II-I2. 6 8€ mpatos ... etvar, sc. Plato (Al. 783. 22). For the phrase cf. 1078” 11, for the doctrine 10764 19 n., 1080? r1.
According to the manuscript reading Plato is described as laying it down (1) that the Ideas existed, (2) that they were numbers, (3) that mathematical objects existed ; éydépucev is left rather awkwardly
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without an object. There is therefore something to be said for Christ’s proposal to omit the second eva. This gives the sense ‘ He who first posited that the Ideas were also numbers naturally separated the Ideas and the mathematical objects’. Cook Wilson’s proposal to put elvan after aprOuovs gives a still better sentence.
17. kat ’Emixappov. Diels, Vors. fr. 14. Ahrens (De Dral. Dor. 457) writes the verse of Epicharmus thus: dptiws te yap AcAexrar KedOds od kadds éxov | haiverat.
Criticism OF THE Doctrine or IpzEas (M. 9. 10862 18—N. 2. 10g0® 2),
(A) Lf assigns separate existence to universals (M. 9. 10864 18—ro. 1087 25).
18. So much for the numbers; with regard to the first principles, what those say who are speaking of sensible substance only is a question for physics; we must discuss the statements of those who believe. in non-sensible substances, Ideas and numbers, whose principles are the principles of all things.
29. Those who believe in mathematical numbers only may be deferred ; we must discuss the believers in Ideas. They treat the Ideas as universals and at the same time as existing apart and as being particulars.
34. The reason of this impossible combination is that they thought that since sensible particulars were in constant flux, universals must be something apart from these.
be. Socrates by reason of his definitions gave the impulse to this view, but did not separate the universals from the particulars. He was right, for knowledge implies a universal; it is the separation that causes the objections to the Ideas.
7. His successors, seeing that if there are substances apart from sensibles they must exist separately, could find no others than these universals to assign separate existence to, and therefore assigned it to them. The result is that their universals and their particulars are practically the same kind of thing.
14. We may state a difficulty already discussed which affects non-believers as well as believers in Ideas: if we do not suppose substances to exist apart, we annihilate substance; if we do suppose them to do so, what are we to say of their elements ?
20. (1) If we make these particulars, then (a) things will be no
more in number than their elements, and (4) the elements will be un- knowable. For suppose syllables to be substances, and their elements (the letters) the elements of substances.
24. Then (a) each syllable will be a unique individual, and there- fore also each letter; and therefore there will be nothing but the letters.
32. (4) The elements will be unknowable. For knowledge is of the universal, as is clear from the nature of demonstration and definition.
37. (2) If the first principles are universal, either the substances com- posed of them wil] be universal, or what is not substance will be prior to substance. For the universal is not-substance, the first principle is universal, and the first principle is prior to what is composed of it.
10872 4. These difficulties arise when people derive the Ideas from elements, and at the same time treat the Ideas as existing apart from the substances that have the same form. But (a) if there are many a’s and b’s and no ‘ aitself’ or ‘b itself’ apart from the many, there can be an infinite number of similar syllables ; and so with substances and their elements.
10. (4) The view that knowledge is universal, so that the first principles of things must be universal and not separate substances, is true only in a sense.
15. The potentiality of knowledge, being universal and indefinite, is of the universal and indefinite, but the actuality is definite and of the definite, individual and of the individual; what the grammarian studies is ‘ this a’, and ‘a’ only indirectly because this a is an a.
21, If the principles had to be universal, their compounds would have to be universal, and then there would be no self-subsistent sub- stance. But it is only in one sense that knowledge is universal.
1086? 20. Bz.’s proposal to read wereopevoy or rererpévovs for the second memetopévos does nothing to remove the difficulty. The manuscript reading is as old as Alexander. The sentence though careless is not unnatura]. Aristotle writes ot@év paAXov as if some- thing like ay éxidoéq could be supplied from the previous clause; but he happens to have written in the previous clause dy zeioGein, which with zpos 76 reve Oqvar would make nonsense.—Cf. note at beginning of Book M.
21. Syrianus tells us (160. 6) that some manuscripts made Book N begin at this point. Certainly there seems to be a greater change of subject than at 108729. So far, Aristotle has been discussing the question whether Ideas and numbers exist independently of particular
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things; now he proposes to discuss ‘the first principles and the first causes and elements’. In essence 1086* 21—108¥%4 25 is a preface to N, and with N forms a parallel and probably earlier treatment of the subject dealt with in M. init.—10862 18. Cf. note at beginning of Book M.
In the discussion now entered upon two~distinct questions arise: (1) whether Ideas and numbers could serve as the elementary principles of things; (2) whether the account given by the Platonists of the principles of Ideas and numbers is satisfactory. ‘The two questions are, as Bz. observes, not kept very clearly apart by Aristotle.
23. év Tols wept pucews. Alexander refers to Phys. ii. 3, where the doctrine of the four causes is stated, and De Gen. ef Corr. ii. 5, where the four elements are deduced. But the reference is more probably to Phys. i. 4-6, De Caelo iii. 3, 4, De Gen. et Corr. i. 1, where the views of the materialists are discussed.
2g. ot pév, the Pythagoreans and Speusippus, cf. 1076 20-21 n., 1080} 14.
30. dotepov, N. 10908 7-15, 20-) 20, 10g1® 13-22.
32. KaOddou Te [ds odcias] movodcr Tas is€as. ‘They make the Ideas universal as substances’ does not give the right sense; the sub- stantiality of the Ideas should not be emphasized in this half of the sentence, but only their universality. Jaeger is probably right in treating as oveias as a variant of ws ywpioras which has found its way from the margin into the wrong part of the text.
33. Kat tdv Kab” exactov, ‘and belonging to the class of particulars’. kai is unmeaning if we take rév kal’ éxaorov as depending on Xwpiotds.
34. Sinmdpyntar suggests a reference to Book B (cf. similar references in T. 100432, I. 1053>10, A. 1076239, > 39, M. 108615); and B. 1003®7 is quite relevant. The same point has been discussed in Z. 13. There is nothing in M. 4, 5 (which Bz. suggests) that quite suits the reference.
35-37. aitiov...émolouv. The traditional text would mean: ‘ The reason why these characteristics (universality and separate existence) were combined together by those who described the Ideas as universal was that they did not regard the Ideas as substances identical with sensible things’, This is evidently in more than one respect a weak sentence. It is completely cured by Jaeger’s conjecture that idéas is a gloss which supplanted ovovas, and that ovovas later found its way from the margin into its traditional position. His reading gives the excellent sense: ‘the reason why these characteristics were combined by those who described their substances as universal was that they did not identify substances (as common sense does) with sensible things’.
ba. év rots éumpooder, A. 6 (= M. 4).
3. éxivyge, ‘stirred up’, perhaps (as Mr. W. J. Goodrich has sug- gested) with a suggestion of the impropriety of the action, as in kwely Ta aKivyta,
8:4 Tods dpiopods, ‘by reason of his definitions’. A less direct con- nexion is implied than would have been conveyed by the genitive.
5. Sydot. For dyAot impersonal and intransitive cf. /ud. Ar. 174° 15-17.
10. e&Becay, cf. A. 992? 10 n.
15. Tots pi) Aéyouow refers both to Speusippus, who did not accept the doctrine of Ideas (# 29 n.), and to non-Platonists.
év Tots Sianopypaciw, B. 999” 24 —1000% 4, 1003” 5-17.
18-19. dvaipyjoer... déyewv. ‘One will be destroying substance in that sense in which we understand “substance”.’ For this use of BovtrcoOau Néyew cf. N. 1089 20, 1091 32, Pl. Laws 892 c 2, When ws Bovdducba déyew is interpreted thus, Alexander’s dep 0d Bovrducba (787. 25) is seen to be not a variant reading but a paraphrase. Bz. supposes Aristotle to be admitting that the refusal to posit substances separate from sensibles leads to the negation of substance, and accord- ingly takes ds BovddpeBa A€yew to mean ‘as we are willing to admit for the sake of argument’. But this is not (I think) idiomatic Greek, and no reason can be suggested why for the sake of argument Aristotle should admit something so entirely contrary to his own view, He is in fact saying something quite different: ‘If one does not suppose substances to exist separately, and in the way in which individual things are said to exist, one will destroy the kind of substance that we wish to maintain’. The question of the chapter is a general one, involving those who do not believe in Ideas as well as those who do (Il. 15). Aristotle agreed with the Platonists in supposing substances to exist separately (the substances ‘hey meant being Ideas, i.e. entities which were supposed to combine universality with independent existence, while the substances 4e means are individuals). He there- fore dismisses at once the supposition that substances do not exist separately, and passes (1. 19) to the supposition that they do, which occupies the rest of the chapter. Are their elements unique individuals or universals? (1) If individuals (Aristotle is no doubt thinking here of expressions like ‘ ‘ze One’, ‘ the indefinite dyad’), then (a) the sub- stances will be unique individuals also, and (6) the elements will be unknowable. (2) If universal, the substances will be universal and no true substances. --Aristotle’s-own view is that the elements, and the substances, are neither unique individuals nor universals. All that is substantial is individual, but individuals are not necessarily unique ; there may be many ofa kind. And what is true of substances is true also of their elements(1087* 7-10). So Aristotle meets objection (1 a) ; (1 5) he meets by the assertion that in a sense knowledge is of individuals (10878 10-25); (2) he leaves alone, since his view is that the elements are individuals, though not unique individuals,
Cf. note at beginning of Book M.
22-32. totwoav... pdvoy Ta atorxeta. ‘The main point of these lines may be put thus: If each letter of the alphabet were a unique individual, then you could never by any process of composition get any more at one time than just A, B, C, &c., each occurring once.
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You could not have, for instance, a syllable BA and a syllable BC. Similarly, if the elements of substances were unique individuals, sub- stances would be miserably Jimited in their number.
Aristotle professes to be assuming that the elements are unique individuals (ll. 20, 21). But he complicates the argument by deducing this (Il. 27, 28) from the unique individuality of the composite sub- stances, which he first states as following from their being separate substances (Il. 22-27), and then establishes by reference to what the Platonists actually say (én... r.0éacw 1. 27).
27. dpdvupov is used here in the sense more properly expressed by ovvevepov (cf. Ind. Ar. 514% 25-31, ' 13-18), as often when there is no point in emphasizing the difference between the two words.
29-30. Kata Tov adtovy Aéyov ... kal aAAy, ‘according to the same argument by which in the case of the other syllables there will not be more than one instance of the same syllable’. For ovrep = xa? dvrep cf, A. 991° 8n.