Six Theosophic Points, and Other Writings
11. But if there be a divisibility in the one will, so that the divisibility disposes itself into centra and self-will, so that thus in that which is separated there is a will of its own, and thus in a single will unfathomable and innumerable wills arise, like branches from a tree; then we see and understand that in such a divisibility each separated will brings itself into a special form, and that the conflict of the wills is about the form, so that one form in the partibility is not as another, and yet all have their subsistence in one ground.
12. For a single will cannot break itself asunder in pieces, just as the soul (Gemiith) breaks not in pieces when it separates into an evil and good willing ; but the out-going of sense only separates into a willing of evil and of good, and the soul remains in itself entire, and suffers an evil and good willing to arise and dwell in it.
13. Now saith Reason: Whereto is this good or useful, that with the good there must be an evil? Answer. That which is evil or of contrary willp. 181 occasions the good or the will to press back towards its primal existence, as towards God, and the good, viz. the good will, to become desirous. For a thing that in itself is only good, and has no suffering (Qual) , desires nothing; for it knows nothing better in itself or for itself after which it could long.
14. Thus then we can philosophize concerning the one good will of God, and say, that he can desire nothing in himself, for he has nothing in or for himself which could give him anything. And therefore he brings himself out of himself into a divisibility, into centra, in order that a contrariety may arise in the emanation, viz. in that which has emanated, that the good may in the evil become perceptible, effectual, and capable of will; namely to will to separate itself from the evil, and to re-will to enter into the one will of God.
15. But seeing the emanation of the one eternal will of God continually proceeds from himself to his manifestation, the good likewise, as the divine power, flows from the eternal One with this emanation, and enters also into the divisibility and into the centra of plurahty.
16. Now, the perpetual emanation of the will occasions the good by its motion to long for standstill again, and to become desirous to repenetrate into the eternal One; and in such penetration into itself the One becomes mobile and desiref ul ; and in such working lies feeling, cognition and will.
17. God, so far as he is called God, can will nothing but himself; for he has nothing before or after him that he can will. But if he will anything, that
p. 182
very same has emanated from him, and is a counterstroke of himself, wherein the eternal will wills in its something. Now if the something were only a one, the will could have no exercise therein. And therefore the unfathomable will has separated itself into beginnings and carried itself into being, that it might work in something, as we have a simihtude in the soul (Gemilth) of man.
If the soul did not itself flow from itself, it would have no sense-perception; but if it had no senseperception, neither would it have any knowledge of itself, nor of any other thing, and were incapable of doing or working. But the efflux of sense from the soul (which efflux is a counterstroke of the soul, in which the soul feels itself) endows the soul with will or desire, so that it introduces the senses into a something, viz. into a centrum of an ego-hood, wherein the soul works through sense, and reveals and contemplates itself in its working through the senses.
19. Now if in these centra of sense in the counterstroke of the soul there were no contrariuni, then all the centra of emanated sense were but a one ; in all the centra of sense but one single will, that did continually but one and the same thing. How could then the wonders and powers of the divine wisdom became known by the soul (which is an image of divine revelation) and be brought into figures?
11. But if there be a divisibility in the one will, so that the divisibility disposes itself into centra and self-will, so that thus in that which is separated there is a will of its own, and thus in a single will unfathomable and innumerable wills arise, like branches from a tree; then we see and understand that in such a divisibility each separated will brings itself into a special form, and that the conflict of the wills is about the form, so that one form in the partibility is not as another, and yet all have their subsistence in one ground.
12. For a single will cannot break itself asunder in pieces, just as the soul (Gemiith) breaks not in pieces when it separates into an evil and good willing ; but the out-going of sense only separates into a willing of evil and of good, and the soul remains in itself entire, and suffers an evil and good willing to arise and dwell in it.
13. Now says Reason: Whereto is this good or useful, that with the good there must be an evil? Answer. That which is evil or of contrary willp. 181 occasions the good or the will to press back towards its primal existence, as towards God, and the good, viz. the good will, to become desirous. For a thing that in itself is only good, and has no suffering (Qual) , desires nothing; for it knows nothing better in itself or for itself after which it could long.
14. Thus then we can philosophize concerning the one good will of God, and say, that he can desire nothing in himself, for he has nothing in or for himself which could give him anything. And therefore he brings himself out of himself into a divisibility, into centra, in order that a contrariety may arise in the emanation, viz. in that which has emanated, that the good may in the evil become perceptible, effectual, and capable of will; namely to will to separate itself from the evil, and to re-will to enter into the one will of God.
15. But seeing the emanation of the one eternal will of God continually proceeds from himself to his manifestation, the good likewise, as the divine power, flows from the eternal One with this emanation, and enters also into the divisibility and into the centra of plurahty.
16. Now, the perpetual emanation of the will occasions the good by its motion to long for standstill again, and to become desirous to repenetrate into the eternal One; and in such penetration into itself the One becomes mobile and desiref ul ; and in such working lies feeling, cognition and will.
17. God, so far as he is called God, can will nothing but himself; for he has nothing before or after him that he can will. But if he will anything, that
p. 182
very same has emanated from him, and is a counterstroke of himself, wherein the eternal will wills in its something. Now if the something were only a one, the will could have no exercise therein. And therefore the unfathomable will has separated itself into beginnings and carried itself into being, that it might work in something, as we have a simihtude in the soul (Gemilth) of man.
If the soul did not itself flow from itself, it would have no sense-perception; but if it had no senseperception, neither would it have any knowledge of itself, nor of any other thing, and were incapable of doing or working. But the efflux of sense from the soul (which efflux is a counterstroke of the soul, in which the soul feels itself) endows the soul with will or desire, so that it introduces the senses into a something, viz. into a centrum of an ego-hood, wherein the soul works through sense, and reveals and contemplates itself in its working through the senses.
19. Now if in these centra of sense in the counterstroke of the soul there were no contrariuni, then all the centra of emanated sense were but a one ; in all the centra of sense but one single will, that did continually but one and the same thing. How could then the wonders and powers of the divine wisdom became known by the soul (which is an image of divine revelation) and be brought into figures?
No commentary for this page.
There is commentary on page 1.