and in itself is always at the end of time, and because ‘of the ever-moving beginning of that which passes, it is always at the beginning, and remains eternal, so that that which has beginning and end in quantity has also beginning and end in time, and the reverse ; for that which has beginning and end in time is not everything simultaneously. So he bases his proof on beginning and end in time. Accordingly he says that that which is not everything—t.e. which is not the whole simultaneously—is not without beginning or end; what applies to things that are indivisible and infinite in their being, applies so much the more to pure being; and that all applies to being. Melissos puts it as follows: (Fr. 7) Since then it did not come into being but is, it always was and always will be, and has neither beginning nor end, but is infinite. For if it had come into existence it would have had a beginning (for that which once came into existence would have a begin- ning) and an end (for that which once came into exist- ence would come to an end) ; if it neither had a beginning nor came to an end, it always was and always will be; it has not beginning or end; but it is impossible that anything which is not the whole should always exist... .. . 81. (Fr. 8) But as it always exists, so it is necessary also that it be always infinite in magnitude. ], 88. (Fr. 15) If being is separated it moves; and that which moves could not exist simultaneously.
94: 110, 1 (Fr. 16) If being exists it must be one,
and being one it is necessary that it should not itself
have body; (19; 87, 6) and if it should have thickness,
it would have parts and would no longer be a unity.
l. 8 (Fr. 9) Nothing which has beginning and end is
either eternal or infinite. 1. 5 (Fr. 10) If it were not
one, it would be bounded by something else.
' The paraphrase above (Fr. 3) gives the argument in fuller form.
The Eleatic School: Melissos 127
24; 111, 18. Melissos bringing his previous topic to a conclusion goes on to consider motion. (Fr. 11) So then the all is eternal and infinite and homogeneous ; and it could neither perish nor become greater nor change its arrangement nor suffer pain or distress. If it experienced any of these things it would no longer be one ; for if it becomes different, it is necessary that being should not be homogeneous, but that which was before must perish, and that which was not must come into existence. If then the all should become different by a single hair in ten thousand years, it would perish in the whole of time. (Fr. 12) And it is impossible for its order to change, for the order existing before does not perish, nor does another which did not exist come into being ; and since nothing is added to it or subtracted from it or made different, how could any of the things that are change their order? But if anything became different, its order would already have been changed. (Fr. 18) Nor does it suffer pain, for the all could not be pained ; it would be impossible for anything suffering pain always to be; nor does it have power equal to the power of what ᾿ is healthy. It would not be homogeneous if it suffered pain ; it would suffer pain whenever anything was added or taken away, and it would no longer be homogeneous. Nor could what is healthy suffer a pang of pain, for both the healthy and being would perish, and not-being would come into existence. The same reasoning that applies to pain applies also to distress. (Fr. 14) Nor is there any void, for the void is nothing, and that which is nothing could not be. Nor does it move, for it has nowhere to go to, since it is full; for if there were a void it could go into the void, but since there is no void it has nowhere to go to. It could not be rare and dense, for it is not possible for the rare to be as full as the dense, but the rare is already more empty than the dense.
128 the First Philosophers of Greece
This is the test of what is full and what is not full: if it has room for anything, or admits anything into it, it is not full; if it does not have room for anything, or admit anything into it, it is full. If no void exists it must be full; if then it is full it does not move. These are the doctrines of Melissos.
84; 162, 24. (Fr. 6) What was, always was and
always will be; for if it had come into existence, it
necessarily would have been nothing before it came into
existence. If now there were nothing existing, nothing
would ever have come into existence from nothing.
Simpl. de Coelo 187r; Schol. Aristot. 509b; cf. Aristokl. Euseb. Pr. Ev. xiv.17. (Fr. 17) This argument is the strongest proof that being is one only. And the proofs are as follows: For if a multiplicity of things existed it would be necessary that these things should be just such as I say the one is. For if earth exists, and water and air and iron and gold and fire and the living and the dead and black and white, and everything else which men say is real,—if these things exist and we see and hear them correctly, it is necessary that each thing should be such as we first determined, namely, it should not change its character or become different, but should always be each thing what it is. Now we say that we see and hear and understand correctly ; but it seems to: us that hot becomes cold and cold hot, that hard becomes soft and soft hard, that the living being dies and life comes from what is not living ; and that all these things become different, and what they are is not like what they were. It seems to us that iron, being hard to the touch, wastes away tbecoming liquefied,t! and so does gold, and rock, and whatever else seems to be strong, so that we conclude that we do not see or know things
1 Zeller i.5 613 η. 1 suggests ix’ ἰοῦ ῥέω», ‘passing away because of rust.’
The Eleatic School: Melissos 129
that are; And earth and rock arise from water. These things then do hot harmonise with each other. Though we said that many things are eternal, and have forms and strength, it seems that they all become different and change their character each time they are seen. Evi- dently we do not see correctly, nor is the appearance of multiplicity correct; for they would not change their character if they were real, but would remain each thing as it seemed, for nothing is nobler than that which is real. But if they change their character, being perishes and not-being comes into existence. So then if a multi- plicity of things exist, it 1s necessary that they should be such as the one is,
(b) ARISTOTLE’s AccoUNT OF MELIssos.
Phys. i. 8; 186 a6. Both Melissos and Parmenides
argue fallaciously, and they make false assumptions and
their reasonings are not logical; but the argument of
Melissos is the more wearisome, for it sets no problem,
but granted one strange thing, others follow ; and there
is no difficulty in this. The error in the reasoning of
Melissos is plain, for he thinks that if everything which
‘ has come into being has a beginning, he can assume
that that which has not come into being does not have
a beginning. This, then, is strange, that he shou'd
think that everything has a beginning except time, and
this does not, and that simple generation has no begin-
ning but change alone begins, as though change as a
whole did not come into being. Even if the all is
a unity, why then should it not move? Why should
not the whole be moved even as a part of it which is a
unity, namely water, is moved in itself? Then why
should there not be change? It is not possible that
being should be one in form, but only in its source.
130 the First Philosophers of Greece
Soph. Elen. 5; 163 b 18. The same is true of syllogisms, as for instance in the case of Melissos’ argu- ment that the all is infinite; in this he assumes that the all is not generated (for nothing is generated from not- being), and that that which is generated, is generated from a beginning. If then the all was not generated, it does not have a beginning, so itis infinite. It is not necessary to assent to this, for even if everything which . is generated has a beginning, it does not follow that if anything has a beginning it was generated, as a man with a fever 1s warm, but one who is warm may not have a fever. |
Soph. Elen. 6; 164 Ὁ 96. Or again, as Melissos
assumes in his argument that generation and having a
beginning are the same thing, or that that which is
generated from equals has the same size. The two
statements, that whatis generated has a beginning, and
that what has a beginning is generated, he deems equiva-
lent, so that the generated and the limited are both the
same in that they each have a beginning. Because
what is generated has a beginning, he postulates that
what has a beginning is generated, as though both that
which 18 generated and that which is finite were the
same in having a beginning. ;
(ο. Passages RELATING το MELISSOS IN THE DoxoGRAPHISTs. |
Epiph. adv. Haer. ili. 12; Dow. 590. Melissos of Samos, son of Ithagenes, said that the all is one in kind, but that nothing is fixed in its nature, for all things are potentially destructible. |
Aet. Plac. i. 8; Ώου. 285. Melissos of Miletos, son of
Ithagenes, became his companion, but he did not pre-
serve in its purity the doctrine that was transmitted to
The Eleatic School: Melissos$ 151
him. For he said in regard to the infinite that the
world of those things that appear is limited. i. 7; 308.
Melissos and Zeno say that the one is universal, and
that it exists alone, eternal, and unlimited. And
this unity is necessity [Heeren inserts here the name
Empedokles], and the material of which it consists
is the four elements, and the forms are love and strife.
He calls the elements gods, and the mixture of them the
world. And the uniform will be resolved. He thinks
that souls are divine, and that pure men who share
these things in a pure way are divine. i. 24; 990.
Melissos (et al.) deny géneration and destruction, because
they think that the all is unmoved.
Aet. ii. 1; 827. Melissos (et al.): The universe is one. 328. The all is infinite, but the world is limited. 4 ; 882. Melissos (et al.) : The world is not generated, not to be destroyed, eternal.
Aet. iv. 9; 896. Melissos (et al.) : Sensations are. deceptive. | | |
153 the First Philosophers οε Greece
IX. PYTHAGORAS AND THE PYTHAGOREANS.
Pyruacoras, son of Mnesarchos, a native of Samos, left his fatherland to escape the tyranny of Polykrates (538 /2 or 529/85B.c.). He made his home for many years in Kroton in southern Italy, where his political views gained control in the city. At length he and his followers were banished by an opposing party, and he died at Metapontum. Many stories are told of his travels into Egypt and more widely, but there is no evidence on which the stories can be accepted. He was a mystic thinker and religious reformer quite as much as 8 philosopher, but there is no reason for denying that the doctrines of the school originated with him. Of his disciples, Archytas, in southern Italy, and Philolaos and Lysis, at Thebes, are the best known. It is the doctrine of the school, not the teaching of Pythagoras himself, which is known to us through the writings of Aristotle.
Literature :—On Pythagoras: Krische, De societatis a
Pythagora conditae scopo politico, 1880 ; E. Rohde,
Rhein. Mus. xxvi. 565 sqq.; xxvii. 28 sqq.; Diels,
Rhein. Mus. xxx1. 258q.; Zeller, Sitz. d. kgl. preus.
Akad. 1889, 45, p. 985 sqq.; Chaignet, Pythagore,
1878, and the excellent account in Burnett.
Philolaos : Boeckh, Philolaos Lehren, nebst den
Bruchstiicken seines Werkes, 1819; V. Rose,
Comment. de Arist. libr. ord. et auct. Berlin 1854 ;
Schaarschmidt, Die angebliche Schriftstelleret de:
Phil. Bonn 1864; Zeller, Gesch. d. griech. Phil.
4 Auf. 261, 341, 886 ; Hermes x. 178; Bywater,
Journal of Philol. i. 21 sqq.
Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans 133
Archytas : Hartenstein, de Archyt. Tar. fragm. Lips.
1888 ; Gruppe, Die F'ragm. d. Archyt. Berlin 1840 ;
Petersen, Zevtschr. f. Altertumsk. 1886 ; Chaignet,
Pythagore, 1873, pp. 191, 255.