1 This is doubtless the meaning of the words τοῖς ἔργοις ὕστερος in Arist. Met. A, 3. 984 ἃ 12(R. P. 150 a); though ἔργα certainly does not mean ‘* writings” or ofera omnia, but simply ‘‘achievements.” The other possible interpretations are ‘‘ more advanced in his views” and ‘‘ inferior in his teaching ” (Zeller, p. 1023, n. 2).
* Arist. Phys. A, 4. 187 b 1 (R. P. 155 a).
‘« Everythin in everythin;
cn IT
The portions.
304 Early Greek Philosophy
what is not flesh?” (fr.10).". That is just the sort of
question the early Milesians must have asked, only the
physiological interest has now definitely replaced the
meteorological. We shall find a similar train of
reasoning in Diogenes of Apollonia (fr. 2).
The statement that there is a portion of everything
in everything, is not to be understood as referring
simply to the original mixture of things before the
formation of the worlds (fr. 1). On the contrary, even
now “all things are together,” and everything, however
small and however great, has an equal number of
“portions” (fr. 6). A smaller particle of matter could
only contain a smaller number of portions, if one of ~
those portions ceased to be; but if anything zs, in the
full Parmenidean sense, it is impossible that mere
division should make it cease to be (fr. 3). Matter is
infinitely divisible; for there is no least thing, any
more than there is a greatest. But however great or
small a body may be, it contains just the same number
of “ portions,” that is, a portion of everything.
129. What are these “things” of which everything
contains a portion? It once was usual to represent the
theory of Anaxagoras as if he had said that wheat, for
instance, contained small particles of flesh, blood, bones,
and the like; but we have just seen that matter is
infinitely divisible (fr. 3), and that there are as many
“portions” in the smallest particle as in the greatest
(fr. 6). This is fatal to the old view. If everything
were made up of minute particles of everything else,
we could certainly arrive at a point where everything was “unmixed,” if only we carried division far enough.
1 Aet. i. 3, 5 (Dox. p. 279). See R. P. 155 fandn.1. I read καρπὸν with Usener.
Anaxagoras of Klazomenai 305
This difficulty can only be solved in one way.' In fr. 8 the examples given of things which are not “cut off from one another with a hatchet” are the hot and the cold ; and elsewhere (frs. 4, 15), mention is made of the other traditional “ opposites.” Aristotle says that, if we suppose the first principles to be infinite, they may either be one in kind, as with Demokritos, or opposite. Simplicius, following Porphyry and Themistios, refers the latter view to Anaxagoras ;* and Aristotle himself implies that the opposites of Anaxagoras had as much right to be called first principles as the “homoeo- meries.” *
It is of those opposites, then, and not of the different
forms of matter, that everything contains a portion.
Every particle, however large or however small,
contains every one of those opposite qualities. That
which is hot is also to a certain extent cold. Even
snow, Anaxagoras affirmed, was black ;° that is, even
the white contains a certain portion of the opposite
quality. It is enough to indicate the connexion of
this with the views of Herakleitos (§ 80).°
1 See Tannery, Sczence helléne, pp. 283sqq. [ still think that Tannery’s interpretation is substantially right, though his statement of it requires some modification.
2 Arist. Phys. A, 2. 184 Ὁ 21, ἢ οὕτως ὥσπερ Δημόκριτος, τὸ γένος ἕν, σχήματι δὲ ἢ εἴδει διαφερούσας, ἢ καὶ ἐναντίας.
5 Phys. p. 44, 1. He goes on} to refer to θερμότητας.. .. καὶ ψυχρότητας ξηρότητάς τε καὶ ὑγρότητας μανότητάς Te Kal πυκνότητας. καὶ τὰς ἄλλας κατὰ ποιότητα ἐναντιότητας. He observes, however, that Alexander rejected this interpretation and took διαφερούσας ἢ καὶ ἐναντίας closely together as both referring to Demokritos.
* Phys. A, 4. 187 ἃ 25, τὸν μὲν (᾿Αναξαγόραν) ἄπειρα ποιεῖν τά τε ὁμοιομερῆ καὶ τἀναντία. Aristotle’s own theory only differs from this in so far as he makes ὕλῃ prior to the ἐναντία.
5 Sext, Pyrrh. i. 33 (R. P. 161 b).
§ The connexion was already noted by the eclectic Herakleitean to whom I attribute Περὲ διαίτης, i. 3-4 (see above, Chap. III. p. 167, ἢ. 2). Cf. the -words ἔχει δὲ ἀπ᾿ ἀλλήλων τὸ μὲν πῦρ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὕδατος τὸ ὑγρόν “"
Seeds.
306 Early Greek Philosophy
130. The difference, then, between the theory of Anaxagoras and that of Empedokles is this. Empe- dokles had taught that, if you divide the various things which make up this world, and in particular the parts of the body, such as flesh, bones, and the like, far enough, you come to the four “roots” or elements, which are, accordingly, the 3. goras held that, however far you may divide any of these things—and they are infinitely divisible—you never come to a part sosmall that it does not contain portions of all the opposites. The smallest portion of bone is still bone. On the other hand, everything can pass into everything else just because the “ seeds,” as he called them, of each form of matter contain a portion of everything, that is, of all the opposites, though in different proportions. If we are to use the word “element” at all, it is these seeds that are the elements in the system of Anaxagoras.
Aristotle expresses this by saying that Anaxagoras
regards the ὁμοιομερῆ as στοιχεῖα We have seen
that the term στουχεῖον is of later date than Anaxagoras,
and it is natural to suppose that the word ὁμοιομερῆ is
also only Aristotle’s name for the “seeds.” In his own
system, the ὁμοιομερῆ are intermediate between the
elements (στοιχεῖα), of which they are composed, and
ἔνι yap ἐν πυρὶ ὑγρότης " τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ ἀπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς τὸ ξηρόν " ἕνι γὰρ καὶ ἐν ὕδατι ξηρόν.
1 Arist. de Gen. Corr. A, 1, 314 a 18, ὁ μὲν yap (Anaxagoras) τὰ ὁμοιομερῆ στοιχεῖα τίθησιν, οἷον ὀστοῦν καὶ σάρκα καὶ μυελόν, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὧν ἑκάστῳ συνώνυμον τὸ μέρος ἐστίν. This was, of course, repeated by Theophrastos and the doxographers ; but it is to be noted that Aetios, supposing as he does that Anaxagoras himself used the term, gives it an entirely wrong meaning. He says that the ὁμοιομέρειαι were so called from the likeness of the particles of the τροφή to those of the body (Dox. 279 a 21; R. P. 155 ἢ. Lucretius, i. 830 sqq. (R. P. 150 a) has a similar account of the matter, derived from Epicurean sources. Obviously, it cannot be reconciled with what Aristotle says.
Anaxagoras of Klazomenai 307
the organs (ὄργανα), which are composed of them. The heart cannot be divided into hearts, but the parts of flesh are flesh. That being so, Aristotle’s statement is quite intelligible from his own point of view, but there is no reason for supposing that Anaxagoras expressed himself in that particular way. All we are entitled to infer is that he said the“ seeds,” which he had. sub- stituted for the “roots” of Empedokles, were not the opposites i in a state of separation, but each contained a portion of them all. If Anaxagoras had used the term “homoeomeries”' himself, it would be strange that Simplicius should quote no fragment containing it.
The difference between the two systems may also be regarded from another point of view. Anaxagoras was not obliged by his theory to regard the elements of Empedokles as primary, a view ‘to which there were obvious objections, especially in the case of earth. He explained them in quite another way. Though every- thing has a portion of everything” in it, things a appear to be that of which there is most in them (fr. 12 sud fin.). ‘We may say, then, that Air is that in which there is most cold, Fire that in which there is most heat, and so on, without giving up-the view that there is a portion of cold in the fire and a portion of heat in the air.2 The great masses which Empedokles had taken for elements are really vast collections of all manner of “seeds.” Each of them is, in fact, a πανσπερμία."
1 It is more likely that we have a trace of the terminology of Anaxagoras himself in Περὶ διαίτης, 3, μέρεα μερέων, ὅλα ὅλων.
2 Cf. above, p. 305.
8 Arist. de Gen. Corr. A, 1. 314.229. The word πανσπερμία was used by Demokritos (Arist. de Am. 404 a 8; R. P. 200), and it occurs in the Περὶ διαίτης (oc. εἶΐ.). It seems natural to suppose that it was used by Anaxagoras himself, as he used the term σπέρματα. Much difficulty has been caused by the apparent inclusion of Water and Fire among the
‘* All things together.”
308 Early Greek Philosophy
131. From all this it follows that, when “all things
were together,” and when the different seeds of things
were mixed together in infinitely small particles (fr. 1),
the appearance presented would be that of one of what
had hitherto been regarded as the primary substances.
As a matter of fact, they did present the appearance
of “air and aether”; for the qualities (things) which
belong to these prevail in quantity over all other
things in the universe, and everything is most obviously
that of which it has most in it (fr. 12 sub fin.). Here,
then, Anaxagoras attaches himself to Anaximenes.
The primary condition of things, before the formation
of the worlds, is much the same in both; only, with
Anaxagoras, the original mass is no longer the primary
substance, but a mixture of innumerable seeds divided
into infinitely small parts.
This mass is infinite, like the air of Anaximenes, and it supports itself, since there is nothing surrounding it.’ Further, the “seeds” of all things which it contains are infinite in number (fr. 1). But, as the innumerable seeds may be divided into those in which the portions of cold, moist, dense, and dark prevail, and those which have most of the warm, dry, rare, and light in them, we may say that the original mass was a mixture of infinite Air and of infinite Fire. The seeds of Air, of course, contain “portions” of the
ὁμοιομερῆ in Arist. Met. A, 3. 984 a τι (R. P. 150 a). Bonitz under- stands the words καθάπερ ὕδωρ ἢ πῦρ to mean “‘as we have just seen that Fire and Water do in the system of Empedokles.” In any case, καθάπερ goes closely with οὕτω, and the general sense is that Anaxagoras applies to the ὁμοιομερῆ what is really true of the στοιχεῖα, It would be better to delete the comma after πῦρ and add one after φησι, for συγκρίσει καὶ διακρίσει μόνον is explanatory of οὕτω... καθάπερ. Inthe next sentence, I read
᾿ἁπλῶς for ἄλλως with Zeller (Avch. ii. p. 261). See also Arist. de Caelo,
I’, 3. 302 δ 1 (R. P. 150 a), where the matter is very clearly put. 1 Arist. Phys. ΓΤ, 5. 205 b1(R. P. 154 a).
Anaxagoras of Klazomenai 309
“things” that predominate in Fire, and vzce versa; but
we regard everything as being that of which it has
most in it. Lastly, there is no void in this mixture,
an addition to the theory made necessary by the
arguments of Parmenides. It is, however, worthy of
note that Anaxagoras added an experimental proof of
this to the purely dialectical one of the Eleatics. He
used the klepsydra experiment as Empedokles had
done (fr. 100), and also showed the corporeal nature of
air by means of inflated skins.’
132. Like Empedokles, Anaxagoras required some
external cause to produce motion in the mixture.
Body, Parmenides had shown, would never move
itself, as the Milesians had supposed. Anaxagoras
called the cause of motion by the name of Nous. It
was this which made Aristotle say that he “stood out
like a sober man from the random talkers that had
preceded him,”? and he has often been credited with
the introduction of the spiritual into philosophy. The
disappointment expressed both by Plato and Aristotle
as to the way in which Anaxagoras worked out the
theory should, however, make us pause to reflect before
accepting too exalted a view of it. Plato® makes
Sokrates say: “I once heard a man reading a book,
as he said, of Anaxagoras, and saying it was Mind
that ordered the world and was the cause of all things.
I was delighted to hear of this cause, and I thought he
really was right. . . . But my extravagant expectations
1 Phys. ὦ, 6. 213 a 22 (R. P. 159). We have a full discussion of the experiments with the &/epsydra in Probl. 914 Ὁ 9 sqq., a passage which we have already used to illustrate Empedokles, fr. 100. See above, Ῥ. 253, ἢ, 2.
? Arist. Met. A, 3. 984 Ὁ 15 (R. P. 152).