The Theology of Plato, in six books — trans. Thomas Taylor

characteristic, which is itself established as the middle of that which has extremes, and of figure. For difference is the feminine itself, and the prolific nature of the Gods. And whole is itself the form of connected comprehension, binding together many parts. And the perfect is itself the good of perfection, possessing a beginning, middle, and end, and conjoining the end to the beginning, according to the peculiarity of conversion. Being also nothing else than a perfect governor it is the cause of the peculiarity of these Gods subsisting every where according to the middle centres. Hence the whole order of the intelligible, and at the same lime, intellectual Gods, may be surveyed as having its subsistence in the middle. For the intelligible Gods, indeed, are especially defined according to hyparxes and summits ; on which account also, they are called fathers, and unical Gods. For the one and father are in them the same. But the intellectual Gods are defined according to ends or extremities ; and on this account, all of them are denominated intellects and intellectual. The intelligible, and at the same time, intellectual Gods, however, being middles, especially present themseLves to the view according to the middles of the triads.

Farther still, this also may be considered in common about all these triads, that each according to the end proceeds to infinity. For the end of the first triad is number ; of the second, the infinite in multitude; and of the third, the rectilinear, which itself participates of the nature of the infinite. And of this the cause is, that each of the triads according to its extremity is curried as in a vehicle in the material worlds, and comprehends according to one cause the infinity of the natures that are generated in them. In addition, likewise, to what has been said, we may survey the order of the triads, from the ends that are in them. For the end of the first triad, is number : but of the second, the finite and the infinite; and of the third, the orbicular, the mixed figure, and the rectilinear. It is evident, therefore, that the first triad is monadic ; but the second dyadic; and the third triadic. And the first of these indeed is analogous to the one being ; but the second to the intelligible whole; and the third, to the all-perfect whole. But that these have this order with respect to each other, has been before pbserved. In short, there-

CHAP. XXXIX.

OF PLATO.

alogous to the one being ; but the second to the intelligible whole; and the third, to the all-perfect whole. But that these have this order with respect to each other, has been before pbserved. In short, there-

CHAP. XXXIX.

OF PLATO.

fore, every intelligible, and at the same time intellectual triad, is according to its summit indeed conjoined to the intelligible ; but according to its middle, unfolds its proper power; and according to its termination, comprehends the infinity of secondary natures. And here we shall end the doctrine concerning the intelligible and intellectual Gods.

S10 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V.

BOOK V.

CHAPTER I.

In the next place, let us survey another order of Gods, which is called intellectual, being indeed conjoined to the orders prior to it, but terminating the total progressions of the Gods, converting them to their principle, and producing one circle of the primarily-efficient and all-perfect orders. Let us also extend the intellect that is in us to the imparticipable and divine intellect, and distinguish the orders and diminutions of essence that are in it, according to the narration of Plato.

This intellectual hypostasis therefore of the Gods, is suspended indeed from more ancient causes, and is filled from them with total goodness and self-sufficiency. But after these causes, it establishes an illustrious empire over all secondary natures, binding to its dominion all the partial progressions of the Gods. And it is denominated indeed intellectual, because it generates an impartible and divine intellect. But it is filled from intelligibles, not as from those intelligibles which are co-arranged

CHAP. I.

OF PLATO.

p. 311

with intellect, nor as with those which are alone divided from intellect by the conception of the mind, but as establishing in itself unically all multitudes, and occultly containing the evolutions of the Cods into light, and the hyparxes of intelligibles. It is likewise allotted the total intellect of intellectuals, the variety of beings, and the multiform orders of divine natures; and it convolves the end of the whole progression* [of the Gods] to the one intelligible principle. For intellectuals are converted to intelligibles. And some intellectuals indeed are united and * firmly established prior to the divided Gods; but others are multiplied and' through conversion are conjoined to primarily-efficient causes.

ne intelligible principle. For intellectuals are converted to intelligibles. And some intellectuals indeed are united and * firmly established prior to the divided Gods; but others are multiplied and' through conversion are conjoined to primarily-efficient causes. The intellectual Gods however proceed from all the Gods prior to them,, receiving indeed unions from the one that is prior to intelligibles; but essences from intelligibles; and being allotted lives all-perfect, connective and generative of divine natures, from the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods; but the intellectual peculiarity from themselves. They likewise convert to themselves all the divided orders, but establish themselves in intelligibles, existing wholly through the whole, pure and unknown knowledges, and fervid lives. Besides these things also, they, are all-perfect essences, producing all secondary natures through subsisting from themselves, and being neither diminished by their progression, nor receiving an addition by their progeny; but through their own. never-failing and infinite powers, being the fathers, causes, and leaders of all things. Nor are they co-divided with their progeny, nor do they depart from themselves in their progressions; but at once, and according to union they govern total multitudes, and all orders, and convolve them, to the intelligible, and to occult good.

"Whether therefore I may speak of life, it is not proper to think that it is such a life as we surveyed a little before. For that was impartici* pable, but this is participated. And that indeed, was generative, but this is vivific. But it is not immanifest that these differ from each other. For the vivific cause indeed, is also evidently generative; but the generative cause is not entirely vivific. For it imparts figure to things

' For nfMiov it it necessary to read »foeio«.

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p. 312

unfiguted, bound to things indefinite, and perfection to tilings imperfect. Or whether I may denominate the cause in intellectuals intelligible, it must not immediately be conceived to be such an intelligible, as that of which we have before spoken. For that was imparticipable, and prior to intellectuals, itself pre-existing by itself, and exempt from wholes; not being denominated intelligible, as the plenitude of intellect, but as the prior-cause of it, and the object of desire and love to it, subsisting uniformly uncoordinated with it.