1Along the paths of Philosophy — Wronski, A∴M∴ — A new edition of Hegel's "Philosophy of Spirit" has just seen the light.
2The celebrated philosopher — whose doctrinal system did not, at the beginning, have the merit of interesting his countrymen — is characterised by his concept of "reality", of "being", of the "absolute", and of the relations that weave man's life into the "cosmic" milieu surrounding him.
3According to Hegel, "reality" (whose essence is truth) cannot be reached in its totality.
4Let us see why: the Universe constitutes a whole, whose parts are partial aspects of the total truth that expresses it; the sum of the truths that can be discriminated by human intelligence will always be a part of the whole, but will never embrace its totality.
5On the other hand, the famous "Hegelian dialectic" demonstrates that any proposition whatever can be negated by its contrary (obtained by analysing its predicate), and that on uniting them they form a new proposition which concretes the "part" of truth affirmed by each.
6In its turn, this last proposition — which we are to call synthetic — can be negated by its contrary and, as in the previous case, the union or synthesis of both will give a new proposition, which in turn will have its contrary, and so "ad infinitum".
7Logically, each new synthetic proposition must hold an ever more general truth, the sum of the partial truths connoted so far; but given that the dialectical process is unlimited, it follows that the last truth (the Absolute) will never be known by any mind — which coincides with the predicate of the premise set out above.
8At first sight, the system set out seems to contain a logical contradiction.
9On one hand Hegel affirms that the dialectical process is unlimited, and on the other he recognises that it has the Absolute as its limit.
10In consequence, either the Absolute is the last truth or it is not; if it is, the dialectical process has an end; if it is not, then the process is infinite.
11What from the logical point of view proves an aberration is not one for Hegelian reasoning; for if on one side the dialectical process seems to end in the Absolute, it happens on the other that its term is infinite, since the Absolute is equally infinite.
12Another important aspect of the Hegelian system is its affirmation that the I and the Not-I, both contradictory in appearance, constitute the two aspects of a synthetic entity which Hegel denominates the act of knowledge.
13The reasoning is, in its general lines, the following: for the I to know itself, it must distinguish itself from something that is not the I — that is, the Not-I.
14But the I and the Not-I are secondary aspects of a much higher primary reality.
15That reality would be found, as we have anticipated, in the act of knowledge — that is, in "that" which judges concerning the I and the Not-I.
16That "that" appears as prior to the subjects of the judgement — and defines what?...
17Pure Being, as our philosopher calls it.
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Our translation, period-faithful. Citable as our translation, never as the source.