Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor
The text is shown on its own: no facing layer is held for this issue.
of all, and according to a co-ordination with all things ; — if this should be said, the one will thus be doubled, and we ourselves shall become doubled, and multiplied about its simplicity. For, by being the one it is all things after the most simple manner. At the same time also, though this should be said, it is necessary that the principle pf all things should be exempt from all things, and consequently that it should be exempt from the most simple allness r and from a simplicity absorbing all things, such as is that of the one. Our soul, therefore, prophesies that the prin¬ ciple which is beyond all things that can in any respect be conceived, is uncoordinated with all things. Neither,p. 588 therefore, must it be called principle nor cause, nor that which is first nor prior to all things, nor beyond all things. By no means, therefore, must we celebrate it as all things, nor, in short, is it to be celebrated, or recalled into memory. We may also add, that the one is the summit of the many, as the cause of the things proceeding from it : and that we form a conception of the one according to a purified suspicion extended to that which is most simple and most comprehensive. But that which is most vene¬ rable must necessarily be incomprehensible by all concep- \ lions and suspicions ; since also in other things, that which always soars beyond our conceptions is more honour¬ able than that which is more obvious ; so that what dies fro in all our suspicions will be most honourable. But if this be the case, it is nothing. Let however nothing be twofold, one better than the one, the other posterior to sensibles. If also we strive in vain in asserting these things, striving in vain is likewise twofold ; the one falling into the ineffable, the other into that which in no respect what¬ ever has any subsistence. For the latter also is ineffable, as Plato says, yet according to the worse, but the former according to the better. If, too, we search for a certain advantage arising from it, this is the most necessary advan¬ tage of all others, that all things proceed as from an ady¬ tum, from the ineffable, and in an ineffable manner. For neither do they proceed as the one produces the many , nor as the united things separated , but as the ineffable similar-
p. 589
ϊν produces all things ineffably, But if in asserting these things concerning it, that it is ineffable, that it is no one of all things, that it is incomprehensible, we subvert what we say, it is proper to know that these are the names and words of our parturitions, daring anxiously to ly, But if in asserting these things concerning it, that it is ineffable, that it is no one of all things, that it is incomprehensible, we subvert what we say, it is proper to know that these are the names and words of our parturitions, daring anxiously to explore it, and which, standing in the vestibules of the adytum, announce indeed nothing pertaining to the ineffable, but signify the manner in which we are affected about it, our doubts and disappointments ; nor yet this clearty, but through indications to such as are able to understand these investigations. We also see that our parturitions suffer these things about the one , and that in a similar manner they are solicitous and subverted. For the one, says Plato, if it is , is not the one . But if it is not, no assertion can be adapted to it : so that neither can there be a negation of it, nor can any name be given to it ; for neither is a name simple. Nor is there any opinion nor science of it. For neither are these simple ; nor is intellect itself simple. So that the one is in every respect unknown and ineffable.
“ What then ? Shall we investigate something else beyond the ineffable ? Or perhaps, indeed, Plato leads us ineffa¬ bly through the one as a medium, to the ineffable beyond the one which is now the subject of discussion ; and this bv an ablation of the one , in the same manner as he leads us to the one by an ablation of other things. But if hav¬ ing ascended as far as to the one he is silent, this also is t becoming in Plato to be perfectly silent, after the manner of the ancients, concerning things in every respect un¬ speakable; for the discourse was indeed most dangerous in consequence of falling on idiotical ears. Hence that which is beyond the one is to be honoured in the most perfect silence, and prior to this, by the most perfect ignorance, which despises all knowledge.” 4
And in another part of the same admirable work, he further observes : u Ascending therefore to the one , shall we meet with it as that which is known ? Or wishing to meet with it as such shall we arrive at the unknown ? May we not say that each of these is true? For we meet with it afar off as that which is known ; and when we are united to it from afar, passing beyond that in our nature which is gnostic of the one , then are we brought to be one, that is to be unknown instead of being gnostic. This contact, therefore, as of one with one, is above know¬ ledge, but the other is as of that which is gnostic with that which is known.
r nature which is gnostic of the one , then are we brought to be one, that is to be unknown instead of being gnostic. This contact, therefore, as of one with one, is above know¬ ledge, but the other is as of that which is gnostic with that which is known. As, however, the crooked is known by the straight, so we form a conjecture of the unknown
1 As that which is below all knowledge is an ignorance worse than knowledge, so the silence in which our ascent to the ineffa¬ ble terminates, is succeeded by an ignorance superior to all know¬ ledge. Let it however be carefully remembered, that such an ignorance is only to be obtained after the most scientific and intellectual energies.
p. 591
by the known. And this indeed is a mode of knowledge* The one , therefore, is so far known, that it does not admit of an approximating knowledge, but appears afar off as known, and imparts a gnostic indication of itself. Unlike other things, however, the nearer we approach to it, it is not the more, but on the contrary less known 5 knowledge being dissolved by the one into ignorance, since as we have before observed where there is knowledge there is also separation. But separation approaching to the one is inclosed in union ; so that knowledge also is refunded into ignorance. This, too, the analogy of Plato requires. For first, we endeavour to see the sun, and we do indeed see it afar off ; but by how much the nearer we approach
«■> to it, by so much the less do we see it : and at length, we neither see other things nor it, the eye becoming spontane¬ ously dazzled by its light. Is therefore the one in its proper nature unknown, though there is something else un¬ known beside the one ? The one indeed wills to be by itself, but with no other ; but the unknown, beyond the one, is per¬ fectly ineffable, w hich we acknowledge we neither know, nor are ignorant of, but which has about itself super-ignorance. Hence by proximity to this Ιΐίβ one itself is darkened : for being very near to the immense principle, if it be lawful so to speak, it remains as it were in the adytum of that truly mystic silence. On this account, Plato in speaking of it finds all his assertions subverted: for it isp. 592 near to the subversion of every thing, which takes place about the first. It differs from it however in this, that it is one simply, and that according to the one it is also at the same time all things. But the first is above the one and all things, being more simple than either of these.”
P. 558. There are apocatastatic periods of the stars and. spheres.