Thrice-Greatest Hermes, Vol. III — G. R. S. Mead (1906)
The text is shown on its own: no facing layer is held for this issue.
Her. God only, 0 [my] son ; or rather that which is still greater, — the [proper] name of God.
COMMENTAKY
The earlier editors of Stobseus (apparently following the mistake of Patrizzi) have Asclepius instead of Tat as the second person of the dialogue, which is clearly wrong according to the text itself (see the first sentence given to Hermes, and §§9 and 10).2
The excerpt is from a sermon in the Collection to Tat. It belongs to the further explanation of things referred to only generally in the General Sermons ; it is, therefore, again probably from one of the Expository Sermons, in which series already a sermon has been given on the Zodiacal Twelve and on the Seven Spheres.
Seeing also that it is stated that this sermon is " most authoritative and the chiefest of them all," we must suppose that it came at the end of one of the Books of the Expository Sermons.
We seem to have the beginning of the sermon, but not the end, for Stobseus breaks off in an aimless and provoking fashion in the midst of a subject.
For a list of the Egyptian names of the Decans, with
their Greek transcriptions and symbols, see Budge,
Gods of the Egyptians, ii. 304--308.
1 Or body.
2 Menard and Wachsmuth have Tat. For other changes of a similar nature cf. Exx. i. and viii., and C. H., ii. (iii.), and xvii.
EXCEEPT X.
[CONCEKNINGTHERULE OF PRO VI- " DENCE, NECESSITY AND FATE]
(Title in Patrizzi (p. 38), " Of Fate," simply ; followed by
' From the [Sermons] to Tat."
Text : Stob., Phys., iv. 8, under heading : " Of Hermes to his Son"; G. pp. 61, 62 ; M. i. 42, 43 ; W. i. 73, 74.
Me*nard, Livre IV., No. vii. of "Fragments from the
Books of Hermes to his Son Tat," pp. 248, 249.)
1. [Tat.] Rightly, 0 father, hast thou told me all ; now further, [pray,] recall unto my mind what are the things that Providence doth rule, and what the things ruled by Necessity, and in like fashion also [those] under Fate.
[Her.~\ I said there were in us, 0 Tat, three species of incorporals.
The first's a thing the mind alone can grasp l ; it thus is colourless, figureless, massless,2 proceeding out of the First Essence in itself, sensed by the mind alone.3
And there are also, [secondly,] in us, opposed to this,1 configurings,2 — of which this serves as the receptacle.3
1 Or an intelligible something. 2 Or bodiless.
3 That is, the intelligible essence.
But what has once been set in motion by the Primal4 Essence for some [set] purpose of the Reason (Logos), and that has been conceived5 [by it], straightway doth change into another form of motion ; this is the image of the Demiurgic Thought.6
2. And there is [also] a third species of incorporals, which doth eventuate round bodies, — space, time, [and] motion, figure, surface,7 size, [and] species.
Of these there are two [sets of] differences.
The first [lies] in the quality pertaining specially unto themselves ; the second [set is] of the body.
The special qualities are figure, colour, species, space, time, movement.
[The differences] peculiar to body are figure configured, and colour coloured ; there's also form conformed, surface and size.1
1 Sc. of opposite nature to the first incorporal, as negative to positive, say.
2 <TXTj/iaT($Ti7T€s — that is, the "somethings" more subtle or ideal than figures or shapes, — types, or prototypes, or paradigms of some kind.
3 That is, plays the part of matter, "womb," or "nurse" to these.
4 Lit. intelligible. 5 Or received.
6 Or Mind. Heeren (as also all editors subsequent to him) thinks that something has here fallen out of the text, because he finds no second incorporal specifically mentioned ; but the duality of the demiurgic thought, active arid passive, creative and conceptive, will do very well for the second.
7 Or appearance.
The latter with the former have no part.
3. The Intelligible Essence, then, in company with God,2 has power o'er its own self, and [power] to keep 3 another, in that it keeps itself, since Essence in itself is not under Necessity.
But when 'tis left by God, it takes unto itself the corporal nature ; its choice of it being ruled by Providence, — that is, its choosing of the world.4
All the irrational is moved to- wards some reason.
Reason [comes] under Providence ; unreason [falls] under Necessity ; the things that happen in the corporal [fall] under Fate.
Such is the Sermon on the rule of Providence,
Necessity and Fate.
COMMENT