre- sented as the mere complement of injunctions ; for of that very person who might deny it it is the Self. And as it is the Self of all, it can neither be striven after nor avoided. All perishable things indeed perish, because they are mere modifications, up to (i. e. exclusive of) the soul. But the soul is imperishable 1, as there is no cause why it should perish ; and eternally unchanging, as there is no cause for its undergoing any modification ; hence it is in its essence eternally pure and free. And from passages, such as * Beyond the soul there is nothing ; this is the goal, the highest road ' (Ka. Up. I, 3, 11), and 'That soul, taught in the Upanishads, I ask thee' (Bri. Up. Ill, 9, 36), it appears that the attribute of resting on the Upanishads is properly given to the soul, as it constitutes their chief topic. To say, therefore, that there is no portion of the Veda referring to existing things, is a mere bold assertion.

With regard to the quotations made of the views of men acquainted with the purport of the Sastra (who alone were stated to have declared that the Veda treats of actions) it is to be understood that they, having to do with the enquiry into duty, refer to that part of the Sastra which consists of

1 Whence it follows that it is not something to be avoided like transitory things.

3 8 VEDANTA-SU TR AS.