conflagration? eemiowors, to use the Stoic term.? That this is incon- sistent with the theory, as we have interpreted it, is obvious, and is indeed admitted by Zeller. To his paraphrase of the statement of Plato quoted above (p. 159) he adds the words: “ Herakleitos did not intend to retract this principle in the doctrine of a periodic change in the constitution of. the world; if the two doctrines ‘are not compatible, it is a contradiction which he has not observed.” Now, it is in itself quite likely that there were contradictions in, the discourse of Herakleitos, but it is very unlikely that there was this particular one. In the first place, it is a contradiction of the central idea of his system, the thought that pos- sessed his whole mind (§ 67), and we can only admit the possibility of that, if the evidence for it should prove irresistible. In the second place, such an inter- pretation destroys the whole point of Plato’s contrast between Herakleitos and Empedokles (§ 68), which is just that, while Herakleitos said the One was always many, and the Many always one, Empedokles ‘said the All was many and one by turns, © Zeller’s interpretation
obliges us, then, to suppose that Herakleitos flatly con-
tradicted his own discovery without noticing it, and
that Plato, in discussing this very discovery, was also
blind to the contradiction.®
1 This is practically Lassalle’s view of the Great Year, except that he commits the anachronism of speaking of ‘‘atoms” of fire instead of ἐς measures.”
2 Schleiermacher and Lassalle are notable exceptions. Zeller, Diels, and Gomperz are all positive that Herakleitos believed in the éxrvpwots.
3 In his fifth edition (p. 699) Zeller seems to feel this last difficulty ; for
Herakleitos of Ephesos 179
Nor is there anything in Aristotle to set against
Plato’s emphatic statement. We have .seen that the
passage in which he speaks of him along with
Empedokles as holding that the heavens were
alternately in one condition and in another refers not
to the world in general, but to fire, which Aristotle
identified with the substance of his own “ first heaven.” ?
It is also quite consistent with our interpretation when
he says that all things at one time or another become
fire. This does not necessarily mean that they all
become fire at the same time, but is merely a statement
of the undoubted Herakleitean doctrine of the upward
and downward path.”
The only clear statements to the effect that
Herakleitos taught the doctrine of a general conflagra-
tion are posterior to the rise of Stoicism. It is
unnecessary to enumerate them, as there is no doubt
about their meaning. The Christian apologists too
were interested in the idea of a final conflagration, and
reproduce the Stoic view. The curious thing, however,
is that there was a difference of opinion on the subject
he now says: ‘‘ It is a contradiction which he, and which probably Plato too (und den wahrscheinlich auch Plato) has not observed.” This seems to me still less arguable. Plato may or may not be mistaken ; but he makes the perfectly definite statement that Herakleitos says del, while Empedokles says ἐν μέρει. The Ionian Muses are called συντονώτεραι and the Sicilian μαλακώτεραι just because the latter ‘‘ lowered the pitch” (ἐχάλασαν) of the doctrine that this is always so (τὸ del ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν).
1 See above, p. 177, ἢ. 2.
2 Phys. T 5, 205 a 3 (Aer. K, το. 1067 a 4), ὥσπερ Ἡράκλειτός φησιν ἅπαντα γίνεσθαί wore wip. Even in his fifth edition (p. 691) Zeller translates this es werde alles dereinst su Feuer werden; but that would require γενήσεσθαι. Nor is there anything in his suggestion that ἅπαντα (‘not merely πάντα) implies that all things become fire at once. In Aristotle’s day, there was no distinction of meaning between πᾶς and ἅπας. Even if he had said σύμπαντα, we could not press it. What is really moticeable is the present infinitive γίνεσθαι, which surely suggests a con- tinuous process, not a series of conflagrations.
180 Early Greek Philosophy
even among the Stoics. In one place, Marcus Aurelius
says: “So that all these things are taken up into
the Reason of the universe, whether by a periodical
conflagration or a renovation effected by external
”1 Indeed, there were some who said there
exchanges,
was no general conflagration at all in Herakleitos, “I
hear all that,” Plutarch makes one of his personages
say, “from many people, and I see the Stoic conflagra-
tion spreading over the poems of Hesiod, just as it
does over the writings of Herakleitos and the verses of
”2 We see from this that the question was
Orpheus.
debated, and we should therefore expect that any state-
ment of Herakleitos which could settle it would be
quoted over and over again. It is highly significant
that not a single quotation of the kind can be produced.
On the contrary, the absence of anything to show
that Herakleitos spoke of a general conflagration only
becomes more patent when we turn to the few fragments
which are supposed to prove it. The favourite is fr. 24,
where we are told that Herakleitos said Fire was Want
and Surfeit. That is just in his manner, and it has a
perfectly intelligible meaning on our interpretation,
which is further confirmed by fr. 36. On the other.
hand, it seems distinctly artificial to understand the
1 Marcus Aurelius, x. 7, ὥστε καὶ ταῦτα ἀναληφθῆναι εἰς τὸν τοῦ ὅλου λόγον, εἴτε κατὰ περίοδον ἐκπυρουμένου, εἴτε ἀιδίοις ἀμοιβαῖς ἀνανεουμένου.. The ἀμοιβαί are specifically Herakleitean, and the statement is the more remarkable as Marcus elsewhere follows the usual Stoic interpretation.
2 Plut. de def. orac. 415 f, καὶ ὁ Κλεόμβροτος, ᾿Ακούῳ ταῦτ᾽, ἔφη, πολλῶν kal ὁρῶ τὴν Στωικὴν ἐκπύρωσιν ὥσπερ τὰ Ἡρακλείτου καὶ ᾿Ορφέως ἐπινεμομένην ἔπη οὕτω καὶ τὰ Ἡσιόδου καὶ συνεξάπτουσαν. As Zeller admits. (p. 693 n.), this proves that some opponents of the Stoic ἐκπύρωσις tried to withdraw the support of Herakleitos from it. Could they have done so if Herakleitos had said anything about it, or would not some one have produced a decisive quotation? "We may be sure that, if any one
had, it would have been reiterated ad nauseam, for the indestructibility of the world was one of the great questions of the day.
oe J ᾿. Ce
Herakleitos of Ephesos 181
Surfeit as referring to the fact that fire has burnt every-
thing else up, and still more so to interpret Want as
meaning that fire, or most of it, has turned into a
world. The next is fr. 26, where we read that fire in
its advance will judge and convict all things. There
is nothing in this, however, to suggest that fire will
judge all things at once rather than in turn, and,
indeed, the phraseology reminds us of the advance of
fire and water which we have seen reason for attribut-
ing to Herakleitos, but which is expressly said to be
limited to a certain maximum.' These appear to be
the only passages which the Stoics and the Christian
apologists could discover, and, whether our interpreta-
tion of them is right or wrong, it is surely obvious that
they cannot bear the weight of their conclusion, and
that there was certainly nothing more definite to be
found.
It is much easier to find fragments which are on
the face of them inconsistent with a general conflagra-
tion. The “measures” of fr. 20 and fr. 29 must be
the same thing, and they must surely be interpreted
in the light of fr. 23. If this be so, fr. 20, and more
especially fr. 29, directly contradict the idea of a
general conflagration. “The sun will not overstep his
measures.”2 Secondly, the metaphor of “exchange,”
which is applied to the transformations of fire in fr. 22,
points in the same direction. When gold is given in
exchange for wares and wares for gold, the sum or
“measure” of each remains constant, though they
change owners. All the wares and gold do not come
2 If any one doubts that this is really the meaning of the ‘* measures,” let him compare the use of the word by Diogenes of Apollonia, fr. 3.
182 Early Greek Philosophy
into the same hands. In the same way, when anything becomes fire, something of equal amount must cease to be fire, if the “exchange” is to be a just one; and that it will be just, we are assured by the watchfulness of the Erinyes (fr. 29), who see to it that the sun does not take more than he gives. Of course there is, as we have seen, a certain variation ; but this is strictly con- fined within limits, and is compensated in the long run by a variation in the other direction. Thirdly, fr. 43, in which Herakleitos blames Homer for desiring the cessation of strife, is very conclusive. The cessation of strife would mean that all things should take the upward or downward path at the same time, and cease to “run in opposite directions.” If they all took the upward path, we should have a general conflagration. Now, if Herakleitos had himself held that this was the appointment of fate, would he have been likely to upbraid Homer for desiring so necessary a consumma- tion?* Fourthly, we note that in fr. 20 it is Ζζδς world,’ and not merely the “ever-living fire,” which is said to be eternal; and it appears also that its eternity depends upon the fact that it is always kindling and always going out in the same “measures,” or that an encroachment in one direction is compensated by a subsequent encroachment in the other. Lastly, Lassalle’s argument from the concluding sentence of the passage from the Περὶ διαίτης, quoted above, is
1 This is just the argument which Plato uses in the Phaedo (72 c) to prove the necessity of ἀνταπόδοσις, and the whole series of arguments in that passage is distinctly Herakleitean in character.
2 However we understand the term κόσμος here, the meaning is the same. Indeed, if we suppose with Bernays that it means ‘‘ order,” the argument in the text will be all the stronger. In no sense of the word could a κόσμος survive the ἐκπύρωσις, and the Stoics accordingly said the κόσμος was φθαρτός.
Herakleitos of Ephesos 183
really untouched by Zeller’s objection, that it cannot be Herakleitean because it implies that all things are fire and water. It does not imply this, but only that man, like the heavenly bodies, oscillates between fire and water; and that is just what Herakleitos taught. It does not appear either that the measures of earth varied at all. Now, in this passage we read that neither fire nor water can prevail completely, and a very good reason is given for this, a reason too which is in striking agreement with the other views of Herakleitos.. And, indeed, it is not easy to see how, in accordance with these views, the world could ever recover from a general conflagration if such a thing were to take place. The whole process depends, so far as we can see, on the fact that Surfeit is also Want, or, in other words, that an advance of fire increases the moist exhalation, while an advance of water deprives | the fire of the power to cause evaporation. The con- flagration, though it lasted but for a moment,’ would destroy the opposite tension on which the rise of a | new world depends, and then motion would become impossible.
1 Περὶ διαίτης, i. 3 (see above, p. 167, n. 2), οὐδέτερον γὰρ κρατῆσαι παντελῶς δύναται διὰ τάδε" τό <re> πῦρ ἐπεξιὸν ἐπὶ τὸ ἔσχατον τοῦ ὕδατος ἐπιλείπει ἡ τροφή᾽ ἀποτρέπεται οὖν ὅθεν μέλλει τρέφεσθαι" τὸ ὕδωρ τε ἐπεξιὸν τοῦ πυρὸς ἐπὶ τὸ ἔσχατον, ἐπιλείπει ἡ κίνησις" ἵσταται οὖν ἐν τούτῳ, ὅταν δὲ στῇ, οὐκέτι ἐγκρατές ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἤδη τῷ ἐμπίπτοντι πυρὶ ἐς τὴν τροφὴν καταναλίσκεται" οὐδέτερον δὲ διὰ ταῦτα δύναται κρατῆσαι παντελῶς, εἰ δέ ποτε κρατηθείη καὶ ὁπότερον, οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη τῶν νῦν ἐόντων ὥσπερ ἔχει νῦν" οὕτω δὲ ἐχόντων ἀεὶ ἔσται τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ οὐδέτερον οὐδαμὰ ἐπιλείψει.
2 In his note on fr. 66 (=26 Byw.), Diels seeks to minimise the difficulty of the ἐκπύρωσις by saying that it is only a little one, and can last but a moment; but the contradiction noted above remains all the same. Diels holds that Herakleitos was ‘‘ dark only in form,” and that “‘ he himself was perfectly clear as to the sense and scope of his ideas” (Herakleitos, p. i). To which I would add that he was probably called ‘* the Dark ᾿
just because the Stoics sometimes found it hard to read their own ideas into his words.
Strife and ‘* harmony.”
184 Early Greek Philosophy
79. We are now in a position to understand more
clearly the law of strife or opposition which manifests
itself in the “upward and downward path.” At any
given moment, each of the three forms of matter, Fire,
Water, and Earth, is made up of two equal portions,—
subject, of course, to the oscillation described above,—
one of which is taking the upward and the other the
downward path. Now, it is just the fact that the
two halves of everything are being “drawn in opposite
directions,” this “opposite tension,” that “keeps things
together,’ and maintains them in an equilibrium which
can only be disturbed temporarily and within certain
limits. It thus forms the “ hidden attunement” of the
universe (fr. 47), though, in another aspect of it, it is
Strife. Bernays has pointed out that the word ἁρμονία