The ‘first people who said there are Ideas’ are stated here, , exactly as Plato was stated in Bk. A, to have been influenced by the Heraclitean doctrines (1078 13, 9872 32), to have followed the lead of Socrates in his search for ethical definitions or universals, and to have given the name of Ideas to these universals (cf. 1078 17-19, 30-32, with 9871-8). Prof. Taylor’s view (Varza Socratica, 81-89) that of & éxépucar (I. 31) refers to the Megarian School, the eidév iAor of the Sopfzszes, ignores the correspondence of the passage with that in Aristotle. The main difference between A and M here is that M, in using the phrase of rpGrou tas ideas Pyoavres eivat, and in referring only to the influence of Heracliteanism in general and not of Cratylus in parti- cular, perhaps suggests that Plato was one of a band of thinkers who by their united efforts arrived at the ideal theory. Socrates, however, was not one of this band, though he prepared the way for it; the dis- tinction between his view and the doctrine of Ideas is stated emphati- cally in ll, 30-32. The vague reference of mparou tas ideas Pjoavtes is thoroughly characteristic of M, which is concerned with doctrines, not with people (cf. 1076 ® 16-22, 1080» 11-30).
There is, of course, a distinction drawn here between the theory of Idea- numbers (which we know Plato to have held) and the first form of the ideal theory (ll. 9-12). But this does not amount to a distinction, as Prof. Burnet maintains (G. P. 157) between Plato and ‘the first persons who said that the Forms existed’. The distinction is between the theory of Idea-numbers (a theory held in different forms by Plato and by Xenocrates) and the ideal theory as it was originally (€ dpyjs) held by its first supporters (Plato and the rest of the band referred to above). Prof. Burnet tries to discount the value of Aristotle’s state- ‘ments about Socrates (in particular his refusal to treat Socrates as a, or the, founder of the ideal theory) by pointing out that Socrates ‘had been dead for thirty years when Aristotle first came to Athens at the age of eighteen’. He smaintains that all that Aristotle knew about Socrates was derived from the Platonic dialogues, and especially from the Phaedo. But it is as near certainty as we need wish that he must have learnt much from Plato about Socrates by word of mouth. Surely the very fact that he does not take the dialogues at their face - value and ascribe to Socrates everything that is ascribed to him in the dialogues shows that he had independent information in the light of which he interpreted them. Cf. Introduction, pp. xxxiii-xlv.
13. TWept Tis dAnPelas, ‘on the question about the truth (or real nature) of things’. Cf. A. 983° 2 n.
tots “Hpakertetois Adyous, cf. A. 987232n.. Cratylus is there mentioned as the Heraclitean who was Plato’s first master in philo- sophy.
422 Commentary
15. povyois is used here in the Platonic sense in which it is not distinguished from éruorjn and restricted to moral questions.
17. The sentence beginning here is never properly completed ; the long parenthesis, ll. 19-30, causes Aristotle to forget the construction cf. K. 1067” 25-34.
19-20. The opposition Tév peév ...puockdr.... ot Sé NuPaydperor sug- gests that rév dvouxGv means ‘of the physicists’, and that the object of nwaro is ‘the problem of definition’; Alexander’s interpretation, that Democritus ‘touched on natural objects’ gives a good enough sense, but the other interpretation is made certain by a comparison with P. A. 6422 24-31. povov goes with él puxpoy Haro and emphasizes the slightness of Democritus’ effort. Cf Phys. 194% 20.
21. On the Pythagorean attempts at definition cf. A. 985? 29, 9874 20.
22. avomrew is not used elsewhere by Aristotle in this sense, and one is tempted to read dvjyov, which Alexander uses in his interpretation and E gives as an alternative reading. But dvamrew is used thus by other authors.
katpds was identified with the number 7 (Al. 38. 16, 75. 23).
23. 75 Sikatov was identified, Alexander tells us (741. 5), with ‘the number that divides ro in half’, i.e. 5 (cf. 721. 13). But elsewhere he says it was the first square, either 4 or 9 (38. 12), and the other evidence (Z. WV. 1132%22, MM. M. 1182%14) tends more in this direction. ydéos was identified with 5, the sum of the. first even and the first odd number (39. 8).
25. oUmw tor ‘jv. Aristotle is quoted as having called Zeno the Eleatic the inventor of dialectic (frr. 1484» 29), and Zeno was doubt- less considerably senior to Socrates (Pl. Parm. 127 Bc), so that ovzw tor Hv is meant only in a very limited sense. Aristotle means that the procedure of which we have an instance in the Parmenzdes (cf. Meno 86 ff. and Sophistes), where the consequences of contrary hypo- theses, ‘if one is’, ‘if many are’, are studied without any definition of one or of many having been agreed upon, was not yet a well-recognized’ mode of discussion in Socrates’ time as it afterwards became.
26. tay évavtioy ei 4 adTy emorypy is again in Zop. 105 23 mentioned as a dialectical inquiry (zpdéracis Aoyixy). It is rather sur- prising to find this particular inquiry about contraries co-ordinated by kai with the general phrase rdavayria, but it is not necessary with Maier (Syll. des Arist. ii. 2. 168) to regard kal... émuornn as a gloss.
28. Aristotle cannot mean that Socrates was the first person who used inductive arguments or gave general definitions, but that he was the first who recognized the importance of them and systematically used the former in order to get the latter. The inductive arguments referred to are not scientific inductions but arguments from analogy such as we often find Socrates using in the AZemoradilia and in Plato’s ‘Socratic’ dialogues. For an instance cf. A. 10252 6-13.
84—108028 agrees almost verbally with A. ggo? 2-991? 9, with the exception of the section 1079” 3-11, which has nothing
answering to it in Book A. The main points of divergence are noted below ; for what is common to both passages cf. the notes on Book A. Alexander had the passage in his text of M but does not comment on it. Occasionally A is fuller than M (cf. 990% 26, 991725, 55 with 1079? 23, > 28, 10804), but for the most part M is fuller (cf. go? 20, 9917 4, 17, °3, 7, 9 with 1079 17, 35, > 21, 108042, 6,8). Cf A.g note ad zniz. 8
36—1079*1. For mheiw... ein A has oxeddv yap ica—i) odk eAdrrw —ra eidn éeori Trovrors, a milder statement.
1079? 5. Setkvutar, 990) g deikvupev. Cf. 7 oiovrat, 990” 11 oidpeba 12, 20, 1080%6 gacw, 990 16, 23, 99127 dapev; 14 BovdAovrar, 990” 18 BovAovrar APAI., BovAdueba E Asc.
20. The M version as compared with the A version affects the use of a plural verb with a neuter plural subject ; cf. 1. 20 with ggo? 24, 28 with 990» 31,» 12 with 99179.
> 3-11 is peculiar to M. It suggests an alternative course between the supposition that the Idea is cvvdévvpoy with its particulars (# 33) and the view that it is éuévvpov (@ 36, » 1)—a course, however, which does not free the Platonists from difficulties. The suggestion is that the definition of an Idea is the same as that of its particulars, except that in the former we must add ‘that of which it is’ the Idea or pattern, EE. g. the Idea of circle would be defined as ‘a plane figure such that every point on the circumference is equidistant from the centre, such figure being the Idea of sensible circles’. Aristotle makes two objections. (1) To what element in the definition must the ov éori, the statement of what the Idea is an Idea of, be added? To the word ‘centre ’, the word ‘ plane’, or to every word? Every element in the Idea must be ideal. (2) ‘Being an Idea of something’ will itself be a common nature present in all Ideas, i.e. itself an Idea:
I10-II. pvow ... yévos is predicate of etvyar, and there should be a comma after érimedov. It is not necessary to omit ts as Christ suggests. ‘“ So-and-so itself” (aiz¢ 71) will be a nature present in all the Forms as their genus, as ‘‘ plane” is present in all the species of plane figure.’ aio 7 is a generalization of Platonic phrases like airs ayaGov, and the meaning is that Formness will itself be a Form; and this can be attacked by a rpiros dv@pwiros argument.
The Forms do not explain the changes in the sensible world (ch. 5).
1079 12. (v) The main question is, what do the Forms contribute either to eternal or to transient sensibles? (a) They cause no change in them, (8) they contribute nothing to the knowledge of them (for, not being in them, they are not their substance),
424 Commentary
17. nor (y) to their being (if they were in them they might perhaps be their causes as white is of the whiteness of that in which it is mixed ; but this view of Anaxagoras and Eudoxus is easily refuted).
23. (vi) Other things are not composed of Forms in any ordinary sense, and to call the Forms patterns and say that other things share ia them is empty metaphor. For (a) what-is it that works with its eye on the Ideas? (@) It is possible to be or become anything without being copied from an original.
gi. (y) There will be many patterns, and therefore Forms, of the same thing; to a man there will answer the Forms of animal, biped, and man. (8) The genus will be the Form of its species, so that the same thing will be pattern and copy.
35- (vii) How can the Ideas, being the substances of things, exist apart from the things? In the Phaedo they are said to be causes both of being and of becoming.
1080* 3. Yet (a) even if the Forms exist, the things that share in them do not come into being unless there is a moving cause, and (8) many things, e.g. houses, come into existence though the Platonists say there are no Forms of them, and therefore those also of which they say there are Forms may be or come into being owing to similar causes, and not to the Forms.
g. These and other more abstract and accurate arguments may be brought against the Ideas.
1079» 28. It is not, I think, necessary to insert éuovov from Book A with Bonitz. ‘It is possible to be or become anything without being copied from an original.’
34. Tav ds yévous cidav, cf. A. 991® 31 n.
10807 10. AoyiKds, AoyiKHs generally in Aristotle denote a discus- sion which does not start from the oixetau dpyad of the subject but from verbal considerations, and is a term of reproach rather than otherwise, so that it is somewhat strange to find Aoyexwrépwy coupled with axpi- Beorépwv. If we remember, however, that the Platonic doctrines are themselves said by Aristotle to have been of this nature (1084) 25, A. 987° 31, ©. 1050” 35, A. 1069228, N, 108721), we may infer that he means that he could produce arguments which would meet the Platonists more on their own ground and would have the precision that comes from abstraction (cf. 10784 9, 10).
III]. Numpers as Separate SuBsTANCES AND First CAusES (chs. 6-9. 1086* 18).
Various ways in which numbers may be concetved as the substance of things (ch. 6).
10802 12. If number is an entity whose essence is just to be number, then (1) there is an order of priority and a specific difference between the numbers, and between the units, which therefore are incomparable.
20. or (2) all units are comparable, as in mathematical number ;
23. or (3) the units of a single number are comparable, but those of different numbers are not comparable zzéer se ;
30. so that while in mathematical number 1 is added to 1 to make 2, in this kind of number 2 is two ones distinct from the number 1 ;
35- or (4) there are all three kinds of number, those described in (1), (2), and (3).
37. Further these numbers must be either separate from things or in things, i.e. composing sensible things; the latter alternative may be true of some or of all numbers.
> 4. All those who treat the One as a first principle and a substance have adopted one or other of the above views, which are the only possible views ; all the views but (1) have found support.
1. (A) Some (Plato) believe in both kinds of number—that which has priority and posteriority (the Ideas) and mathematical number ; they believe both to exist apart from sensibles.