The Questions of King Milinda, Part I — SBE Vol. 35 (trans. Rhys Davids, 1890)
English·1879–1910·trans. T. W. Rhys Davids·277 passages
The text · part 4 of 14
63, pag4nana is the mark of pa#a#indriya, avigg4ya akampiyam of pafflabala, and tad-uttariyam of pa##4 simply. He gives no ‘mark’ of yoniso manasik4ra,
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‘Good conduct, great king, and faith, and perseverance, and mindfulness, and meditation ?.
‘And what is the characteristic mark of good conduct ?’
‘It has as its characteristic that it is the basis of all good qualities. The five moral powers *—faith, perseverance, mindfulness, meditation,and wisdom—; the seven conditions of Arahatship*—self-possession, investigation of the Dhamma, perseverance, joy, calm, meditation, and equanimity—; the Path; readiness of memory (unbroken self-possession)‘; the four kinds of right exertion®; the four constituent bases of extraordinary powers *; the four stages of ecstasy ’; the eight forms of spiritual emancipation °; the four modes of self-concentration®; and the eight states of intense contemplation’? have each and all of them good conduct (the observance of outward morality) as their basis. And to him who builds upon that foundation, O king, all these good conditions will not decrease ",’
‘Give me an illustration.’
‘Just, O king, as all those forms of animal and vegetable life which grow, develope, and mature, do so with the earth as their basis; just so does the recluse, who is devoted in effort, develope in himself the five moral powers, and so on, by means of virtue, on the basis of virtue.’
‘Give me a further illustration.’
1 Silam, saddha, viriyam, sati, sam4dhi.
2 Indriya-balani. ®' Bogghanga. ‘ Satipaffhana.
5 Sammappadhana, 6 Iddhipada. 7 Ghana.
® Vimokha ® Samadhi. 10 Sam4patti.
"| The above-mentioned meritorious conditions are those the sum of which make Arahatship.
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‘Just, O king, as all the occupations which involve bodily exertion are carried on in ultimate dependence upon the earth, just so does the recluse develope in himself the five moral powers, and so on, by means of virtue, on the basis of virtue.’ [84]
‘Give me a still better illustration.’
‘Just, O king, as the architect of a city, when he wants to build one, first clears the site of the town, and then proceeds to get rid of all the stumps and thorny brakes, and thus makes it level, and only then does he lay out the streets and squares, and crossroads and market places, and so build the city; just so does the recluse develope in himself the five moral powers, and so on, by means of virtue, on the basis of virtue.’
‘Can you give me one more simile ?’
‘Just, O king, as an acrobat'!, when he wants to exhibit his skill, first digs over the ground, and proceeds to get rid of all the stones and fragments of broken pottery, and thus to make it smooth, and only then, on soft earth, shows his tricks ; just even so does the recluse develope in himself the five moral powers, and so on, by means of virtue, on the basis of virtue. For it has been said, Sire, by the Blessed One:
For it has been said, Sire, by the Blessed One:
“Virtue’s the base on which the man who's wise
‘* Can train his heart, and make his wisdom grow. Thus shall the strenuous Bhikkhu, undeceived, Unravel all the tangled skein of life *.
1 Langhako, not in Childers; but compare GAtaka I, 431, and below, pp. 191, 331 of the text. ? This verse occurs twice in the Samyutta (I, 3, 3, and VII, 1, 6).
a
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“This is the base—like the great earth to men— And this the root of all increase in goodness, The starting-point of all the Buddhas’ teaching, Virtue, to wit, on which true bliss depends ?.”’
‘Well said, Nagasena!’
10% The king said, ‘Venerable NAgasena, what is the characteristic mark of faith ?’
‘ Tranquillisation, O king, and aspiration 3,’
‘And how is tranquillisation the mark of faith ?’
‘As faith, O king, springs up in the heart it breaks through the five hindrances—lust, malice, mental sloth, spiritual pride, and doubt—and the heart, free from these hindrances, [85] becomes clear, serene, untroubled.’
‘Give me an illustration.’
‘Just, O king, as a suzerain king, when on the march with his fourfold army, might cross over a small stream, and the water, disturbed by the elephants and cavalry, the chariots and the bowmen, might become fouled, turbid‘, and muddy. And
1 Vara-patimokkhiyo, a poetical expression found only in this passage, and of the exact connotation of which I am uncertain. It is not in Childers; and Hinasi-kumburé gives no assistance. The whole line may mean, ‘The scheme of a virtuous life as laid down in the most excellent Patimokkha.’ See the use of Samyutta-Nikdya-vare below, p. 36 of the text. On the whole section compare M.P.S. I, 12.
2 This section is summarised in Hardy’s ‘ Manual of Buddhism,’ pp. 411, 412 (1st edition).
5’ Sampasadana and sampakkhandana. Buddhaghosa, loc. cit, does not give faith in his list, but he gives the power of faith (saddh4-bala), and as its ‘mark’ ‘that it cannot be shaken by incredulity.’
‘ Lu/ita, not in Childers; but compare Anguttara I, 55, and ‘Book of the Great Decease,’ 1V, 26-32.
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when he was on the other side the monarch might give command to his attendants, saying: “ Bring some water, my good men. I would fain drink.” Now suppose the monarch had a water-clearing gem;}, and those men, in obedience to the order, were to throw the jewel into the water ; then at once all the mud would precipitate itself, and the sandy atoms of shell and bits of water-plants would disappear, and the water would become clear, transparent, and serene, and they would then bring some of it to the monarch to drink. The water is the heart; the royal servants are the recluse; the mud, the sandy atoms, and the bits of water-plants are evil dispositions; and the water-cleansing gem is faith.’
‘And how is aspiration the mark of faith ?’
The water is the heart; the royal servants are the recluse; the mud, the sandy atoms, and the bits of water-plants are evil dispositions; and the water-cleansing gem is faith.’
‘And how is aspiration the mark of faith ?’
‘In as much as the recluse, on perceiving how the hearts of others have been set free, aspires to enter as it were by a leap upon the fruit of the first stage, or of the second, or of the third in the Excellent Way, or to gain Arahatship itself, and thus applies himself to the attainment of what he has not reached, to the experience of what he has not yet felt, to the realisation of what he has not yet realised —therefore is it that aspiration is the mark of faith.’
‘Give me an illustration.’
‘Just, O king, as if a mighty storm [86] were to break upon a mountain top and pour out rain, the water would flow down according to the levels, and after filling up the crevices and chasms and gullies
‘ Udakappasadako mani. Doubtless a magic gem is meant: with allusion particularly to the Wondrous Gem (the Masi-ratana) of the mythical King of Glory (see my ‘ Buddhist Suttas,’ p. 256).
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of the hill, would empty-itself into the brook below, so that the stream would rush along, overflowing both its banks. Now suppose a crowd of people, one after the other, were to come up, and being ignorant of the real breadth or depth of the water, were to stand fearful and hesitating on the brink. And suppose a certain man should arrive, who knowing exactly his own strength and power should gird himself firmly and, with a spring, land himself on the other side. Then the rest of the people, seeing him safe on the other side, would likewise cross. That is the kind of way in which the recluse, by faith!, aspires to leap, as it were by a bound, into higher things. For this has been said, O king, by the Blessed One in the Samyutta Nikaya : ‘By faith he crosses over the stream,
By earnestness the sea of life;
By steadfastness all grief he stills,
By wisdom is he purified 2.”’
‘Well put, Nagasena !’
1 In the Buddha, in the sufficiency of the Excellent Way he taught, and in the capacity of man to walk along it. It is spoken of slightingly (compared with Arahatship) in Mah4vagga V, 1, 21— in the Mah4parinibbana Sutta VI, 9 (of Ananda, who has faith, compared with the brethren, who have entered one or other of the stages of the Excellent Way)—and in Anguttara III, 21 (in comparison with intuitive insight and intellectual perception). For this last comparison see further the Puggala Pa##atti ITI, 3. From these passages a fair idea of the Buddhist view of faith could be formed. Although the Buddhist faith and the Christian faith are in things contradictory, the two conditions of heart are strikingly similar both in origin and in consequence.
? This verse is not yet reached in the Pali Text Society’s edition of the Samyutta, but it is found also in the Sutta Nipata-I, 10, 4.
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? This verse is not yet reached in the Pali Text Society’s edition of the Samyutta, but it is found also in the Sutta Nipata-I, 10, 4.
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114. The king said: ‘What, Nagasena, is the characteristic mark of perseverance ?’
‘The rendering of support, O king, is the mark of perseverance”. All those good qualities which it supports do not fall away.’
‘Give me an illustration.’
‘Just as a man, if a house were falling, would make a prop for it of another post, and the house so supported would not fall; just so, O king, is the rendering of support the mark of perseverance, and all those good qualities which it supports do not fall away.’
‘Give me a further illustration.’
‘Just as when a large army has broken up a small one, then the king of the latter would call to mind every possible ally and reinforce his small army *, and by that means the small army might in its turn break up the large one; just so, O king, is the rendering of support the mark of perseverance, and all those good qualities which it supports do not fall away [87]. For it has been said by the Blessed One: “The persevering hearer of the noble truth, O Bhikkhus, puts away evil and cultivates goodness, puts away that which is wrong and developes in himself that which is right, and thus does he keep himself pure.”’
? This section is summarised by Hardy, loc. cit. p. 409.
* Buddhaghosa, loc. cit., says that paggaha (tension) is the mark of viriyindriya.
5 Afifffamafifiam anusareyya anupeseyya. This is the way in which Hinasi-kumburé understands this doubtful passage. Hardy has bungled the whole simile. Both the words are new, and I am not sure that the first does not after all come from the root sar, to follow.
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‘Well put, Nagasena !’
12. The king said: ‘What, Nagasena, is the characteristic mark of mindfulness??’
‘Repetition, O king, and keeping up *.’
‘ And how is repetition the mark of mindfulness ?’
‘As mindfulness, O king, springs up in his heart he repeats over the good and evil, right and wrong, slight and important, dark and light qualities, and those that resemble them, saying to himself: ‘“‘ These are the four modes of keeping oneself ready and mindful, these the four modes of spiritual effort, these the four bases of extraordinary powers, these the five organs of the moral sense, these the five mental powers, these the seven bases of Arahatship, these the eight divisions of the Excellent Way, this is serenity and this insight, this is wisdom and this emancipation *.” Thus does the recluse follow after
1 Sati, summarised in Hardy’s ‘ Manual,’ p. 412.
412.
? Api/4pana and upagazhana, both new words. This definition is in keeping with the etymological meaning of the word sati, which is ‘memory.’ It is one of the most difficult words (in its secondary, ethical, and more usual meaning) in the whole Buddhist system of ethical psychology to translate. Hardy renders ‘conscience,’ which is certainly wrong; and Gogerly (see my ‘ Buddhist Suttas,’ p- 144) has ‘meditation, which is equally wide of the mark. I have sometimes rendered it ‘self-possession.’ It means that activity of mind, constant presence of mind, wakefulness of heart, which is the foe of carelessness, inadvertence, self-forgetfulness. And it is a very constant theme of the Buddhist moralist. Buddhaghosa, loc. cit., makes upa//h4na, ‘readiness,’ its mark.
’ These are the various moral qualities and mental habits which together make up Arahatship, and may be said also to make up Buddhism (as the Buddha taught it), It was on these that he laid special stress, in his last address to the members of the Order, just before his death (‘Book of the Great Decease,’ III, 65, in my ‘Buddhist Suttas,’ pp. 60-63); and the details of them will be found in the note to that passage.
— — — — a a — an
Il, 1, 12. MINDFULNESS (SAT1). 59
those qualities that are desirable, and not after those that are not; thus does he cultivate those which , ought to be practised, and not those which ought not. That is how repetition is the mark of mindfulness.’
‘Give me an illustration.’
‘It is like the treasurer of the imperial sovran?, who reminds his royal master early and late of his glory, saying : “ So many are thy war elephants, O king, and so many thy cavalry’, thy war chariots and thy bowmen, so much the quantity of thy money, and gold, and wealth, may your Majesty keep yourself in mind thereof.’
‘And how, Sir, is keeping up a mark of mindfulness ?’
‘As mindfulness springs up in his heart, O king, he searches out the categories of good qualities and their opposites, saying to himself: “Such and such qualities are good, and such bad ; [88] such and such qualities helpful, and such the reverse.” Thus does the recluse make what is evil in himself to disappear, and keeps up what is good. That is how keeping up is the mark of mindfulness.’
‘ Give me an illustration.’
‘It is like the confidential adviser of that imperial
? Kakkavattissa bhandag4riko, no doubt with allusion to the gahapati-ratanam, one of the seven treasures of the mythical King of Glory (see my ‘ Buddhist Suttas,’ p. 257). It is particularly interesting to me to find here the use of the word ‘treasurer’ instead of ‘householder ;’ for it was in that exact sense that I had understood the word gahapati in that connection, at a time when, in the then state of Pali scholarship, it seemed very bold to do so.
* Literally ‘horses.’ The whole list is again a manifest allusion to the corresponding one in the Sutta of the Great King of Glory.
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* Literally ‘horses.’ The whole list is again a manifest allusion to the corresponding one in the Sutta of the Great King of Glory.
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sovran! who instructs him in good and evil, saying: “ These things are bad for the king and these good, these helpful and these the reverse.” And thus the king makes the evil in himself die out, and keeps up the good.’
‘Well put, Ndgasena !’
13% The king said: ‘What, NAgasena, is the characteristic mark of meditation ° ?’
‘Being the leader, O king. All good qualities have meditation as their chief, they incline to it, lead up towards it, are as so many slopes up the side of the mountain of meditation.’
‘Give me an illustration.’
‘ As all the rafters of the roof of a house, O king, go up to the apex, slope towards it, are joined on together at it, and the apex is acknowledged to be the top of all; so is the habit of meditation in its relation to other good qualities.’
‘Give me a further illustration.’
‘It is like a king, your Majesty, when he goes down to battle with his army in its fourfold array. The whole army—elephants, cavalry, war chariots, and bowmen—would have him as their chief, their
1 Parindyaka, the seventh treasure of the King of Glory. (Compare the ‘ Buddhist Suttas,’ p. 259.) It will be seen that our author is in substantial agreement with the older tradition, and does not, like the Lalita Vistara, understand under this officer a general.
* Omitted by Hardy.
* Sam4dhi. Buddhaghosa, loc. cit. p. 65, gives also ‘being the chief’ as its mark, but he previously (p. 64) gives avikkhepa, ‘serenity,’ as the mark of samm4-samAdhi, and also (p. 63) of samadhindriya, while ‘ being unshaken by spiritual pride’ is his mark (p. 63) of SamAdhi-bala.
Il, 1, 14. WISDOM. 61
lines would incline towards him, lead up to him, they would be so many mountain slopes, one above another, with him as their summit, round him they would all be ranged. [89] And it has been said, O king, by the Blessed One: “ Cultivate in yourself, O Bhikkhus, the habit of meditation. He who is established therein knows things as they really are'.”’ ‘Well put, Nagasena !’
14. The king said: ‘What, Nagasena, is the characteristic mark of wisdom ??’ .
‘I have already told you, O king, how cutting off, severance, is its mark*, but enlightenment is also its mark.’
‘ And how is enlightenment its mark ?’
‘When wisdom springs up in the heart, O king, it dispels the darkness of ignorance, it causes the radiance of knowledge to arise, it makes the light of intelligence to shine forth ‘, and it makes the Noble Truths plain. Thus does the recluse who is devoted to effort perceive with the clearest wisdom the impermanency (of all beings and things), the suffering (that is inherent in individuality), and the absence of any soul.’
‘ Give me an illustration.’
Thus does the recluse who is devoted to effort perceive with the clearest wisdom the impermanency (of all beings and things), the suffering (that is inherent in individuality), and the absence of any soul.’
‘ Give me an illustration.’
‘It is like a lamp, O king, which a man might introduce into a house in darkness. When the lamp had been brought in it would dispel the darkness,
1 Samyutta Nikdya XXI, 5.
2 Paaaa. Hardy in the ‘Manual of Buddhism,’ pp. 414, 415, gives a jumble of this passage and several others.
* See above, p. 51.
* Vidamseti, not in Childers; but compare Theri G4tha, 74 ; Anguttara III, 103; and Gataka III, 222.
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cause radiance to arise, and light to shine forth, and make the objects there plainly visible. Just so would wisdom in a man have such effects as were just now set forth.’
‘Well put, Nagasena !’
15. The king said: ‘These qualities which are so different’, Nagasena, do they bring about one and the same result ?’
‘They do. The putting an end to evil dispositions. ~
‘ How is that? Give me an illustration.’
‘They are like the various parts of an army— elephants, cavalry, war chariots, and archers—who all work to one end, to wit : the conquest in battle of the opposing army.’
‘Well put, Nagasena!’
Here ends the First Chapter.
1 That is, the five referred to above, p. 51, § 9.
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Boox II. Cuapter 2,
1. [40] The king said: ‘ He who is born, Nagasena, does he remain the same or become another ?’
‘ Neither the same nor another.’
‘Give me an illustration.’
‘Now what do you think, O king? You were once a baby, a tender thing, and small in size, lying flat on your back. Was that the same as you who are now grown up?’
‘No. That child was one, I am another.’
‘If you are not that child, it will follow that you have had neither mother nor father, no! nor teacher. You cannot have been taught either learning, or behaviour, or wisdom. What, great king! is the mother of the embryo in the first stage different from the mother of the embryo in the second stage, or the third, or the fourth! ? Is the mother of the baby a different person from the mother of the grown-up man? Is the person who goes to school one, and the same when he has finished his schooling another ? Is it one who commits a crime, another who is punished by having his hands or feet cut off??’
‘Certainly not. But what would you, Sir, say to that ?’
The Elder replied: ‘I should say that I am the same person, now I am grown up, as I was when I was a tender tiny baby, flat on my back. For all these states are included in one by means of this body.’
‘Give me an illustration,’
* On these four stages see Gataka IV, 496, and Samyutta X, 1, 3.
* Hardy makes sad nonsense of all this,
64 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. II, 2, r.
‘Suppose a man, O king, were to light a lamp, would it burn the night through ?’
‘Yes, it might do so.’
* Hardy makes sad nonsense of all this,
64 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. II, 2, r.
‘Suppose a man, O king, were to light a lamp, would it burn the night through ?’
‘Yes, it might do so.’
‘Now, is it the same flame that burns in the first watch of the night, Sir, and in the second?’
‘No.’
‘Or the same that burns in the second watch and in the third ?’
‘No.’
‘Then is there one lamp in the first watch, and another in the second, and another in the third ?’
‘No. The light comes from the same lamp all the night through.’
‘Just so, O king, is the continuity of a person or thing maintained. One comes into being, another passes away; and the rebirth is, as it were, simultaneous. Thus neither as the same nor as another does a man go on to the last phase of his self-consciousness ',’
‘ Give me a further illustration.’
1 Hardy (p. 429) renders this as follows: ‘In the same way, great king, one being is conceived, another is born, another dies ; when comprehended by the mind, it is like a thing that has no before, and no after; no preceding, no succeeding existence. Thus the being who is born does not continue the same, nor does he become another; the last winyana, or consciousness, is thus united with the rest.’ (!) He confesses himself in doubt as to the last few words, but is quite unconscious of having completely misinterpreted the whole paragraph.
The meaning is really quite plain in both the Pali and the Simhalese. A man, at any one moment, is precisely all that he is then conscious of. The phase of his self-consciousness, the totality of that of which he is conscious, is always changing; and is so different at death from what it was at birth that, in a certain sense, he is not the same at the one time as he was at the other. But there is a continuity in the whole series ;—a continuity dependent
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‘It is like milk, [41] which when once taken from the cow, turns, after a lapse of time, first to curds, and then from curds to butter, and then from butter to ghee. Now would it be right to say that the milk was the same thing as the curds, or the butter, or the ghee?’
‘Certainly not; but they are produced out of it.’
‘Just so, O king, is the continuity of a person or thing maintained. One comes into being, another passes away; and the rebirth is, as it were, simultaneous. Thus neither as the same nor as another does a man go on to the last phase of his self-consciousness.’
‘Well put, Nagasena !’
21, The king said: ‘Is a man, Nagasena, who will not be reborn, aware of the fact ?’
‘Yes, O king.’
‘And how does he know it ?’
‘ By the cessation of all that is cause, proximate or remote ?, of rebirth.’
‘Give me an illustration.’
‘ Suppose a farmer, great king, had ploughed and sown and filled his granary; and then for a period should neither plough nor sow, but live on the
on the whole body. And this fits the simile, in which the lamp is the body, and the flame the changing self-consciousness ; whereas it is impossible to make the simile fit the conclusion as rendered by Hardy.
On the phrase apubbam akariyam see Dr. Morris’s note at p. ror of the Pali Text Society’s Journal, 1887, and the passages he there quotes.
' Omitted in Hardy. The correlative question is discussed below, III, 5, 8, p. 112.
8 That is to say, Tawha and Up4dana.
[35] Fp. 3 stored-up grain, or dispose of it in barter, or deal with it as he had need. Would the farmer be aware, great king, that his granary was not getting filled ?’
‘Yes, he ought to know it.’
‘But how ?’
‘He would know that the cause, proximate and remote, of the filling of the granary had ceased.’
‘Just so with the man you spoke of. By the cessation of all that leads to rebirth, he would be conscious of having escaped his liability to it.’
‘Well explained, N4gasena!’
31. The king said: ‘He who has intelligence, NA4gasena, has he also wisdom ? ?’
‘Yes, great king.’ [42]
‘What ; are they both the same?’
‘Yes.’
‘Then would he, with his intelligence — which, you say, is the same as wisdom—be still in bewilderment or not ?’
‘In regard to some things, yes; in regard to others, no.’
‘What would he be in bewilderment about ?’
‘He would still be in bewilderment as to those parts of learning he had not learnt, as to those countries he had not seen, and as to those names or terms he had not heard.’
‘And wherein would he not be in bewilderment ?’
‘As regards that which has been accomplished by insight—(the perception, that is,) of the imper-
? Summarised in Hardy’s ‘ Manual,’ p. 414. 3 Nana and pafaa.
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manence of all beings, of the suffering inherent in individuality, and of the non-existence of any soul ?.’
‘ Then what would have become of his delusions on those points.’
‘When intelligence has once arisen, that moment delusion has died away.’
‘Give me an illustration.’
‘It is like the lamp, which when a man has brought into a darkened room, then the darkness would vanish away, and light would appear.’
‘And what, Nagasena, on the other hand, has then become of his wisdom ?’
‘When the reasoning wisdom has effected that which it has to do, then the reasoning ceases to go on. But that which has been acquired by means of it remains—the knowledge, to wit, of the impermanence of every being, of the suffering inherent in individuality, and of the absence of any soul.’
‘Give me an illustration, reverend Sir, of what you have last said.’
‘It is as when a man wants, during the night, to send a letter, and after having his clerk called, has a lamp lit, and gets the letter written. Then, when that has been done, he extinguishes the lamp. But though the lamp had been put out the writing would still be there. Thus does reasoning cease, and knowledge remain.’
‘Give me a further illustration.’
Then, when that has been done, he extinguishes the lamp. But though the lamp had been put out the writing would still be there. Thus does reasoning cease, and knowledge remain.’
‘Give me a further illustration.’
‘In Eastern districts [48] the peasants have a custom of arranging five pots full of water behind
1 That is, he might still be wrong on matters of mere worldly knowledge, but would be clear in his mind as to the fundamental truths of religion. Compare the analogous distinctions often drawn as to the inspiration of Scripture, or the infallibility of the Pope.
F 2
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each hut with the object of putting out at once any spark of fire that may be kindled. Suppose now the house had caught fire, and they had thrown those five potfulls of water over the hut, and the fire had gone out, would those peasants then think of still going on using the water-pots ?’
‘No, Sir, the water-pots would be done with. What would be the use of them (on that occasion) any more ?’
‘The five water-pots are the five organs of moral sense—faith, to wit, and perseverance in effort, and mindfulness, and meditation, and the reasoning wisdom. The peasantry are the recluse, who is devoted in effort!; the fire is sinfulness. As the fire is put out by the water in the five pots, so is sinfulness extinguished by the five organs of moral sense, and when once extinguished it does not again arise®.’
‘Give me a further illustration.’
‘It is like a physician who goes to the sick man with the five kinds of drugs made from medicinal
1 Yog4vakaro; one of the technical terms in constant use by our author, but not found in the Pali Pifakas. Hardy renders it, ‘who is seeking Nirvana;’ but though this may be suggested by the term, it is not its meaning. Literally it is ‘he whose sphere, whose constant resort, is Yoga.’ Now yoga is ‘diligence, devotion, mental concentration;’ and there is nothing to show that our author is using the word as an epithet of Arahatship. It seems to me, therefore, that the whole compound merely means one of those ‘religious,’ in the technical sense, who were also religious in the higher, more usual sense. It would thus be analogous to the phrase samgim4vasaro, ‘at home in war,’ used of a war elephant in the Samgimavakara Gataka (Fausbdll, II, 95), and of a soldier below, Mil. 44.
* This must, I think, be understood in a modified sense, for the first of the four Great Exertions (Sammappadh4nas) is the effort to prevent sinful conditions arising.
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roots}, and grinding them up, gives him to drink, and thereby his sickness passes away. Would the physician in that case think of making any further use of the medicine ?’
‘Certainly not, the medicine has done its work. What would be the use of any more ?’
‘Just so, O king, when sinfulness is destroyed by the five moral powers, then reasoning ceases, but knowledge remains.’
[44] ‘Give me a further illustration.’
What would be the use of any more ?’
‘Just so, O king, when sinfulness is destroyed by the five moral powers, then reasoning ceases, but knowledge remains.’
[44] ‘Give me a further illustration.’
‘It is like a warrior, at home in war, who takes five javelins and goes down to battle to conquer the foe. And when he has cast them the enemy is broken. There is no need for him to go on casting javelins any more.’
‘Well put, Nagasena !’
4. The king said: ‘He who will not be reborn, NAgasena, does he still feel any painful sensation ?’
The Elder replied: ‘Some he feels and some not.’
‘Which are they?’
‘He may feel bodily pain, O king; but mental pain he would not.’
‘-How would that be so ?’
‘Because the causes, proximate or remote, of bodily pain still continue, he would be liable to it. But the causes, proximate or remote, of mental agony having ceased, he could not feel it. For it has been said by the Blessed One: “One kind of pain he suffers, bodily pain: but not mental.” ’
‘Then why, Sir, does he not die ?’
‘The Arahat, O king, has need neither to curry
1 Pafika mola bhessagg4ni: not the five principal sorts of medicine mentioned by Childers.
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favour nor to bear malice. He shakes not down the unripe fruit, but awaits the full time of its maturity. For it has been said, O king, by the Elder, Sariputta, the Commander of the faith [45]: “Tt is not death, it is not life I welcome; As the hireling his wage, so do I bide my time. It is not death, it is not life I want; Mindful and thoughtful do I bide my time.” ‘Well put, Nagasena |!’
5. The king said: ‘Is a pleasant sensation, Nagasena, good or evil or indifferent ?’
‘It may be any one of the three.’
‘But surely, Sir, if good conditions are not painful, and painful ones not good, then there can arise no good condition that is at the same time painful *.’
‘Now, what do you think, great king? Suppose a man were to hold in one hand a red-hot ball of iron, and in the other a lump of icy snow, would they both hurt him ?’
‘Yes; they both would.’
‘But are they both hot ?’
‘Certainly not.’
‘But are they both cold ?’
‘No.’
‘Then acknowledge yourself put in the wrong! If the heat hurts, and they are not both hot, the pain cannot come from the heat. If the cold hurts,
1 These verses are nearly the same as those put in reverse order into Sariputta’s mouth in the Theri Gathd, 1003, 1002. And the first two lines, as Dr. Rost was good enough to point out to me, are identical (except as to a slight grammatical variation) with Manu VI, 45.
® And the same, therefore, of pleasant sensations that are evil.
p. 71
and they are not both cold, the pain cannot come from the cold. How then, O king, can they both hurt you, since they are not both hot, nor both cold, and (as one is hot and the other cold) the pain comes neither from the hot nor from the cold?’
p. 71
and they are not both cold, the pain cannot come from the cold. How then, O king, can they both hurt you, since they are not both hot, nor both cold, and (as one is hot and the other cold) the pain comes neither from the hot nor from the cold?’
‘I am not equal to argument with you. Be so good, Sir, as to explain how the matter stands.’
Then the Elder reasoned with king Milinda, persuading him by talk on the subject drawn from the Abhidhamma, such as: ‘ There are these six pleasures, O king, connected with life in the world, and these other six with renunciation. There are six griefs connected with life in the world, and six with renunciation. There are six kinds of indifference to pleasure and to grief connected with life in the world, and six with renunciation. [46] Altogether there are thus six series of six, that is to say, thirtysix kinds of sensations in the present, and the like number in the past, and the like in the future. And adding all these up in one total we arrive at one hundred and eight kinds of sensation.’
‘Well put, Nagasena !’
61. The king said: ‘What is it, Nagasena, that is reborn ?’
‘ Name-and-form is reborn.’
‘What, is it this same name-and-form that is reborn ?’
‘No: but by this name-and-form deeds are done, good or evil, and by these deeds (this Karma) another name-and-form is reborn.’
1 This dialogue is in Hardy, p. 429 (No. 7).
72 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. _ II, a, 6.
‘If that be so, Sir, would not the new being be released from its evil Karma???’
The Elder replied: ‘ Yes, if it were not reborn. But just because it is reborn, O king, it is therefore not released from its evil Karma.’
‘Give me an illustration.’
‘Suppose, O king, some man were to steal a mango from another man, and the owner of the mango were to seize him and bring him before the king, and charge him with the crime. And the thief were to say: “Your Majesty! I have not taken away this man’s mangoes. Those that he put in the ground are different from the ones I took. I do not deserve to be punished.” How then? would he be guilty ?’
‘Certainly, Sir. He would deserve to be punished.’
‘But on what ground ?’
‘Because, in spite of whatever he may say, he would be guilty in respect of the last mango which ‘resulted from the first one (the owner set in the ground).’
‘Just so, great king, deeds good or evil are done by this name-and-form and another is reborn. But that other is not thereby released from its deeds (its Karma).
‘Give me a further illustration.’
‘It is like rice or sugar so stolen, of which the same might be said as of the mango. [47] Or it is like the fire which a man, in the cold season, might kindle, and when he had warmed himself, leave still burning, and go away. Then if that fire were to set
? Repeated below, III, 5, 7, p. 112.
Il, 2, 6. KARMA. 73
[47] Or it is like the fire which a man, in the cold season, might kindle, and when he had warmed himself, leave still burning, and go away. Then if that fire were to set
? Repeated below, III, 5, 7, p. 112.
Il, 2, 6. KARMA. 73
. another man’s field on fire, and the owner of the field were to seize him, and bring him before the king, and charge him with the injury, and he were to say: “ Your Majesty! It was not I who set this man’s field on fire. The fire I left burning was a different one from that which burnt his field. I am not guilty.” Now would the man, O king, be guilty?’
‘Certainly, Sir.’
‘But why?’
‘ Because, in spite of whatever he might say, he would be guilty in respect of the subsequent fire that resulted from the previous one.’
‘Just so, great king, deeds good or evil are done by this name-and-form and another is reborn. But that other is not thereby released from its deeds (its Karma).
‘Give me a further illustration.’
‘Suppose, O king, a man were to take a lamp and go up into the top storey of his house, and there eat his meal. And the lamp blazing up were to set the thatch on fire, and from that the house should catch fire, and that house having caught fire the whole village should be burnt. And they should seize him and ask: “ What, you fellow, did you set our village on fire for?” And he should reply: “I’ve not set your village on fire! The flame of the lamp, by the light of which I was eating, was one thing; the fire which burnt your village was another thing.” Now if they, thus disputing, should go to law before you, O king, in whose favour would you decide the case?’
‘In the villagers’ favour,’
‘But why ?’
p. 6
‘Because, Sir, in spite of whatever the man might say, the one fire was produced from the other.’
‘Just so, great king, it is one name-and-form which has its end in death, and another name-and-form which is reborn. But the second is the result of the first, and is therefore not set free from its evil deeds.’
‘Give me a further illustration.’
‘Suppose, O king, a man were to choose a young girl in marriage, and give a price! for her and go away. [48] And she in due course should grow up to full age, and then another man were to pay a price for her and marry her. And when the first one had come back he should say: “ Why, you fellow, have you carried off my wife?” And the other were to reply: “It’s not your wife I have carried off! The little girl, the mere child, whom you chose in marriage and paid a price for is one; the girl grown up to full age whom I chose in marriage and paid a price for, is another.” Now if they, thus disputing, were to go to law about it before you, O king, in whose favour would you decide the case ?’
‘In favour of the first.’
‘But why?’
‘Because, in spite of whatever the second might say, the grown-up girl would have been derived from the other girl.’
‘Just so, great king, it is one name-and-form which has its end in death, and another name-and-form
1 Sunkam datva. Literally ‘paying a tax.’ So early were early marriages! Compare Theri Gath, 402. Hinafi-kumburé, p- 58, has woe/up dif, ‘having provided her with means of subsistence.’ But, of course, the Sunka must have been a price paid to the parents.
p. 75
which is reborn. But the second is the result of the first, and is therefore not set free from its evil deeds.’
‘Give me a further illustration.’
‘Suppose a man, O king, were to buy of a herdsman a vessel of milk, and go away leaving it in his charge, saying : “I will come for it to-morrow;” and the next day it were to become curds. And when the man should come and ask for it, then suppose the other were to offer him the curds, and he should say: “It was not curds 1 bought of you; give me my vessel of milk.” And the other were to reply: “Without any fault of mine? your milk has turned to curds.” Now if they, thus disputing, were to go to law about it before you, O king, in whose favour would you decide the case ?’
‘In favour of the herdsman.’
‘But why?’
‘Because, in spite of whatever the other might say, the curds were derived from the milk.’
‘ Just so, great king, it is one name-and-form that finds its end in death, and another that is reborn. But that other is the result of the first, and is therefore not thereby released from its evil deeds (its bad Karma).’
‘Very good, Nagasena !’
7°. The king said: ‘ Will you, Nagasena, be reborn ?’
1 Agdnato: there is an ambiguity here, as the word may mean ‘to me not knowing it,’ or ‘to you not knowing it.’ Hinafikumburé takes the latter interpretation, and renders: ‘O come! Do you not know that your milk has become curds?’ (Embala, tage kiri maw bawa no dannehi deeyi.)
? Not in Hardy.
p. 8
‘ Nay, great king, what is the use of asking that question again ? Have I not already told you that if, when I die, [49] I die with craving in my heart, I shall; but if not, not? ?’
‘Give me an illustration.’
‘Suppose, O king, a man were to render service to the king ?: and the king, pleased with him, were to bestow an office upon him. And then that he, while living through that appointment, in the full possession and enjoyment of all the pleasures of sense, should publicly declare that the king had repaid him naught. Now would that man, O king, be acting rightly ?’
‘Most certainly not.’
‘Just so, great king, what is the use of asking that question again? Have I not already told you that if, when I die, I die with craving in my heart, I shall; and if not, not ?’
‘You are ready, Nagasena, in reply.’
8. The king said: ‘ You were talking just now of name-and-form. What does “name” mean in that expression, and what “form” ?’
‘ Whatever is gross therein, that is “form”: whatever is subtle, mental, that is “ name.”’
‘Why is it, N&gasena, that name is not reborn separately, or form separately ?’
The king said: ‘ You were talking just now of name-and-form. What does “name” mean in that expression, and what “form” ?’
‘ Whatever is gross therein, that is “form”: whatever is subtle, mental, that is “ name.”’
‘Why is it, N&gasena, that name is not reborn separately, or form separately ?’
‘These conditions, great king, are connected one with the other; and spring into being together.’
‘Give me an illustration.’
‘As a hen, great king, would not get a yoke or
1 See above, Chapter 1, § 6, p. go. 2 This simile, with a different conclusion, recurs below, II, 3, 10 (P. 93).
p. 77
an egg-shell separately, but both would arise in one, they two being intimately dependent one on the other; just so, if there were no name there would be no form. What is meant by name in that expression being intimately dependent on what is meant by form, they spring up together. And this is, through time immemorial, their nature,’ ‘You are ready, Nagasena, in reply.’
9. The king said: ‘ You speak, Nagasena, of time immemorial. What does this word “time” mean ?’
‘ Past time, O king, and present, and future.’
‘But what ? is there such a thing as time ?’
‘There is time which exists, and time which does not.’
‘Which then exists, and which not ?’
[50] ‘There are Confections (constituent potentialities of being)?, O king, which are past in the sense of having passed away, and ceased to be, or of having been dissolved, or altogether changed. To them time is not. But there are conditions of heart which are now producing their effect, or still have in them the inherent possibility of producing
1Evam etam digham addhanam sambhavitam: which Hardy, p. 141, renders: ‘They accompany each other (as to the species, but not as to the individual) during infinitude.’ But even the Simhalese text cannot be made to mean this.
* Samkh4r4. See the full list in my ‘ Buddhism,’ pp. 91, 92 (a list, indeed, not found as yet in the Pifakas, and probably later, but yet founded on the older divisions, and explanatory of them). They are all those divisions into which existence (or the process of becoming and ceasing to be as Buddhism looks at it) should be divided, and are practically so many sorts of action (Karma). For the older divisions see the note at the passages quoted in ‘ Vinaya Texts,’ I, 76.
p. 9
effect, or which will otherwise lead to reindividualisation. To them time is. Where there are beings who, when dead, will be reborn, there time is. Where there are beings who, when dead, will not be reborn, there time is not; and where there are beings who are altogether set free (who, having attained Nirv4za in their present life, have come to the end of that life), there time is not—because of their having been quite set free!’ ‘You are ready, Nagasena, in reply.’
Here ends the Second Chapter.
1 Parinibbutatta. Hardy renders this whole clause (the last lines): ‘ Nirvana is attained, time is no longer.’ But this is one of the endless confusions arising out of not knowing the distinction between Nirvaza and Parinirvina, To a man who had ‘attained Nirvana’ there would still be time as long as he was in the enjoyment of it, that is as long as he continued in his present (and last) existence. The Simhalese is perfectly clear.
p. 79
Boox II. Cuwaprter 3.
1. The king said: ‘What is the root, Nagasena, of past time, and what of present, and what of future time ?’
‘Ignorance. By reason of Ignorance came the Confections, by reason of the Confections consciousness, by reason of consciousness name-and-form, by reason of name-and-form the six organs of sense}, by reason of them contact, by reason of contact sensation, by reason of sensation thirst, by reason of thirst craving, by reason of craving becoming, by reason of becoming birth, by reason of birth old age and death, grief, lamentation, sorrow, pain, and despair. Thus is it that the ultimate point in the past of all this time is not apparent.’
‘You are ready, Nagasena, in reply.’
2. The king said: ‘You say that the ultimate point of time is not apparent. Give me an illustration of that.’
‘Suppose, O king, a man were to plant in the ground a tiny seed, and that it were to come up as a shoot, and in due course grow, develope, and mature until it produced a fruit. [51] And then the man, taking a seed from that fruit, were again to plant it in the ground, and all should happen as before. Now would there be any end to this series ?’
‘ Certainly not, Sir.’
' Sa/ayatan4ni, that is the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body (as the organ of touch), and mind (or, as we should say, brain),
p. 2
‘Just so, O king, the ultimate point in the past of the whole of this time is not apparent.’
‘Give me a further illustration.’
‘The hen lays an egg. From the egg comes a hen. From the hen an egg. Is there any end to this series ?’
‘No.’
‘ Just so, O king, the ultimate point in the past of the whole of this time is not apparent.’
‘Give me a further illustration.’
Then the Elder drew a circle on the ground and asked the king : ‘ Is there any end to this circle ?’
‘No, it has no end.’
‘Well, that is like those circles spoken of by the Blessed One’. “By reason of the eye and of forms there arises sight ?, when these three come together there is touch, by reason of touch sensation, by reason of sensation a longing (Tamhé, thirst), by reason of the longing action (Karma), and from action eye is once more produced *.” Now is there any end to this series ?’ ‘No.’
1 Hinafi-kumburé applies this to the previous words (the circles of the chain of life quoted in § 1 from the Mahfvagga I, 1, 2), and he is followed by Hardy, p. 434. Trenckner makes it apply to the following words, giving the reference to No. 18 in the Magghima Nik4ya, and I think he is right. Whichever way it is taken, the result is much the same.
* Kakkhu-vifitana. It is not clear from the terse phraseology of this passage whether this is supposed to be a subjective stage preliminary to the ‘touch’ (phasso), or whether it is inclusive of it. (Compare Dhamma Sangazi, 589, 599, 620.) I am inclined to think it is the former. But if the latter be meant it might be rendered ‘there arises that consciousness (of existence) which is dependent upon the eye.’ See below, § 4.
* That is, another eye in another birth.
p. 81
Then setting out a precisely corresponding circle of each of the other organs of sense (of the ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind’), he in each case put the same question. And the reply being always the same, he concluded :
‘Just so, O king, the ultimate point of time in the past is not apparent.’
‘You are ready, N4gasena, in reply.’
3. The king said: ‘When you say that the ultimate point is not apparent, what do you mean by “ultimate point” ?’
‘Of whatsoever time is past. It is the ultimate point of that, O king, that I speak of.’
‘ But, if so, when you say that it is not apparent, do you mean to say that of everything? Is the ultimate point of everything unknown ?’
‘ Partly so, and partly not.’
‘Then which is so, and which not ?’
‘Formerly, O king, everything in every form, everything in every mode, was ignorance. It is to us as if it were not. In reference to that the ultimate beginning is unknown. But that, which has not been, becomes; as soon as it has begun to become it dissolves away again. In reference to that the ultimate beginning is known 2’ [52]
‘But, reverend Sir, if that which was not, becomes, and as soon as it has begun to become passes again
' In the text the whole sentence is repeated of each.
* That is, ‘the beginning of each link in the chain—the beginning of each individuality—can be traced, but not the beginning of each chain. Each life is a link in a chain of lives, bound together by cause and effect, different, yet the same. There are an infinite number of such chains; and there is no reference in the discussion to any greater unity, or to any “ultimate point” of all the chains,’
(35] Gp. 4 away, then surely, being thus cut off at both ends, it must be entirely destroyed?’
‘Nay, surely, O king, if it be thus cut off at both ends, can it not at both ends be made to grow again 2?’
‘Yes, it might. But that is not my question. Could it grow again from the point at which it was cut off ?’
‘Certainly.’
‘Give me an illustration.’
But that is not my question. Could it grow again from the point at which it was cut off ?’
‘Certainly.’
‘Give me an illustration.’
Then the Elder repeated the simile of the tree and the seed, and said that the Skandhas (the constituent elements of all life, organic and inorganic) were so many seeds, and the king confessed himself satisfied.
4. The king said: ‘Are there any Confections * which are produced ?’
‘ Certainly.’
‘Which are they ?’
‘Where there is an eye, and also forms, there is sight‘, where there is sight there is a contact through the eye, where there is contact through the eye there is a sensation, where there is sensation there is a longing °, where there is longing there is a grasping *, where there is grasping there is a becoming,
‘1 That is, ‘each individuality must be separate. The supposed chain does not really exist.’
2 There is an odd change of gender here. Possibly the word ‘ignorance’ has been dropped out. Trenckner says the passage is corrupt, and the Simhalese is so involved as to be unintelligible.
* Sankhfr§, potentialities, possible forms, of sentient existence.
‘ Kakkhu-vi##ana. See note 2 above, p. 80.
5 Tamh, thirst.
® Upadana, a stretching out towards a satisfaction of the longing, and therefore a craving for life, time, in which to satisfy it.
IT, 3, g. BECOMING. 83
where there is becoming there is birth, and at birth old age and death, grief, lamentation, pain, sorrow, and despair begin to be. Thus is the rise of the whole of this class of pain—Where there is neither eye nor form there is no sight, where there is not sight there is no contact through the eye, where there is not contact there is no sensation, where there is not sensation there is no longing, where there is not longing there is no grasping, where there is not grasping there is no becoming, where there is not becoming there is no birth, and where there is not birth there is neither old age nor death nor grief, lamentation, pain, sorrow, and despair. Thus is the ending of all this class of pain.’ ‘Very good, Nagasena!’
5. The king said: ‘Are there any Confections (qualities) which spring into being without a gradual becoming?’
‘No. They all have a gradual becoming.’
‘Give me an illustration.’
‘Now what do you think, great king? Did this house in which you are sitting spring suddenly into being ?’
[53] ‘Certainly not, Sir. There is nothing here which arose in that way. Each portion of it has had its gradual becoming—these beams had their becoming in the forest, and this clay in the earth, and by the moil and toil of women and of men? was this house produced.’
‘ It is a small matter, but noteworthy, that the Buddhist texts always put the women first.
G2
p. 84
‘Just so, great king, there is no Confection which has sprung into being without a gradual becoming. It is by a process of evolution that Confections come to be!’
‘Give me a further illustration.’
G2
p. 84
‘Just so, great king, there is no Confection which has sprung into being without a gradual becoming. It is by a process of evolution that Confections come to be!’
‘Give me a further illustration.’
‘ They are like all kinds of trees and plants which, when set in the ground, grow, develope, and mature, and then yield their fruits and flowers. The trees do not spring into being without a becoming. It is by a process of evolution that they become what they are. Just so, great king, there is no Confection which has sprung into being without a gradual becoming. It is by a process of evolution that Confections come to be!’
‘Give me a further illustration.’
‘They are like the pots of various kinds which a potter might form when he has dug up the clay out of the earth. The pots do not spring into being without a becoming. It is by a process of evolution that they become what they are. Just so, great king, there is no Confection which has sprung into being without a gradual becoming. It is by a process of evolution that Confections come to be!’
‘Give me a further illustration.’
‘Suppose, O king, there were no bridge of metal ona mandolin’, no leather, no hollow space, no frame, no neck, no strings, no bow, and no human effort or exertion, would there be music ?’
‘Certainly not, Sir.’
‘But if all these things were there, would not there be a sound ?’
1 Vinaya pattam. I don’t know what this is. The Simhalese merely repeats the words.
Il, 3, 5 FORMATION OF QUALITIES. 85
‘Of course there would.’
‘Just so, great king, there is no Confection which has sprung into being without a gradual becoming. It is by a process of evolution that Confections come to be!’
‘Give me a further illustration.’
‘Suppose, O king, there were no fire-stick apparatus!, no twirling-stick!, and no cord for the twirling-stick, and no matrix}, and no burnt rag for tinder, and no human effort and exertion, could there be fire by attrition ?’
‘ Certainly not.’
‘But if all these conditions were present, then might not fire appear ?’
‘Yes, certainly.’
[54] ‘Just so, great king, there is no Confection which has sprung into being without a gradual becoming. It is by a process of evolution that Confections come to be!’
‘Give me one more illustration.’
‘Suppose, O king, there were no burning glass, and no heat of the sun, and no dried cow-dung for tinder, could there be fire ?’
‘Certainly not.’
‘But where these things are present there fire might be struck, might it not ?’
‘Yes.’
‘Just so, great king, there is no Confection which
Arani, arani-potako, and uttarfrani. The exact differentiation of these parts of the fire-stick apparatus is uncertain. The Simhalese throws no real light on them, as it translates them respectively yafa liya, ‘under wood,’ matu Ifya, ‘upper wood,’ and uturu Ifya, also ‘upper wood.’ This method of ignition was probably quite as strange to Hinasi-kumburé as it is to us.
a
p. 4
The Simhalese throws no real light on them, as it translates them respectively yafa liya, ‘under wood,’ matu Ifya, ‘upper wood,’ and uturu Ifya, also ‘upper wood.’ This method of ignition was probably quite as strange to Hinasi-kumburé as it is to us.
ap. 4p. 6 has sprung into being without a gradual becoming. It.is by a process of evolution that Confections come to be!’
‘Give me another illustration.’
‘Suppose, O king, there were no looking-glass, and no light, and no face in front of it, would there appear an image ?’
‘No.’
‘But given these things,there might be a reflection?’
‘Yes, Sir, there might.’
‘Just so, great king, there is no Confection which has sprung into being without a gradual becoming. It is by a process of evolution that Confections come to be!’
‘Very good, NAgasena !’
6. The king said: ‘Is there, Nagasena, such a thing as the soul! ?’
‘What is this, O king, the soul (Vedagu) ?’
‘The living principle within? which sees forms through the eye, hears sounds through the ear, experiences tastes through the tongue, smells odours through the nose, feels touch through the body, and . discerns things (conditions, “dhamm4”) through the mind—just as we, sitting here in the palace, can look out of any window out of which we wish to look, the east window or the west, or the north or the south.’
The Elder replied: ‘I will tell you about the five
1 Vedagf, see below, III, 5, 6, p. r11, not found in this meaning in the Pisakas. ‘
* Abbhantare givo, also not found in this sense in the Pi/akas. Att4, rendered just above ‘image’ or ‘reflection,’ is the word used in them for soul. Hinaf-kumburé renders this here by prana giwa, ‘breath-soul.’ See below, III, 7, 15, p. 132; and above, II, 4, p. 48; and I, 2, 6, p. 71.
—_ — - Oop. 87 doors', great king. Listen, and give heed attentively. If the living principle within sees forms through the eye in the manner that you mention, [55] choosing its window as it likes, can it not then see forms not only through the eye, but also through each of the other five organs of sense? And in like manner can it not then as well hear sounds, and experience taste,and smell odours, and feel touch,and discern conditions through each of the other five organs of sense, besides the one you have in each case specified?’
‘No, Sir.’
‘Then these powers are not united one to another indiscriminately, the latter sense to the former organ, and so on. Now we, as we are seated here in the palace, with these windows all thrown open, and in full daylight, if we only stretch forth our heads, see all kinds of objects plainly. Can the living principle do the same when the doors of the eyes are thrown open? When the doors of the ear are thrown open, can it do so? Can it then not only hear sounds, but see sights, experience tastes, smell odours, feel touch, and discern conditions ? And so with each of its windows ?’