ΡΣ and the arts, and we know that they were ς

1 These two points are rightly emphasised by Staigmiiller, Beztrage zur Gesch. der Naturwissenschaften im klassischen Altertume (Progr. Stuttgart,

ee ee ae Ser TON ye ee 1.0 ΦΌΝΟΝ : INTRODUCTION 31

instruments of precision; but a great deal can be
discovered by the help of very simple apparatus. It is
not to be supposed that Anaximander erected his
gnomon merely that the Spartans might know the
seasons.’

Nor is it true that the Greeks made no use οἱ
experiment. The rise of the experimental method
dates from the time when the medical schools began
to influence the development of philosophy, and
accordingly we find that the first recorded experiment
of a modern type is that of Empedokles with the
klepsydra. We have his own account of this (fr. 100),
and we can see how it brought him to the verge of
anticipating both Harvey and Torricelli. It is once
more inconceivable that an inquisitive people should
have applied the experimental method in a single
case without extending it to the elucidation of other

_ problems.

Of course the great difficulty for us is the geocentric
hypothesis from which science inevitably started, though
only to outgrow it in a surprisingly short time. So
long as the earth is supposed to be in the centre of
the world, meteorology, in the later sense of the word,
is necessarily identified with astronomy. It ,is difficult
for us to feel at home in this point of view, and indeed
we have no suitable word to express what the Greeks
at first called an οὐρανός. It will be convenient
to use the word “world” for it; but then we must
remember that it does not refer solely, or even chiefly,

-1 The gnomon was not a sundial, but an upright erected on a flat surface, in the centre of three concentric circles. ‘These were drawn so that the end of the gnomon’s shadow touched the innermost circle at midday on the summer solstice, the intermediate circle at the equinoxes, and the outer- most circle at the winter solstice. See Bretschneider, Die Geometrie vor Euklid, p. 60.

32 Early Greek Philosophy

to the earth. The later word κόσμος bears witness to
the growth of scientific ideas. It meant at first the
marshalling of an army, and next the ordered constitu-
tion of a state. It was transferred from this to the
world because in early days the regularity and
constancy of human life was far more clearly seen than
the uniformity of nature. Man lived in a charmed
circle of law and custom, but the world around him
still seemed lawless. That, too, is why, when the
regular course of nature was first realised, no better
word for it could be found than δίκη. It is the same
metaphor which still lives on in the expression
“natural law.” ?

The science of the sixth century was mainly
concerned, then, with those parts of the world that
are “aloft” (τὰ μετέωρα), and these include, along
with the heavenly bodies, such things as clouds, rain-
bows, and lightning. That is how the heavenly bodies
came sometimes to be explained as ignited clouds, an
idea which seems astonishing to us. But we must
bear in mind that science inevitably and rightly began
with the most obvious hypothesis, and that it was
only the thorough working out of this that could show
its inadequacy. It is just because the Greeks were
the first people to take the geocentric hypothesis
seriously that they were able to go beyond it. Of
course the pioneers of Greek thought had no clear idea
of the nature of scientific hypothesis, and supposed
themselves to be dealing with ultimate reality. That
was inevitable before the rise of Logic. At‘the same

1 The term κόσμος seems to be Pythagorean in this sense. It was not familiar even at the beginning of the fourth century. Xenophon speaks of ‘what the sophists call the κόσμος " (AZem. i. 11). For δίκη, see below, 88 14, 72.

Introduction 33

time, a sure instinct guided them to the right method,
and we can see how it was the effort to “save appear-
ances” ’* that really operated from the first. It is,
therefore, to those men that we owe the conception of
an exact science which should ultimately take in the
whole world as its object. They fancied—absurdly
enough, no doubt—that they could work out this
science at once. We sometimes make the same mistake

a ae

nowadays; and it can no more rob the Greeks of the
honour of having been the first to see the true, though
perhaps unattainable, end of all science than it can rob
our own scientific men of the honour of having brought
that end nearer than it was. It is still knowledge of
the kind foreseen and attempted by the Greeks that
they are in search of.

XIV. Theophrastos, the first writer to treat the Schools of : ὃ ‘ philosophy. history of Greek philosophy in a systematic way,” represented the early cosmologists as standing to one another in the relation of master and scholar, and as members of regular societies. This has been regarded by many modern writers as an anachronism, and some have even denied the existence of “schools” of philosophy altogether. Such a reaction against the older view was quite justified in so far as it was directed against arbitrary classifications like the “Ionic” and “Italian” schools, which are derived through Laertios Diogenes from the Alexandrian writers of “ Successions.” But the express statements of Theophrastos are not

1 This phrase originated in the school of Plato. The method of research in use there was for the leader to ‘‘ propound” (προτείνειν, προβάλλεσθαι) it as a ‘‘ problem” (πρόβλημα) to find the simplest ‘‘ hypothesis” (τένων ὑποτεθέντων) on which it is possible to account for and do justice to all the observed facts (σῴζειν τὰ φαινόμενα). It was in its French form, saver les apparences, that the phrase acquired the meaning it usually has now.

2 See Appendix, § 7.

34 Early Greek Philosophy

to be so lightly set aside. As this point is of great
importance, it will be necessary to elucidate it still
further before we enter upon our story.

The modern view really rests upon a mistaken idea
of the way in which civilisation develops. In almost
every department of life, we find that the corporation
at first is everything and the individual nothing. The
peoples of the East hardly got béyond this stage at
all; their science, such as it is, is anonymous, the
inherited property of a caste or guild, and we still see
clearly in some cases that it was once the same among
the Hellenes. Medicine, for instance, was originally the
“mystery ” of the Asklepiads, and it is to be supposed
that all craftsmen (δημιουργοί), amongst whom Homer
classes the bards (ἀοιδοί), were at first organised in
a similar way. What distinguished the Hellenes from
other peoples was that at a comparatively early date
these crafts came under the influence of outstanding
individuals, who gave them a fresh direction and a new
impulse. It is doubtless in some such way that we
should understand the relation of Homer to the
Homeridai. The Asklepiads at a later date produced
Hippokrates, and if we knew more of such guilds as the
Daidalids, it is likely we should find something of the
same kind. But this does not destroy the corporate
character of the craft; indeed, it rather intensifies it.
The guild becomes what we call a “school,” and the
disciple takes the place of the apprentice. That is a
vital change. A close guild with none but official
heads is essentially conservative, while a band of
disciples attached to a master they revere is the
greatest progressive force the world knows.

It is certain that the later Athenian schools were

3 Introduction 35

organised corporations, the oldest of which, the
Academy, maintained its existence as such for some
nine hundred years, and the only question we have to
decide is whether this was an innovation made in the
fourth century B.C., or rather the continuance of an old
tradition. As it happens, we have the authority of
Plato for speaking of the chief early systems as handed
down in schools. He makes Sokrates speak of “ the
men of Ephesos,” the Herakleiteans, as forming a
strong body in his own day,’ and the stranger of the
Sophist and the Statesman speaks of his school
as still in existence at Elea.” We also hear of

8 and no one, of course, can doubt

_ “ Anaxagoreans,”
that the Pythagoreans were a society. In fact, there
is hardly any school but that of Miletos for which we
have not external evidence of the strongest kind ; and
even as regards it, we have the significant fact that
Theogphrastos speaks of philosophers of a later date
as having been “associates of the philosophy of
Anaximenes,”* We shall see too in the first chapter
that the internal evidence in favour of the existence of
a Milesian school is very strong indeed. It is from
this point of view, then, that we shall now proceed to
consider the men who created Hellenic science.

1 Tht. 179 6 4, αὐτοῖς. . . τοῖς περὶ τὴν "Edecov. The humorous denial that the Herakleiteans had any disciples (180 Ὁ 8, Ποίοις μαθηταῖς, ὦ δαιμόνιε ;) implies that this was the normal and recognised relation.

2 Soph. 242 ἃ 4, τὸ. .. παρ᾽ ἡμῖν ᾿Ελεατικὸν ἔθνος. Cf. 2b. 216 a 3, ἑταῖρον δὲ τῶν ἀμφὶ ἸΤαρμενίδην καὶ Ζήνωνα [ἑταίρων] (where ἑταέρων is probably interpolated, but gives the right sense) ; 2178, 1, οἱ περὶ τὸν ἐκεῖ τόπον.

3 Crat. 409 Ὁ 6, εἴπερ ἀληθῆ οἱ ᾿Αναξαγόρειοι λέγουσιν. φ'

4 Cf. Chap. VI. 8 122; and, on the whole subject, see Diels, ‘‘ Uber die altesten Philosophenschulen der Griechen” in Phzlosophische Aufsatze Eduard Zeller gewidmet (Leipzig, 1887).

2 re
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CHAPTER.

The Milesian School

1. IT was at Miletos that the earliest school of Miletos and Lydia.

scientific cosmology haditshome. At the time it arose, the Milesians were in an exceptionally favourable position for scientific as well as commercial pursuits, They had, indeed, come into conflict more than once with the neighbouring Lydians, whose rulers were now bent upon extending their dominion to the coast ; but, towards the end of the seventh century B.c., Thrasy- boulos, tyrant of Miletos, had succeeded in making terms with King Alyattes, and an alliance was concluded between them, which not only saved Miletos for the present from a disaster like that which befell Smyrna, but secured it against molestation for the future. Even half a century later, when Croesus, resuming his father’s forward policy, made war upon and conquered Ephesos, Miletos was still able to maintain the old treaty-relation, and never, strictly speaking, became subject to the Lydians at all. We can hardly doubt that the sense of security which this exceptional position would foster had something to do with the rise of scientific inquiry. Material prosperity is necessary as a foundation for the highest intellectual effort ; and at this

38 Early Greek Philosophy

time Miletos was in possession of all the refinements of life to a degree unknown in continental Hellas.

Nor was it only in this way that the Lydian connexion would favour the growth of science at Miletos. What was called Hellenism at a later date seems to have been traditional in the dynasty of the Mermnadai. There may well be some truth in the statement of Herodotos, that all the “sophists” of the time flocked to the court of Satdeis." The tradition which represents{ Croesus as what we should call the “patron” of Greek wisdom, was fully developed in the fifth century ; and, however unhistorical its details may: be, it must clearly have some sort of foundation in fact. Particularly noteworthy is “the common tale among the Greeks,” that Thales accompanied him on his luckless campaign against Pteria, apparently in the capacity of military engineer. Herodotos, indeed, disbelieves the story that he diverted the course of the Halys ;* but he does not attack it on the ground of any antecedent improbability, and it is quite clear that those who reported it found no difficulty in accept- ing the relation which it presupposes between the philosopher and the king.