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The First Philosophers of Greece — Arthur Fairbanks (Empedocles)

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ν 176, 24. Phys. 157, 3 cf. 385 ν 165, 14. Phys. 157, 4 cf. 35 v 165, 3. 156, 15. 176, 84 ἐπ᾽ ἑωυτοῦ: D ἀλλὰ τέω, HI ἀλλὰ τέως, F GAA’, Text froma. 156,16. DEF µετεῖχε μὲν, Text from a. 156, 17. Refers to Fr. 5. aH F ἀνεκώλυεν, Text from D. 156,20. ἴσχει. 177, 1 ἔχει. +156, 21. aDF' omit καὶ before ὅσα, Text from FE and 177,2. 177, 2 τὰ µείζω καὶ τὰ ἑλάσσω. 156, 99. HD! περιχωρήσεως, Text from aD?F. 177, 8 omits ἄστε-- ἐπὶ πλέον. 156, 23. HE omits τοῦ before σμικροῦ. al’ περιχωρῆσαι, Text from DE. 156, 26. 165, 33 καὶ ὁπόσα νῦν ἐστι καὶ ἔσται, 177, 5. ἄσσα νῦν μὴ ἔστι. 157, 3. 165, 15. After ὅμοιον οὐδενὶ the words érépp ἀπείρων ὕντων should probably be ascribed to Simpl. 157, 4. DE ἀλλ ὅτω, F ἄλλω τῶ: F' τὰ πλεῖστα (also 165, 3), Text from aDZ£.

Anaxagoras 24]

not by. itself, but were mixed with anything else, it would include parts of all things, if it were mixed with any- thing ; for a portion of everything exists in everything, as has been said by me before, and things mingled with it would prevent it from having power over anything in the same way that it does now that it is alone by itself. For it is the most rarefied of all things and the purest, and it has all knowledge in regard to everything and the greatest power ; over all that has life, both greater and less, mind rules. And mind ruled the rotation of the whole, so that it set it in rotation in the beginning. First it began the rotation from a small beginning, then more and more was included in the motion, and yet more will be included. Both the mixed and the separated and distinct, all things mind recognised. And whatever things were to be, and whatever things were, as many as are now, and whatever things shall be, all these mind arranged in order; and it arranged that rotation, according to which now rotate stars and sun and moon and air and aether, now that they are separated. Rotation itself caused the separation, and the dense is separated from the rare, the warm from the cold, the bright from the dark, the dry from the moist. And there are many portions of many things. Nothing is absolutely separated nor distinct, one thing from another, except mind. All mind is of like character, both the greater and the -

smaller. But nothing different is ike anything else, but R

242 the First Philosophers of Greece

ἕτερον δὲ οὐδεν dori ὅμοιον οὐδένι, GAN’ ὅτῳ πλεῖστα Et, ταῦτα ἐνδηλότητα by ἕκαστόν ἐστι καὶ ἦν.

7. καὶ ἐπεὶ ἤρξατο ὁ νοῦς κινεῖν, ἀπὸ τοῦ κινουµένου
παντὸς ἀπεκρίνετο, καὶ ὅσον ἐκίνησεν ὁ νοῦς, Tay τοῦτο
διεκρίθη. µκινουµένων δὲ καὶ διακρινοµένων ἡ περεχώ-
ρησ!:9 πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐποίει διακρίνεσθαι.

8. τὸ μὲν πυκνὸν καὶ διερὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν καὶ τὸ
ζοφερὸν ἐνθάδε συνεχώρησεν ἔνθα νῦν <1) γῆΣ" τὸ δὲ
ἀραιὸν καὶ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ξηρὸν «καὶ τὸ λαμπρὸν»
ἐξεχώρησεν eis τὸ πρὀσω τοῦ αἰθέρον.

9. ἀπὸ τουτέων ἄποκρινομένων συµπήγνυται yn’ ἐκ
μὲν γὰρ τῶν νεφελῶν ὕδωρ ἀποκρίνεται, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ὕδατος
yi, ἐκ δὲ THs γῆς λίθοι συµπήγνυνται ὑπὸ τοῦ ψυχροῦ,
οὗτοι δὲ ἑκχωρέουσι μᾶλλον τοῦ ὕδατος.

12. ὁ δὲ νοῦς, ws dei ποτε, κάρτα καὶ νῦν ἐστιν, ἵνα
καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα, ἐν τῷ πολλῷ περιέχοντι καὶ ἐν τοῖς
ὠποκριθεῖσι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀποκρινομένοι».

19. οὐ κεχώρισται ἀλλήλων τὰ ἐν τῷ svi κὀσμῳ οὐδὲ
ἀποκέκοπται πελέκει οὔτε τὸ θερμὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ ψυχροῦ
οὔτε τὸ ψυχρὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ θερμοῦ.

15. οὔτε γὰρ τοῦ σμικροῦ ἐστι τό γε ἐλάχιστον, ἀλλ ἔλασσον ἀεί. τὸ yap ἐὸν οὐκ ἔστι τὸ μὴ οὐκ εἶναι.

7. Simpl. Phys. 66r; 300, 31. 33. DE καὶ, aF' omit. 8. Simpl. Phys. 38r; 179, 3. Cf. Dow. 562, 8. 4. 179, 4 Diels would supply τὸ before d:epdy and ψυχρὸν. 5. From Dox. 562 add 4 γῆ . . « Τὸ λαμπρὸν.

9. Simpl. Phys. 96 r 179, 8. In part 33 τ 166, 21. ΟΙ. 106 v 460, 19.14. 155,22. λίθοι συµπήγνυνται.

19. Simpl. Phys. 98 r 157, 7. Simpl. ὅσα ἐστί τε, corr. Diels : πολλὰ περιέχοντι, corr. Diels; cf. p. 155, δΙ : προσκριθεῖσι . . . ἀποκρινομένοις, corr. Diels ; cf. 156, 28.

13. Simpl. Phys. 87 r 175, 12 beginning with οὐδέ. To πελέκει, 38 ν 176, 29.

15. Simpl. Phys. 85 ν 164,17. Cf. 35 r 166, 15.

164, 17. MS. τὸ wh, Zeller, Phil. Gr. 1. 884 η. 3 τομῇ. After

Anaxagoras 243

in whatever object there are the most, each single object is and was most distinctly these things.!

7. And when mind began to set things in motion,
there was separation from everything that was in motion,
and however much mind: set in motion, all this was
made distinct. The rotation of the things that were
moved and made distinct caused them to be yet more
distinct. |

8. The dense, the moist, the cold, the dark, collected
there where now is the earth; the rare, the warm, the
dry, the bright, departed toward the farther part of the
aether. |

9. Earth is condensed out of these things that are
separated. For water is separated from the clouds, and
earth from the water; and from the earth stones are
condensed by cold; and these are separated farther
from water.?

12. But mind, as it always has been, especially now
also is where all other things are, in the surrounding
mass, and in the things that were separated, and in the
things that are being separated.

19. Things in the one universe are not divided from
each other, nor yet are they cut off with an axe, neither
hot from cold, nor cold from hot.

15. For neither is there a least of what is small, but there is always a less. For being is not non-being.

' 1.9. things are called after the element or elements (homoeomeries)
which predominate in their make-up.
2 Cf. Herakleitos, Fr. 68.

244 the First Philosophers of Greece

ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ μεγάλου ἀεί ἔστι psiCov. καὶ ἴσον ἐστὶ τῷ
σμικρῷ πλῆθος, πρὸς ἑαυτὸ δὲ ἕκαστόν ἐστι καὶ péya καὶ
σμικρόν.

16. καὶ ὅτε δὲ ἴσαι μοῖραί εἶσι τοῦ τε μεγάλου καὶ τοῦ
σμικροῦ πλῆθος, καὶ οὕτως ἂν εἴη ἐν παντὶ πάντα. οὐδὲ
χωρὶς ἔστιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πάντα παντὸς μοῖραν μετέχει.
ὅτε τοὐλάχιστον μὴ ἔστιν εἶναι, οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο χωρι-
σθῆναι, οὐδ' ἂν ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ γενέσθαι ' ἆλλ᾽ ὅπωσπερ ἀρχὴν
εἶναι καὶ νῦν, πάντα ὁμοῦ. ἐν πᾶσι δὲ πολλὰ ἔνεστι, καὶ
τῶν ἀποκρινομένων ica πλῆθος ἐν τοῖς μείζοσί τε καὶ
ἐλάσσοσι. .

17. τὸ δὲ γίνεσθαι καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι οὐκ ὀρθῶς νοµί-
ζουσιν οἱ Ἕλληνες: οὐδὲν γὰρ χρῆμα γίνεται οὐδὲ ἀπόλ-
λυται, ἀλλ) ἀπὸ ἐόντων χρημάτων συμμίσγεταί τε καὶ
διακρίνεταυ. και οὕτως ἂν ὀρθῶς καλοῖεν TO τε φίνεσθαι
συμμίσγεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀπόλλυσθαι διακρίνεσθαι.

19η πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἐκ μὴ τριχὸς γίνοιτο θρὶξ καὶ capt

ἐκ μὴ TAPKOS ;

εἶναι Schorn inserts οὔτε τὸ µέγιστον, comparing previous line and 166, 16.

16. Simpl. Phys. 35 v 164, 24. 17. Simpl. Phys. 34 v 163, 20. 18. Schol. in Gregor. Naz. Migne 36, 911. (Cf. Hermes xiii. 4, Diels.)

Anaxagoras 245

But there is always a greater than what is great. And
it is equal to the small in number; but with reference
to itself each thing is both small and great.
16. And since the portions of the great and the
small are equal in number, thus also all things would
be in everything. Nor yet is it possible for them to
exist apart, but all things include a portion of every-
thing. Since it is not possible for the least to exist,
nothing could be separated, nor yet could it come into
being of itself, but as they were in the beginning so they
are now, all things together. And there are many
things in all things, and of those that are separated
there are things equal in number in the greater and
the lesser.

17. The Greeks donot rightly use the terms ‘ coming into being’ and ‘perishing.’ For nothing comes into

being nor yet does anything perish, but there is mixture

and separation of things that are. So they would do right
in calling the coming into being ‘ mixture,’ and the
perishing ‘ separation.’

(18.) For how could hair com2 from what is not hair? Or flesh from what is not flesh ?

PASSAGES FROM PLATO REFERRING TO ANAXAGORAS.

Apol. 26 p. He asserts that I say the sun is a stone
and the moon is earth. Do you think of accusing
Anaxagoras, Meletos, and have you so low an opinion of
these men and think them so unskilled in letters as not
to know that the books of Anaxagoras of Klazomenae
are full of these doctrines? And forsooth the young
men are learning these matters from me, which some-
times they can buy from the orchestra for a drachma at
the most, and laugh at Sokrates if he pretends that they
are his—particularly seeing they are so strange.

246 the First Philosophers of Greece

Phaedo 72 c. And if all things were composite and
were not separated, speedily the statement of Anaxa-
goras would become true, ‘ All things were together.’

97 ο. 1 heard a man reading from a book of one
Anaxagoras (he said), to the effect that it is mind which
arranges all things and is the cause of all things.

98 B. Reading the book, I see that the man does
not make any use of mind, nor does he assign any causes
for the arrangement of things, but he treats air and
aether and water as causes, and many other strange
things.

Lysis 214 5. The writings of the wisest men say...
that it is necessary for the like always to be loved by
the unlike. .

Hipp. Mai. 283 4. They say you had an experience
opposite to that of Anaxagoras; for though he inherited
much property he lost it all by his carelessness ; so he
practised a senseless wisdom.

Kratyl. 400 a. And do you not believe Anaxagoras
that the nature of all other things is mind, and that
it is soul which arranges and controls them ? (cf. Phaedo
72 ο).

409 a. It looks as though the opinion Anaxagoras
recently expressed was 8 more ancient matter, that the
moon has its light from the sun. |

419 c. Anaxagoras is right in saying that this is
mind, for he says that mind exercising absolute power
and mingled with nothing disposes all things, running
through all.

Rival. 1382 a. But the youths seemed to be quarrel-
ling about Anaxagoras or Oenopedos, for they were
evidently drawing circles and imitating certain inclina-
tions by the slope of their hands with great earnestness.

Phil. 28 c. All the wise men agree that mind 16 king of heaven and earth for us.

Anaxagoras 247

90 p. Some long ago declared that always mind rules the all.

Legg. 967 8. And some had the daring to conjecture
this very thing, saying that it is mind which disposes
all things in the heavens. And the same men again,
being in error as to the nature of soul, in that it is
older than bodies, while they regarded it as younger, to
put 16 in a word, turned all things upside down, and
themselves most of all. For indeed all things before
their eyes—the things moving in the heavens—appeared
to them to be full of stones and earth and many other
soulless bodies, which dispose the causes of all the
universe.

Phaedr. 270 a. All the arts that are great require subtlety and the higher kind of philosophy of nature ; so such loftiness and complete effectiveness seem to come from this source. This Perikles acquired in addition to being a man of genius; for as the result, I think, of his acquaintance with such a man as Anaxagoras he became imbued with high philosophy, and arrived at the nature of intelligence [νοῦς] and its opposite, concerning which Anaxagoras often discoursed, so that he brought to the art of speaking what was advantageous to him.

PassaGEsS IN ARISTOTLE REFERRING TO ANAXAGORAS.

Phys. i. 4; 187a 20. And others say that the oppo-
sites existing in the one are separated out of it, us
Anaximandros says, and as many as say that things are
one and many, as Empedokles and Anaxagoras; for
these separate other things out of the mixture. . . And
Anaxagoras seems to have thought (the elements) in-
finite because he assumed the common opinion of the
physicists to be true, that nothing arises out of non-
being; for this is why they say, as they do, that al

248 the First Philosophers of Greece

things were together, and he established the fact that such ‘ arising’ was change of form. |

Phys.1.4; 187 α 96. They thought that (what arose)
arose necessarily out of things that are and their attri-
butes, and, because the masses were so small, out of
what we cannot perceive. Wherefore they say that
everything was mixed in everything because they saw
everything arising out of everything; and different
things appeared and were called different from each
other according to what is present in greater number
in the mixture of the infinites; for the whole is not
purely white or black or sweet or flesh or bone, but the
nature of the thing seems to be that of which it has
the most.

Phys. iii. 4; 208 a 19. And as many as make the
elements infinite, as Anaxagoras and Demokritos, the
former out of homoeomeries. . . .

Phys. iii. 5; 205b1. Anaxagoras speaks strangely
about the permanence of the infinite; for he says that
the infinite itself establishes itself—that is, it is in itself;
for nothing else surrounds it, so that wherever anything
may be, it is there in virtue of its origin.

Phys. iv. 6 ; 218 a 22. Some who try to show that the
void does not exist, do not prove this of what men are
wont to call a void, but they make the mistake Anaxa-
goras did and those who attempted to prove it after this
manner. For they show that air is something, blowing
skins up tight, and showing how strong air is, and shut-
ting it up in clepsydrae.

Phys. viii. 1; 250b24. For Anaxagoras says that
when all things were together and had been at rest for
an infinite time, mind introduced motion and caused
separation.'