Process and Reality — the Gifford Lectures, 1929

inal physical feeling, and the derived perceptive feeling. In the earlier factor the nexus, physically felt, is objectified through its own proper physical bonds. There are no incompatibilities between fact and reverted concept to produce attenuation. The objective datum is therefore felt with its own proper intensities, transmitted to the subjective form of the physical feeling. The other factor in the integration is the ‘perceptive’ feeling. The datum of this feeling is the proposition with the actual entities of the nexus as its logical subjects, and with its predicate also derived from the nexus. The whole origination of this perceptive feeling has its sole basis in the physical feeling, which plays the part both of ‘indicative feeling’ and of ‘physical recognition’ (cf. Part III, Ch. IV, Sect. III).

The integration of the two factors into the conscious perception thus confronts the nexus as fact, with the potentiality derived from itself, limited to itself, and exemplified in itself. This confrontation is the generic contrast which is the objective datum of the integral feeling. The subjective form thus assumes its vivid immediate consciousness of what the nexus really 7s in the way of potentiality realized. In Hume’s phraseology, there is an ‘impression’ of the utmost ‘force and vivacity.’

There are therefore two immediate guarantees of the correctness of a conscious perception: one is Hume’s test of ‘force and vivacity,’ and the other is the illumination by consciousness of the various feelings involved in the process. Thus the fact, that the physical feeling has not transmuted concept into physical bond, lies open for inspection. Neither of these tests is infallible. There is also the delayed test, that the future conforms to expectations derived from this assumption. This latter test can be realized only by future occasions in the life of an enduring object, the enduring percipient.

It is to be observed that what is in doubt is not the immediate perception of a nexus which is a fragment ofp. 412 the actual world. The dubitable element is the definition of this nexus by the observed predicate.

An unauthentic perceptive feeling arises in the subject when its own conceptual origination from its own basic physical feeling passed on to the secondary stage of producing a reverted conceptual feeling to play the part of predicative feeling. The physical feeling may, or may not, have also suffered loss of direct relevance by reason of derivation from conceptual reversions in the nexus. But anyhow the subject by its own process of reversion has produced for the logical subjects a predicate which has no immediate relevance to the nexus, either as physical fact or as conceptual functioning in the nexus. Thus the comparative feeling which integrates the physical feeling with the unauthentic perceptive feeling has for its datum the generic contrast of the nexus with a proposition, whose logical subjects comprise the actualities in the nexus, and whose predicate partly agrees with the complex pattern exemplified in the nexus and partly disagrees with it. This case is really the conscious perception of a proposition imaginatively arrived at, which concerns the nexus and disagrees with the facts. The case is in fact more analogous to intellectual feelings of the second species, namely, to intuitive judgments. But by reason of the use of one basic physical feeling, in the double function of indicative feeling and of physical recollection, the proposition in the comparative feeling will have some of the vivid relevance to the nexus in the same feeling, which arises in the case of authentic perceptions. Practically, however, this case is an intuitive judgment in which there is consciousness of a proposition as erroneous.

SECTION V

The term ‘judgment’ refers to three species among the comparative feelings with which we are concerned. In each of these feelings the datum is the generic contrast between an objectified nexus and a proposition whose logical subjects make up the nexus. The three speciesp. 413 are composed of (i) those feelings in the ‘yes-form,’ (ii) those feelings in the ‘no-form,’ and (iii) those feelings in the ‘suspense-form.’

In all three species of felt contrast, the datum obtains its unity by reason of the objective identity of the actual entities on both sides of the contrast. In the ‘yes-form’ there is the further ground of unity by reason of the identity of the pattern of the objectified nexus with the predicate. In the ‘no-form’ this latter ground of unity is replaced by a contrast involving incompatible diversity. In the suspense-form the predicate is neither identical, nor incompatible, with the pattern. It is diverse from, and compatible with, the pattern in the nexus as objectified: the nexus, in its own ‘formal’ existence, may, or may not, in fact exemplify both the pattern and the predicate. In this species of comparative feeling there is therefore contrast between pattern and _ predicate, without incompatibility.

In intuitive judgments, as has been stated, the comparative feeling is the integration of the physical feeling of a nexus with a propositional feeling whose logical subjects are the actual entities in the nexus. So far as this general description is concerned intuitive judgments and conscious perceptions do not differ, and are therefore classed together as ‘intellectual’ feelings. But in the case of intuitive judgments there is a more complex process of origination. There are two distinct physical feelings, the indicative feeling and the physical recollection (Part III, Ch. IV, Sect. III). The predicative feeling originates from the physical recollection, either immediately according to categoreal condition IV or mediately according to categoreal condition V. The integration of the predicative feeling with the indicative feeling produces the ‘imaginative feelings’ (cf. Part III, Ch. IV, Sect. V). This is a propositional feeling with the logical subjects of its doctrine derived from the indicative feelings and with the predicative pattern derived from physical recollection. These two physical feelings may be relativelyp. 414 disconnected in their origination. Thus the imaginative feeling may have in its subjective form no bias as to belief or disbelief; or, if there be such bias, the intensity of the emotion may be slight.