It is also to be observed that Sokrates does not introduce the theory as a novelty. The reality of the
1 Stob. cl. i. p. 125, 19 (R. P. 65 ἃ). 2 Tambl. zz Wicom. p. 10, 20 (R. P. 56 c). 8 Plato, Phd. 73 ἃ sqq. + Ibid. 74a sqq.
The Pythagoreans 355
“ideas” is the sort of reality “we are always talking
about,” and they are explained in a peculiar vocabulary
which is represented as that of a school. The technical
terms are introduced by such formulas as “we say.”'
Whose theory is it? It is usually supposed to be
Plato’s own, though nowadays it is the fashion to call
it his “early theory of ideas,’ and to say that he
modified it profoundly in later life. But there are
serious difficulties in this view. Plato is very careful
to tell us that he was not present at the conversation _
recorded in the Phaedo. Did any philosopher ever
propound a new theory of his own by representing it
as already familiar to a number of distinguished living
contemporaries? It is not easy to believe that. It
would be rash, on the other hand, to ascribe the theory
to Sokrates, and there seems nothing for it but to
suppose that the doctrine of “forms” (εἴδη, ἐδέαι)
originally took shape in Pythagorean circles, perhaps
under Sokratic influence. There is nothing startling in
this. It is a historical fact that Simmias and Kebes
were not only Pythagoreans but disciples of Sokrates ;
for, by a happy chance, the good Xenophon has included
them in his list of true Sokratics.2 We have also
sufficient ground for believing that the Megarians had
adopted a like theory under similar influences, and
Plato states expressly that Eukleides and Terpsion of
1 Cf. especially the words ὃ θρυλοῦμεν ἀεί (76d 8). The phrases αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν, αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτό, and the like are assumed to be familiar. ‘‘ We” define reality by means of question and answer, in the course of which ‘‘ we” give an account of its being (ἧς λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ εἶναι, 78 d 1, where Aoyov . . . τοῦ εἶναι is equivalent to λόγον τῆς οὐσίας). When we have done this, ‘‘ we” set the seal or stamp of αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν upon it (75d 2). Tech- nical terminology implies a school. As Diels puts it (Z/ementum, p. 20), it is in a school that ‘‘the simile concentrates into a metaphor, and the metaphor condenses into a term.”
2 Xen. Mem. i. 2, 48.
356 Early Greek Philosophy
Megara were present at the conversation recorded in
the Phaedo, There were, no doubt, more “friends of
the ideas” * than we generally recognise. It is certain,
in any case, that the use of the words εἴδη and ἐδέαι to
express ultimate realities is pre-Platonic, and it seems
most natural to regard it as of Pythagorean origin.’
We have really exceeded the limits of this work by
tracing the history of Pythagoreanism down to a point
where it becomes practically indistinguishable from the
earliest form of Platonism ; but it was necessary to do
so in order to put the statements of our authorities in
their true light. Aristoxenos is not likely to have been
mistaken with regard to the opinions of the men he.
had known personally, and Aristotle’s statements must
have had some foundation. We must assume, then,
a later form of Pythagoreanism which was closely akin
to early Platonism. That, however, is not the form οἵ
it which concerns us here, and we shall see in the next
chapter that the fifth-century doctrine was of the more
primitive type already described.
1 Plato, Soph. 248 a 4.
2 See Diels, Z/ementum, pp. 16 sqq. Parmenides had already called the: original Pythagorean ‘‘ elements” μορφαί (8 91), and Philistion called the ‘**elements” of Empedokles ἰδέαι. If the ascription of this terminology to the Pythagoreans is correct, we may say that the Pythagorean ‘‘ forms” ‘developed into the atoms of Leukippos and Demokritos on the one hand: __ (8 174), and into the ‘‘ideas” of Plato on the other.
CHAPTER VIII THE YOUNGER ELEATICS..
154. THE systems we have just been studying were
all fundamentally pluralist, and they were so because
Parmenides had shown that, if we take a corporeal
monism seriously, we must ascribe to reality a number
of predicates which are inconsistent with our experience
of a world which everywhere displays multiplicity,
motion, and change (§ 97). The four “roots” of
Empedokles and the innumerable “seeds” of Anaxa-
goras were both of them conscious attempts to solve
the problem which Parmenides had raised ({§ τοῦ,
127). There is no evidence, indeed, that the Pytha-
goreans were directly influenced by Parmenides, but it
has been shown (§ 147) how the later form of their
system was based on the theory of Empedokles.
Now it was just this prevailing pluralism that Zeno
criticised from the Eleatic standpoint; and his argu-
ments were especially directed against Pythagoreanism.
Melissos, too, criticises Pythagoreanism ; but he tries
to find a common ground with his adversaries by
maintaining the old Ionian thesis that reality is
infinite.
J συν enw +
Relation to predecessors.
Life.
358 Early Greek Philosophy
I. Zeno of Elea
155. According to Apollodoros,' Zeno flourished in
Ol. LXXIX. (464-460 B.c.). This date is arrived at
by making him forty years younger than his master
Parmenides. We have seen already (ὃ 84) that the
meeting of Parmenides and Zeno with the young
Sokrates cannot well have occurred before 449 B.C.,
and Plato tells us that Zeno was at that time “nearly
forty years old.”* He must, then, have been born
about 489 B.C., some twenty-five years after Parmenides.
He was the son of Teleutagoras, and the statement of
Apollodoros that he had been adopted by Parmenides
is only a misunderstanding of an expression of Plato’s
Sophist.2 He was, Plato further tells us,* tall and of
a graceful appearance.
Like Parmenides and most other early philosophers,
Zeno seems to have played a part in the politics of his
native city. Strabo ascribes to him some share of the
credit for the good government of Elea, and says that
he was a Pythagorean.’ This statement can easily be
explained. Parmenides, we have seen, was originally a
Pythagorean, and the school of Elea was no doubt
popularly regarded as a mere branch of the larger
society. We hear also that Zeno conspired against a
tyrant, whose name is differently given, and the story
1 Diog. ix. 29 (R. P. 130 a). ‘“Apollodoros is not expressly referred to for Zeno’s date ; but, as he is quoted for his father’s name (ix. 25; R. P. 130), there can be no doubt that he is also the source of the floruzt.
2 Plato, Parm. 127 b(R. P. 111 d). The visit of Zeno to Athens is confirmed by Plut. Per. 4 (R. P. 130 6), where we are told that Perikles ‘*heard” him as well as Anaxagoras. It is also alluded to in A/. 1. 119 a, where we are told that Pythodoros, son of Isolochos, and Kallias, son of Kalliades, each paid him 100 minae for instruction.
3 Plato, Soph. 241 ἃ (R. P. 130 a).
J Plato, Parm., loc. cit. 5 Strabo, vi. p. 252 (ΒΕ. P. 111 ὁ).
The Younger Eleatics 359
of his courage under torture is often repeated, though © with varying details.’
156. Diogenes speaks of Zeno’s “ books,” and Writings.
Souidas gives some titles which probably come from
the Alexandrian librarians through MHesychios of
Miletos.” In the Parmenides, Plato makes Zeno say
that the work by which he is best known was written
in his youth and published against his will.2 As he ©
is supposed to be forty years old at the time of the
dialogue, this must mean that the book was written
before 460 B.C. (§ 84), and it is very possible that he
'- wrote others after it. The most remarkable title which
has come down to us is that of the /xterpretation of
Empedokles. It is not to be supposed, of course, that
Zeno wrote a commentary on the Poem of Empedokles ;
but, as Diels has pointed out,* it is quite credible that
he should have written an attack on it, which was
afterwards called by that name. If he wrote a work
against the “philosophers,” that must mean the
Pythagoreans, who, as we have seen, made use of
the term in a sense of their own.’ The Dzsputations
and the Treatise on Nature may, or may not, be the
same as the book described in Plato’s Parmenides.
It is not likely that Zeno wrote dialogues, though
certain references in Aristotle have been supposed to
imply this. In the Physzcs® we hear of an argument
of Zeno’s, that any part of a heap of millet makes a
1 Diog. ix. 26, 27, and the other passages referred to in R. P. 130 Ὁ.
2 Diog. ix. 26 (R. P. 130); Suidas s.v. (R. P. 130 d).
3 Plato, Parm. 128 ἃ 6(R. P. 130 d).
4 Berl. Sitzb., 1884, p. 359.
5 See above, p. 321, ἢ. 2. It hardly seems likely that a later writer would make Zeno argue πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσόφους, and the title given to the book at Alexandria must be based on something contained in it.
6 Arist. Phys. H, 5. 250 a 20(R. P. 131 a).
360 Early Greek Philosophy
sound, and Simplicius illustrates this by quoting a
passage from a dialogue between Zeno and Protagoras.'
If our chronology is right, there is nothing impossible
in the idea that the two men may have met; but it
is most unlikely that Zeno should have made himself
a personage in a dialogue of his own. That was a
later fashion. In another place Aristotle refers to a
passage where “the answerer and Zeno the questioner”
occurred,” a reference which is most easily to be under-
stood in the same way. Alkidamas seems to have
written a dialogue in which Gorgias figured,® and the
exposition of Zeno’s arguments in dialogue form must
always have been a tempting exercise. It appears
also that Aristotle made Alexamenos the first writer
of dialogues.*
Plato gives us a clear idea of what Zeno’s youthful
work- was like. It contained more than one “ dis-
course,” and these discourses were subdivided into
sections, each dealing with some one presupposition
of his adversaries.” We owe the preservation of Zeno’s
arguments on the one and many to Simplicius. Those
1 Simpl. Phys. p. 1108, 18 (R. P. 131). If this is what Aristotle refers to, it is hardly safe to attribute the xeyxpirns λόγος to Zeno himself. It is worth noting that the existence of this dialogue is another indica- tion of Zeno’s visit to Athens at an age when he could converse with Protagoras, which agrees very well with Plato’s representation of the matter.
Arist. Soph. Zl. 170 b 22 (R. P. 130 b). * "Chap. V. ‘p. 23%, 0. °5
4 Diog. iii. 48. It is certain that the authority whom Diogenes follows hére took the statement of Aristotle to mean that Alexamenos was the first yriter of prose dialogues.
δ Plato, Parm. 127d. Plato speaks of the first ὑπόθεσις of the first λόγος, which shows that the book was really divided into separate sections. Proclus (272 Joc.) says there were forty of these λόγοι altogether.
§ Simplicius expressly says in one place (p. 140, 30; R. P. 133) that he is' quoting κατὰ λέξιν. I now see no reason to doubt this, as the Academy, would certainly have a copy of the work. If so, the fact that the fragments’are not written in Ionic is another confirmation of Zeno’s residence at Athens.
The Younger Eleatics 361
relating to motion have been preserved by Aristotle himself ;* but, as usual, he has restated them in his
own language.
157. Aristotle in his Sophist? called Zeno the in- Dialectic.
ventor of dialectic, and this, no doubt, is substantially
true, though the beginnings at least of that method of
arguing were contemporary with the foundation of the
Eleatic school. Plato® gives us a spirited account of
the style and purpose of Zeno’s book, which he puts
into his own mouth :—
In reality, this writing is a sort of reinforcement for the argument of Parmenides against those who try to turn it into
ridicule on the ground that, if reality is one, the argument becomes invelved in many absurdities and contradictions. This writing argues against those who uphold a Many, and gives them back as good and better than they gave; its aim is to show that their assumption of multiplicity will be involved in still more absurdities than the assumption of unity, if it is sufficiently worked out.
The method of Zeno was, in fact, to take one of his adversaries’ fundamental postulates and deduce from it two contradictory conclusions.* This is what Aristotle meant by calling him the inventor of dialectic, which is just the art of arguing, not from true premisses, but from premisses admitted by the other side. The