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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1(854) 8. ‘Equable (upekhaka), always thoughtful, he does not think himself equal (to others)? in the world, nor distinguished, nor low: for him there are no desires (ussada). (855) 1 Vitatazho pura bheda Pubbam antam anissito Vemagghe n’ fipasamkheyyo Tassa n’ atthi purekkhatam. 3 Rasesu nanugigghati 5 Na loke mafifiate samam Na visest na nigeyyo. Compare Tuva/akasutta, v. 4; Attadandasutta, v. 20. M 2 164 ATTHAKAVAGGA. g. ‘ The man for whom there is nothing upon which he depends, who is independent, having understood the Dhamma, for whom there is no desire for coming into existence or leaving existence, (856) 10. ‘Him I call calm, not looking for sensual pleasures ; for him there are no ties, he has overcome desire. (857) 11. ‘For him there are no sons, cattle, fields, wealth, nothing grasped or rejected is to be found in him. (858) 12. ‘ That fault of which common people and Samazas and Bréhmamas say that he is possessed, is not possessed by him, therefore he is not moved by their talk. (859) 13. ‘Free from covetousness, without avarice, the Muni does not reckon himself amongst the distinguished, nor amongst the plain, nor amongst the low, he does not enter time, being delivered from time }. (860) 14. ‘He for whom there is nothing in the world (which he may call) his own, who does not grieve over what is no more, and does not walk amongst the Dhammas (after his wish), he is called calm*’ (861) Purdbhedasutta is ended. 11. KALAHAVIVADASUTTA. The origin of contentions, disputes, &c. &c. 1. ‘Whence (do spring up) contentions and disputes, lamentation and sorrow together with envy ; 1 Vitagedho amaffhart Na ussesu vadate muni Na samesu na omesu, Kappam n’ eti akappiyo. * Comp. infra, Attadamdasutta, v.16, and Dhp. v. 367. KALAHAVIVADASUTTA. 165 and arrogance and conceit together with slander, whence do these spring up? pray, tell me this.’ (862) 2. ‘From dear (objects) spring up contentions and disputes, lamentation and sorrow together with envy; arrogance and conceit together with slander ; contentions and disputes are joined with envy, and there is slander in the disputes arisen.’ (863) 3. ‘The dear (objects) in the world whence do they originate, and (whence) the covetousness that prevails in the world, and desire and fulfilment whence do they originate, which are (of consequence) for the future state of a man??’ (864) 4. ‘From wish? originate the dear (objects) in the world, and the covetousness that prevails in the world, and desire and fulfilment originate from it, which are (of consequence) for the future state of a man,’ (865) 5. ‘From what has wish in the world its origin, and resolutions * whence do they spring, anger and falsehood and doubt, and the Dhammas which are made known by the Samaza (Gotama) ?’ (866) 6. ‘What they call pleasure and displeasure in the world, by that wish springs up; having seen decay and origin in (all) bodies‘, a person forms (his) resolutions in the world. (867)
2‘What they call pleasure and displeasure in the world, by that wish springs up; having seen decay and origin in (all) bodies‘, a person forms (his) resolutions in the world. (867) 7. ‘Anger and falsehood and doubt, these Dhammas are a couple®; let the doubtful learn in the way of knowledge, knowingly the Dhammas have been proclaimed by the Samaza.’ (868) - 8, ‘Pleasure and displeasure, whence have they 1 Ye samparfy4ya narassa honti, 2 Khanda. 3 Vinikkhaya. * Rapesu disv& vibhavam bhavai a. 5 Te pi kodh&dayo dhammé sat@s4tadvaye sante eva pahonti uppagganti, Commentator. 166 ATTHAKAVAGGA. their origin, for want of what do these not arise? This notion which (thou mentionest), viz. “decay and origin,” tell me from what does this arise.’ (869) g. ‘Pleasure and displeasure have their origin from phassa (touch), when there is no touch they do not arise. This notion which (thou mentionest), viz. “decay and origin,” this I tell thee has its origin from this.’ (870) 10. ‘ From what has phassa its origin in the world, and from what does grasping spring up? For want of what is there no egotism, by the cessation of what do the touches not touch ?’ (871) 11. ‘On account of name and form the touches (exist), grasping has its origin in wish; by the cessation of wishes there is no egotism, by the cessation of form the touches do not touch.’ (872) 12. ‘ How is one to be constituted that (his) form may cease to exist, and how do joy and pain cease to exist? Tell me this, how it ceases, that we should like to know, such was my mind??? | (873) 13. ‘Let one not be with a natural consciousness, nor with a mad consciousness, nor without consciousness, nor with (his) consciousness gone; for him who is thus constituted form ceases to exist, for what is called delusion has its origin in consciousness *.’ (?) (874) 14. ‘What we have asked thee thou hast explained 1 Katham sametassa vibhoti rpaz, Sukhamw dukham vapi katham vibhoti, Etam me pabréhi, yatha vibhoti Tam ganiyama, iti me mano ahf. ~ ~A 3 Na sannasagvfif na visannasasit No pi asav#t na vibhftasafizt Evam sametassa vibhoti rfpam Safifianidana hi papafiéasamkha. KOLAVIYOHASUTTA. 167 unto us; we will ask thee another question, answer us that: Do not some (who are considered) wise in this world tell us that the principal (thing) is the purification of the yakkha, or do they say something different from this! ?’ (875) 15. ‘Thus some (who are considered) wise in this world say that the principal (thing) is the purification of the yakkha; but some of them say samaya (annihilation), the expert say (that the highest purity lies) in anupddisesa (none of the five attributes remaining) %. (876) 16. ‘And having known these to be dependent, the investigating Muni, having known the things we depend upon, and after knowing them being liberated, does not enter into dispute, the wise (man) does not go to reiterated existence®.’ (877) Kalahavivadasutta is ended. 12. KOLAVIYUHASUTTA.
3(876) 16. ‘And having known these to be dependent, the investigating Muni, having known the things we depend upon, and after knowing them being liberated, does not enter into dispute, the wise (man) does not go to reiterated existence®.’ (877) Kalahavivadasutta is ended. 12. KOLAVIYUHASUTTA. A description of disputing philosophers. The different schools of philosophy contradict each other, they proclaim different truths, but the truth is only one. As long as the disputations are going on, so long will there be strife in the world. 1. Abiding by their own views, some (people), having got into contest, assert themselves to be 1 Comp. Sundarikabharadvagasutta, v. 25. 2 Ettavat’ aggam pi vadanti h’ eke Yakkhassa suddhim idha panditdse, Tesam pun’ eke samayam* vadanti , Anupadisese kusalé vadana, $ Ete 4a fatva upanissita ti Watva munt nissaye so vimamst Natva vimutto na vivddam eti Bhavabhavaya na sameti dhiro. * Ukkhedam. Commentator. 168 ATTHAKAVAGGA. the (only) expert (saying), ‘(He) who understands this, he knows the Dhamma; he who reviles this, he is not perfect’.’ (878) 2. So having got into contest they dispute: ‘ The opponent (is) a fool, an ignorant (person),’ so they say. Which one of these, pray, is the true doctrine (vada)? for all these assert themselves (to be the only) expert. (879) 3. He who does not acknowledge an opponent's doctrine (dhamma), he is a fool, a beast, one of poor understanding, all are fools with a very poor understanding ; all these abide by their (own) views. (880) 4. They are surely purified by their own view, they are of a pure understanding, expert, thoughtful, amongst them there is no one of poor understanding, their view is quite perfect! (881) 5. I do not say, ‘This is the reality,’ which fools say mutually to each other; they made their own views the truth, therefore they hold others to be fools. (882) 6. What some say is the truth, the reality, that others say is void, false, so having disagreed they dispute. Why do not the Samamzas say one (and the same thing) ? (883) 7. For the truth is one, there is not a second, about which one intelligent man might dispute with another intelligent man; (but) they themselves praise different truths, therefore the Samazas do not say one (and the same thing)*. (884) 1 Sakam sakam disthi paribbasin& Viggayha nan4 kusala vadanti Yo evam gAn&ti sa vedi dhammam Idam pafikkosam akevalt so. * Ekam hi sakéam na dutfyam atthi Yasmim pagaéno vivade pagdnam, KOLAVIYOHASUTTA. 169 8. Why do the disputants that assert themselves (to be the only) expert, proclaim different truths ? Have many different truths been heard of, or do they (only) follow (their own) reasoning ? (885) 9. There are not many different truths in the world, no eternal ones except consciousness; but having reasoned on the (philosophical) views they proclaim _a double Dhamma, truth and falsehood}. (886)
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1(854) 8. ‘Equable (upekhaka), always thoughtful, he does not think himself equal (to others)? in the world, nor distinguished, nor low: for him there are no desires (ussada). (855) 1 Vitatazho pura bheda Pubbam antam anissito Vemagghe n’ fipasamkheyyo Tassa n’ atthi purekkhatam. 3 Rasesu nanugigghati 5 Na loke mafifiate samam Na visest na nigeyyo. Compare Tuva/akasutta, v. 4; Attadandasutta, v. 20. M 2 164 ATTHAKAVAGGA. g. ‘ The man for whom there is nothing upon which he depends, who is independent, having understood the Dhamma, for whom there is no desire for coming into existence or leaving existence, (856) 10. ‘Him I call calm, not looking for sensual pleasures ; for him there are no ties, he has overcome desire. (857) 11. ‘For him there are no sons, cattle, fields, wealth, nothing grasped or rejected is to be found in him. (858) 12. ‘ That fault of which common people and Samazas and Bréhmamas say that he is possessed, is not possessed by him, therefore he is not moved by their talk. (859) 13. ‘Free from covetousness, without avarice, the Muni does not reckon himself amongst the distinguished, nor amongst the plain, nor amongst the low, he does not enter time, being delivered from time }. (860) 14. ‘He for whom there is nothing in the world (which he may call) his own, who does not grieve over what is no more, and does not walk amongst the Dhammas (after his wish), he is called calm*’ (861) Purdbhedasutta is ended. 11. KALAHAVIVADASUTTA. The origin of contentions, disputes, &c. &c. 1. ‘Whence (do spring up) contentions and disputes, lamentation and sorrow together with envy ; 1 Vitagedho amaffhart Na ussesu vadate muni Na samesu na omesu, Kappam n’ eti akappiyo. * Comp. infra, Attadamdasutta, v.16, and Dhp. v. 367. KALAHAVIVADASUTTA. 165 and arrogance and conceit together with slander, whence do these spring up? pray, tell me this.’ (862) 2. ‘From dear (objects) spring up contentions and disputes, lamentation and sorrow together with envy; arrogance and conceit together with slander ; contentions and disputes are joined with envy, and there is slander in the disputes arisen.’ (863) 3. ‘The dear (objects) in the world whence do they originate, and (whence) the covetousness that prevails in the world, and desire and fulfilment whence do they originate, which are (of consequence) for the future state of a man??’ (864) 4. ‘From wish? originate the dear (objects) in the world, and the covetousness that prevails in the world, and desire and fulfilment originate from it, which are (of consequence) for the future state of a man,’ (865) 5. ‘From what has wish in the world its origin, and resolutions * whence do they spring, anger and falsehood and doubt, and the Dhammas which are made known by the Samaza (Gotama) ?’ (866) 6. ‘What they call pleasure and displeasure in the world, by that wish springs up; having seen decay and origin in (all) bodies‘, a person forms (his) resolutions in the world. (867)
2‘What they call pleasure and displeasure in the world, by that wish springs up; having seen decay and origin in (all) bodies‘, a person forms (his) resolutions in the world. (867) 7. ‘Anger and falsehood and doubt, these Dhammas are a couple®; let the doubtful learn in the way of knowledge, knowingly the Dhammas have been proclaimed by the Samaza.’ (868) - 8, ‘Pleasure and displeasure, whence have they 1 Ye samparfy4ya narassa honti, 2 Khanda. 3 Vinikkhaya. * Rapesu disv& vibhavam bhavai a. 5 Te pi kodh&dayo dhammé sat@s4tadvaye sante eva pahonti uppagganti, Commentator. 166 ATTHAKAVAGGA. their origin, for want of what do these not arise? This notion which (thou mentionest), viz. “decay and origin,” tell me from what does this arise.’ (869) g. ‘Pleasure and displeasure have their origin from phassa (touch), when there is no touch they do not arise. This notion which (thou mentionest), viz. “decay and origin,” this I tell thee has its origin from this.’ (870) 10. ‘ From what has phassa its origin in the world, and from what does grasping spring up? For want of what is there no egotism, by the cessation of what do the touches not touch ?’ (871) 11. ‘On account of name and form the touches (exist), grasping has its origin in wish; by the cessation of wishes there is no egotism, by the cessation of form the touches do not touch.’ (872) 12. ‘ How is one to be constituted that (his) form may cease to exist, and how do joy and pain cease to exist? Tell me this, how it ceases, that we should like to know, such was my mind??? | (873) 13. ‘Let one not be with a natural consciousness, nor with a mad consciousness, nor without consciousness, nor with (his) consciousness gone; for him who is thus constituted form ceases to exist, for what is called delusion has its origin in consciousness *.’ (?) (874) 14. ‘What we have asked thee thou hast explained 1 Katham sametassa vibhoti rpaz, Sukhamw dukham vapi katham vibhoti, Etam me pabréhi, yatha vibhoti Tam ganiyama, iti me mano ahf. ~ ~A 3 Na sannasagvfif na visannasasit No pi asav#t na vibhftasafizt Evam sametassa vibhoti rfpam Safifianidana hi papafiéasamkha. KOLAVIYOHASUTTA. 167 unto us; we will ask thee another question, answer us that: Do not some (who are considered) wise in this world tell us that the principal (thing) is the purification of the yakkha, or do they say something different from this! ?’ (875) 15. ‘Thus some (who are considered) wise in this world say that the principal (thing) is the purification of the yakkha; but some of them say samaya (annihilation), the expert say (that the highest purity lies) in anupddisesa (none of the five attributes remaining) %. (876) 16. ‘And having known these to be dependent, the investigating Muni, having known the things we depend upon, and after knowing them being liberated, does not enter into dispute, the wise (man) does not go to reiterated existence®.’ (877) Kalahavivadasutta is ended. 12. KOLAVIYUHASUTTA.
3(876) 16. ‘And having known these to be dependent, the investigating Muni, having known the things we depend upon, and after knowing them being liberated, does not enter into dispute, the wise (man) does not go to reiterated existence®.’ (877) Kalahavivadasutta is ended. 12. KOLAVIYUHASUTTA. A description of disputing philosophers. The different schools of philosophy contradict each other, they proclaim different truths, but the truth is only one. As long as the disputations are going on, so long will there be strife in the world. 1. Abiding by their own views, some (people), having got into contest, assert themselves to be 1 Comp. Sundarikabharadvagasutta, v. 25. 2 Ettavat’ aggam pi vadanti h’ eke Yakkhassa suddhim idha panditdse, Tesam pun’ eke samayam* vadanti , Anupadisese kusalé vadana, $ Ete 4a fatva upanissita ti Watva munt nissaye so vimamst Natva vimutto na vivddam eti Bhavabhavaya na sameti dhiro. * Ukkhedam. Commentator. 168 ATTHAKAVAGGA. the (only) expert (saying), ‘(He) who understands this, he knows the Dhamma; he who reviles this, he is not perfect’.’ (878) 2. So having got into contest they dispute: ‘ The opponent (is) a fool, an ignorant (person),’ so they say. Which one of these, pray, is the true doctrine (vada)? for all these assert themselves (to be the only) expert. (879) 3. He who does not acknowledge an opponent's doctrine (dhamma), he is a fool, a beast, one of poor understanding, all are fools with a very poor understanding ; all these abide by their (own) views. (880) 4. They are surely purified by their own view, they are of a pure understanding, expert, thoughtful, amongst them there is no one of poor understanding, their view is quite perfect! (881) 5. I do not say, ‘This is the reality,’ which fools say mutually to each other; they made their own views the truth, therefore they hold others to be fools. (882) 6. What some say is the truth, the reality, that others say is void, false, so having disagreed they dispute. Why do not the Samamzas say one (and the same thing) ? (883) 7. For the truth is one, there is not a second, about which one intelligent man might dispute with another intelligent man; (but) they themselves praise different truths, therefore the Samazas do not say one (and the same thing)*. (884) 1 Sakam sakam disthi paribbasin& Viggayha nan4 kusala vadanti Yo evam gAn&ti sa vedi dhammam Idam pafikkosam akevalt so. * Ekam hi sakéam na dutfyam atthi Yasmim pagaéno vivade pagdnam, KOLAVIYOHASUTTA. 169 8. Why do the disputants that assert themselves (to be the only) expert, proclaim different truths ? Have many different truths been heard of, or do they (only) follow (their own) reasoning ? (885) 9. There are not many different truths in the world, no eternal ones except consciousness; but having reasoned on the (philosophical) views they proclaim _a double Dhamma, truth and falsehood}. (886)
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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