ing may be translated ‘if plurality is a class of which one member is always few’. This, however, is very unnatural. (2) Alexander 802. 37 says Néyer ei 8€ 8} Kal ori TL TAHOOS, Aeywr Tr TAHOOS THv dvada, Kal’ 5 TO Erepov popiov THS evavTboews KaTYyopElTal, Coy TO GALyov. This suggests the reading of 76 pév det, 7d édiyov ; we may understand KaTyyoperat from 1. 6 (cf, 1. 12). (3) All the difficulties would be removed by a change of two letters if we read wAjOos 0 Acyopev det “éd‘yov. But it is hard to see how this could have been corrupted into the manuscript reading.
10. Bz.’s omission of kat is necessary.
14-28, The argument is:
Things that have elements are complexes.
Complexes have matter.
What has matter is capable of ceasing to be.
What is capable of ceasing to be is not eternal.
Therefore things that have elements are not eternal.
The argument is put forward in opposition to the Platonic doctrine that the numbers have elements and are eternal.
16. ei kal del éort. Alexander understands as the subject of this 7o €€ ov, But a remark of this sort about the elements would be irrelevant to the argument. Bz. is therefore right in taking the subject to be 70 é& abrod dv (cf. 1. 20), There is, of course, a contradiction in saying ‘it is necessary that whether a thing exists for ever or comes into being’ (ei cat... Kav ei seems to be = ceive. . . Eire, Al. 804, 5, though the usage is curious), ‘it comes into being from that of which it consists’. But the meaning is explained by 1. 20, ‘ however true it be that number or anything else that contains matter exists for ever, it must be capadle of not being’, So here dvayky ylyvecOa. must mean something like ‘must be capable of having come into being’.
18. We must either take toGro 8 ytyveras as predicate of ycyverat or read TOUTOU 6 ylyverau.
24. év Gddows Adyors. The reference may be either, as Alexander says, to the De Caelo (I. 12, not I. 7 as Bz. says) or to @. 1050) 7 ff, It is not safe to assume with Bz. that MN never refer to TEZHO.
28-35. Christ thinks that this section belongs to the latter part of ch. 1. But it is quite appropriate that after mentioning the general difficulties (cf. dwAds 1. 14) that attend the derivation of number from elements (Il. 14-28), Aristotle should now point out that by giving up the term évoov certain particular difficulties, though not the general difficulties, are escaped.
28-30. The passage suggests at first sight that the description of the material principle as ‘the indefinite dyad’ was a modification of an earlier description of it as ‘the unequal’. Yet Aristotle couples the two phrases as occurring in the same theory (1088415), and implies that the phrase ‘indefinite dyad’ goes back to Plato (1090) 32 —1091*5, M. 1083 23-32). His meaning here is that owing to certain difficulties some thinkers abandoned the phrase ‘the unequal’
but retained ‘the indefinite dyad’. Cf. Robin, pp. 643-653. | Xeno-
crates is probably meant, as there is evidence connecting the ee ‘indefinite dyad’ particularly with him (M. ro814 14 n.).
10892 2-6. Aristotle plainly has the Sophzstes in mind ; cf. ‘such passages aS 237 A, 2505.
4. ob yap... ébvra = fr. 7 in Diels, Vors. In Pl. Soph. 237 a the best manuscripis are divided between rodr’ otdauq (BT) and roir’ od dayn (W); here EJ have rodro dayy, APT rotr’ ovdaun, Alexander has rodro pydapy, and only inferior manuscripts have rotro days. Simpl. Phys. 135. 21, 143. 31, 244. 1 has rotro dayq (best manu- scripts), which is clearly the right reading.
5. dvdyxy is the right case after édoge 1. 2; Bz.’s proposal of dvay«nv is a mistake. Aristotle is thinking of such passages as Soph. 241 D. ek Tov dvTos Kal dAXov Tivos iS explanatory of otrw, and should therefore be preceded and followed by commas.
47. 67 seems to be an emblema from |. 8. Cf. H. 1043 34 n.
Q-10. Totoy ody... éotar; ‘What sort of unity will all things that are constitute, if that which is not be not admitted to be?’ Aristotle means that Plato hastened to maintain the existence of 70 pm ov without considering what sort of unity of all things Parmenides’ denial of 76 pi) év implied—whether a unity of substance, or of substance with all the other categories.
Aristotle asks ‘ what sort of unity do all things make?’, and interprets this (]. 10) as meaning ‘ what things make the unity?’. The question he addresses to the Platonists really is ‘do you mean that all substances make a one of substance, or that all the categories make a one which embraces them all?’ Cf. Phys, 185% 20-30.
Bz.’s rota is impossible, and the text needs no emendation.
IL. # wdvta, Kal éorar... onpaiver is evidently meant to convey the same meaning as the last of the possibilities stated before it. Now the meaning of kai éorau «rd. is ‘and will substance, quality, &c., form all together a single unity’. This seems to justify Bz. in reading n before zdvra. (It is read by JI’, and omitted by EA? Al.) Thus there are three alternatives. The unity may be (1) a unity of sub- stance, (2) a unity of quality, &c., separately from substance, (3) a unity of all the categories. together. -
12. Bz.’s ov does not seem necessary. é tu = one genus or category.
12-15. GAN Gromoy... mov, Aristotle now points out that 76 pi dv will not save Plato from a unity of the third kind, if that was what he feared. It might divide the world into two parts, but it could not divide it into ten. ptay dvow twd = 7d py dv. yevouernv, ‘having been called into play by the doctrine ’,
17. Jaeger is probably right in supposing ¢ivar to have dropped out by haplography ; this is more likely than that dvOpwmros should have been corrupted into dvOpwrrov. Alexander’ S 6 pa dvOpwros (806. 16) is probably only his interpretation of 6 7) dvOpwrrov.
20. Either the manuscript Aéyew or Alexander’s déyer gives a
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possible sense. (1) ‘He means by “not-being ” the false and every- thing of that sort’. (2) ‘He means the false and calls that kind of entity not-being’. The manuscript reading is the more idiomatic (cf. M. 1086> r8-r19n.), and the other has probably arisen from a failure to understand it.
The reference is to Plato (Soph. 237 4,240), but Plato only says that there cannot be Weidos unless there is not-being; he does not identify the two.
21-23. 816... ph} wodvatay, Apparently some Platonist (not, as far as we know, Plato) argued that, just as geometry has to assume what is false in order to prove what is true, so philosophy must assume the false or non-existent in order to explain the true or existent. The charge against geometry that it makes false assumptions goes back to Protagoras (B. 99843). Cf. An. Pr. 4935, An. Post. 76” 41.
24. ov yep év TO oudhoyrop@ Fi 4) mpotacis. Alexander: explains (806. 34) ov yap 7 TpoTewopevn Kal ypapopery YPappay év TO ovAoyio pg kat TH amrodeiée mapohapBdverat, aXN 7 i) voouper. This, however, is an unexampled sense of mpdracis. Proclus 7m Luci. (p. 203." 6) uses the term zpéracus for the enunciation of a preposition, tivos dedouevov Ti 70 Cytovpevov éorw; e.g. in Eucl. i. 1 d€dorau eiOeta rerepacpevn (ib. 208. 4). So too in the case mentioned here the geometer says dédorax ypappa odvaia and seeks to prove something about it or to construct some figure onit. But supposing the given line is not a foot long, what then? It does not matter, says Aristotle; the zpdracis is not part of the proof. Strictly the weddos occurs not in the zpdracis or general enunciation but in what Proclus calls the éeous or setting out of the particular data. But in Aristotle’s time wporacis may have been used to cover both.
In M. 10788 20 rats rpordcecr is used (in a similar context) in its more ordinary sense of ‘ premises’.
26. To... Kata tds mrdcets pi) Ov, ‘the ju dv taken according to its different cases’, such as those named in ll. 16-19. ardors is as general in its meaning as ‘case’ (cf. its use in geometry). The only exact parallel to the present use in the Aristotelian corpus is £. Z. 121729 70 ayabov ev exdotn TOY TrdcEdY (= Tov KaTnyopLOv) éotL TOUTWV.
34. 76 Tl éom is in apposition to ro dv, ‘being, in the sense of substance ’.
35. TOs S€ H ord H Trood, Sc. toAAG oT.
b 3. 76 yap atrd Kat 7d dvddoyoy aitov, ‘it is the same thing or something analogous that is the cause’. Aristotle means Ay, which is the same in all the categories, or analogically the same; i.e. in all things matter and form are in the same relation to one another, cf,.Z, r029» 23, A. rozo> ry, 26.
12. For wod0 éAtyov cf. 1087 16, 1088» 5-13, A. 992% 16.
16-20 is a digression. Plato defined that which is potentially sub- stance as 7d dviov, which is a zpdés 7. This is as bad as if he had said that what is potentially being is quality—which, so far from
being the potentiality or negation of being, is merely one kind of being.
20. domep éhéxOn, ® 34.
25. émiotaow. Bz. prefers the interpretation of this as = dmdxpiow, which occurs once in one manuscript of Alexander (811. 27). But Alexander’s commentary there shows that this is a mere copyist’s error. Alexander really interpreted the word as meaning dzopiav (816. 8, 12, 21, 811. 27), and this meaning alone agrees with the Aristotelian usage of émicracis (cf. Phys. 1967 36, £. £. 1236” 33) and of épiordvar (cf. 1090" 2 and Jnd, Ar. 305% 2-17). émicracis is an arresting of the attention, and this is caused by a problem or dzropia.
Bz.’s preference for the meaning ‘answer’ is no doubt due to the fact that the words immediately following, dia yap ... rood, answer a question instead of propounding one. But these words are concessive and preparatory to the problem, which is stated in xafrov... tav ovovdy. The special difficulty attaching to the minor categories is that of assigning to each a matter which shall render plurality possible without being separable from substance.—Alexander is quite at sea about Il. 25-28.
27. It seems impossible to interpret the etva: after zoAAd. We should either read «fy dv with Apelt (or éo7. or éorav) or treat eiyar as an emblema and understand éo7u.
29. éxeu twa Adyov. Alexander explains as ‘contains a difficulty’, but the only meaning the phrase seems to have in Aristotle is ‘is intelligible’ (dnd. Ar. 436% 48-54), and this suits the context perfectly. Aristotle has assumed in ]. 26 that a tzoxe/uevov becomes and is many, i.e. comes to have and has many attributes. Now he continues ‘it is intelligible how the individual thing can be many, if we do not confusedly suppose that a thing can be both an individual and a certain characteristic ’,—the confusion with which Aristotle habitually charges the Platonists. If an individual were a characteristic, it could not be many in the sense of being many characteristics, but there is no reason why a genuine individual should not be many in the sense of having several characteristics—Alexander’s interpretation of ll. 29, 30, adopted with reserve by Bz., seems impossible.
30-31. airy dé... odctar.- ‘ The problem that really arises out of the facts about substance is this, how there can be many actually existing substances ’,—not how one thing can be many in the sense of having many attributes.
82. GAG pry kat ei, ‘but also if’, not ‘ but even if’.
35. ei py... Gdcaiperov. The manuscript reading seems to mean that if the unit is not some finite measure it is the limiting case of quantity—infinitesimal quantity ; it is always quantity of some kind. But dr: is superfluous, and the opposition of pérpov to 76 Kara Td TooOv dS.atperov is not Aristotelian. Alexander (812. 23) says éfuordve. Kadds déywr, et pH) dpa H povas od roady, didtt pérpov apiOwod Kai didre kara toaov ddiaiperos. Cf. Syr. 176. 6. This suggests the reading «i py pérpov Kal to Katrdé xth, ‘The unit indicates a quantity unless it
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means a measure or what is indivisible in quantity.” ‘Measure’ and ‘indivisible in quantity ’ are not, indeed, absolute synonyms, for the measure may be an ‘indivisible in quality’ (I. 1053” 4-7), but 7d & is a measure of quantity primarily (1052) 20, 1053? 5).
For a similar confusion between dru and xaé in the manuscripts, where Alexander preserves xai, cf. H. 1043828. The error probably arose from the misreading of a contraction.